13-14 March 2006: EXPORT CONTROL MEETING HELD IN PERM, RUSSIA
On 13-14 March 2006, the Moscow-based Center for Export Control jointly with the Russian Federal Customs Service (FCS) and Federal Technical and Export Control Service (FTECS) organized a workshop, in the Russian city of Perm in the Urals, on customs procedures for dual-use goods, commodity identification, and updates in Russia’s export control legislation. Participants included FCS and Perm customs officials, representatives from the FTECS, Ministry of Defense, and Center for Export Control, as well as an assistant export control attaché from the U.S. Embassy and a representative of Commonwealth Trading Partners, a U.S. company based in Alexandria, Virginia, that provides a wide variety of export control products and services to public and private sector clients. During the workshop, participants reviewed the Russian export control system and national control lists, discussed the purposes of commodity identification, and addressed issues related to interaction between the FCS, FTECS, and Ministry of Defense in the field of export control. They also discussed commodity identification methods, the possible use of electronic search systems in commodity identification, as well as the role of the Russian customs service in implementing export controls. The event was followed by a similar workshop for Perm Oblast exporters and importers held on 15-17 March 2006.[1]
Source:
[1] “Novoye v regulirovanii eksportnogo kontrolya” (New developments in the regulation of export control), TKS.RU customs information website, 15 March 2006, <http://www.tks.ru>.
This item originally appeared in the International Export Control Observer:<http://www.cns.miis.edu/pubs/observer/index.htm>.

3 March 2006: RUSSIA RATIFIES RUSSIAN-TAJIK BORDER COOPERATION AGREEMENT
On 22 February and 3 March 2006, respectively, the two chambers of the Russian Federal Assembly—the State Duma and the Federation Council—ratified the Agreement between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Tajikistan on Border Cooperation.[1,2] The agreement, signed on 16 October 2004, during Russian president Vladimir Putin’s visit to Tajikistan, provides a legal basis for cooperation between Tajik and Russian border guard services.

The agreement creates the Federal Security Service (FSB) Operational Border Guard Group that will work with and advise Tajik border control authorities. [Editor’s Note: On 11 March 2003, the Federal Border Guard Service of the Russian Federation was transformed into the Border Guard Service of the Russian Federation and subordinated to the FSB.] Although Russian ratification of the agreement was delayed until 2006, the creation of the operational group, staffed with Russian border guard officers and advisors, started immediately following the withdrawal of Russian border guard troops from Tajikistan in June 2005.

The group is tasked with rendering assistance to Tajik border guards in securing the country’s border, including the promotion and implementation of bilateral Russian-Tajik agreements on border issues, improving coordination and exchanging information between the border guard agencies of the two countries, maintaining relations with border guard agencies of non-CIS countries, developing suggestions on Tajikistan's border control issues and relevant legislation, training local border guard personnel, organizing joint border operations, and assisting with logistics and maintenance of military equipment. Russia will also continue training Tajik border guard officers at Russian military institutions.[3]

Under the terms of the agreement, the Tajik side provides free accommodation to Russian border guard personnel and their families, and grants them unhindered travel rights to and from Tajikistan. Russian border guards cannot be arrested and put on trial in Tajikistan without the consent of Russian authorities. The FSB Operational Border Guard Group is exempt from taxes, customs duties and other local charges while engaging in activities covered by the agreement, but Russian border guards cannot engage in entrepreneurial activities. In addition, Tajikistan pledges to provide free office space and communication services to the group.[4,5] The Russian-Tajik border cooperation agreement is to have a duration of five years. It will automatically be extended for another five-year term unless either side notifies the other of its intention to terminate the agreement. The Tajik parliament ratified the agreement in January 2005.[6]
Sources:
[1] “Gosduma RF ratifitsirovala soglasheniye s Tadzhikistanom o sotrudnichestve po pogranichnym voprosam” (The State Duma of the Russian Federation ratified a cooperation agreement with Tajikistan on border issues), Interfax, February 22, 2006, <http://www.interfax.ru>.
[2] “Sovet Federatsii ratifitsiroval soglasheniye o sotrudnichestve Rossii i Tadzhikistana v okhrane granitsy s Afganistanom” (The Federation Council ratified a Russian-Tajik agreement on cooperation in guarding the border with Afghanistan), Radio Voice of Russia, March 3, 2006, <http://www.vor.ru>.
[3] “Soglasheniye mezhdu Rossiyskoy Federatsiyey i Respublikoy Tadzhikistan o sotdrudnichestve po pogranichnym voprosam (Dushanbe, 16 oktyabrya 2004 g.)” (Agreement between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Tajikistan on cooperation on border issues (Dushanbe, October 16, 2004)), Government of the Russian Federation website, <http://npagov. garweb.ru:8080/public/default.asp?no=1056664>.
[4] “Ratifitsirovano soglasheniye o pogransotrudnichestve s Tadzhikistanom” (An agreement on border cooperation with Tajikistan has been ratified), Rosbalt news agency, February 22, 2006, <http://www.rosbalt.ru>.
[5] “Gosduma ratifitsirovala rossiysko-tadzhikkoye soglasheniye po prigranichnomu sotrudnichestu” (The State Duma ratified a Russian-Tajik agreement on border cooperation), REGNUM news agency, February 22, 2006, <http://www.regnum.ru>.
[6] Galina Gridneva, Valeriy Zhukov, “Parlament Tadzhikistana ratifitsiroval ryad mezhpravitelstvennykh rossiysko-tadzhikskikh dokumentov” (Tajikistan’s parliament ratified a number of intergovernmental Russian-Tajik agreements), ITAR-TASS, January 19, 2005; in Integrum Techno, <http://www.integrum.com>.
This item originally appeared in the International Export Control Observer: <http://www.cns.miis.edu/pubs/observer/index.htm>.

2 March 2006 KAZAKHSTAN RATIFIES BORDER AGREEMENT WITH RUSSIA AND MAKES EFFORTS TO IMPROVE CUSTOMS PROCEDURES
On 2 March 2006, Kazakhstan’s president Nursultan Nazarbayev signed law No. 129-III ratifying the Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan and the Government of the Russian Federation on the Activity of Border Representatives, following the ratification of the agreement by the Senate (upper house of Kazakhstan’s parliament) on 16 February 2006. The original agreement was signed in Astana on 9 January 2004, by Bolat Zakiyev, director of the Border Guard Service under the Kazakhstan’s Committee for National Security, and Vladimir Pronichev, first deputy director of the Russian Federal Security Service and head of the Border Guard Service, during the official visit of Russian president Vladimir Putin to Kazakhstan.[1,2,3]

Under the agreement, Kazakhstan and Russia will have seven and fifteen border representatives respectively, assigned to specific sections of the Kazakhstani-Russian border. The representatives will be chosen among officials of the Kazakhstani and Russian border guard services. Each border representative will have a deputy and support personnel, including assistants, secretaries, interpreters, and couriers. Border representatives may also engage experts and other personnel, if necessary.

Border representatives from both countries are tasked with jointly taking necessary measures, including exchange of information, to prevent, investigate, and settle border incidents, such as cross-border fire, illegal border crossings, unintentional border crossings by border guard officials on duty, and other incidents. Joint decisions on measures will be taken at meetings held at the request of one of the parties. Issues that do not require meetings can be solved through written correspondence or other means of communication. According to the agreement, investigations of border incidents by border representatives will not serve to replace investigations by law enforcement agencies. However, the agreement does not define the authority of border representatives vis-à-vis these agencies.

Under the agreement, border representatives will also work jointly with relevant authorities in Kazakhstan and Russia to fight smuggling, deport illegal migrants, participate in the identification and transfer of human corpses, conduct environmental control over economic and other activities on the border, and inform one another about threats posed by fires, epidemic and epizootic outbreaks, and agricultural pests. The agreement will be in force for five years starting from the document’s ratification by both parties. It will be automatically renewed for another five-year term unless either side notifies the other of its intention to terminate the agreement.[4]

In a separate development, on 10 March 2006, the Customs Control Committee (CCC) of the Ministry of Finance of Kazakhstan unveiled a computerized information system called “Electronic Customs,” at its headquarters in Astana. The system is being jointly developed by the CCC and the South Korean firms KT-NET, Samsung Corporation, and a Samsung affiliate—Samsung SDS. According to CCC deputy chairman Tlegen Suntayev, the information system, which incorporates risk assessment tools, advance notifications and electronic declarations, is designed to expedite customs clearance procedures and reduce related costs for importers. The introduction of “Electronic Customs” is also expected to help increase collection of customs duties and reduce corruption. The system will also facilitate electronic document exchanges with Kazakhstani ministries, agencies, banks, and financial institutions, as well as with customs agencies of other countries and international organizations.[5,6]

In a further effort to simplify customs procedures, on  15 March 2006, the CCC opened a new checkpoint on the Kazakhstani-Russian border that incorporates an integrated control system based on the so-called “one-stop” principle. The new checkpoint, named Zhaysan and located in the Martuk District, Aktobe Oblast, incorporates customs, border guard, vehicle control, veterinary/plant pathogen control, and sanitary-quarantine control in a single building and is equipped with the Rapiscan X-ray inspection system, information monitors, a mobile radiation control laboratory, and other modern customs control tools.[7,8]

[Editor’s Note:
The Rapiscan X-ray, a product of Rapiscan Systems, is a high energy X-ray cargo inspection system capable of penetrating 425 mm of steel equivalent and inspecting the widest range of cargo, including densely-loaded trucks and containers, thereby eliminating the need for costly and time-consuming manual inspections. Rapiscan Systems, a subsidiary of OSI Systems, is headquartered in Hawthorne, California and has additional offices and manufacturing facilities in Finland, India, Malaysia, Singapore, United Kingdom, and the United States.][9]
Sources:
[1] “Kazakhstan ratifitsiroval mezhpravitelstvennoye soglasheniye s Rossiyey o deyatelnosti pogranichnykh predstaviteley” (Kazakhstan ratified an intergovernmental agreement with Russia on the activity of border representatives), Kazakhstan Today news agency, 2 March 2006; in Gazeta.kz, <http://www.gazeta.kz>.
[2] “Parlament Kazakhstana ratifitsiroval mezhpravitelstvennoye soglasheniye s Rossiyey o deyatelnosti pogranichnykh predstaviteley” (Kazakhstan’s parliament ratified an intergovernmental agreement with Russia on the activity of border representatives), Kazakhstan Today news agency, 16 February 2006; in Gazeta.kz, <http://www.gazeta.kz>.
[3] “Mezhdu pravitelstvami Rossii i Kazakhstana podpisan ryad soglasheniy” (Governments of Russia and Kazakhstan signed a number of agreements), Kazinform news agency, 9 January 2006, <http://www.inform.kz>.
[4] “Soglasheniye mezhdu Pravitelstvom Rossiyskoy Federatsii i Pravitelstvom Respubliki Kazakhstan o deyatelnosti pogranichnykh predstaviteley” (Agreement between the Government of the Russian Federation and the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan on the Activity of Border Representatives), Government of the Russian Federation website, <http://npa-gov.garweb.ru:8080/public/default.asp?no=1056472>.
[5] Serik Kozhkenov, “Tamozhnya dayet dobro” (Customs gives its approval),Kazinform news agency, 10 March 2006, <http://www.inform.kz>.
[6] Serik Kozhkenov, “Elektronnaya tamozhnya oblegchit zhizn i prineset vygodu biznesmenam” (Electronic customs will make businessmen’s lives easier and bring them benefits), Kazinform news agency, 18 March 2006, <http://www.inform.kz>.
[7] “15 marta t.g., v tselyakh realizatsii Programmy razvitiya tamozhennoy sluzhby Respubliki Kazakhstan na 2004-2006 gody, na territorii Aktyubinskoy oblasti vveden v ekspluatatsiyu eshche odin Edinyy kontrolno-propusknoy punkt ‘Zhaysan’” (On 15 March 2006, another integrated checkpoint, Zhaysan, was opened in Aktobe Oblast under the development program of the customs service of the Republic of Kazakhstan for 2004-2006), Kazakhstan’s Customs Control Committee website, <http://www.customs.kz/exec/news/news_msg?newsid=458>.
[8] Galiya Zhaldybayeva, “V ‘Zhaysane’ ostanovka” (The stop in Zhaysan), Kazakhstanskaya pravda online edition, 22 March 2006, <http://www.kazpravda.kz>.
[9] Rapiscan Systems website, <http://www.rapiscansystems.com>.
This item originally appeared in the International Export Control Observer: <http://www.cns.miis.edu/pubs/observer/index.htm>.

20 February 2006: INCIDENTS WITH RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS IN RUSSIA
The past several months have seen a number of instances in which Russian authorities have seized radioactive materials at customs checkpoints and other locations.

According to Russian media reports, two incidents involving radioactive materials took place in Vladivostok, Primorskiy Kray, Russia’s Far East, in early 2006. In the first case, on January 31, 2006, an alarm went off when a truck was passing through the Yantar radiation detection system installed at the Vladivostok port checkpoint. The inspection of the vehicle revealed a marine navigation sextant manufactured in 1967. Radiation on the surface of the device was more than 30 times higher than the permissible level. According to Ivan Skogorev, director general of Primtekhnopolis, a local company responsible for radiation safety, some components of the sextant contained radium-226. The radioactive item was seized for subsequent disposal in accordance with the existing regulations.[1]

In the second case, on February 20, 2006, another truck with radioactive cargo was detained at the Vladivostok port. Radiation from the truck carrying a minivan smashed in a car accident was up to 500 microroentgens per hour. A spectral analysis conducted by Primtekhnopolis specialists called to the site showed the presence of a radium-based source. Port officials placed the truck in a special guarded storage area for the subsequent extraction and disposal of the radioactive source. According to press reports, local authorities launched an investigation to find the owner of the cargo.[2,3] [Editor’s Note: Radium is a naturally-occurring radioactive metal. It has 25 different isotopes, four of which are found in nature, with radium-226 being the most common. Radium is a radionuclide formed by the decay of uranium and thorium in the environment. Ra-226 is a decay product of uranium-238, and is the longest-lived isotope of radium with a half-life of 1,602 years. Long-term exposure to radium increases the risk of developing several diseases. Inhaled or ingested radium increases the risk of developing such diseases as lymphoma, bone cancer, and diseases that affect the formation of blood, such as leukemia and aplastic anemia. External exposure to radium’s gamma radiation increases the risk of cancer to varying degrees in all tissues and organs. According to the IAEA, a radium source containing 10 or more curies (370 or more GBq) could pose safety and security concerns. In other words, a radiological dispersal device, one type of which is known as a “dirty bomb,” would have to contain 10 or more curies of radium-226 to have the potential to cause significant harm. Based on the reported information about the radioactive source, it is uncertain how much radioactivity was contained in the source.][4,5]

According to Russia’s Federal Customs Service, in early February 2006, the Yantar-2Zh radiation detection system at the Dolbino railway checkpoint in Belgorod Oblast, Russia, signaled the presence of radiation in a coach car of the Moscow-Sevastopol passenger train passing through the checkpoint. Customs officers stopped the train and examined the car identified by the Yantar system using portable dosimeters. While examining the carry-on luggage of a Ukrainian national, they found a carton with two radioisotope ice detector sensors commonly used in airplanes and helicopters. Radiation on the surface of the box was more than 280 higher than the natural level. The sensors registered a radioactivity warning sign. The Belgorod Oblast Center for Hygiene and Epidemiology concluded that these sensors were closed radionuclide sources that require special permission for handling and a license for export from the Russian Federation.

Since the Ukrainian national failed to declare the items and lacked necessary documents, the Russian authorities launched a criminal case under Article 188, Part 2 of the Russian Criminal Code, “Smuggling.”[6] This criminal charge carries the punishment of imprisonment for a period from three to seven years, with a possible fine in the amount of up to one million rubles (US$35,000) or the amount of the defendant’s salary or any other income for a period of up to five years.[7]

In a separate development, in mid-December 2005, the Prosecutor’s Office of the Chechen Republic opened a criminal case under Article 247, Part 1 of the Russian Criminal Code, “Violation of Rules of Handling Environmentally Dangerous Substances and Wastes,” against officials of the oil company Chechenneftekhimprom Federal State Unitary Enterprise following the inspection of the Groznyy Chemical Combine, a subsidiary of Chechenneftekhimprom. According to a news release by the Russian Federation’s Prosecutor’s Office, the inspection requested by the local Radon Special Combine discovered about 27 to 29 unsecured cobalt-60-based radioactive sources in one of the combine’s workshops that emitted radiation exceeding the permissible level by 58,000 times. The Chechen Prosecutor’s Office accused the enterprise and combine management in taking no action to secure and dispose of the sources.[8] [Editor’s Note: Radon is a network of Russian state enterprises responsible for the disposal of radioactive waste.] As reported by Russian media, as of early February 2006, the situation with radioactive sources at the Groznyy Chemical Combine remains unchanged.[9]
Sources:
[1] “Radioaktivnyy morskoy sekstant obnaruzhen v rybnom portu Vladivostoka” (Radioactive sea sextant discovered in fish port of Vladivostok), Vostok Media news agency, 31 January 2006, <http://www.vostokmedia.com>.
[2] “Radiatsionnaya avariya likvidiruyetsya vo Vladivistoke” (A radiation accident is being liquidated in Vladivostok), PrimaMedia news agency, 21 February 2006, <http://www.primamedia.ru>.
[3] “Radioaktivnyy gruzovik zaderzhan vo Vladivostoke” (A radioactive truck detained in Vladivostok), TVTs television channel, 21 February 2006, <http://www.tvc.ru>.
[4] “Radium,” Wikipedia, the free online encyclopedia, <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Radium>.
[5] “Radium,” U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, <http://www.epa.gov/radiation/radionuclides/radium.htm>.
[6] “Radioaktivnyy gruz ostanovlen na granitse” (Radioactive cargo stopped at the border), Press Release, Russia’s Federal Customs Service website, 7 February 2006, <http://www.customs.ru>.
[7] The Criminal Code of the Russian Federation, Article 188, “Smuggling,” Chelovek i zakon (Human Being and Law) website, <http://zakon.kuban.ru/uk96/st/188.shtml>.
[8] “Prokuraturoy Chechenskoy Respubliki vozbuzhdeno ugolovnoye delo po faktu neprinyatiya neobkhodimykh mer po soblyudeniuy pravil khraneniya radioaktivnykh veshchestv” (The Prosecutor’s Office of the Chechen Republic initiated a criminal case in connection with the failure to take necessary measures to comply with storage rules for radioactive substances), News Release, Russian Federation’s Prosecutor’s Office website, 15 December 2005, <http://genproc.gov.ru/ru/news/news_current.shtml?2005/12//2825.html>.
[9] Aleksandr Grigoryev, “Posledstviya radiatsionnoy opasnosti v Groznom ne ustraneny do sikh por, schitayut v prokurature Chechni” (Chechnya’s Prosecutor’s Office believes that consequences of the radiation danger in Groznyy have note been eliminated yet), Caucasian Knot website, 8 February 2006, <http://www.kavkaz.memo.ru>.
This item originally appeared in the International Export Control Observer: <http://www.cns.miis.edu/pubs/observer/index.htm>.

20 February 2006: RUSSIA TO INSTALL NON-INTRUSIVE INSPECTION SYSTEMS AT SEAPORTS
On February 20, 2006, the Russian Federal Customs Service (FCS) and Federal Agency for Marine and River Transport (Rosmorrechflot) under the Ministry of Transport jointly organized a meeting in St. Petersburg to discuss issues related to equipping Russian seaports with non-intrusive inspection systems. The meeting, chaired by Vladimir Shamakhov, FCS first deputy head, and Vladimir Popov, deputy head of Rosmorrechflot, was attended by St. Petersburg municipal and Leningrad Oblast administrative officials, representatives of the Association of Commercial Seaports, the Port of St. Petersburg, and stevedore companies from St Petersburg, Novorossiysk, and Vladivostok.[1] [Editor’s Note: Rosmorrechflot is a Russian federal executive agency under the Ministry of Transport that administers Russian stateowned marine and river transport infrastructure including commercial seaports, specialized and fishing ports.]

The FCS representatives noted at the meeting that the customs agency places a high priority on furnishing customs checkpoints, including at seaports, with stationary and mobile non-intrusive detection equipment, such as large-scale X-ray machines and radiation detectors, to interdict illegal cargoes that pose a high proliferation or terrorist threat. Non-intrusive inspection systems are designed to detect hidden contraband, including weapons, explosives, drugs, undeclared goods, and weapons of mass destruction. This measure is one of the core elements of the World Customs Organization’s (WCO) Framework of Standards to Secure and Facilitate Global Trade. [Editor’s Note: The Framework of Standards to Secure and Facilitate Global Trade was unanimously adopted by 166 WCO members during the WCO June 2005 session in response to the growing concern over vulnerability of the global shipping system to the terrorist threat. The Framework is based on four principles: harmonizing advance electronic manifests; using risk management approaches to target suspect shipments; requiring exporting countries to perform inspections, preferably with non-intrusive detection equipment, at the reasonable request of importing countries; and providing customs benefits to businesses that strengthen their internal supply chain security. The adoption of the Framework is voluntary, so effective implementation will require significant cooperation among customs agencies and between businesses and governments. Russia was among about one hundred nations that announced their intention to implement the framework in the summer of 2005.] The use of non-intrusive detection equipment is also part of the “Development Concept of the Customs Service of the Russian Federation until 2010,” adopted by the government in December 2005. Under this concept, the Russian government plans to have 22 mobile and 50 stationary non-intrusive inspection systems operational on the national borders by 2010, including 10 stationary systems to be installed in seaports. After 2010, the FCS plans to equip checkpoints along the entire Russian state border and all main seaports with non-intrusive systems. The Port of St. Petersburg will become the first seaport to be equipped with non-intrusive inspection equipment.[1,2,3]

 Customs officials emphasized that the installation of non-intrusive screening systems will facilitate not only the work of the customs service, but also of the management of seaports and the activities of stevedore companies. Since these systems allow quick inspection of cargo containers without unloading for manual searches, their installation in Russian ports is expected to improve the effectiveness of customs control and increase duties collected, as well as significantly reduce the time spent on customs clearance and thereby increase the flow of legitimate trade.[1]
Sources:
[1] “Inspektsionno-dosmotrovyye kompleksy v morskikh portakh: kto pervyy” (Non-intrusive inspection systems in seaports: who will be the first), Russia’s Federal Customs Service website, February 21, 2006, <http://www.customs.ru/ru/press/index.php?&date286=200602&id286=9617>.
[2] “FTS ustanovit IDK v portakh” (FCS will install non-intrusive inspection systems in seaports), SeaNews news agency, March 17, 2006; in LogLink.ru, <http://www.loglink.ru>.
[3] Ilya Desyaterik, “‘Seryy’ import prosvetyat rentgenom” (‘Grey’ import will be screened with roentgen), Delovoy Peterburg, March 2, 2006; in Tamozhennyy portal (Customs portal) website, <http://customs.net.ru>.
This item originally appeared in the International Export Control Observer:<http://www.cns.miis.edu/pubs/observer/index.htm>.

19 January 2006: MEETING OF THE CIS CUSTOMS HEADS HELD IN ST. PETERSBURG
On 19 January 2006, the 42nd meeting of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) Council of Customs Services Heads (CCSH) was held in St. Petersburg, Russia. The CCSH is a multilateral forum of heads of CIS customs agencies created in December 1993 to harmonize customs legislations, mechanisms, and procedures of the CIS members. Member countries of the CIS are Azerbaijan, Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Ukraine. The meeting discussed a wide range of issues including amendments to the Rules for Identification of Commodities’ Country of Origin approved in 2000; activities of the World Customs Organization (WCO) Regional Communications Center on Law Enforcement for CIS Countries based in Moscow, also known as the Regional Intelligence Liaison Office (RILO-Moscow); the approval of the Russian-language version of the Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System (4th Edition); training of customs personnel in CIS member states and other issues. The participants unanimously elected Alexander Zherikhov, head of the Russian Federal Customs Service (FCS), the CCSH chairman and approved the work plan for the year 2006.

The meeting was attended by WCO Secretary General Michelle Danet, who briefed the heads of CIS customs services on the principles of the Framework of Standards to Secure and Facilitate Global Trade adopted during the WCO June 2005 session in response to the growing concern over vulnerabilities of the global shipping system. The WCO Secretary General informed participants of the steps that national customs administrations of the WCO member states will have to take to introduce the standards, possible assistance measures that more developed countries can render to less developed countries in this process, as well as the WCO role in the implementation of the framework.

Leonid Lozbenko, deputy FCS head, reported on how the CIS customs agencies plan to implement the newly adopted WCO standards. According to Lozbenko, the assessment made by the FCS found that some of the elements of the Framework of Standards are already in existence or are being introduced in the customs practices of the CIS countries. These include the automation of customs information technologies, the electronic declaration system, the use of radiation detection devices in customs inspection equipment as well as cooperation and exchange of information on the security of supply chains. As pointed out by the CIS customs heads, to achieve the goals set by the WCO, CIS countries must modernize their respective customs agencies. This includes the computerization of their systems and the introduction of compatible electronic databases to enhance their performances as well as cooperation and communication among customs agencies, and between customs agencies and businesses.[1]
Source:
[1] “The Council Meeting of Heads of the CIS customs services,” Press Release, Russia’s Federal Customs Service website, 20 January 2006, <http://www.customs.ru/en/news/index.php?id695=9358>.
This item originally appeared in the International Export Control Observer: <http://www.cns.miis.edu/pubs/observer/index.htm>.

5 January 2006: RADIOACTIVE SOURCES DISCOVERED IN NAKHODKA SEAPORT
Russian media reported that on 5 January 2006, customs officers at the commercial seaport in Nakhodka, Primorsky Kray, in the Russian Far East, detained a truck loaded with scrap metal. Detection equipment showed a considerable radiation level. The scrap metal originating in the town of Bolshoy Kamen, Primorsky Kray, was to be exported by sea to an unidentified foreign destination. According to Albina Golubeva, press secretary of the Nakhodka Directorate of Interior Affairs, the cargo was transported without proper documentation. Examination of the cargo conducted by specialists from the Far Eastern regional center of the Russian Ministry of Emergencies revealed four radioactive gamma sources hidden within a shipment of scrap metal. No explanation was provided by authorities as to how the sources became included in the scrap metal shipment.

According to an unidentified center official, the lead-shielded sources contained cesium-137 and were, most likely, part of special radioisotope equipment used at industrial facilities. The official indicated that the radiation level on the surface of the sources was 2,370 microroentgens per hour, while, according to some press reports, the radiation reached 3,000 microroentgens per hour. The official also noted that extraction of the radioactive sources from the objects by individuals without relevant expertise or equipment would have likely resulted in death. At present the seized radioactive sources have been placed in a special storage facility for subsequent disposal in accordance with the existing regulations. An investigation into the case has been launched.[1,2,3]
Sources:
[1] Veronika Perminova, “Radioaktivnyy gruz, zaderzhannyy v odnom iz portov Primorya, smertelno opasen dlya lyudey – MChS” (Ministry of Emergencies: Radioactive cargo seized in one of the Primorye seaports poses mortal danger to humans), RIA Novosti, 10 January 2006; in Integrum Techno, <http://www.integrum.com>.
[2] “Radioaktivnyy gruz zaderzhan v Nakhodke” (Radioactive cargo seized in Nakhodka), Deita.ru news agency, 10 January 2006, <http://www.deita.ru/>.
[3] “Radioaktivnyy gruz, zaderzhannyy v Primorye, perevozili bez dokumentov” (Radioactive cargo seized in Primorye was transported without documents), PrimaMedia news agency, 10 January 2006, <http://www.primamedia.ru/>.
This item originally appeared in the International Export Control Observer: <http://www.cns.miis.edu/pubs/observer/index.htm>.

1 December 2005: RUSSIAN GENERAL REPORTS WMD BLUEPRINTS FOUND IN CHECHNYA, COMPLAINS OF U.S. “DOUBLE STANDARDS”
At a press conference in Moscow on 1 December 2005, Chief of the Russian General Staff, General Yuriy Baluyevskiy, announced that blueprints describing the technology for producing “radioactive [dirty bombs], chemical and biological weapons” had been found in Chechnya. The general provided no further details regarding the origin or contents of the blueprints. Baluyevskiy emphasized that Russia must upgrade its system of protection against such weapons.[1,2,3,4] According to Baluyevskiy, the creation of a unified system of “radiation, chemical and biological intelligence” involving all member states of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) could be one such preventive measure of particular value.[2]

Speaking at the same press conference regarding Russian-U.S. cooperation on WMD nonproliferation, General Baluyevskiy identified several areas of cooperation as high-priorities in the fight against terrorism. These included strengthened controls over man-portable air-defense systems (MANPADS) and the exchange of intelligence data to help eradicate funding sources for terrorism and curb illegal arms trafficking.[2] However, Baluyevskiy complained that while the Russian side takes this cooperation seriously both on bilateral and multilateral levels, the cooperation is clouded by U.S. “double standards.” According to the general, the United States demands full transparency from a number of countries with regard to their nuclear programs, while turning a blind eye towards Israel’s “impressive” nuclear arsenal. Baluyevskiy continued by stating that Washington applies the same double standards in other fields, such as missile technology control. He accused the United States of using the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) as a means to defend its own national interests and engage in unfair competition in the hightechnology market by putting pressure on potential competitors, including Russia. At the same time, the United States actively cooperates with allies, such as Israel and South Korea, in this field, Baluyevskiy pointed out. He also claimed that Russia possesses technologies to create strategic missiles capable of penetrating existing and prospective anti-ballistic missile systems. Baluyevskiy noted, however, that the launch of the industrial-scale production of these “very costly” weapons would depend on the global security situation. [3,5]

Speaking about Russia’s relations with NATO, General Baluyevskiy said that currently there are neither “antagonistic nor ideological contradictions” between the two sides like those that existed during the Cold War.[5] Baluyevskiy also pointed out that in 2006, as part of multilateral efforts to prevent illicit trade in weapons of mass destruction, Russia will join the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and Turkey in interdiction exercises in the Mediterranean Sea, to be held under the auspices of the Proliferation Security Initiative. However, he said, “the remnants of old thinking” create problems for the Russia-NATO partnership from the Russian point of view.[2] According to the Russian general, NATO’s efforts to integrate former Soviet republics into its structures is meant to weaken the CIS, thus forcing Russia to defend its national interests in the former Soviet Union. Baluyevskiy, however, did not provide any specifics on what this might entail.[3,5] He also claimed that at present about 200 foreign mercenaries, including some from NATO member states, fight against Russian troops in Chechnya.[2,4]

Editor’s Note: The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) was created in 1991, as an alliance of independent states. The CIS includes 12 of the 15 former Soviet Republics: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan.
Sources:
[1] “V Chechne naydeny dokumenty s tekhnologiyey sozdaniya ‘gryaznogo’ oruzhiya” (Documents describing the technology for creating ‘dirty’ weapons found in Chechnya), RIA Novosti, 1 December 2005, <http://www.rian.ru/>.
[2] “Rossiya predlagayet Zapadu rasshirit sotrudnichestvo v borbe s terrorizmom” (Russia offers the West to expand cooperation in fighting terrorism), Voice of Russia, 2 December 2005, <http://www.vor.ru/>.
[3] Stepan Kostin, “Genshtab: ‘My budem otstaivat svoi interesy’” (General Staff: “We will defend our interests”), KM.ru, 2 December 2005, <http://www.km.ru/>.
[4] “V Chechne naydeny dokumenty s tekhnologiyey sozdaniya ‘gryaznoy bomby’” (Documents describing the technology for creating a ‘dirty bomb’ found in Chechnya), Vesti.ru, 1 December 2005, <http://www.vesti.ru/>.
[5] “Glava Genshtaba Rossii raskryl voyennyye sekrety Izrailya” (Russia’s General Staff chief disclosed Israel’s military secrets), Cursor news agency (Israel), 2 December 2005, <http://cursorinfo.co.il/>.
This item originally appeared in the International Export Control Observer: <http://www.cns.miis.edu/pubs/observer/index.htm. {Entered 9 May 2006 SR}

28 September 2005: RUSSIAN CUSTOMS PREVENTS ILLEGAL EXPORT OF DUAL-USE GOODS
On 28 September 2005, head of Russia’s Siberian Operational Customs press service Aleksandr Malik announced that customs officers in Novosibirsk prevented an attempt to illegally export 300 night-vision devices to the United States. [Editor’s Note: Siberian Operational Customs is the division of the Siberian Regional Customs Directorate headquartered in Novosibirsk, one of the seven regional customs directorates of the Russian Federal Customs Service.] As reported by Malik, “a well-known Novosibirsk company” engaged in the production of optoelectronic instruments for military and civil purposes signed a contract with an unspecified U.S. company to supply night-vision devices. According to Malik, several shipments of the devices had been sent to the United States earlier without being stopped by the customs authorities because the company had deliberately understated the technical characteristics of the high-precision items, declaring them as tourist equipment. Malik claimed that the items were dual-use goods equipped with optoelectronic transducers used by the Russian military, and if declared properly, the company would have had to obtain an export license from Russia’s Federal Technical and Export Control Service. The official said that the Novosibirsk Oblast Federal Security Service Directorate is now conducting a criminal investigation into the case, in accordance with Article 188 of the Russian Criminal Code, “Smuggling.”[1,2]

As reported later by local Novosibirsk media, the enterprise in question was the Novosibirsk Instrument-Making Plant (NPZ), and the items illegally exported were PN-14K night-vision goggles. According to Sergey Maslikov, NPZ assistant director general for export control issues, the plant won a contract from a U.S. company in April 2005 and between May and July sent six shipments of night-vision goggles to the United States. In late July, Siberian Operational Customs questioned the validity of the declared technical characteristics and seized the next shipment. Customs officials claimed that export of the night-vision goggles was subject to licensing because the sensitivity of the optoelectronic transducer exceeds 350 units (microamperes per lumen), the threshold that divides civil-use from dual-use in Russian export control regulations.

Referring to the results of two independent expert examinations conducted by the Siberian division of the Russian Academy of Sciences and the Russian Center for Standardization and Metrology, Maslikov indicated that both studies agreed that the sensitivity of the optoelectronic transducer did not exceed 350 units and therefore their export did not require a license. However, Siberian Operational Customs sent the night-vision goggles to a third, unspecified laboratory, which found that the sensitivity of the transducer in one of the devices was higher than the permissible level. Based on the results of this last examination, customs officials initiated a criminal case, while the NPZ appealed to the Novosibirsk Oblast Prosecutor’s Office. According to Sergey Maslikov, in mid-August, the U.S. customer broke the contract, citing the delay in the shipping schedule, and other NPZ export shipments have also been halted due to the ongoing investigation. The NPZ management believes that the customs incident was initiated by the plant’s competitors in Russia.[3,4] The International Export Control Observer will provide additional information on the case as it becomes available.
Sources:
[1] Yana Ryabinskaya, “Sotrudniki Sibirskoy operativnoy tamozhni presekli popytku nezakonnogo eksporta priborov nochnogo videniya” [Siberian operational customs officers prevented an attempt to illegally export night vision devices], RIA Novosti-Sibir, 28 September 2005; in Integrum Techno, <http://www.integrum.com>.
[2] “Sotrudniki Sibirskoy operativnoy tamozhni presekli ocherednuyu popytku nezakonnogo vyvoza partii priborov nochnogo videniya dvoynogo naznacheniya” [Siberian operational customs officers prevented another attempt to illegally export dual-use night vision devices], Sibir news agency (Novosibirsk), 29 September 2005, <http://riasibir. ru/>.
[3] Konstantin Ponomarev, “Tamozhnya ne dayet dobro” [Customs does not approve the deal], NGS (Novosibirsk city website), 12 October 2005; in Integrum Techno, <http://www.integrum.com>.
[4] Mariya Dranishnikova, Yevgeniy Filimonov, “Kontrabandista vek ne dolog” [Smugglers do not live long], Novaya Sibir (Novosibirsk), No. 40, 7 October 2005; in Integrum Techno, <http://www.integrum.com>.
This item originally appeared in the International Export Control Observer: <http://www.cns.miis.edu/pubs/observer/index.htm>. {Entered 9 May 2006 SR}

23 August 2005: RADIOACTIVE SOURCE FOUND IN SARATOV, RUSSIA
According to Russian media reports, on 23 August 2005, a radioactive source was found in the village of Tarkhany in Russia’s Saratov Oblast. The item, 5 cm by 4 cm in size and marked with a radioactivity sign, was discovered under a seeding machine in the yard of a private house. Measurements made by regional emergency response officials showed that radiation from the container was about 70 microsievert per hour, which exceeds the background level by 350 times. Upon examination, specialists from the Saratov Radon Special Combine who were called to the site suggested that the item might contain cesium-137 or strontium-90/yttrium-90 isotopes. According to Nikolay Aktayev, Radon’s deputy chief engineer, the item was probably a component from an instrument used for testing the performance of radiation dosimeters. Officials claimed that the local population was not exposed to radiation and that the source did not cause radioactive contamination. The item was placed in a special storage site, and an investigation is under way to determine the origin of the radioactive item.[1,2] [Editor’s Note: Radon is a network of Russian state enterprises responsible for the disposal of radioactive waste.]
Sources:
[1] “Vo dvore doma nayden istochnik radioaktivnogo izlucheniya” [Radiation source found in the yard of a private house], SaratovBiznesConsalting news agency, 26 August 2005, <http://news.sarbc.ru/>.
[2] Andrey Minin, “U nas yeye ne chuvstvuyet nikto…” [Nobody feels it here], Saratovskiy Arbat (Russia), No. 35 (351), 31 August 2005; in Integrum Techno, <http://www.integrum.com>.
This item originally appeared in the International Export Control Observer: <http://www.cns.miis.edu/pubs/observer/index.htm>. {Entered 9 May 2006 SR}

15 August 2005: RUSSIA ADOPTS NEW LICENSING RULES TO FACILITATE IMPLEMENTATION OF CATCH-ALL PROVISION
On 15 August 2005, Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Fradkov signed government Decree No. 517 approving the rules On Licensing by the Export Control Commission of the Russian Federation of Transactions with Goods, Information, Activities, Services, and Intellectual Property that Can Be Used by a Foreign State or Foreign National to Create Weapons of Mass Destruction and Their Means of Delivery.

The new rules supersede government Decree No. 57 of 22 January 1998, On Reinforcing Controls Over Exports of Dual-Use Goods and Services Related to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Their Means of Delivery [Missiles]. The new rules describe the licensing procedure for foreign economic transactions with goods and technologies that are not included in the Russian export control lists and aim to help Russian exporters implement the catch-all provision contained in Article 20 of the Russian law On Export Control.

According to Article 20 of the law On Export Control, as further detailed by the new rules, Russian exporters must obtain a license from the Export Control Commission, if they have been informed by the Federal Technical and Export Control Service (FTECS) [Russia’s licensing authority] or other relevant government agencies that a product to be exported can be used to create WMD or means of their delivery, or if they have a reason to believe that a product can be used, in full or in part, for this purpose.

To help Russian exporters, the rules contain a list of conditions to look for that could give an exporter reason to suspect that a product to be exported can be used to create WMD and means of their delivery:

• if there is official information that a recipient foreign state violated its nonproliferation commitments;

• if a Russian exporter knows that a foreign national, be it a contractor, recipient or end user of a product to be exported, is linked to military nuclear, chemical, biological or missile programs;

• if a foreign recipient is not willing to provide information on end use, end users, and location of use of a product to be exported;

• if the technical characteristics of a product to be exported do not correspond to the declared end use;

• if the quantity and characteristics of a product to be exported do not correspond to the type of production, technical level, and production capacities of an end user;

• if a foreign recipient places high demands on maintaining confidentiality with regard to end use and end users of a product to be exported;

• if a foreign recipient uses unusual payment arrangements or seeks to pay by cash;

• if an export order for a product has been placed by an organization or individual located in a country different from the recipient country;

• if a foreign recipient or end user of a product to be exported rejects without supporting reasons installation, assemblage, and maintenance services offered by a supplier;

• if a foreign recipient places high demands on packaging and labeling of a product to be exported that will hinder customs clearance and control;

• if there is information that a foreign recipient or end user intends to modify a product to be exported that will make it usable for the creation of WMD or their means of delivery;

• if a foreign recipient or end user of a product to be exported uses a post office box for business correspondence;

• if a foreign recipient chooses economically irrational means and routes for shipping a product to be exported to its declared destination;

• if a foreign recipient indicates an area or facility with restricted access to foreigners as a location of use of a product to be exported.

According to the new rules, to obtain a license for export transactions with items that are not included in the Russian export control lists, but which do come under the catch-all rule, Russian exporters must submit the following documents to FTECS: a license application; a copy of the contract; a copy of a document confirming the registration of a legal entity or an individual in Russia’s Uniform State Register of Legal Entities or Uniform State Register of Individual Entrepreneurs, respectively; a copy of an identity document for individuals who are not individual entrepreneurs; technical description of the goods to be exported; and information on the foreign recipient and the location of use of the product to be exported.

After receiving a complete set of application documents, FTECS, jointly with the Ministries of Defense and Foreign Affairs and, if needed, other federal agencies, will conduct a state examination of the suggested export transaction. If the state examination concludes that the transaction requires a license, the Export Control Commission will decide whether to grant or deny the license. The rules, however, do not specify the timeframe for decision making. The commission’s executive secretary must notify an exporter of its decision within three working days after the decision is made. According to the rules, a license, if issued, must be signed by the chair, deputy chair or executive secretary of the Export Control Commission. No fee is required for the review and issuance of licenses.[1]

Editor’s Note: Established in March 2004, FTECS responsibilities include technical counterintelligence, protection of information and state secrets, and export control. FTECS reports to the Ministry of Defense. For more information on FTECS, see the FTECS website (Russian only) at <http://www.fstec.ru> and Elina Kirichenko, “New Licensing Agency Created in Russia,” NIS Export Control Observer, No. 19, August 2004, pp. 3-4, <http://www.cns.miis.edu/pubs/nisexcon/>.
Source:
[1] “Postanovleniye Pravitelstva RF ot 15 avgusta 2005 g. N 517 ‘O poryadke polucheniya razresheniya Komissii po eksportnomu kontrolyu Rossiyskoy Federatsii na osushchestvleniye vneshneekonomicheskikh operatsiy s tovarami, informatsiyey, rabotami, uslugami, rezultatami intellektualnoy deyatelnosti, kotoryye mogut byt ispolzovany inostrannym gosudarstvom ili inostrannym litsom v tselyakh sozdaniya oruzhiya massovogo porazheniya i sredstv yego dostavki’” [Decree of the Government of the Russian Federation No. 517 of August 15, 2005, On Licensing by the Export Control Commission of the Russian Federation of Foreign Economic Transactions with Goods, Information, Activities, Services, and Intellectual Property that Can Be Used by a Foreign State or Foreign National to Create Weapons of Mass Destruction and Their Means of Delivery], Government of the Russian Federation website, <http://govportal.garant.ru:8081/SESSION/S__L4xejeA1/PILOT/main.htm>.
This item originally appeared in International Export Control Observer: <http://www.cns.miis.edu/pubs/observer/index.htm>. {Entered 9 May 2006 SR}

3 August 2005: NEW DEPUTY HEAD OF RUSSIAN FTECS APPOINTED
On 3 August 2005, Russian president Vladimir Putin appointed Boris Viktorovich Nazarov first deputy director of the Federal Technical and Export Control Service (FTECS). Sergey Grigorov continues to serve as FTECS director.[1] Nazarov previously served as Grigorov’s deputy at the State Technical Commission, a predecessor of the FTECS.[2].
Sources:
[1] Edict of the President of the Russian Federation No. 912 of 3 August 2005, “O pervom zamestitele direktora Federalnoy sluzhby po tekhnicheskomu i eksportnomu kontrolyu” [On the First Deputy Director of the Federal Technical and Export Control Service], President of Russia website, <http://www.kremlin.ru>.
[2] “Struktury gosudarstvennoy vlasti RF” [Structure of the Government of the Russian Federation], Business-Press agency, 1 October 2002; in Integrum Techno, <http://www.integrum.com>.
This item originally appeared in International Export Control Observer: <http://www.cns.miis.edu/pubs/observer/index.htm>. {Entered 10 May 2006 SR}

24 February 2005:  U.S. AND RUSSIA SIGN MANPADS AGREEMENT
On 24 February 2005, U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and Russian Defense Minister Sergey Ivanov signed the United States-Russia Arrangement on Cooperation in Enhancing Control of Man-Portable Air Defense Systems (MANPADS) during the Bush-Putin presidential summit in Bratislava, Slovakia.[1,2,3]

This arrangement provides a bilateral framework for cooperation in the control of MANPADS that can threaten global aviation if obtained by criminals, terrorists, and other non-state actors. The arrangement will allow the two countries to share information about MANPADS sales and transfers to third countries. It also provides for mutual assistance in destroying MANPADS that are obsolete or otherwise in excess of legitimate defense requirements through an exchange of information on the methods and means of destroying them, as well as through the provision of technical and financial assistance in carrying out their destruction; an exchange of information on controlling MANPADS, including improving measures to enhance physical security and the taking of inventory, and control during the production, safeguarding, transfer, and destruction of MANPADS and individual components thereof; and further mutual coordination on preventing the global proliferation of MANPADS.[1]

According to Ivanov, the arrangement does not prohibit nor limit MANPADS sales. He added that the two countries will step up their efforts to induce their allies to take measures preventing the proliferation of MANPADS.[2,3] According to Russian presidential aide Sergey Prikhodko, the initiative to sign the arrangement on MANPADS came from Russia.[3]
Sources:
[1] "U.S.-Russia Arrangement on Cooperation in Enhancing Control of Man-Portable Air Defense Systems (MANPADS),"
U.S. Embassy in Russia fact sheet, 24 February 2005, http://www.usembassy.ru/bilateral/joint_statement.php?record_id=40.
[2] "Rossiya i SShA dogovorilis o sotrudnichestve v oblasti usileniya kontrolya za perenosnymi zenitnymi raketnymi kompleksami," ITAR-TASS, 24 February 2005; in Integrum Techno, http://www.integrum.com.
[3] "Rossiya i SShA podpisali soglasheniye ob usilenii
kontrolya za perenosnymi zenitnymi raketnymi kompleksami," RIA Novosti, February 24, 2005; in Integrum Techno,
http://www.integrum.com.
This item originally appeared in NIS Export Control Observer: <http://www.cns.miis.edu/pubs/nisexcon/index.htm>.

10-17 November 2004: INTERNAL COMPLIANCE PROGRAM WORKSHOPS HELD
In November 2004, the U.S. Department of Energy’s International Nonproliferation Export Control Program (INECP) sponsored two export control workshops in Russia. The first was organized in cooperation with the Federal Atomic Energy Agency at the N. A. Dollezhal Research and Development Institute of Power Engineering (NIKIET) in Moscow, on 10-12 November 2004, and the second with the support of the Projects Center of Industry Development, a private institution based in Novgorod, on 15-17 November 2004. The seminar at NIKIET dealt with nuclear export control, and was the first instance of U.S. government cooperation with the facility since it was removed from the U.S. sanctioned entities list in late March 2004.[1] Russian attendees included representatives of the FAEA, Federal Technical and Export Control Service (FTECS), Federal Customs Union, Institute of Physics and Power Engineering (Obninsk), All-Russian Scientific Research Institute of Technical Physics (Snezhinsk), and NIKIET. The internal compliance program seminar in Novgorod was organized for representatives from private enterprises that conduct business operations that fall under the purview of the export control system. Apart from presentations on the U.S. export control system, the participants also received relatively detailed instruction from participating Russian government officials regarding the Russian export control system, from contract development, through commodity identification and licensing, to customs and currency controls.
[U.S. Department of State Bureau of Nonproliferation Public Notice 4677, "Lifting of Nonproliferation Measures Against Four Russian Entities," Federal Register, 1 April 2004, Vol. 69, No. 63, pp. 17262-17263, http://www.gpoaccess.gov.]
This item originally appeared in NIS Export Control Observer: <http://www.cns.miis.edu/pubs/nisexcon/index.htm>.

16 August 2004: RUSSIA CREATES NEW LICENSING AGENCY
On 16 August 2004, Putin signed the long-awaited Edict No. 1085, which approved the Statute of the Federal Technical and Export Control Service (FTECS)—Russia’s new licensing agency. In accordance with the statute, the FTECS is subordinate to the Ministry of Defense, and the president himself will supervise FTECS activities. The statute provides for the creation of an FTECS board composed of heads of federal executive authorities, state agencies, and organizations in accordance with a list to be approved by the president as advised by the minister of defense. FTECS board members will be approved by the Cabinet of Ministers. On 28 July 2004, Sergey Grigorov was appointed FTECS director by Presidential Edict No. 968. Before the March 2004 Russian government restructuring, Grigorov served as chairman of the State Technical Commission responsible for inter-industry coordination and functional regulation of activities directed at ensuring the protection of information classified as state or official secrets. Now that the FTECS statute has been approved, the FTECS director can make personnel arrangements, specifically, move specialists from the former Department of Export Control of the Ministry of Economic Development and Trade (MEDT) to the FTECS. In the absence of a full-fledged FTECS, the MEDT Department of Export Control still deals with the licensing process. As stated in the statute, the most important FTECS responsibilities are technical counterintelligence and technical protection of information and state secrets. However, export control is also one of the main responsibilities of FTECS. According to the statute, FTECS export control responsibilities are defined as follows:
• to ensure the implementation of export controls in accordance with Russian legislation and orders from the Ministry of Defense;
• to develop with the participation of relevant federal executive agencies and organizations, as established by law, drafts of lists (registers) of goods (activities, services), information, and intellectual property subject to export control;
• to organize and conduct, as established by law, the state examination of foreign economic transactions with regard to commodities that can be used to produce WMD, means of their delivery, other types of weapons and military hardware;
• to participate in the implementation of government policy on the nonproliferation of WMD and other dangerous types of weapons as well as on the export control of commodities that can be used to produce WMD, means of their delivery, other types of weapons and military hardware;
• to organize with the participation of interested federal executive agencies and organizations the creation of an integrated federal export control information system and an information sharing procedure between the FTECS and other state agencies;
• to ensure, within its jurisdiction, the participation of the Russian Federation in international export control regimes;
• to carry out activities aimed at the prevention of violations of Russia’s export control legislation and relevant international commitments;
• to organize activities to raise the awareness among Russian exporters and importers of export control objectives, procedures, and regulations;
• to participate in the consideration of issues of trade and scientific-technical cooperation of Russia with foreign states as related to the implementation of export control;
• to organize in accordance with Russian legislation the state accreditation of organizations that implement internal compliance programs, and issue state accreditation certificates;
• to carry out, within its jurisdiction, the non-tariff regulation of foreign trade activity, including the issuance of licenses for exports and (or) imports of goods (activities, services), information, and intellectual property in instances specified in the Russian legislation;
• to determine the accounting order and form for foreign economic transactions for the purpose of export control;
• to participate in the preparation and implementation of activities on the harmonization and unification of national export control legislation of CIS member states and Eurasian Economic Community member-states on the basis of generally recognized principles and rules of international law;
• to participate in the consideration of issues related to Russia’s joining in international economic sanctions against one state or a number of states;
• to issue rulings on the application of non-tariff regulation measures in the course of foreign economic activities;
• to maintain the federal database on issued export and import licenses for commodities subject to export control;
• to participate in activities directed at the prevention of unauthorized re-export from the Russian Federation of dual-use goods imported to the Russian Federation under the government guarantee of their usage for declared purposes, and issue Russian import certificates, as established by law;
• to supervise the independent identification of goods and technologies and control over its execution, and maintain a register of organizations that receive special permission for conducting such examination;
• to carry out, within its jurisdiction, international cooperation, and participate in activities on international information exchange as well as in the development and implementation of international cooperative programs in information protection and export control.

All above-mentioned FTECS responsibilities are similar to those of the former MEDT Department of Export Control. The Russian government has been given three months to bring its regulations into compliance with Edict No. 1085. {Entered 2 February 2005 CC}
[This item originally appeared in NIS Export Control Observer: <http://www.cns.miis.edu/pubs/nisexcon/index.htm>]

11 July 2003: RUSSIA ADOPTS NEW STATUTE FOR REGULATING IMPORTS OF IRRADIATED NUCLEAR FUEL ASSEMBLIES
On 11 July 2003, the Russian government issued Decree No. 418 On Regulations for Imports of Irradiated Fuel Assemblies of Nuclear Reactors to the Russian Federation.[1] The Statute adopted by this Decree establishes regulations for implementing foreign contracts for the import of spent nuclear fuel assemblies for temporary storage, both with subsequent mandatory return of these assemblies and with their subsequent reprocessing. The Statute regulates the application mechanism of the laws On Use of Atomic Energy, On Special Environmental Programs of Rehabilitation of Radiation Polluted Territories, and Article 48 (4) of the law On Environmental Protection.

Upon the publication of the above-mentioned Statute by Rossiyskaya gazeta, Nikolay Shingarev, head of the Directorate of Government Coordination and Information Policy of the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy, commented on the new regulatory document, noting that it requires that plans to import spent fuel assemblies must include a special environmental program detailing activities meant to reduce environmental risks related to imports of such items. Moreover, a contract is considered authorized only after it undergoes a state environmental examination. Finally, the new Statute gives preferential treatment to Russian-origin fuel.[2] The waste resulting from reprocessing of such fuel can remain in Russia, while waste resulting from foreign-origin fuel must be returned to the sending country.
Sources:
[1] According to Russian Government Decree No. 418 of 11 July 2003, the previous governmental decrees, No. 773 of 29 July 1995 and No. 745 of 10 July 1998, have expired. See Decree of the Government of the Russian Federation No. 418 of 11 July 2003, Rossiyskaya gazeta online edition, http://www.rg.ru/oficial/doc/postan_rf/418-03.shtm.
[2] Vladimir Barshev, "Oblucheno i neopasno. Novyye pravila 'yadernoy igry,'" Rossiyskaya gazeta online edition, 17 July 2003; in Ekologicheskaya pravda online edition, http://eco-pravda.km.ru/ojat/rg17il3.htm. {Entered 1 October 2003 EC}
[This item originally appeared in NIS Export Control Observer: <http://www.cns.miis.edu/pubs/nisexcon/index.htm>]

29 May 2003:  RUSSIA APPROVES NEW CUSTOMS CODE
On 29 May 2003, Russian President Putin signed the Customs Code of the Russian Federation, passed by the State Duma on 25 April 2003 and approved by the Federation Council on 14 May 2003.[1] The new Code is a result of more than four years of work by the parliament, the State Customs Committee, and the Russian business community.[2,3] The final version of the new Code contains a total of 6,500 amendments, with 400 out of 460 articles of the old Code modified.[3,4] The new Code simplifies customs rules and procedures with the ultimate goal of reducing red tape and arbitrary actions of customs officers.[4,5] For example, the Code requires customs officers to clear goods no later than three days after a declaration has been filed.[4] The Code also stipulates that changes in procedures for declaring goods for custom purposes should enter into force no earlier than 90 days after their publication, giving importers and exporters more time to adjust to new requirements.[6] These changes make foreign trade operations more stable and predictable. Moreover, the new Code complies with the 1999 Kyoto Convention on Simplification and Harmonization of Customs Procedures. Currently, Russia is working on joining this convention; Russian officials also hope that the approval of the new Customs Code will facilitate Russia's admission to the World Trade Organization.[3,4,5] The Code enters into force on 1 January 2004.[1]
Sources:
[1] "V. Putin podpisal Tamozhennyy kodeks RF," 29 May 2003, Tamozhennyy kompyuternyy servis (TKS) Web Site, <http://www.tks.ru>.
[2] Anastasiya Onegina, "Customs Without Surprises," Vedomosti, 8 April 2003; in "Russia's New Customs Code Curtails Customs Officers' Powers," FBIS Document CEP20030408000255.
[3] Interfax Business Law Review, 13-20 May 2003; in "Federation Council Approves New Wording of Customs Code," FBIS Document CDP20030520000275.
[4] ITAR-TASS, 14 May 2003; in "Russia: Federation Council Unanimously Votes for New Customs Code," FBIS Document CEP20030514000057.
[5] ITAR-TASS, 3 April 2003; in "Duma Deputy: Russia adopting Customs Code can ease talks on WTO entry," FBIS Document CEP20030403000266.
[6] Radio Rossii, 14 May 2003; in "Russia's upper house passes new customs code," FBIS Document CEP20030514000441. {Entered 7 February 2003 KB}

[This item originally appeared in NIS Export Control Observer: <http://www.cns.miis.edu/pubs/nisexcon/index.htm>]

17 May 2003: RUSSIA OPENS NEW CHECKPOINT ON BORDER WITH AZERBAIJAN
On 17 May 2003, Russia opened the Yarag-Kazmalyar checkpoint on its border between the Russian Republic of Dagestan and Azerbaijan. The checkpoint is an 11.5 hectare complex located near a bridge crossing the Samur River, and represents an investment of 250 million rubles ($8.24 million as of 30 June 2003) approved by the Russian State Duma in 1996.[1,2] In the past, the area was used by groups for criminal cross-border activities. The new checkpoint will permit a flow of 500 vehicles per day – 300 cargo trucks, 180 automobiles, and 20 buses, as well as 1,000 passengers and pedestrians. Officials expect that the new checkpoint will promote the development of trade relations between Russia and the Caucasian states while simultaneously facilitating the activities of customs officials, border guards, and other enforcement agencies.[1]
Sources:
[1] “17 maya 2003 goda na rossiysko-azerbaydzhanskom uchastke gosgranitsy RF otkryvayetsya novyy kompleks punkta propuska ‘Yarag-Kazmalyar’ Dagestanskoy tamozhniy,” Finmarket novosti, 18 May 2003; in Integrum Techno, http://www.integrum.com.
[2] Azertac, 18 May 2003; in “New Checkpoint Opens on Russian-Azerbaijani Border,” FBIS Document CEP20030518000024. {Entered 26 September 2003 EC}
[This item originally appeared in NIS Export Control Observer: <http://www.cns.miis.edu/pubs/nisexcon/index.htm>]
 

10 April 2003: EU PLEDGES €16 MILLION TO UPGRADE RUSSIAN CUSTOMS CHECKPOINTS
On 10 April 2003, Dino Sinigallia, the head of EuropeAid Cooperation Office (Aidco), an organization in charge of the European Commission's foreign aid programs, told Interfax that the EU plans to spend €16 million ($17.4 million as of 18 April 2003) on modernizing customs checkpoints in northwestern Russia. Two checkpoints in northwestern Russia were already modernized with EU assistance last year. €8 million ($8.7 million) will be allocated to the Chernyshevskoye checkpoint on the border between Kaliningrad Oblast and Lithuania. Two checkpoints on the Finnish border, Suopera and Brusnichnoye, will receive €6 million ($6.5 million) and €2 million ($2.17 million), respectively. The implementation of these projects should start in early 2004. Deputy Head of Russia's State Customs Committee Viktor Krutskikh expects that the project will be completed by mid-2005.
[Interfax, 10 April 2003; in "EU plans to help modernize Russian customs checkpoints," FBIS Document CEO20030410000361.] {Entered 18 April 2003 NL}
[This item originally appeared in NIS Export Control Observer: <http://www.cns.miis.edu/pubs/nisexcon/index.htm>]

31 March 2003: RUSSIA, BELARUS  START ANTI-SMUGGLING OPERATION
At a 31 March 2003 session of the Russian Belarus Union's Customs Committee, heads of the two countries' customs committees announced the launch of a new joint anti-smuggling operation, known as Belarus Transit.[1] According to ITAR-TASS, the main purpose of the operation is to stop firms from trying to smuggle contraband to and from Russia through Belarus. Special attention will be paid to blocking fraudulent information submitted by bogus firms.[2] The operation is to continue until the end of 2003. If it proves to be effective, it may be conducted again in 2004.[1]
Sources:
[1] Nataliya Grib, "Rossiya i Belorussiya prosledyat za kontrabandoy," IRU-CIS Web Site, http://www.iru-cis.ru/news/2003/4/01_0.htm.
[2] ITAR-TASS, 31 March 2003; in "Belarusian, Russian customs to carry out joint anti-contraband operation," FBIS Document CEP20030331000238.{Entered 18 April 2003 NL}
[This item originally appeared in NIS Export Control Observer: <http://www.cns.miis.edu/pubs/nisexcon/index.htm>]

14 January 2003: RUSSIA UPDATES NUCLEAR DUAL-USE CONTROL LIST
On 14 January 2003, Russian President Vladimir Putin signed Edict No. 36, On Approval of the List of Dual-Use Equipment and Materials and Corresponding Nuclear Technology Subject to Export Controls, updating Russia’s list of nuclear dual-use equipment and materials.[1] The new Edict replaced Presidential Edict No. 228 of 21 February 1996. The changes have been interpreted by the Ministry of Atomic Energy (Minatom) as an opportunity to expand Russian nuclear exports, as the export of some items previously considered to pose a security threat is now allowed. A Minatom spokesperson noted that Russian nuclear technology is in high demand.[2] Russia is building nuclear reactors in Iran (Bushehr), India (Koodankulam), and China (Lianyungang), and supplies nuclear technology to several other countries. (See the Russian nuclear exports section for more information.)
Sources:
[1] Presidential Edict No. 36, Ob utverzhdenii Spiska oborudovaniya i materialov dvoynogo naznacheniya i sootvetstvuyushchikh tekhnologiy, primenyayemykh v yadernykh tselyakh, v otnoshenii kotorykh osushchestvlyayetsya eksportnyy control, Rossiyskaya gazeta, No. 11, 22 January 2003; in Integrum Techno, http://www.integrum.com.
[2] German Solomatin, ITAR-TASS, 15 January 2003; in "Updated dual-use list to expand international nuclear cooperation," FBIS Document ID CEP20030115000401. {Entered 17 April 2003 KB}
[This item originally appeared in NIS Export Control Observer: <http://www.cns.miis.edu/pubs/nisexcon/index.htm>]

January 2003: RUSSIAN AUTHORITIES CONSIDER AUTOMATED EXPORT CONTROL LICENSING SYSTEM
According to an article in the January 2003 issue of the NIS Export Control Observer, the Russian Ministry of Economic Development and Trade is studying the possibility of establishing an automated export control licensing system. There is growing concern among Russian authorities and export control experts that private companies and state enterprises are bypassing Russia's export control system because of the lengthy process required for obtaining export licenses. Some officials believe that compliance would increase if export licensing were expedited; however, funding and security for such a system remain a concern.
["Russian Authorities Consider Automated Export Control Licensing System," NIS Export Control Observer, January 2003, CNS Web Site, http://www.cns.miis.edu/pubs/nisexcon/index.htm.] {Entered 16 March 2003 KB}
[This item originally appeared in NIS Export Control Observer: <http://www.cns.miis.edu/pubs/nisexcon/index.htm>]

January 2003: RUSSIA ESTABLISHES CLASSIFICATION CENTERS TO ASSIST EXPORTERS
According to an article in the January 2003 issue of the NIS Export Control Observer, the Russian government has established eight regional Classification Centers in accordance with Government Decree No. 477, 21 June 2001. These Classification Centers are expected to assist exporters and customs officials in determining whether items are subject to licensing. Currently, only two of these Centers--the Russian Academy of Science, in Moscow, and the Center for Industry Development Projects, in Saint Petersburg--have expertise to cover the entire range of controlled commodities. The other institutes tapped to establish Classification Centers, such as the Urals Polytechnical Institute and TsNIIChermet (Central Research Institute for Ferrous Metallurgy), have more limited expertise, on select control lists. Thus, Russian experts believe that many of the new Classification Centers will not be able to fulfill the objectives of this program and that centers with broad expertise covering all the control lists would be more effective.
["Russia Establishes Classification Centers to Assist Exporters," NIS Export Control Observer, January 2003, CNS Web Site, http://www.cns.miis.edu/nisexcon/index.htm/index.htm.] {Entered 3 March 2003 KB}
[This item originally appeared in NIS Export Control Observer: <http://www.cns.miis.edu/pubs/nisexcon/index.htm>]

December 2002: RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT CONTINUES ACCREDITATION OF COMPANIES WITH INTERNAL COMPLIANCE PROGRAMS
The Russian Ministry of Economic Development and Trade continues to offer accreditation to institutes and enterprises establishing internal compliance programs. This accreditation gives such institutes and enterprises the opportunity to obtain general licenses, that is, licenses permitting the export of specified items to particular end-users for a fixed period, without the need for additional governmental approvals. All other institutions must obtain individual licenses for each individual export. Among the organizations that have obtained governmental accreditation are TENEX, the Russian Academy of Sciences, the Kurchatov Institute, and TsNIIMash (the Central Research Institute for Machine Building).
[University of Georgia Interview with Andrey Pinchuk and Sergey Mikhaylov, deputy heads of the Department of Export Controls at the Russian Ministry of Economic Development and Trade, December 2002.] {Entered 13 March 2003 KB}

1 October 2002: IDENTITY OF COMPANY SANCTIONED BY UNITED STATES IN QUESTION
On 1 October 2002, the Rostvertol helicopter company in Rostov reported that Rostov Airframe Plant 168, sanctioned by the United States the previous month (see the 9/13/2002 entry, below), ceased to exist about 50 years ago.  Rostvertol inherited the former airframe plant, but was unsure as to whether U.S. sanctions were being directed against it.  Rostvertol, one of Russia's largest exporters of helicopters, has the right to export Mi-26T helicopters without going through Rosoboroneksport, the Russian arms export agency; all other production is exported through the agency.  Rostvertol questioned the reason for the U.S. announcement of sanctions, asking if it was due to "incompetence, a mistake by experts, or, most likely, unscrupulous competition on the weapons market."[1] Other Russian sources suggested Rostvertol was likely the company being sanctioned.[2]  Rostvertol participates in helicopter exhibitions in the United States.[1]  (CNS has found no information to indicate whether any actions have been taken against Rostvertol.)
Sources:
[1] Novosti, 1 October 2002, Rostvertol Company Web Site, http://www.rostvertolplc.ru.
[2] Interfax, 13 September 2002; in "Predstavitel rossiyskogo VPK obvinyayet SShA v popytkakh ubrat konkurentov s rynkov vooruzheniy," Mezhregionalnyy fond informatsionnykh tekhnologiy Web Site, http://www.mfit.ru.{Entered 14 April 2003 CC}

25 September 2002: SECURITY OF RUSSIAN-KAZAKHSTANI BORDER TO TAKE SEVERAL YEARS

On 25 September 2002, Interfax reported that securing the Russian-Kazakhstani border will take several years due to lack of financing. According to State Customs Committee chief Mikhail Vanin, border security should be one of the country's priorities, because poor border control facilitates the penetration of drugs, smuggling, and other criminal activities between Russia and Kazakhstan. Currently, there are 80 checkpoints and over 20 border guard detachments on the border. A Ministry of Economic Development spokesman told Interfax that the federal program "Borders of the Russian Federation" paid serious attention to the Russian-Kazakh border security issue. According to the spokesman, $25.27 million will be allocated in 2003 for Kazakhstan-Russia border construction.

[Interfax, 25 September 2002; "Security of Russian-Kazakhstani Border to take several years," FBIS Document CEP20020925000233.]{Entered 27 September 2002 AI}

16 September 2002: THREE-WEEK CUSTOMS TRAINING IN VLADIVOSTOK

On 16 September 2002, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) held a three-week training course in Vladivostok, Russia on the prevention of the illegal transfer of nuclear and other radioactive materials. Representatives from Russia, radiation control equipment production firms, and law enforcement officials from Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Ukraine, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan participated in the training. Observers from the IAEA, the United States, Japan, China, Sweden, Mongolia, and Vietnam also took part in the program. The practical training included a visit to the customs post at Grodekovo (on the border with Suifenhe, China), the Vladivostok commercial sea port, and the airport. The IAEA representatives and officials of the Russian Customs Academy held an exam for the trainees during the last week of the three-week program.

["Vo Vladivostokskom filiale Rossiyskoy tamozhennoy akademii nachinayut rabotu trekhnedelnyye kursy instruktorov stran-uchastnits MAGATE," Vostok-Media, 16 September 2002; in Integrum Techno, http://www.integrum.com.] {Entered 17 February 2003 AI}

11 September 2002: UNITED STATES ANNOUNCES SANCTIONS AGAINST THREE RUSSIAN COMPANIES

On 11 September 2002, the U.S. Department of State officially announced sanctions against three Russian companies, the Tula Instrument Design Bureau, the Bazalt State Scientific Production Enterprise and the Rostov Airframe Plant 168, after the three were accused of selling military equipment to countries that the United States regards as supporters of terrorism. The U.S. Department of State imposed sanctions as early as 13 August 2002, but the official announcement was not released until 11 September 2002. Countries where military goods were exported are identified as Syria, Sudan, and Libya.[1] According to Russian Foreign Ministry spokesman Boris Malakhov, military cooperation between Russia and these countries is legitimate and limited.[2] The U.S. decision came as a surprise to some Russian officials, because Tula Instrument Design Bureau started selling arms to Syria in 1998, and the sanctions were imposed four years later. Malakhov called the U.S. sanctions "unjustified" because there are no internationally approved bans on selling weapons to Sudan, Syria, or Libya.[1] The Deputy Director of the Tula Instrument Design Bureau believes that the U.S. sanctions were imposed as an attempt to push Russian companies out of a competitive market, because the company is Russia's second-largest arms exporter. The sanctions will last for one year.[2]

Sources:
[1]  Aleksey Nikolskiy, "Bessmyslennye sanktsii: SSHA nakazali rossiyskikh oboronshchikov," Vedomosti, 16 September 2002; in Russia & WTO Web Site, http://www.wto.ru/ru/press.asp?msg_id=2781.

[2] "Russia angered by U.S. sanctions move," The Washington Times online edition, http://www.washtimes.com/upi-breaking/
20020913-044410-7687r.htm, 13 September 2002. {Entered 16 October 2002 AI}

23 August 2002: U.S. Contractor and Russian Institute Pursue Missile Defense Cooperation
U.S. defense contractor Lockheed Martin and the Khrunichev State Research and Production Center in Moscow are planning to cooperate in the area of missile defense and other space related work. According to Khrunichev Deputy Director General of Strategic Planning Anatoliy Kuzin, certain political decisions, including relaxation of technology and information controls, will have to be made on both sides before any joint work in the area of missile defense can begin. Although there is strong support for cooperation, some officials express concern over such an agreement between the United States and Russia. U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz is concerned that sharing U.S. military technology and information with Russia may result in leaks to countries such as Iran.

[David Ruppe, "U.S. Contractor, Russian Institute Pursue Missile Defense Cooperation," Global Security Newswire, www.nti.org/d_newswire/issues/2002/8/23/14p.html, 23 August 2002.] {Entered 21 April 2003 AI}

17 June 2002: ALEXEY KUDRIN REPLACES ILYA KLEBANOV AS HEAD OF EXPORT CONTROL COMMISSION
On 17 June 2002, Russian President Putin signed an edict appointing Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Finance Alexey Kudrin the new head of the Export Control Commission. The former head of the Commission, Ilya Klebanov, was appointed deputy chairman of the Commission, according to AK&M Online News. The edict also made other changes. First Deputy Minister of Energy Pavel Ivanov, former First Deputy Minister of Industry, Science and Technologies Boris Aleshin, Deputy Minister of Education Boris Vinogradov, and Director General of the Russian Agency for Systems Management Vladimir Simonov were removed from the Commission. They were replaced by Deputy Minister of Atomic Energy Eduard Antipenko, First Deputy Minister of Industry, Science, and Technologies Aleksandr Brindikov, Deputy Minister of Education Yuriy Shlenov, and First Deputy Director of the Russian Agency for Systems Management Aleksandr Shmakov.
["V. Putin naznachil A. Kudrina predsedatelem Komissii po eksportnomu kontrolyu RF vmesto I. Klebanova." 19 June 2002, AK&M Online News Web Site, http://www.akm.ru/rus/news/2002/june/19/ns897324.htm.] {Entered 24 June 2002 NL}
 
7 May 2002: PUTIN SIGNS FEDERAL LAW AMENDING PUNISHMENT FOR SMUGGLING AND ILLEGAL EXPORTS
The Federal Law amending Articles 188 and 189 of the Russian Criminal Code was adopted by the State Duma on 5 April 2002, approved by the Federation Council on 23 April 2002, and signed by Russian President Putin on 7 May 2002.  The Law took effect on 14 June 2002. Amendments to Article 188 expanded the list of items, the illicit trafficking of which is subject to criminal prosecution. These include radioactive materials, radiation sources, fissile materials, and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) delivery systems. Article 189 was amended to expand the list of activities considered a crime under the Criminal Code. For instance, illegal transactions for or rendering of services to a foreign organization or its representatives that may contribute to the development of WMD is now a crime, in addition to the illegal transfer of goods, technologies, materials, and information.[1] Commenting on the amendments in a news bulletin, the Russian Federation's Ministry of Foreign Affairs declared that "Russia is once again strikingly demonstrating its firm and consistent commitment to nonproliferation, backing its principled line by concrete moves in national legislation…."[2] However, analysts from the Russian non-governmental organization Center for the Development of Democracy and Human Rights noted that these amendments in some respect weaken the enforcement power of export control legislation. Indeed, the explanatory note to Article 189 restricts responsibility for wrongdoing to the exporter. This could allow the actual organizers of illegal transfers, who often act indirectly through intermediaries, to go unprosecuted.[3] Criminal penalties have been imposed only twice in Russia: one case involved imprisonment of an employee of Khimavtomatika Design Bureau (a company which specializes in rocket engine design, based in Voronezh); a second case involved illicit arms sales.[4] In addition, approximately 20 enterprises are under investigation.

In July 2002, the Russian Administrative Code was also amended and now includes clauses that call for penalties for export control violations. The five relevant clauses are Article 14.20 (Violation of Export Control Legislation); Article 19.5 (Failure to Fulfill Orders of Oversight Agencies); Article 19.6 (Failure to Avoid Causes and Conditions Contributing to Administrative Violation); Article 19.7 (Failure to Provide Data or Information); and Article 23.9 (Export Control Bodies). However, some believe these provisions are vague and fail to give adequate guidance to agencies on implementation of the code. To date, no administrative penalties have been imposed on Russian institutions for export control violations.[5]
Sources:
[1] Federal Law No. 50-FZ, "O vnesenii izmeneniy v stati 188 i 189 Ugolovnogo kodeksa Rossiyskoy Federatsii," 7 May 2002, Rossiyskaya gazeta online edition, http://www.rg.ru/oficial/doc/federal_zak/50.shtm.
[2] "On the Measures Being Taken by Russia to Raise the Efficiency of the System of Control over Export of Dual-Use Goods and Technologies," Daily News Bulletin, 30 May 2002, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Web Site, http://www.ln.mid.ru.
[3] "O vnesenii izmeneniy v statyi 188 i 189 Ugolovnogo kodeksa Rossiyskoy Federatsii," Zakonotvorcheskii protsess v Gosudarstvennoy Dume, No. 37, Center for the Development of Democracy and Human Rights Web Site, http://www.demokratia.ru.
[4] Interview with Sergey Yakimov, Director of the Office of Export Control, Ministry of Economic Development and Trade, CITS/CEC Export Control Bulletin, No. 3, 2000.
[5] "Russia Expands Coverage of Export Control Violations," NIS Export Control Observer, January 2003, CNS Web Site, http://www.cns.miis.edu/pubs/nisexcon/index.htm. {Entered 18 June 2002 NL, Updated 13 March 2003 KB}
 
16 April 2002: FEDERATION COUNCIL CONFERENCE HIGHLIGHTS EXPORT CONTROL FLAWS
On 16 April 2002, the Federation Council held a conference to commemorate the tenth anniversary of the 11 April 1992 signing by then-president Boris Yeltsin of Edict No. 388, which provided the initial legislative foundation for the Russian export control system. The conference, Export Control and National Security of the Russian Federation: Legal and Developmental Challenges, focused on challenges facing Russia's export control system and the legislative framework for export controls in Russia. Speaking at the conference, Sergey Yakimov, head of the Department of Export Control of the Ministry of Economic Development and Trade, highlighted several problems that prevent the system from functioning effectively. According to Yakimov, one of the flaws is the lack of coordination between different government agencies involved in export control.  This lack of coordination results in inconsistent implementation of export control regulations. Another flaw, according to Yakimov, is that the existing Criminal Code does not always adequately provide for the criminal prosecution of export control violators.  Another area that needs improvement is the process governing transactions under military-technical cooperation.[1] Yakimov suggested that the state not only use criminal prosecution but also introduce administrative responsibility for infringements of export control legislation.  The conference concluded with the adoption of a recommendation by the Federation Council to appeal to the world community to consider a Russian initiative that calls for the creation of a universal and nondiscriminatory system to control the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and missile technologies. Conference participants also recommended that the government take measures to limit transactions in the fields of science and technology where Russia takes leading positions, and consider a strengthening of penalties for any kind of illegal transfers of goods and technologies that are subject to export control.[2]
Sources:
[1] Aleksandr Sharov, "Export under Rigorous Control," Parlamentskaya gazeta online edition, 17 April 2002; in "Federation Council Reviews Export Control, Nonproliferation," FBIS Document CEP20020416000435.
[2] "Natsionalnaya sistema eksportnogo kontrolya - deystvennyy mekhanizm borby s mezhdunarodnym terrorizmom," Informatsionnyy kanal Soveta Federatsii RF Web Site, http://www.akdi.ru/sf/prb71/4.htm. {Entered 25 June 2002 NL}
 
22 February 2002: RUSSIA AND U.S. AGREE TO EXTEND COOPERATION ON EXPORT CONTROLS
From 21 to 22 February 2002, Russian and American government officials met at the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Moscow to discuss areas of future cooperation on export controls. The two sides agreed to establish an informal mechanism for monitoring the export of arms and dual-use technologies. Joint export control activities are conducted within the framework of the 1994 U.S.-Russian bilateral memorandum on cooperation on export controls. In addition to the meeting at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the American delegation, headed by John Schlosser, Director of the Office of Export Controls and Sanctions, Bureau of Nonproliferation of the U.S. Department of State, met Russian officials from the Ministry of Atomic Energy and the State Customs Committee.[1,2]
Sources:
[1] "O vstreche rossiyskikh i amerikanskikh ekspertov po eksportnomu kontrolyu," Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Web Site, http://www.ln.mid.ru.
[2] "Voprosy exporta rossiyskogo ViVT," MFIT Web Site, http://www.mfit.ru/defensive/obzor/ob01-03-02-2.html. {Entered 18 June 2002 NL}

26 December 2001: NEW ADMINISTRATIVE CODE OUTLINES PENALTIES FOR EXPORT CONTROL VIOLATIONS
On 26 December 2001, the Federation Council approved the new Administrative Code of the Russian Federation. Article 14.2 of the Code outlines penalties for violations of export control procedures. The Article states that transfers of goods and information or provision of services, which can be used to develop weapons of mass destruction, without a license (where licensing is required), with violations of the terms of a license, or with a license obtained illegally, are subject to penalties equaling the value of goods, information, and services involved in the illegal transaction. A violation of the established accounting procedures for foreign transactions will result in penalties of 10-20 times minimum wage for officials and 100-200 times minimum wage for corporations. The new Administrative Code enters into force on 1 July 2002.
[Kodeks Rossiyskoy Federatsii ob administrativnykh pravonarusheniyakh, VFF-S Web Site, http://www.vff-s.narod.ru/fz/ak/14.html.] {Entered 20 June 2002 NL}
 
13 November 2001: RUSSIAN PRIME MINISTER FAVORS CUSTOMS CODE AMENDMENTS
On 13 November 2001, Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov opened a government session intended to review proposed amendments to the Russian Customs Code of 1993.  According to Kasyanov, the changes will standardize and simplify current customs procedures and will meet requirements of international customs organizations as well as those of WTO countries.  In addition, Kasyanov said that some of the customs procedures should be regulated by law, not regulatory documents, as is currently the case.
["Russian PM Favors Customs Code Amendments," Interfax, 13 November 2001.] {Entered 14 November 2001 KB}
 
8 November 2001:  RUSSIA TIGHTENS CONTROL OVER CHEMICAL COMPONENTS
According to ITAR-TASS, Russia has issued a special order listing chemical-related equipment and technologies that are prohibited from being transferred across Russian borders.  The new restrictions were put in place to protect national security interests and to meet Russia's international obligations to the CWC, to which it is a signatory.
["Russia tightens export controls on potential chemical weapons components," ITAR-TASS, 8 November 2001; in FBIS Document CEP20011108000120.} {Entered 14 November 2001 KB}
 
4 September 2001:  RUSSIAN OFFICIAL REJECTS CLAIMS OF INSTITUTE-SPONSORED LEAKS TO IRAN
According to First Deputy Minister of Atomic Energy Valentin Borisovich Ivanov, export controls on nuclear materials are effective in preventing individual institutes from illegally leaking nuclear technology to Iran.  All scientific institutes within Minatom are subject to strict controls.  According to Ivanov, who also serves as chairman of Minatom's Export Council, leaks could occur through individual scientists, but not through individual institutes.
[Russian Public Television ORT 1, 4  September 2001; in "Deputy minister assures nuclear cooperation with Iran is safe," FBIS Document CEP20010904000353, 4  September 2001.] {Entered 14 November 2001 KB}
 
21 June 2001:  NEW DECREE ON INDEPENDENT CLASSIFICATION PASSED
On 21 June 2001, the Russian government adopted Decree No. 477, On the System of Independent Classification of Goods and Technologies for Export Control Purposes, which outlines rules for conducting independent classification of goods and services intended for export.  According to the Decree, the Export Control Commission may grant the right to classify goods and services intended for export by Russian companies and individuals to private entities.[1,2] 
Sources:
[1] Interfax, 3 July 2001; in "Interfax Business Law Review for 26 June - 03 July, 2001," FBIS Document CEP20010703000320.
[2] Government Decree No.477, O sisteme nezavisimoy identifikatsionnoy ekspertizy tovarov i tekhnologiy, provodimoy v tselyakh eksportnogo kontrolya,  21 June 2001; in The Legislation in Russia, http://law.optima.ru. {Entered 14 November 2001 KB}
 
14 June 2001:  NEW DECREE SIMPLIFIES LICENSING OF DUAL USE GOODS
On 14 June 2001, the Russian government approved Decree No. 462, which put into force a statute governing the licensing procedures for dual-use goods and technologies.  The new statute simplified the licensing process, allowing exporters to submit license applications to just one government office, the Ministry of Economic Development and Trade.  Previously, exporters were required to obtain rulings from and coordinate with other government offices.
[M.I.Tymoniuk, A.S. Tsekhmistro, "Control Over External Economic Activity Related to Dual-Use Nuclear Equipment, Materials, and Technologies," Nonproliferation Export Control in Russia, No. 3 (20), September 2001, p. 3.] {Entered 14 November 2001 KB}
 
22 February 2001: PUTIN PRESIDES OVER SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING ON EXPORT CONTROLS
On 22 February 2001, Russian President Vladimir Putin presided over a meeting of the Russian Security Council dedicated to export controls.  At the meeting, Putin declared that Russia is keeping all of its international commitments on export controls and noted the accomplishments thus far, which include the creation of relevant export control legislation.  He called for strengthening the country's export control system as a way to safeguard Russian interests and to prevent sensitive technologies from being peddled abroad.  Putin also indicated that Russia will increase cooperation on export controls with other countries.[1]  According to a report in Vedomosti, participants at the meeting discussed proposed reforms, including the creation of a system of government-accredited companies that will classify goods for and provide regulatory information to exporters.  Another proposed reform discussed at the Security Council meeting was the possibility of granting general licenses to exporters for dual-use goods on the condition that the exporter establishes an internal compliance program and receives the government accreditation.[2]
 
According to a report by the Center for International Trade and Security, the official Russian response to recent U.S. accusations of export controls violations occupied a significant place at the meeting. President Putin noted that although some violations have, indeed, occurred in the past, they were mostly the result of the "brain drain" from Russian educational and research institutions, rather than activities of government enterprises. Putin also emphasized the problem of proliferation by individuals in an attempt to reassure the United States that Russian federal agencies are not to blame for WMD proliferation. With respect to Russia's nuclear and missile cooperation with Iran and India, Putin reiterated that Russian exports to these countries do not violate the precepts of international export control regimes.  Participants also discussed the problem of intangible transfers of technologies.
Announcing the appointment of Ilya Klebanov as the new head of the Export Control Commission, Putin said that the export control system in Russia would be under the direct control of the executive office and his own supervision. He also noted measures that will be undertaken to strengthen Russian export control mechanisms, such as the creation of a government database of all foreign contracts involving high technology, improvement of the Criminal Code, the assignment of regional representatives to oversee the industry, and allocation of adequate funding for these activities in the 2002 budget.[3]
Sources:
[1] "Putin Urges More Effective Export Control," Presidential Bulletin, Vol. No. 36 (2281), Interfax, 22 February 2001; in "Presidential Bulletin for 22 Feb 01," FBIS Document CEP20010222000331.
[2] Zoya Kaika and Mikhail Kozyrev, "Science To Distinguish," Moscow vedomosti, 23 February 2001; in "RF Government to Review Plans for Reform of Export Control System," FBIS Document CEP20010223000409.
[3] Masha Katsava, Igor Khripunov, "Russian Export Controls Will be under Putin's Supervision," Center for International Trade and Security Web Site, http://www.uga.edu/cits/news/Russ_Sec_Coun_fp.htm. {Entered  18 June 2002 NL}
 
7 February 2001:  NEW PROCEDURE FOR LICENSING OF NUCLEAR ITEMS
On 7 February 2001, the State Customs Committee issued letter No. 01-6/4744 stating that after 1 January 2001 the Export Control Department of the Ministry of Trade and Economic Development is responsible for accepting applications and issuing licenses for the export and import of nuclear materials and technologies.  The Export Control Department will accept applications and issue licenses for the export of controlled goods and technologies and accept applications for Russian Export Control Committee certificates.
[Interfax Business Law Review for 14-20 March 2001, Vol. 12 (428), Interfax, 20 March 2001; in Business Law Review for 20 Mar 01," FBIS Document CEP20010320000343.] {Entered 14 November 2001 KB}
 
29 January 2001:  PUTIN SIGNS EDICT CREATING EXPORT CONTROL COMMISSION
On 29 January 2001, Russian President Vladimir Putin signed Presidential Edict No. 96, On the Export Control Commission of the Russian Federation, establishing the Export Control Commission. The commission was formed under Article 9 of the Russian law On Export Control, which stipulates the creation of such a commission to implement Russia's export control policies and to coordinate the efforts of federal executive institutions involved in export controls.[1,2,3] The commission's main tasks include examination of international cooperation in the export control area; overview of analytical studies of foreign export control systems, in part, to prevent discriminatory restrictions on Russian trade in high-tech products; and preparation of proposals for the president and government.[3] The edict also gives the commission the power to grant permission to enterprises for the temporary export of dual-use items without transferring ownership rights for these items.[4]
Sources:
[1] Presidential Edict, O komissii po eksportnomu kontrolyu Rossiiskoi Federatsii, 29 January 2001, Legislation in Russia Database Web Site, http://law.optima.ru.
[2] ITAR-TASS, 30 January 2001; in "Putin orders creation of commission on export control," FBIS Document CEP20010130000379.
[3] "RF President V.V. Putin Signed the Edict 'On the RF Export Control Commission,'" RF Presidential Press Service, 30 January 2001; in "Vladimir Putin signed the Edict 'On the RF Export Control Commission,'" Yadernyy kontrol, No. 2, March - April 2001; in "Selected Press Coverage of Nuclear Weapons, RF Policy, World Affairs," FBIS Document CEP20010514000001.
[4] Zoya Kaika and Mikhail Kozyrev, "Science To Distinguish," Vedomosti online edition, 23 February 2001; in "RF Government to Review Plans for Reform of Export Control System," FBIS Document CEP20010223000409. {Entered 18 June 2002 NL}
 
January 2001:  SECURITY COUNCIL OFFICIAL NOTES PROGRESS ON EXPORT CONTROLS
According to Russian Security Council Deputy Secretary Oleg Chernov, the Security Council has been closely involved in nonproliferation issues over the past two years and will continue its involvement, particularly in the area of export controls.  One of the Security Council's major responsibilities is implementing the law On Export Control.  Chernov noted that more than twenty export control-related decrees and statutes have been adopted in the last six months; half of these have already been implemented.  The new decrees and statutes bring about improvements to export control regulations and provide for the introduction of internal compliance programs at enterprises.  According to Chernov, Russia must develop an export control system that operates on its own without constant orders from above.
["Oleg Chernov:  'Globalization of World Development Forces Russia to Take New Missile Threats More Seriously," Yadernyy kontrol, January-February 2001, pp. 26-31; in "Interview of Dep. Secretary of the RF Sec. Council, Oleg Chernov on Developments in Nuclear Policy," FBIS Document CEP20010317000001.] {Entered 14 November 2001 KB}
 
17 May 2000: PUTIN DECREE ABOLISHES FEDERAL CURRENCY AND EXPORT CONTROL SERVICE
President Vladimir Putin issued Decree No. 867 on 17 May 2000, restructuring the Russian government. As part of this restructuring, the Federal Currency and Export Control Service (VEK) was abolished, and its functions divided between the newly-established Ministry of Economic Development and Trade and the Ministry of Finance.[1] VEK, and specifically the Department of Export Controls within VEK, was the working group or permanent secretariat for the interdepartmental Export Control Commission (Eksportkontrol). It was given this role in August 1996, in accordance with Government Resolution No. 1005. The Department of Export Controls regularly prepared drafts of export control decrees, directives, and resolutions for the President and the Cabinet of Ministers, and was the principal entity responsible for the development of dual-use export control lists. VEK also analyzed and made recommendations on nuclear and nuclear dual-use export applications for Eksportkontrol. Representatives from VEK also participated in negotiations and consultations on export control issues with foreign governments and relevant multilateral control regimes.[2] VEK was expected to be designated as the "Special Authorized Federal Executive Body in the Export Control Sphere" under the terms of the 1999 Law on Export Control, which would have given it a major role in the Russian export control system.[3]  This function will now likely be carried out by the Ministry of Economic Development and Trade, although the implementing regulations for the 1999 law have still not been finalized. Plans calling for them to be completed by early 2000 were disrupted by the political and adminstrative turmoil following the December 1999 resignation of former President Boris Yeltsin and the early presidential elections which followed. Putin's decree reorganizing the government will likely further delay the process of finalizing the implementing regulations.[4]
Sources:
[1] Presidential Edict No. 867 "O strukture federalnikh organov ispolnitelnoy vlasti," 17 May 2000, Sobraniye zakonodatelstva Rossiiskoy Federatsii, No. 21, June 2000,  pp. 4391-4394.
[2] Elina Kirichenko and William Potter, "Nuclear Export Controls in Russia: The Players and the Process," in Gary Bertsch and William Potter, eds., Dangerous Weapons, Desperate States (New York: Routledge, 1999), pp. 27-31.
[3] Vladimir Orlov, "Natsionalnaya sistema eksportnogo kontrolya Rossii v yadernoy oblasti," Eksportnyy kontrol v Rossii: politika i praktika (Moscow: PIR Center, 2000), p. 9.
[4] Scott Parrish,  "Kiev, Ukraine and Minsk, Belarus," NISNP Trip Report,  15-23 May 2000, UKR000515. {Entered 12 July 2000  SDP}
 
7 May 2000: PUTIN DECREE LOOSENS NUCLEAR EXPORT CONTROLS
Russian President Vladimir Putin issued Decree No. 822 on 6 May 2000, broadening the conditions under which Russia can export nuclear materials, equipment, and technology to non-nuclear weapons states. The new decree states that "in exceptional cases" Russia can export nuclear technology and equipment to non-nuclear weapons states that have not concluded full-scope safeguards agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).  It provides that nuclear exports to such a state must be approved on a case-by-case basis by the Russian government. The decree also outlines the conditions that must be met if a nuclear export to such a state is to be approved: 1) the export must not contradict the international obligations of the Russian Federation; 2) the recipient state must guarantee Russia that the exported technology and materials will not be used to create a nuclear explosive device; 3) the exported material and technology must be used exclusively to ensure the safe and secure operation of an already-existing nuclear installation in the recipient state; and 4) the installation to which the material is shipped must be subject to IAEA safeguards.[1] The new decree modifies Presidential Decree No. 312 of 27 March 1992, which had stated that Russia would only export nuclear materials an technology to non-nuclear weapon states which had concluded full-scope safeguards agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency.[2]  The provisions of the new decree should only affect potential nuclear sales to non-nuclear weapons states which do not have comprehensive safeguards agreements with the IAEA. There are four such countries: India, Pakistan, Israel, and Cuba. Among these, the most likely customer for Russian nuclear exports is India. The provisions of the decree, while loosening earlier Russian export control regulations, appear consistent with the agreement among the members of the Nuclear Suppliers' Group (NSG) to allow a safety exception to the general requirement that sensitive nuclear technology (so-called "trigger list" items) can only be exported to countries that have full-scope safeguards agreements with the IAEA. This exception applies only to "exceptional cases."  In accordance with a decision taken at the 1994 plenary meeting of the NSG, "exceptional cases are generally understood as those when a transfer of a trigger list item is deemed to be essential in order to prevent or correct a radiological hazard posing a significant danger to public health and safety and which cannot be realistically met by other means."[3]
Sources:
[1] Ukaz Prezidenta Rossiyskoy Federatsii No. 822, O vnesenii izmeneniy v ukaz Presidenta Rossiyskoy Federatsii ot 27 marta 1992 goda No. 312 "O kontrole za eksportom iz Rossiyskoy Federatsii yadernykh materialov, obrudovaniya, i tekhnologii," 6 May 2000.
[2] Ukaz Prezidenta Rossiyskoy Federatsii No. 312, O kontrole za eksportom iz Rossiyskoy Federatsii yadernykh materialov, obrudovaniya, i tekhnologii, 27 March 1992.
[3] Carlton Thorne, ed., A Guide to Nuclear Export Controls (Burke, VA: Proliferation Data Services, 1997), Attachment 4-1. {entered SDP 12 May 2000}
 
25 October 1999: YELTSIN VETOES BILL REQUIRING LEGISLATIVE APPROVAL OF NUCLEAR EXPORTS
Russian President Boris Yeltsin vetoed an amendment to the law On the Use of Nuclear Energy that would have required each individual export of nuclear material from Russia to be approved by a federal law, the presidential press service announced on 25 October 1999.  The bill had been passed by the Duma on 22 September 1999 and was considered approved by the Federation Council under the terms of Section 4, Article 105 of the Russian constitution. Under the terms of this article, most bills that the Federation Council does not act upon within 14 working days of their passage by the Duma are considered approved and sent to the President for his consideration. In a letter to the speakers of both houses, Yeltsin said he had vetoed the law because "it did not have a sufficiently thought-out conception of the legal regulation of exports and imports of nuclear installations, equipment, technology, nuclear and radioactive materials, special non-nuclear materials, and services in the area of nuclear energy."  Yeltsin also said that the law conflicted with some provisions of the Russian constitution and several other laws which are already in force. The bill had been harshly criticized by the Ministry of Atomic Energy, which said it would hobble Russian nuclear exports.  The Federal Assembly could override Yeltsin's veto, but it would require the support of  two-thirds of the deputies of both the Federation Council and the Duma.
["Soobshcheniye press-sluzhby Prezidenta Rossiyskoy Federatsii 1999-10-25-007," 25 October 1999, Russian Government Website, http://www.gov.ru.]{entered 6 March 2000 SDP}
 
22 September 1999: DUMA PASSES BILL REQUIRING LEGISLATIVE APPROVAL OF NUCLEAR EXPORTS
The State Duma approved an amendment to the law On the Use of Atomic Energy that requires each individual export of nuclear material from Russia to be approved by a federal law, Interfax reported on 22 September 1999. The amendment states that "export of nuclear materials, including nuclear fuel and radioactive substances, with the exception of those intended for medical use, will in each case be realized by the adoption of a federal law." Another amendment to the law adopted as part of the same bill requires that "export and import of nuclear installations, equipment, technology, nuclear materials, radioactive substances, special non-nuclear materials and services related to the use of atomic energy are carried out in accordance with procedures established by the legislation of the Russian Federation." Deputy Aleksandr Pomorov, a member of the Communist faction, and deputy chairman of the Duma Committee on Conversion and Science-Intensive Technologies, told Interfax that the amendments were necessary to regulate operations with nuclear materials.  He added that the amendments would restrict "those who would enrich themselves on the basis of these valuable materials." Deputy Vyacheslav Ovchenkov, of the Our Home is Russia Faction, argued against the adoption of the amendments, saying that if they were accepted, Russia "will not be able to build nuclear power stations abroad." Although the amendments did not receive the necessary 226 votes (out of 450 total deputies in the Duma) to pass at first, on a second attempt, they received the support of 242 deputies and will now be sent to the Federation Council for consideration.[1] Officials from the Ministry of Atomic Energy were quick to condemn the amendments.  First Deputy Minister of Atomic Energy Valentin Ivanov told Interfax that the amendments, "would actually 'kill' all Russian nuclear exports." Ivanov said that under the procedures envisaged under the amendments, in the best case, it would probably take a year to get a law approving a nuclear export passed by the Federal Assembly. No Western company would ever wait that long to conclude a contract, he added.[2] Ivanov said that Russia annually concluded "hundreds" of contracts for the export of nuclear materials and technology, having an approximate value of $2 billion. Most of this trade would be lost if the amendments were passed, said Ivanov. He noted that the Ministry of Atomic Energy was preparing a report on the amendment for submission to the Federation Council, and said "the nuclear industry hopes that the governors will not accept this amendment."[2] Some nongovermental analysts also questioned the amendments.  Vladimir Orlov, director of the Moscow-based PIR Center, critically commented to the newspaper Vek, "Russian annually signs hundred of export contracts involving nuclear technology--so what, now hundreds of federal laws will be necessary?" [3] Vek speculated that the amendments had been passed because of the support of the "antinuclear" lobby in the Duma, which has the support of the environmental movement in Western Europe. The paper said that the amendments may also be part of a larger strategy by those who oppose plans by the Ministry of Atomic Energy to import spent nuclear fuel for reprocessing.[3] It seems equally likely, however, that the support of the Communist faction in the Duma for these amendments is motivated by opposition efforts to gain some political leverage over those elements of the executive branch that are able to earn hard currency through exports, as the opposition believes that a large part of these earnings are being used for corrupt purposes.
Sources:
[1] "Eksport yadernykh materialov dolzhen osushchestvlyatsya tolko posle prinyatiya v kazhdom konkretnom sluchaye federalnogo zakona--resheniya Gosdumy," Interfax, 22 September 1999.
[2] "Popravka v zakon 'ob izpolzovanii atomnoy energii' svodit na net atomnyy eksport Rossii--Minatom RF," Interfax, 22 September 1999.
[3] "Zakonodateli voyuyut s eksportom," Vek, 1-7 October 1999, p. 8. {entered 26 October 1999 SDP}
 
3 September 1999: GOVERNMENT ISSUES PLAN TO IMPLEMENT NEW EXPORT CONTROL LAW
Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin issued a government resolution on 3 September 1999 outlining the steps that the Russian government will take in order to implement the federal law On export control, which took effect in July 1999. In addition to laying out a work plan for the government to implement the law, the resolution formally designated the Federal Service for Currency and Export Controls the "Special Authorized Federal Executive Body in the Export Control Sphere" called for by Article 9 of the law.  According to the work plan, in September 1999, the government will prepare a draft presidential decree outlining the organization of the "Interdepartmental Export Control Coordinating Body," authorized by Article 9 of the law.  In November 1999, the workplan calls on the government to issue draft amendments to the Code on Administrative Violations [Kodeks RSFSR ob Administrativnykh Pravonarusheniyakh] which would bring its provisions into line with the new export control law, and also calls for the preparation of a draft presidential decree revising the control list of chemical weapons-related materials and technologies. Other points of the work plan include: preparation in November 1999 of draft government resolutions detailing the export control procedures applicable to foreign trade operations in missile-related technology and chemical weapons-related technology; drafting in December 1999 of a government resolution outlining the procedures for government certification of internal export control compliance programs at Russian firms, as required by Article 16 of the law On export control; preparation in January 2000 of a draft presidential decree updating the control list of materials and technologies that could be used to create biological or toxin weapons; drafting in February 2000 of a government resolution outlining the procedure for conducting government technical reviews of foreign trade operations involving materials and technologies that could be used to create weapons of mass destruction, delivery systems for those weapons, and other types of military weapons and equipment which are subject to export control.
["O merakh po realizatsii Federalnogo zakona 'Ob eksportnom kontrole,'" Postanovleniye Pravitelstva Rossiyskoy Federatsii No. 993, 3 September 1999, Sobraniye zakondatelstva Rossiyskoy Federatsii, No. 37, 13 September 1999, pp. 8308-8310.]{entered 12 October 1999 SDP}
 
29 July 1999: NEW EXPORT CONTROL LAW TAKES EFFECT
The federal law On export control took effect on 29 July 1999, when it was officially published in Rossiyskaya gazeta.  The law, which was passed by the Duma on 22 June 1999, had been approved by the Federation Council on 2 July 1999 and signed by President Yeltsin on 18 July 1999. The new law provides the legal basis for the Russian export control system, which had previously operated largely on the basis of presidential decrees and government resolutions. Article 1 of the law gives a legal definition of the term "export control," which it describes as a group of measures regulating "foreign economic activity with goods, information, work, services, and the results of intellectual activity that could be used the development of weapons of mass destruction, their delivery systems, and other types of weapons and military equipment." Article 4 declares that the objectives of the Russian export control system are to 1) protect the interests of the Russian Federation; 2) satisfy the requirements of international agreements; and 3) create the necessary conditions for the integration of Russia into the international economy.  The law provides (Article 6) that export control lists will be drawn up by the president, in consultation with the Federal Assembly and industry representatives, a change from the previous regulations, in which the executive branch had sole discretion over the contents of the lists. The law requires "transparency" and open access to information about the export control system.  Article 9 establishes an "Interdepartmental Export Control Coordinating Body," to oversee federal export control policy, and also authorizes the creation of a "Special Authorized Federal Executive Body in the Export Control Sphere" to implement that policy. Currently, the Federal Service for Currency and Export Controls fills this role. Article 17 authorizes this body to conduct detailed audits of organizations suspected of possible export control violations. Article 16 directs the Russian government to aid in the establishment of internal export control compliance departments at companies that deal in controlled goods and technologies.  This article also makes the establishment of such departments mandatory at Russian firms that conduct "scientific or production activity in support of federal defense and national security requirements," or "regularly earn income from foreign trade operations involving controlled goods and technologies." Article 20 establishes the legal basis for the use of the "catch-all" principle, which was introduced into the Russian export control system by a January 1998 government decree. Article 25 allows the imposition of export controls on WMD-related technology on the basis of either international agreements or Russian national interests, laying the legal basis for the imposition of unilateral export controls. Article 32 calls for sanctions against those violating Russian export control regulations, including fines and in "extreme cases that result in the infliction of considerable damage to the economic interests of the Russian Federation, national defense and state security, or in the case of a repeat offense, the organization may lose the right to conduct certain types of foreign economic activities for up to three years." (The full text of the law is available here.)
["Russian Federation Federal Law on Export Control," Rossiyskaya gazeta, 29 July 1999, pp. 4-5; in "Export Control Law Published," FBIS Document FTS19990802000019.]{entered 18 August 1999 SDP}
 
23 June 1999: SECURITY COUNCIL WORKING GROUP SUPPORTS EXPORT CONTROL COOPERATION WITH U.S.
A meeting of the Russian Security Council's working group on WMD proliferation "found it expedient" to continue dialogue with the United States on export control issues, ITAR-TASS reported on 23 June 1999.  The session considered a number of U.S. proposals for cooperation in the creation of internal export control compliance deparments at Russian industrial facilities in the nuclear, missile, military, and space launch sectors, taking into account the provisions of the law On export control, which was adopted by the Duma on 22 June 1999.
[ITAR-TASS, 23 June 1999; in "Russia-US Talks on Export Control Considered Expedient," FBIS Document FTS19990623001475.]{entered 28 July 1999 SDP}
 
22 June 1999: DUMA PASSES EXPORT CONTROL LAW
The State Duma passed the draft law On export control in both its second and third readings on 22 June 1999, Interfax reported. The third reading indicates that the house has given final approval to the draft, which now proceeds to the Federation Council for consideration. The draft law specifies the rights and duties of participants in foreign trade, and lays out the legal foundation for the Russian export control system. The draft law was presented to the Duma by Deputy Adrian Puzanovskiy, the chairman of the Economic Policy Committee, who said it had been amended to make it consistent with other laws on foreign trade in military products subject to export control.[1] The Duma passed the law in both its second and third readings on 22 June 1999, rapidly finishing its consideration of the issue.[2]
Sources:
[1]ITAR-TASS, 22 June 1999; in "Duma Passes Law on Export Control," FBIS Document FTS19990623000470.
[2]Interfax, 22 June 1999; in "Daily Financial Report," FBIS Document FTS19990623001124. {entered 22 June 1999 SDP}
 
3 June 1999: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AGENCY CITES EXPORT CONTROL VIOLATIONS
Yuriy Gaydukov, general director of the Federal Agency for the Legal Protection of the Results of of Intellectual Activity in the Sphere of Military, Special, and Dual-Use Technology (FAPRID), told a 3 June 1999 press conference that his agency was investigating cases in which Russian citizens had illegally patented Russian technology with potential applications in the missile, nuclear, chemical, and aviation sectors, Vremya-MN reported. According to Gaydukov, over 800 patents involving such technology have been registered in the United States by Russian citizens since 1993.[1] Under Russian law, as specified in Government Resolution No. 1132, the intellectual property rights to all military, nuclear, and dual-use technologies that were developed with Russian government funding belong to the state.[2] As a result, said Gaydukov, those individuals who filed for these patents in the United States were violating Russian law. Although there is currently no penalty stipulated by Russian legislation for violating these patent regulations, Gaydukov said those who had filed the patents in the United States could be charged with violating Article 189 of the Russian Criminal Code, which prohibits the illegal export of technologies, materials, services, and equipment used in the production of WMD. Gaydukov said these 800 cases had already been turned over to the Federal Security Service for investigation. According to this report, the Russian government hopes to use FAPRID, which will be involved in the export control process, not only to protect Russian national security interests, but also for economic reasons. If the cash-strapped Russian government can re-establish the tight control over intellectual property rights in the area of military, nuclear, and dual-use technologies that existed during the Soviet era, it could take in $250 million to $450 million annually in royalties and fees.[1]
Sources:
[1]Oleg Volkov, "Pravo pervogo patenta," Vremya-MN, online edition, http://www.eastview.com, 3 June 1999.
[2] "O pervoocherednykh merakh po pravovoy zashite interesov gosudarstva v protsesse ekonomicheskogo i grazhdansko-pravovogo oborota rezultatov nauchno-issledovatelskikh, opytno-konstruktorskikh i tekhnologicheskikh rabot voyennogo, spetsialnogo i dvoynogo naznacheniya," Government Resolution No. 1132, 29 September 1998, Sobranie zakonodatelstva Rossiyskoy Federatsii No. 40 (5 October 1998), pp. 9184-9186.{entered 22 June 1999 SDP}
 
1 June 1999: EXPORT CONTROL LAW TO UNDERGO SECOND READING IN DUMA
The Economic Policy Committee of the Duma has completed its examination of the draft law On export control, which will now be submitted to the full Duma for approval. Draft laws are not considered to be approved by the Duma until they have undergone three readings. During its consideration of the draft law, the Economic Policy committee examined 46 proposed amendments, of which it accepted 41. Proposed amendments were submitted by Duma deputies, members of the Federation Council, and President Yeltsin. Among the amendments that the committee accepted were changes expanding the definition of "weapon of mass destruction" to include "delivery vehicles." Another amendment modifies the procedure for drawing up national control lists, so that changes to lists would be made by the executive branch "in consultation with representatives of the Federal Assembly and industry," while the original version of the law gave the executive branch sole responsibility for formulating control lists. The new law also includes provisions regulating the return to Russia of hard currency receipts from foreign trade operations. An amendment submitted by Deputy Aleksey Arbatov will allow executive branch agencies to issue normative acts on export controls "within their area of competence."
["Proyekt Zakona 'Ob eksportnom kontrole' podgotovlen ko vtoromu chteniyu," Rossiyskaya gazeta, online edition http://www.rg.ru]{entered 18 June 1999 SDP}
 
25 May 1999: SECURITY COUNCIL STAFF HOLDS SESSION ON EXPORT CONTROLS
On 25 May 1999, the working group on WMD nonproliferation of the Russian Security Council apparatus held a meeting to discuss the effectiveness of the Russian export control system, RIA-Novosti reported. At the meeting, which was attended by officials from a number of Russian government agencies, the implementation of internal export control compliance departments at Russian military-industrial firms and higher educational institutions was discussed. The members of the working group also agreed that it was necessary to pass the comprehensive draft federal law on export controls as soon as possible. That law is still under consideration in the State Duma.
[Olga Semyonova, RIA-Novosti, 25 May 1999; in "Russian Security Council Addresses Proliferation," FBIS Document FTS199905250001556.]{entered 26 May 1999 SDP}
 
26 April 1999: RUSSIA, BELARUS SIGN EXPORT CONTROL AGREEMENT
Russia and Belarus have signed an agreement on cooperation in the area of export controls, ITAR-TASS reported on 26 April 1999. According to the report, the agreement calls for the development of a single procedure for export controls in both countries, as part of the process of implementing the Russia-Belarus union. The agreement states that the development of a unified system of export controls regulating trade in WMD, associated delivery systems, and other types of arms and military equipment "is vital primarily for ensuring the national security of Russia and Belarus." Under the agreement, the two countries will unify their national legislation on export controls, based on "national unified lists of certain types of materials, equipment, technology, and services which are subject to export control." The agreement notes that these unified national control lists must correspond to international treaties and the Wassenaar arrangement. The report did not specify the time frame in which Russia and Belarus will unify their export control systems. The agreement entered into force on 13 April 1999, following its signature.
[ITAR-TASS, 26 April 1999; in "Russia-Belarus Export Control Agreement Signed," FBIS Document FTS19990426001261]{entered 22 June 1999 SDP}
 
11 April 1999: YELSTIN CALLS FOR CHANGES TO DRAFT LAW ON EXPORT CONTROL
Preident Yeltsin sent his evaluation of the draft law On export control to the State Duma on 11 April 1999, ITAR-TASS reported. Yeltsin said that several aspects of the draft law should be modified in order to bring it into line with exisiting legislation. In particular he noted that an export control system for military goods has already been established under the terms of the law On military-technical cooperation with foreign states, arguing that the new law On export control should be consistent with the earlier legislation. Yeltsin also complained that the draft law does not specify the sanctions for violating export controls, fails to define a standard of evidence for imposing sanctions on violators, and does not identify the government agencies that are authorized to impose sanctions. Yeltsin also concluded that the draft law does not clearly define the responsibilities of companies engaged in export operations involving goods and services subject to export control.
[ITAR-TASS, 11 April 1999; in "Yeltsin Calls for Changes to Export Control Bill," FBIS Document FTS19990411000785.]{entered 18 June 1999 SDP}
 
8 April 1999: EXPORT CONTROL COMMISSION CONSIDERS AMENDMENTS TO CRIMINAL CODE
At a meeting held on 7 April 1999 under the chairmanship of First Deputy Prime Minister Yuriy Maslyukov, the Government Commission on Export Control held a closed-door meeting to discuss amendments to the Criminal Code that had been suggested by the Federal Security Service. According to Kommersant-daily, the amendments would impose stiffer penalities on those convicted of illegal export operations. The meeting also discussed the prospects of the draft federal law on export control, which is still under consideration in the Duma. The subject of the ten Russian entities that have been sanctioned by the United States for allegedly assisting the Iranian nuclear and missile programs was not on the agenda of the meeting, according to the paper, but was discussed nonetheless (for information on these entities see the entry for 1/13/99 below and the overview, "Institutions Suspected by the Russian Government of Violating Export Control Legislation.") The Government Commission on Export Control has almost completed its investigation of these entities, and has concluded that most of them did not violate any Russian law. However, the Moso and Evropalas-2000 companies were found to have violated Russian customs regulations when shipping Spanish-made steel to Iran via Azerbaijan in March 1998. The investigation concluded that both companies were "fronts" with no real assets. Moso was founded by an Iranian national and three citizens of Tajikistan, the Russian investigation concluded. Both companies were accused by U.S. officials of attempting to export maraging steel to Iran for use in ballistic missiles, although Russian officials have said the steel involved was of an ordinary type not specially suited for use in missiles. Officials from the commission reportedly still have unresolved questions about the activities of one or two of the other entities that the United States government has sanctioned, but will try to convince the United States that the sanctions should be lifted from those that have not violated Russian export controls.
[Nikolay Kuchin and Leonid Panin, "Ikh uchreditelyami byli inostransty," Kommersant-daily online edition, http://win.www.online.ru/.../commersant-daily-month/, 8 April 1999.]{entered 19 April 1999 SDP}
 
22 March 1999: PRIMAKOV SAYS RUSSIA OBSERVES EXPORT CONTROL OBLIGATIONS
Following a 22 March 1999 meeting with his Israeli counterpart Benjamin Netanyahu, Russian Prime Minister Yevgeniy Primakov declared, "I can say can say clearly and definitively that we are doing everything to prevent leakages of weapons of mass destruction. Russia is abiding by absolutely every international standard concerning export. This policy has not changed," Interfax reported.[1] Israel, along with the United States, has expressed concern that Russian missile and nuclear technology is leaking to Iran. Primakov's statement was the latest denial by the Russian government of these charges, although his carefully phrased statement does not necessarily preclude that some leakage of technology and materials could be occurring without the knowledge of the government and despite its efforts.
[Interfax, 22 March 1999; in "Primakov Reiterates Remarks on Technology Exports," FBIS Document FTS19990322000642]{entered 22 June 1999 SDP}
 
11 February 1999: BORDYUZHA CHAIRS MEETING ON EXPORT CONTROLS
Security Council Secretary and Chief of Staff of the Presidential Administration Nikolay Bordyuzha chaired a meeting of government officials to discuss nonproliferation of WMD, related delivery systems, and the Russian export control system, Interfax reported on 11 February 1999. The meeting was attended by relevant government officials, including First Deputy Prime Minister Yuriy Maslyukov. According to the report, the meeting included discussions on the means of improving Russian export controls, and emphasized that these controls are "a constituent part of the national security of the country." The officals also discussed the CIA report issued on 8 February 1999, Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, which accuses Russia of lax export control enforcement. Deputy Security Council Secretary Oleg Chernov told Interfax after the meeting that the session had worked out concrete proposals on "assisting Rusian exporters from the military-industrial complex," which will be submitted to President Boris Yeltsin and Prime Minister Yevgeniy Primakov. Although Russian officials have previously hotly denied the CIA assessment of Russian export controls as lax (see item for 2/10/99 below), Chernov said that during the meeting Bordyuzha had conceded that "in this sphere there are still some blank spots," implying that the Russian export control system could use improvement. In this context, the meeting noted that a comprehensive draft law on export controls is still under consideration by the Duma, having passed only the first of three required readings. This draft law was only submitted to the Duma last July, however, following its approval by the Russian government (see item for 7/30/98 below). Chernov also admitted that the control of exports has been complicated because many private Russian firms are now able to seek foreign markets "independently." He noted that another area of possible improvement is the monitoring of "brain drain," as a result of which Russian technological know-how related to WMD may leak. "Russia has much to do in this area," he said.  In a reflection of Russian pique over public U.S. criticism, Chernov said that Russia had a number of issues to raise with the United States regarding export controls, but expressed confidence that they could be resolved by discussions in the U.S.-Russian Joint Commission on Economic and Technological Cooperation (formerly known as the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission).
["Bordyuzha provel soveshchaniye po voprosu nerasprostraneniya oruzhiya massovogo unichtozheniya, sredstv ego dostavki i eksportnogo kontrolya," Interfax, 11 February 1999.]{entered 17 Feruary 1999 SDP}
 
10 February 1999: MASLYUKOV SLAMS CIA ASSESSMENT OF RUSSIAN EXPORT CONTROLS
Anton Surikov, press spokesman for Russian First Deputy Prime Minister Yuriy Maslyukov, told ITAR-TASS on 10 February 1999 that "Russia cannot accept accusation[s] alleging that it outrageously violates international agreements on non-proliferation of missile, nuclear-missile, and dual-purpose technologies." Masluykov was responding to the harsh criticism of Russian export controls expressed by U.S. Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet in congressional testimony on 2 February 1999, which is repeated in the publicly released Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions. Masluykov, who heads the Russian Government Commission on Military-Technical Cooperation with Foreign Countries, insisted that "Russia possesses an efficient enough system of exports control to prevent leak of missile technologies and other technologies connected with creation of weapons of mass destruction." Maslyukov noted that Russia is cooperating with other states in the area of export control, including the United States.  He argued that the CIA assessment of Russian export controls "had apparently been made for political purposes," implying that the charges made by Tenet are largely false and motivated by a desire to discredit Russia.  Interfax also reported that the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service announced on 10 February 1999 that "according to data available, no facts of violation of international agreements by Russia on a state level exist." This carefully worded statement seems to imply the private Russian entities may be violating international agreements on export control without the knowledge of the Russian government.
[ITAR-TASS, 10 February 1999; in "Further on Maslyukov Comments on CIA Accusations," FBIS Document FTS19990210000932.]{entered 17 February 1999 SDP}
 
4 February 1999: RUSSIAN OFFICIAL TERMS EXPORT CONTROL SYSTEM "SEMI-VIRTUAL"
In a candid admission that diverges from official rhetoric insisting that Russian export controls are effective, Viktor Mizin, the head of the division in the Russian Foreign Ministry responsible for export controls, termed the Russian export control system "semi-virtual," and not operational.  Mizin, in comments published in the 4 Feburary 1999 edition of Foreign Report, said that "the problem is enforcement, enforcement, enforcement." He blamed bureaucratic infighting for the poor functioning of the export control system, saying that authority should be vested in one office. Mizin's comments dovetail with those of many Western analysts, who say that while Russia has an export control system on paper, its provisions are not effectively enforced, and firms and individuals violating its provisions are not punished.  Mizin also called for intensified efforts to aid Russia's missile industry to prevent further technology leakage.[1] While Mizin's comments are atypical for a Russian official, he had previously written in an article published in the Spring-Summer 1998 edition of The Nonproliferation Review that although Russia has had missile export control regulations in place since 1993, "no one in Russia has yet been prosecuted and convicted under this legislation."[2]
Sources:
[1] "Russia's Aid to Iran," Foreign Report, 4 February 1999; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, http://www.lexis-nexis.com.
[2] Viktor Mizin, "Russia's Missile Industry and U.S. Nonproliferation Options," The Nonproliferation Review 5 (Spring-Summer 1998), p. 37.
 
2 February 1999: DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE CRITICIZES RUSSIAN EXPORT CONTROLS
U.S. Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet harshly criticized the Russian export control system in his testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee on 2 February 1999. Tenet identified proliferation of WMD as the most significant current and projected threat to the national security of the United States, singling out Russia (as well as China) as a supplier of WMD technology to countries of proliferation concern. Tenet expressed concern about the weakness of Russian export controls, saying that while there had been "some positive signs" during early 1998 with regard to the tightening of missile technology export controls, "there has been no sustained improvement." He added that "especially during the last six months, expertise and materiel from Russia has continued to assist the Iranian missile effort in areas ranging from training, to testing, to components." He said this assistance "was continuing as we speak," and would play a "crucial" role in the Iranian missile program. The same day, Yuriy Koptev, head of the Russian Space Agency, told Interfax that the U.S.-Russian Joint Commission on Economic and Technological Cooperation (formerly known as the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission), will "consider plans to tighten control of nuclear technologies at its next session" which is currently scheduled for late March 1999. (Please see also the full text of the CIA Nonproliferation Center's Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions,  issued on 8 February 1999 and available in the NIS Nuclear Profiles full-text documents section.)
Sources:
[1] "Statement of the Director of Central Intelligence George J. Tenet As Prepared for Delivery Before the Senate Armed Services Committee Hearing on Current and Projected National Security Threats," 2 February 1999, http://www.cia.gov/cia/.../speeches/ps020299.html
[2]"Russia, U.S. To Discuss Nuclear Export Control," Interfax, 2 February 1999.{Entered 3 February 1999 SDP}
 
13 January 1999: SECURITY COUNCIL OFFICIAL SAYS EXPORT CONTROLS STRENGTHENED
An anonymous official from the Russian Security Council told the Interfax news agency on 13 January 1999 that Russian export controls had been significantly tightened over the past several months.  Responding to U.S. criticism of the Russian export control system implicit in the 12 January 1999 decision by the Clinton administration to impose sanctions on three Russian entities (the Scientific Research and Design Institute for Energy Technologies (NIKIET), the D. I. Mendeleyev Russian Chemical-Technological University, and the Moscow Aviation Institute), for allegedly shipping sensitive nuclear and missile-related technologies to Iran, the official said that Russia has created an "effective" export control system, adding that the recently-reorganized Federal Currency and Export Control Service is actively carrying out its work. The offical noted that under the provisions of Government Resolution No. 57 of 22 January 1998, all ministries that deal with technology exports have now established export control departments. At virtually all enterprises and institutions of the Russian defense industry that export military and dual-use technology, internal export control compliance programs have been established, he added. The official said that on the orders of First Deputy Prime Minister Yuriy Maslyukov, who heads the Government Commission on Export Control, an export control check was conducted at a number of military-industrial firms during summer 1998. This check did not uncover a single violation of Russian export control legislation or Russian obligations under international agreements on export control. Nevertheless, said the official, the Government Commission on Export Control has warned a number of ministries and defense industrial enterprises to very closely monitor prospective foreign purchasers of their technology, and to consult with the commission if they have any questions about the legitimacy of a particular buyer.
["Kontrol za eksportom tekhnologiy iz Rossii znachitelno usilen--predstavitel sovbeza RF," Interfax, 13 January 1999.]{entered 20 January 1999 SDP}
 
5 January 1999: YELTSIN DECREES CHANGES IN EXPORT CONTROL LISTS
The presidential press service told Interfax on 5 January 1999 that President Yeltisn has signed decrees making changes in the lists that determine which missile-related and dual-use equipment, technology, and know-how is subject to export control. The press service said that Yeltsin's decrees modified Presidential Decree No. 1268, "On Control of Exports from the Russian Federation of Dual-Use Goods and Technologies," adopted on 26 August 1996, and Presidential Decree No. 1194, "On Control of Exports from the Russian Federation of Equipment, Materials, and Technology Employed to Develop Missile Weapons," approved on 16 August 1996. The report did not specify the changes made to the control lists, but announced that "the amendments aim to ensure the implementation of Russia's international obligations as a signatory to the Wassenaar Agreements [sic] on export controls over conventional arms, dual-purpose goods, and missile technology," and argued that "these presidential decrees again confirmed Russia's commitment to the policy of nonproliferation and the strengthening of the national system for export controls."[1] Both the United States and Israel have publicly criticized Russia for lax export controls, accusing the Russian government of failing to stop Russian firms from collaborating with Iran on nuclear and missile development projects. The full text of Presidential Decree No. 7, issued 4 January 1999, was subsequently published in Rossiyskaya gazeta on 19 January 1999. The published decree, which modified the missile technology control list, included the amendments and supplements to the list.[2] The full text of Presidential Decree No. 6, issued 4 January 1999, was published in Rossiskaya gazeta on 14 January 1999, including an appendix of amendments and supplements to the dual-use control list.[3]
Sources:
[1] Interfax, 5 January 1999; in "Yelstin Decrees 'Confirmed' Commitment to Nonproliferation," FBIS Document FTS19990105000690.
[2] "Decree of the President of the Russian Federation 'On Amending and Supplementing the List of Equipment, Materials, and Technology Used in Developing Nuclear [sic: mistranslated, should be "Missile"] Weapons Under Export Control', approved by Decree No 1194, 16 August 1996 of the President of the Russian Federation 'On Control of Export of Equipment, Materials, and Technology Used in Developing Missile Weapons From the Russian Federation,'" Rossiyskaya gazeta, 19 January 1999, p. 6; in "Missile Export Restrictions (Amended List)," FBIS Document FTS19990122001122.
[3] "Decree of the President of the Russian Federation  On Amending and Supplementing the List of Dual-Purpose Goods and Technologies Subject to Export Control, Approved by Russian Federation Presidential Decree No. 1268 of 26 August 1996, 'On Control of Exports from the Russian Federation of Dual-Purpose Goods and Technologies,'" Rossiyskaya gazeta, 14 January 1999, pp. 1-10; in "Yeltsin Decree on Export," FBIS Document FTS19990130000888. {updated  18 August 1999 SDP}
 
1 January 1999: ANALYST: FAPRID UNNECESSARILY COMPLICATES EXPORT LICENSING PROCESS
In a letter published in the January-February 1999 edition of Yadernyy kontrol, Aleksandr Tokarev complained that the provisions of Government Resolution No. 1132, which created a new subdivision of the Ministry of Justice, the Federal Agency for the Legal Protection of the Results of of Intellectual Activity in the Sphere of Military, Special, and Dual-Use Technology (FAPRID), have unnecessarily complicated the export control licensing process in Russia. Tokarev complained that even before this resolution, Russian exporters of controlled commodities in effect were forced to obtain two licenses, one from the Federal Currency and Export Control Service (VEK), and another from the Ministry of Trade.  Since the adoption of Government Resolution No. 1132, which requires the Ministry of Justice agree to any export license granted by VEK, Tokarev argued, exporters face yet another barrier to the prompt receipt of an export license. He pointed out that the Ministry of Justice has not yet issued clear guidelines that specify its requirements for granting permission for an export transaction, leading to confusion among exporters and possibly "subjective" decisions by the ministry. Tokarev also argued that the granting to the Ministry of Justice of effective veto rights over export licenses violates provisions of the Law on Foreign Trade Activity. He concluded that the Ministry of Justice should be limited to merely registering applications for export until an interagency commission can work out formal procedures for including the Ministry in the export control process.
[Aleksandr Tokarev, "Iz redaktsionnoy pochty: Izmeneniya v sisteme eksportnogo kontrolya proiskhodyat ne v storonu uproshcheniya oformleniya dokumentov," Yadernyy kontrol No. 1, January-February 1999, pp. 86-87.]{entered 22 February 2000 SDP}
 
24 November 1998: SECURITY COUNCIL NONPROLIFERATION COMMISSION HOLDS SESSION
On 24 November 1998, Security Council Deputy Secretary Grigoriy Rapota chaired a meeting of the interdepartmental commission on nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems of the Russian Security Council.  Among other topics, the commission had a "businesslike and constructive" discussion of measures to improve internal export control compliance programs at Russian companies dealing with military and dual-use exports. The meeting was attended by representatives of Minatom, the Federal Currency and Export Control Service, the Russian Space Agency, the Ministry of the Economy, and other federal agencies.
["Kommissiya po nerasprostraneniyu deystvuyet," Yadernyy kontrol No. 6, November-December 1998, p. 8]{entered 11 March 1999 SDP}
 
12 November 1998: GOVERNMENT APPROVES PROPOSED CHANGES TO EXPORT CONTROL LISTS
The Russian government has approved two resolutions that submit to the president proposed amendments to the lists that determine which missile-related and dual-use equipment and technology is subject to export control, Interfax reported on 12 November 1998.[1]  According to media reports, the changes broaden the control lists and thus tighten Russian export controls.[2]  Government Resolution No. 1319, aproved on 9 November 1998, submitted to the president proposed amendments to the control list contained in Presidential Decree No. 1268, "On Control of Exports from the Russian Federation of Dual-Use Goods and Technologies," adopted on 26 August 1996.[3]  The changes suggested by this resolution are designed to allow Russia to meet the requirements of the Wassenaar Arrangement, according to Interfax.[1] Government Resolution No. 1318, also approved on 9 November 1998, submitted to the president proposed amendments to Presidential Decree No. 1194, "On Control of Exports from the Russian Federation of Equipment, Materials, and Technology Employed to Develop Missile Weapons," approved on 16 August 1996.[4] The details of the proposed amendments to the control lists were not released.  The amendments will become effective if they are approved by the president and issued in the form of a presidential decree making changes in the earlier decrees.
Sources:
[1] Interfax, 12 November 1998; in "Moscow Approves Changes in List of Dual-Purpose Products," FBIS Document FTS19981112000779.
[2] AFP, 12 November 1998; in "Russia Moves to Tighten Control Over Dual-Use Technology," Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe,  http://www.lexis-nexis.com.
[3] "Ob odobrenii i predstavlenii na utverzhdeniye Prezidenta Rossiyskoy Federatsii izmeneniy i dopolneniy, vnosimykh v Spisok tovarov i tekhnologiy dvoynogo naznacheniya, eksport kotorykh kontoliruyetsya," Sobraniye zakonodatelstva RF No. 47, 23 November 1998, p. 10516.
[4] "Ob odobrenii i predstavlenii na utverzhdeniye Prezidenta Rossiyskoy Federatsii izmeneniy i dopolneniy, vnosimykh v Spisok obrudovaniya, materialov, i tekhnologiy, primenyayushchikhsya pri sozdanii raketnogo oruzhiya, eksport kotorykh kontoliruyetsya," Sobraniye zakonodatelstva RF No. 47, 23 November 1998, p. 10515.{entered 21 January 1999 SDP}
 
 November 1998: PRIMAKOV FORMS EXPORT OVERSIGHT COMMITTEE
Russian Prime Minister Yevgeniy Primakov has created a new federal commission to oversee weapon exports and arms cooperation with foreign countries. Yuriy Maslyukov, first deputy prime minister for the defense industry, will lead the new Commission on Military-Technical Cooperation with Foreign Countries. This will make Maslyukov the senior Russian official in charge of arms exports, and will include managing the state-owned arms agency Rosvooruzheniye. Representatives from the Defense Ministry, Federal Security Service, Foreign Intelligence Service, Ministry of Finance, and other governmental agencies that supervise arms exports will participate in the commission. Within a month Maslyukov is to draw up an outline of his commission's responsibilities and submit it to Primakov for formal approval. Defense experts believe that Maslyukov will also reshuffle the leadership at Rosvooruzheniye, which he has repeatedly accused of not maintaining a sufficient level of sales. Rosvooruzheniye controls 80 percent of Russia's arms exports.
[Simon Saradzhyan, "New Committee to Oversee Russian Weapon Exports," Defense News, 2-8 November 1998, p.14.]{entered 19 March 1999 FW}
 
29 September 1998: GOVERNMENT RESOLUTION ESTABLISHES NEW INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AGENCY
The government of the Russian Federation issued resolution No. 1132 on 29 September 1998, entitled, On Urgent Measures to Protect the Interests of the State in the Process of Economic and Civil Transactions Involving Results of Scientific, Experimental, and Technological Work for Military, Special, and Dual-Use Applications. This resolution implements the directives issued by President Yeltsin in Presidential Decree No. 556 of 14 May 1998, On the Legal Protection of the Results of Scientific, Experimental, and Technological Work with Military, Special, and Dual-Use Applications. The resolution stipulates that the intellectual property rights to all military, nuclear, and dual-use technologies that were developed with Russian government funding belong to the state. The resolution charges the Ministry of Justice with administering the government's interest in such intellectual property rights.  It also establishes a new subdivision of the Ministry of Justice, the Federal Agency for the Legal Protection of the Results of of Intellectual Activity in the Sphere of Military, Special, and Dual-Use Technology (FAPRID), to carry out this function. FAPRID will create a register of state-owned military, special, and dual-use technologies; monitor the use of these technologies; administer intellectual property rights associated with these technologies; prepare contracts for the use of these technologies; and prepare licensing agreements for these technologies.[1] As a result of this resolution, FAPRID will participate in the interagency review of export license applications for most sensitive nuclear, missile, and dual-use technologies, since most such technologies used in Russia were developed with state funding and are now subject to the control of FAPRID. Some analysts believe that the addition of another government agency to the license review process will slow it down and reduce its efficiency.[2]
Sources:
[1] "O pervoocherednykh merakh po pravovoy zashchite interesov gosudarstva v protsesse ekonomicheskogo i grazhdansko-pravovogo oborota rezultatov nauchno-issledovatelskikh, opytno-konstruktorskikh i tekhnologicheskikh rabot voyennogo, spetsialnogo i dvoynogo naznacheniya," Government Resolution No. 1132, 29 September 1998, Sobraniye zakonodatelstva Rossiyskoy Federatsii No. 40, 5 October 1998, pp. 9184-9186.
[2] Anna Otkina, "Russia's New Regulations for Copyright Protection: Implications for Export Controls," The Monitor Vol. 4 , Fall 1998, pp. 53-54.{entered 22 February 2000 SDP}
 
30 July 1998: GOVERNMENT APPROVES DRAFT EXPORT CONTROL LAW
At a cabinet meeting on 30 July 1998, the Russian government approved a draft federal law on export control.[1] The bill will now be submitted to the Russian Federal Assembly for consideration. The draft law "is intended to be a compendium of all existing normative and legally binding acts which prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction and missiles that deliver them and also prevent exports of dual-purpose technology."[2] According to an article in the Moscow daily Russkiy Telegraf, the draft law envisages the creation of an interdepartmental commission to review license applications to export controlled technologies and products.  However, the article criticized the criteria reportedly laid out in the draft law under which this commission would decide to grant or deny license applications, terming them excessively bureaucratic and potentially too restrictive. The paper argued that the procedures outlined under the new law might hurt Russian exporters. [3]
Sources:
[1] ITAR-TASS, 30 July 1998; in "Draft Law on Export Controls Approved," FBIS-SOV-98-217.
[2] "At the Russian Federation Government," Rossiyskaya gazeta, 31 July 1998, p. 2; in "Results of Cabinet's 30 Jul Session Reported," FBIS-SOV-98-218.
[3] Viktor Strelnikov, "Iranian Missile Hits Russian Exporters," Russkiy Telegraf, 30 July 1998, p. 1; in "Provisions of Draft Export Control Law Criticized," FBIS-TAC-98-217. {entered 20 January 1999 SDP}
 
15 July 1998: YELTSIN ORDERS SPEEDY DRAFTING OF EXPORT CONTROL LAW, AMENDMENTS TO CRIMINAL CODE
According to a 15 July 1998 report by Interfax, Russian President Boris Yeltsin has ordered the Russian goverment to speedily draft and submit to the Federal Assembly a federal export control law.  Russia still does not have a comprensive export control law, and export control procedures are currently established largely on the basis of presidential decrees and government regulations. Yeltsin also instructed the government to speed up work on amendments to the Russian Criminal Code "regarding responsibility for the illegal distribution of technology, scientific and technical information, and services related to the manufacture of weapons of mass destruction and delivery missiles."[1] Some Russian experts have criticized the relevant provisions of the current Russian criminal code, which entered into force on 1 January 1997, as too lax.[2] The presidential press service said that Yeltsin's action was prompted by the need to improve control over military and dual-purpose goods, the export of which may damage Russia's defense potential. The action came on the same day that the Russian Government Commission on Export Control announced that it was investigating nine Russian firms for possible export control violations.
Sources:
[1] Interfax, 15 July 1998; in "Yelstin Orders Drafting of Export Control Bill," FBIS-SOV-98-196.
[2] Vladimir Orlov and Anna Otkina, "Uroki dela o giroskopakh," Yadernyy kontrol, No. 2 (March-April 1998); available at http://www.pircenter.org/ykr/index.htm {entered 20 January 1999 SDP}
 
14 July 1998: CHIEF OF GENERAL STAFF SAYS GOVERMENT IS TIGHTENING EXPORT CONTROLS
The Chief of the Russian General Staff, Anatoliy Kvashnin, told Interfax on 14 July 1998 that the Russian government is taking additional measures to tighten control over exports of military materials and technologies. Kvashnin said that the Export Control Commission of the Ministry of Defense is “increasing coordination with law enforcement agencies, which is making it possible to prevent and cut short attempts to take out [of Russia] military purpose goods whose export is banned.” Kvashnin emphasized that “the danger of the spread of materials and technologies for the manufacture of weapons of mass destruction and means of their delivery is obvious…this rule is sacred for Russia.” He added that Russia is maintaining its commitments not to export such technologies under the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the Missile Technology Control Regime.
[INTERFAX, “Russian Govt Tightening Control over Military Exports - General Staff,” 14 July 1998.]{entered 6 August 1998 SDP]
 
20 May 1998: FSB CREATES "BLACK LIST"
The FSB produced a "black list" of foreign entities suspected of involvement in military programs that are illegally developing weapons of mass destruction and missiles for their delivery. Reportedly, the list includes entities in North Korea, Pakistan, Iran and Libya. The list was given to the Ministry of Atomic Energy, the Ministry of the Economy, the Ministry of Industry and Trade, the Russian Space Agency, the Ministry of Science and Technology, and a number of other government agencies and organizations. These Ministries were instructed to recommend that enterprises under their jurisdiction refrain from any export contracts with these black-listed entities. The list was developed in accordance with the Russian National Security Concept of December 1997, which states that the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems is one of the top priorities of Russian national security.[1,2]
Sources:
[1] "Russian Security Service Lists Firms Developing Weapons of Mass Destruction," Interfax, 20 May 1998.
[2] "Nerasprostraneniye yadernogo oruzhiya--osnova bezopasnosti strany," Segodnya, 23 May 1998.{entered 6 August 1998 SDP}
 
14 May 1998: YELTSIN ORDERS PROTECTION OF GOVERNMENT INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
President Yeltsin issued a decree entitled On the Legal Protection of the Results of Scientific, Experimental, and Technological Work with Military, Special, and Dual-Use Applications on 14 May 1998. The decree accepts a proposal from the Russian government that additional steps be taken to protect the state's interest in intellectual property rights associated with military, special, and dual-use technologies that were developed with government funding. The decree charges the Ministry of Justice with the legal defense of the government's intellectual property rights in such technologies. It also orders the Russian government to take "organizational steps" to implement the legal protection of these rights.  The decree could further complicate the Russian export control system, as many controlled commodities exported by Russian firms in the nuclear, missile, and dual-use sectors were developed with government funding, and will now presumably be subject to monitoring and possibly licensing by the Russian Ministry of Justice, which does not presently participate in the interagency license review process in Russia. Its main purpose is probably financial, however, since the government will now be able to demand fees from Russian firms in return for licensing the intellectual property rights to defense-related technologies that can currently be exported without paying such fee.
["O pravovoy zashchite rezultatov nauchno-issledovatelskikh, opytno-konstruktorskikh, i tekhnologicheskikh rabot voennogo, spetsialnogo i dvoynogo naznacheniya,"  Presidential Decree No. 556, 14 May 1998, Sobraniye zakonodatelstva Rossiyskoy Federatsii No. 20, 18 May 1998, p. 4129.]{entered 22 February 2000 SDP}
 
3 March 1998: PRESIDENTIAL SPOKESMAN DENIES EXPORT CONTROL VIOLATIONS
According to Presidential spokesman Sergey Yastrzhembskiy, Russia has tightened restrictions on the export of dual-use technologies. Meeting with Yastrzhembskiy on 2 March 1998, Israeli Trade Minister Natan Sharansky raised the question of allegations that Russia has given missile technologies to Iraq [sic, probably means Iran]. Briefing journalists after the meeting, Yastrzhembskiy said that although the United States and Israel often raise this issue, Russia “has not breached and will not breach international obligations on the nonproliferation of missile technologies.”
[Interfax, 3 March 1998; in "Russia Tightens Restriction On Export Of Dual Technologies," FBIS-SOV-98-062.]{entered 5 November 1998 SDP}
 
27 January 1998:  FEDERAL SECURITY SERVICE "SUBORDINATES" FEDERAL BORDER SERVICE
Russian President Boris Yeltsin made the decision to place the Federal Border Service (FPS), which includes the border troops, under the "subordination" of the Federal Security Service (FSB). The decision was announced by Minister of Justice Sergey Stepashin, a former director of the FSB. However, Stepashin was quick to point out that "subordination" did not mean "a mechanical merger of the two structures."[1,2] Although there had been speculation prior to this announcement that the FPS would be merged with the FSB, a merger has not taken place as a result of the announcement. In the Soviet era, the border troops were subordinate to the KGB, which also carried out functions that are currently performed by the FSB as well as the Federal Agency for Government Communications and Information (FAPSI) and the Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR). The initial announcement did not fully clarify what "subordination" to the FSB would mean for the FPS. In the following days, Yeltsin's spokesman Sergey Yastrzhembskiy said that only "operational subordination" of the border guards to the FSB was envisioned, although the definition of this term was not specified either. The Director of the FPS, Colonel-General Nikolay Bordyuzha, told the newspaper Vek that the announcement did not mean the integration of the FPS into the FSB, saying there was only "an instruction of the Russian Federation president, which is presently being studied."[3]  On 11 February 1998, Deputy Director of the FPS Lieutenant General Alaksandr Manilov told RIA-Novosti that the "operational subordination of the Federal Border Service to the Federal Security Service means nothing but coordination of their actions...for example, in investigations."[4]  As a result, the FPS remains an independent federal agency, even though it may be involved in more joint operations under FSB leadership in the future. The continuing independent status of the FPS is also confirmed in a presidential decree containing the statute of the FSB, issued by President Yeltsin on 6 July 1998. The statute, which outlines the structure and functions of the FSB, charges the agency with taking measures to protect the state borders of the Russian Federation "in concert with the organs of the Russian Federation Border Service." The statue also does not list the FPS as one of the constituent units of the FSB.[5] As a result of the change, however, the FSB may gain more influence over the formulation of Russian border control policy.
Sources:
[1] Interfax, 27 January 1998; in "Yeltsin Subordinates Border Service to FSB," FBIS-SOV-98-027.
[2] RIA-Novosti, 27 January 1998; in "Russian Justice Minister: No Plans to Merge FSB, FPS," FBIS-SOV-98-027.
[3] Nikolay Manvelov, "Can We Live Under the KGB?" Vek, 30 January-5 February 1998, p. 3; in "'Experts Express Doubts on FPS-FSB Merger," FBIS-SOV-98-034.
[4] RIA-Novosti, 11 February 1998; in "Russian Border Official Confirms No Change in Policy," FBIS-SOV-98-042.
[5] "Text of Russian Federation Presidential Edict No. 806 on Approval of the Statue of the Russian Federation Security Service and Its Structure," Rossiyskaya gazeta, 14 July 1998, p. 4; in "Edict, Statute on Federal Security Service," FBIS-SOV-98-217.
 
22 January 1998: RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT ISSUES "CATCH ALL" EXPORT CONTROL REGULATIONS
On 22 January 1998, the Russian government issued a decree, signed by Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin, to improve the mechanism controlling the export of dual-use goods and services. Provisions of the decree included the following: (1) Russian firms are prohibited from selling dual-use goods if the firms know they will be used in weapons of mass destruction (WMD), even if they are not on specific "control lists" established by Russian law and regulations; (2) Russian firms should request guidance from the Government Commission on Export Control if they suspect the dual-use goods will be used in WMD or delivery systems. The Federal Currency and Export Control Service, which is the "working organ" of the Government Commission on Export Control, will deal with such inquiries. Russian agencies, including Minatom, the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade of the Russian Federation, the Russian Space Agency, and the Federal Currency and Export Control Service will work together to explain provisions of this decision to Russian organizations involved in foreign trading. The provisions of this decree introduce the principle of "catch all" export controls into the Russian export control system. Similar regulations, which are designed to plug any possible oversights in existing "control lists," are used in many Western countries.
["Decision  No. 57 of the Government of the Russian Federation," 22 January 1998; in "On the Strengthening of Controls Over the Export of Dual-Use Goods and Services Related to Weapons of Mass Destruction and the Missile Means of their Delivery" Nonproliferation Export Control in Russia (February 1998), No. 1(6),  p. 9.]{entered 5 November 1998 SDP}

Last updated 20 April 2005

Comments or questions? Contact Kenley Butler at MIIS CNS: Kenley.ButlerATmiis.edu

This material is produced independently for NTI by the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies and does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been independently verified by NTI or its directors, officers, employees, agents. Copyright © 2010 by MIIS.

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