The following is an overview based on a report prepared by the Center for
Nonproliferation Studies of the Monterey Institute of International Studies
in January 1997 under a grant from the United States Department of Energy's
Office of Nonproliferation and Arms Control. The views expressed in this
report are those of the authors alone, and do not necessarily represent the
views of the Department of Energy or the United States Government.
The Russian Federation inherited the nuclear-weapon status of the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), along with its membership in international
and bilateral nonproliferation export control agreements and treaties. For more
information specific to Russia, see the section on International
Organizations and Treaties. For general information on international organizations
and nonproliferation, please see the
Inventory
of International Nonproliferation Organizations and Regimes compiled by the Center for Nonproliferation Studies.
April 8, 1957. The USSR became a member of the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).[1] As a nuclear-weapon-state, the USSR (and
now the Russian Federation) is not required to put its nuclear facilities
under IAEA safeguards.
July 1, 1968. The USSR signed the Non-Proliferation
Treaty as a nuclear-weapon-state party. It deposited its instruments of
ratification on March 5, 1970.
April 10, 1972. The USSR signed the Biological
Weapons Convention. It deposited its instruments of ratification on March
26, 1975.
August 14, 1974. The Zangger
Committee first agreed on the basic guidelines for the export of nuclear
material. The guidelines included what has become known as the Trigger List
of materials which must be under IAEA safeguards if exported to a non-nuclear-weapon
state.[2] The USSR was one of the founding members of the Zangger Committee
when it first met in 1971.
January 1978. The Nuclear
Suppliers Groupfirst transmitted its Guidelines for Nuclear Transfers
to the IAEA Director General.[3] The USSR was one of the founding members
of the Nuclear Suppliers Group when it first met in 1975.
June 10, 1985. After a voluntary offer, the USSR signed
an agreement with the IAEA to put a limited number of civilian facilities
under IAEA safeguards.[4]
June 26, 1992. The Russian Federation signed the Minsk
Accord on CIS Export Control Coordination. This was the first multilateral
accord on CIS export control coordination, and calls for the signatories to
develop uniform control lists modeled after existing international export
control regimes. Other signatories include Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan. The Minsk Accord is important
in that it provides a forum for coordinated export control policy in the NIS.
Although there have been a number of CIS meetings at which export controls
were discussed, few steps have been taken by the signatories to coordinate
export control policy.
January 13-15, 1993. The Russian Federation became
an original signatory to the Chemical Weapons Convention. The Russian
Duma has not yet ratified the CWC.
March 3, 1993: The Russian Federation, Armenia, Belarus,
Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan agreed to cooperate in control over
exports of raw materials, equipment, technologies and services which could
be used in the production of weapons of mass destruction.[5]
May 31, 1993. The heads of the Ministries of Foreign
Economic Relations of the CIS countries agreed to establish a CIS Export
Control Council, which will be headed by the chairman of the Russian Eksportkontrol.[6]
January 14, 1994. The Russian Federation and the United
States sign a Memorandum of Intent Between the Government of the United
States of America and the Government of the Russian Federation on Cooperation
in the Area of Export Control in order to cooperate in the area of export
controls and the nonproliferation of weapons and weapon technologies.[7] Although
the United States had earmarked $2.6 million in export control assistance
to Russia through the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, the
two countries were unable to conclude a formal agreement on export controls.
This Memorandum of Intent was a compromise document that enabled the United
States to provide seminars and exchanges in the export control sphere, but
not deliver any export control equipment or technical assistance.
January 6, 1995. The Russian Federation, Belarus,
and Kazakhstan concluded a joint Customs Union. The primary result
of the Customs Union is that it abolishes tariffs on trade between the three
countries. It does not effect the political aspects of nonproliferation export
controls.
October 10-12, 1995. The Russian Federation was formally
admitted to the Missile Technology
Control Regime. December 1995. The Russian Federation signed the framework
agreement for the Wassenaar Arrangement
on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies.[8]
The Wassenaar Arrangement is a new multilateral export control regime,
designed to take the place of the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral
Strategic Export Controls (COCOM). COCOM was dissolved on March 31, 1994.
March 29, 1996. The Russian Federation signed the
Treaty on Deepening Integration in Economic and Humanitarian Fields
with Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan. Although the Treaty does not specifically
address export controls, implementation of the treaty "will inevitably lead
to closer cooperation between these four countries in the sphere of export
controls," according to a Belarusian analyst. An Interstate Council, established
by the Treaty, has called for the creation of a single customs territory and
coordinated trade practices with third countries.[9]
September 19, 1996. During the IAEA 40th General Conference,
Russian Minister of Atomic Energy Viktor Mikhailov, US Secretary of Energy
Hazel O’Leary, IAEA Director General Hans Blix announced trilateral efforts
to safeguard US and Russian weapons-grade nuclear material against reuse for
military purposes.[10]
Sources: [1] "Nonproliferation Attitude," NIS Nuclear Profiles Database,
Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies,
(November 1996). [2] Roland Timerbaev and Meggen Watt, Inventory of International
Nonproliferation Organizations and Regimes, Center for Nonproliferation
Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, (1995 Edition). [3] Ibid. [4] "Nonproliferation Attitude," NIS Nuclear Profiles Database. [5] Itar-Tass, February 9, 1993; in "Six States Agree To Bar Weapons
Technology Exports," JPRS-TND-93-006, (March 5, 1993), p. 17. [6] Kommersant Daily, (June 5, 1993), p. 2. [7] Itar-Tass, (January 14, 1994); in "'Text' Of Memorandum On
Export Controls," FBIS-SOV-94-010, January 14, 1994, p. 20. [8] "Nonproliferation Attitude," NIS Nuclear Profiles Database. [9] Ural Latypov, "Integration in the CIS and Problems of Export
Controls," The Monitor, (Summer 1996), p. 14. [10] Amber Jones, "Secretary of Energy Represents United States
as IAEA Meetings: Focus Is On Reducing Nuclear Danger," DOE Press Release.
To return to the
current
Russian export controls section, see the 