To return to the
current
Russian export controls section, see the Russia: Export
Controls
file.
This
report was prepared by the Center for Nonproliferation Studies of the Monterey
Institute of International Studies in January 1997 under a grant from the
United States Department of Energy's Office of Nonproliferation and Arms
Control. The views expressed in this report are those of the authors alone,
and do not necessarily represent the views of the Department of Energy
or the United States Government. Updates to this report will be included
in future editions of the NIS Nuclear Profiles Database.
As the sole inheritor of the Soviet system of export controls, the Russian
Federation was the only Newly Independent State that was able to draw upon
the considerable technical expertise and experience in the field of export
control policy that had existed in Soviet Moscow. Since 1992, Russia has
made significant progress in reorganizing the previously existing bureaucracy
and establishing a more comprehensive framework for nonproliferation export
controls. Although development of the system has been slow and marked by
numerous fluctuations, it is now possible to point to a growing internal
consistency in the administrative and legal structures of Russian export
control.
In late 1991, the Russian President and the Russian Government [ "Government"
refers to the Russian term " Pravitelstvo." Pravitelstvo refers primarily
to the Cabinet of Ministers, led by Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin.]
attempted to liberalize foreign economic activity while simultaneously
maintaining the Soviet system of quotas and licensing standards to control
certain strategic commodities, including nuclear materials, weapons, and
military technology. As this was an imperfect way to effectively control
the export of strategic commodities, Russia began to formulate a new system
for export controls in the spring of 1992. Since then, a series of Presidential
Decrees (ukazy) and Directives (rasporyazheniya) have developed
export control policy and guidelines, approved specific control lists,
and established administrative bodies with export control responsibility.
Resolutions adopted by the Government have approved statutes that regulate
the export control guidelines and licensing procedures.
The first decree which specifically defined export controls as an element
of Russian nonproliferation policy was a Presidential Decree entitled "On
Measures to Establish an Export Control System in Russia," (No. 388, 4/11/92).
In addition to providing the legal basis for the creation of a nonproliferation
export control system in Russia, the decree established an Export Control
Commission (Eksportkontrol) charged with coordinating export control
policy between other administrative bodies. Over the course of the next
two years, the President approved control lists for the different categories
of dual-use items, and the Government approved licensing procedures for
these items. Meanwhile, new decrees and resolutions also established standards
of control for nuclear items. By early 1993, licensing procedures had been
established for both nuclear and dual-use nuclear commodities.
In 1996, a new resolution was passed that consolidated controls over nuclear
commodities. This resolution gave Eksportkontrol a role in the approval
of nuclear export license applications, thus clarifying previous inconsistencies
and balancing the decision-making authority of the Ministry of Atomic Energy
(Minatom). Previously, Minatom was the sole administrative body whose approval
was required for certain types of nuclear export decisions.
After much bureaucratic reshuffling of the export control administrative
structure, those with primary responsibilities in the nuclear sphere currently
include the Ministry of Atomic Energy (Minatom), Eksportkontrol,
the Federal Service for Currency and Export Controls, the Ministry of Foreign
Economic Relations, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Customs Service.
In 1995, the Russian Duma also played a significant role in the development
of export control policy by successfully passing the Federal Law on State
Regulation of External Trade Activity and the Federal Law on Use of Atomic
Energy (both of which contain articles that provide a new legislative basis
for nonproliferation export control). Before 1995, the only significant
legislation passed by the Duma was an addendum to the Criminal Code of
1993, which established punishments for violations of export control regulations.
A comprehensive export control law has not yet been adopted, although some
Russian officials have stated that a draft law will be presented to the
Duma sometime in 1997. [ Presentation by Rustam Safaraliyev, Deputy Director
of the Russian Federal Service for Currency and Export Controls, "Russia’s
Export Control System and Its Development," at the International Conference
on Industry-Government Relations in Export Control, December 18-19, 1996,
Moscow, Russia. Conference was sponsored by the Moscow-based Center on
Export Controls, the US Department of Commerce, and the University of Georgia.
]
There are three categories of commodities that are subject to export control
in Russia:
1) nuclear materials, technology, equipment, installations, and special
non-nuclear materials which could be diverted from peaceful nuclear programs
to build nuclear weapons or other explosive devices. (In Russian Federation
regulations this category is referred to as "critical nuclear items")[ "Critical nuclear items" are defined in Government Resolution No.
574 (5/8/96) as "20% and higher enriched HEU, plutonium, equipment for
processing irradiated fuel, equipment for isotope separation, equipment
for heavy water production, equipment for the conversion of enriched uranium
and plutonium, the main components for such equipment, as well as technologies
related to critical nuclear products." ];
2) dual-use equipment, materials, and technologies, which include commodities
that could be used for nuclear, chemical, biological, or missile weapons
purposes;
3) conventional arms and military-technical cooperation.
Export control lists and licensing guidelines have been developed with
Russia’s international obligations in mind. Developments in nuclear export
controls parallel developments in the Guidelines of the Nuclear Suppliers
Group, to which Russia gained membership in 1992. Russia also made its
missile control lists more consistent with the Missile Technology Control
Regime (MTCR), culminating in its admission to the regime in 1995. Export
controls for chemical and biological weapons agents were designed with
Australia Group standards in mind, although Russia is not a member of this
regime. Lastly, a new Presidential Decree and corresponding Governmental
Resolution were recently introduced to accommodate the dual-use export
control principles agreed upon by Russia as a founding member of the Wassenaar
Arrangement.
Russia also has sought to develop coordinating mechanisms for cooperative
export controls within the CIS. Development of the CIS Customs Union could
have major implications on nonproliferation export controls as border controls
are gradually relaxed along the Belarus-Russia and the Russia-Kazakhstan
borders.
This report describes the status of nonproliferation export controls in
Russia as of December 1996. It focuses primarily on export controls for
critical nuclear and nuclear dual-use items, although many of the developments
also apply to the control of chemical, biological, and missile technologies.
The report describes the organizational actors with responsibilities for
export controls, the export licensing process, legislative acts and executive
decrees which address export controls, and related international and bilateral
agreements. The report also includes an analytical perspective on the effectiveness
and implementation of Russian export controls. The full texts of selected
export control legislation and decrees, in English and in Russian, are
attached to the report as appendices. Updates to this status report will
be provided at the end of March and June 1997.