The following is an overview based on a report prepared by the Center for
Nonproliferation Studies of the Monterey Institute of International Studies
in January 1997 under a grant from the United States Department of Energy's
Office of Nonproliferation and Arms Control. The views expressed in this
report are those of the authors alone, and do not necessarily represent the
views of the Department of Energy or the United States Government.
EXPORT CONTROL LICENSING PROCESS
The procedure for obtaining a license for the export of
goods and services of proliferation concern varies
depending on the type of commodity in question. The
export licensing process has been outlined below for the
following two categories:
• Critical nuclear items -- which consist of nuclear
materials, equipment, and related technologies that could
be diverted from peaceful nuclear programs to build
nuclear weapons or other explosive devices. Critical
nuclear items are defined to be uranium enriched to 20%
or higher, plutonium, equipment for processing irradiated
fuel, equipment for uranium isotope separation, equipment
for heavy water production, equipment for the conversion
of enriched uranium and plutonium, and technologies
related to these items;
• Dual-use equipment, materials, and technologies --
which consist of commodities that have a peaceful
application but which could be applied for the production
of nuclear weapons;
Groups of experts from the appropriate state bodies have
drawn up specific control lists for both of these
categories, which the Prime Minister subsequently
approved, and the President signed into law. The Ministry
of Atomic Energy (Minatom) took the lead in drafting the
control list for critical nuclear items, and the Federal
Service for Currency and Export Control (VEK) took the
lead in drafting the control list for dual-use nuclear
items. Control lists specify commodities, technologies,
equipment, and material that cannot be exported without a
license.
CRITICAL NUCLEAR ITEMS[1]
Current procedures for licensing the export of critical
nuclear items are specified in Government Resolution No.
574 (5/8/96). This resolution redefined the authority for
approving export licenses. Before this resolution was
introduced, Minatom was the sole administrative body with
the authority to approve license applications for the
export of critical nuclear items. Now, however, it must
share authority in the licensing process with Eksportkontrol.
The fact that Eksportkontrol plays a role
guarantees that the opinions of all the ministries and
agencies that are members of the Commission will be
represented in the export licensing decision.[2]
Resolution No. 574 also incorporated into Russian
licensing procedures the amendments to the Nuclear
Suppliers Group Guidelines that resulted from the
Helsinki session in April 1995.
The following procedures were established to control the
export of critical nuclear items:
1) Drafts of international treaties or agreements that
include the transfer of critical nuclear items must be
coordinated with the appropriate state bodies (including Eksportkontrol,
Minatom, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the
Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations). This process is
known as soglasovaniya ("agreement" or
"harmonization").[3] Official negotiations with
foreign states regarding agreements that involve a
transfer of critical nuclear products must be sanctioned
by the Cabinet of Ministers.
2) Any contract (agreement, treaty) involving the export
of critical nuclear items must first be evaluated by Eksportkontrol
and then approved by Minatom in order to determine that
the proposed export is in accordance with both the
international nonproliferation obligations of the Russian
Federation and its domestic nonproliferation export
control regulations and requirements.
3) A one-time license must be issued by the Ministry of
Foreign Economic Relations (MFER).
4) All controlled items are subject to customs inspection
and registration to confirm that actual transfers are in
accordance with the license issued.
Before the MFER grants an export license for a critical
nuclear item, Eksportkontrol must officially
conclude that the proposed export is in accordance with
the international obligations and domestic requirements
of the Russian Federation. In order to obtain such a
conclusion, an exporter must submit the following
documents to the Federal Service on Currency and Export
Control (VEK):
• a notarized copy of the certificate showing that
the exporter is registered with the State;
• a copy of the permit to handle nuclear materials
issued to the exporter by the Russian State Committee for
Supervision of Nuclear and Radiation Safety;
• a copy of a signed or initialed contract (treaty,
agreement) for export of the critical nuclear product,
with a notarized translation of the text into Russian;
• a copy of the agreement between the Russian
manufacturer and the exporting organization, if the
export of the critical nuclear item is performed through
an intermediary;
• documents containing a determination as to whether
the nuclear export could convey information that is a
state secret;
• original documents from the government of the
importing country, if the country is a non-nuclear-weapon
state, which provide guarantees that:
• The country has an acting safeguards agreement
with the International Atomic Energy Agency which covers
all its peaceful nuclear activities, including those
carried out using the imported nuclear item;
• The country will not use the nuclear item imported
from the Russian Federation -- or any equipment,
installation, nuclear or non-nuclear materials produced
on the basis of that nuclear item -- in the production of
nuclear weapons, nuclear explosive devices, or for any
military purpose whatsoever;
• The nuclear item imported from the Russian
Federation -- as well as any equipment, installation,
nuclear or non-nuclear materials produced on the basis of
that nuclear item -- must be provided with physical
protection at levels not less than those recommended by
the IAEA.
• The importing country will not re-export or transfer
any equipment for the chemical processing of irradiated fuel,
isotope uranium enrichment, or heavy water production; the main
components of such equipment; items produced on the basis of such
equipment; uranium enriched to 20% and higher; plutonium; or
heavy water without written permission from Minatom. Minatom
gives such permission only after consultations with Eksportkontrol.
• If the country receives such permission and exports the
equipment noted in point four (above), it must guarantee that the
third country will not use the equipment for the production of
uranium enriched to 20% or higher (HEU), nor will it use any
equipment designed or produced on the basis of the transferred
technology for the production of HEU, without written permission
from Minatom. Minatom gives such permission only after
consultations with Eksportkontrol.
• original documents from the government of the importing
country, if the country is a nuclear-weapon state, which provide
guarantees that:
• The country will not use the nuclear item imported from
the Russian Federation -- or any equipment, installation, nuclear
or non-nuclear materials produced on the basis of that nuclear
item -- in the production of nuclear weapons, nuclear explosive
devices, or for any military purpose whatsoever;
• The nuclear item imported from the Russian Federation
-- as well as any equipment, installation, nuclear or non-nuclear
materials produced on the basis of that nuclear item -- must be
provided with physical protection at levels not less than those
recommended by the IAEA.
• The country will not re-export or transfer any
equipment for the chemical processing of irradiated fuel,
isotope uranium enrichment, or heavy water production;
the main components of such equipment; items produced on
the basis of such equipment; uranium enriched to 20% and
higher; plutonium; or heavy water without written
permission from the Russian Federation Minatom. Minatom
gives such permission only after consultations with Eksportkontrol.
If a Russian exporter wishes to export critical nuclear
items to a country that does not itself require IAEA
safeguards as a condition of export to a third country,
it must receive assurances from the government of that
country that it will not re-export or transfer any items
imported from Russia (or any items produced with the aid
of equipment or technologies imported from Russia)
without the written permission of the Minatom, which is
given only in consultation with Eksportkontrol.
Eksportkontrol has 30 days to issue a conclusion
regarding the proposed export, once VEK has received all
the documents outlined above. VEK forwards the conclusion
to the exporter, Minatom , and the MFER.
Once the exporter has received a positive conclusion from
Eksportkontrol, it can begin the application
process at Minatom. The exporter must submit the same
documents to Minatom as it submitted to Eksportkontrol,
plus the following:
• an application for the issuance of a license,
filled out in accordance with the format specified by the
MFER;
• documents confirming the producer of the object of
critical nuclear export, and a permit for production
issued to the manufacturer by the Russian State Committee
for Supervision of Nuclear and Radiation Safety;
• documents confirming the absence of limitations on
the part of the manufacturer for export of the nuclear
objects abroad;
• a positive conclusion from Eksportkontrol regarding
the possibility of carrying out the proposed contract for
critical nuclear export;
(There are two documents that the exporter must submit to
Eksportkontrol, that it is not necessary to submit
to Minatom -- proof of registration with the State and
documents proving that the export will not convey state
secrets.)
All of this documentation is reviewed by the Committee on
International Relations within Minatom. If Minatom
approves the license application, it forwards this
information to the MFER. In general, the Russian MFER
issues both general and one-time licenses. However, all
goods and technologies that can be used in the production
of weapons may be exported under a one-time license only.
A one-time license is issued to a specific enterprise for
a specific contract involving the export of a specific
commodity. The maximum length of time for which a license
is issued is 12 months.[4]
Both Minatom and Eksportkontrol have the right to
ask the exporter, any other enterprise in any way related
to the proposed nuclear export, as well as any state body
for additional information or documentation that could
help in the decision to issue an approval to a license
application.
In the case of violations of the requirements outlined in
the procedures for the export of nuclear items, licenses
may be canceled or suspended by the MFER. If violations
are made by the importing country under the terms of
export from the Russian Federation, the export license is
suspended and nuclear exports to that country cease until
the violation is rectified. The Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, MFER, and Minatom take appropriate measures to
guarantee the fulfillment of obligations by the importer
and receiving country, and inform Eksportkontrol
of this action.
The exporter is responsible for forwarding all
information on critical nuclear exports to the Central
Scientific Research Institute of Administration, Economy,
and Information (TsNIIAtominform), which is under the
auspices of Minatom. TsNIIAtominform is responsible for
notifying the IAEA of all Russian nuclear exports.
The last step is customs certification, which is carried
out on the basis of nuclear export licenses issued by the
MFER. Until the object of nuclear export has actually
been transferred to the intended recipient, the Russian
exporter is responsible for ensuring physical protection
at levels not less than those recommended by the IAEA.
DUAL-USE NUCLEAR ITEMS[5]
The export licensing process for dual-use nuclear items
is very similar to the procedure for licensing critical
nuclear items. The major difference, however, is that a
separate approval from Minatom is not required. The MFER
can issue an export license based only on a positive
conclusion from Eksportkontrol. Current procedures
for the export of dual-use equipment, materials, and
technologies are specified in Government Resolution No.
575 (5/8/96). This resolution incorporated into Russian
licensing procedures the Guiding Principles adopted by
the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) in Warsaw in 1992, as
well as the amendments introduced at the NSG sessions in
Helsinki in April 1995 and Vienna in October 1995.
The following procedures were established to control the
export of dual-use nuclear items:
1) The preparation and issuance of a conclusion from Eksportkontrol,
which confirms that the proposed export is in accordance
with the Russian Federation’s international
obligations and domestic laws and regulations;
2) The issuance of a license by the Ministry of Foreign
Economic Relations;
3) Customs control and customs certification of the
dual-use nuclear export as it crosses the borders of the
Russian Federation.
In order to obtain a conclusion from Eksportkontrol,
the exporter must submit the following documents to VEK:
• a letter requesting such a conclusion, which
includes information identifying the owner of the
dual-use nuclear item, as well as information that shows
that the export will not convey any information that is
considered a state secret;
• a notarized copy of the certificate showing that
the exporter is registered with the State;
• copies of the permits from the Russian State
Committee for Supervision of Nuclear and Radiation
Safety, issued to both the exporter and the owner of the
dual-use nuclear item (if the exporter is not the owner)
for the appropriate activity involving radioactive
substances and goods based on these substances;
• an export license application, filled out in
accordance with the requirements specified by the Russian
MFER;
• a copy of the contract (treaty, agreement) for the
proposed export of dual-use equipment, material or
technology. There are a number of points which must be
specified in the contract:
• The contract must specify the purpose and place of
application of the exported goods;
• The contract must specify the end-user of the
exported goods;
• The contract must include a guarantee from the
importer that neither the exported dual-use equipment,
material, technology -- nor reproductions of these items
-- will be used in the creation of nuclear explosive
devices;
• If the export is to a non-nuclear-weapon state,
the contract must include a guarantee from the importer
that the dual-use equipment, material, or technology will
not be used in any component of the nuclear fuel cycle
which has not been placed under IAEA safeguards;
• If the export is to a country that is not a member
of the Nuclear Supplier Group, the contract must include
a guarantee from the importer that the dual-use
equipment, material, or technology will not be
re-exported without the written permission of the
exporter;
• original documents which contain the
importer’s obligation not to use the dual-use
nuclear item in the production of nuclear explosive
devices, in an unsafeguarded nuclear fuel-cycle or to
re-export the item without written permission from the
Russian exporter, if these obligations were not already
specified in the contract. If the importer is an
intermediary, the end-user must provide the same
guarantees as the importer in writing.
• an import certificate issued by the appropriate
state agency of the country in which the end-use of the
dual-use nuclear item will take place.
Any documents which are not written in Russian must be
submitted to Eksportkontrol with notarized copies
of translations into Russian. Once Eksportkontrol receives
all of the above documentation, it has thirty days to
issue a conclusion. Eksportkontrol has the right
to ask the exporter, any enterprise in any way related to
the proposed nuclear export, as well as any state body
for additional information or documentation that could
help in the decision to issue an approval to a license
application. In order to make a conclusion, Eksportkontrol
takes into account the following: the export of
dual-use equipment, material, and technologies is
prohibited to non-nuclear-weapon states if it is to be
used for the purpose of creating nuclear explosive
devices, [6]or for use in any component of the nuclear
fuel cycle that is not under IAEA safeguards. [7] In
addition, the export of the above items is prohibited if
there is an unacceptable risk that such activities might
take place, or if the export in any way threatens the
goal of the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. To that
end, Eksportkontrol:
1) Examines whether the importing state is a signatory to
the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Treaty Banning
Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlateloco),
or any other international agreement on the
nonproliferation of nuclear weapons;
2) Examines whether the importing state has a
comprehensive safeguards agreement in place with the IAEA
which is applicable to all of its peaceful nuclear
activities;
3) If the importing country is not a signatory to the
Non-Proliferation Treaty or any other international
agreement on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, Eksportkontrol
examines whether the state has any nuclear fuel cycle
installations or sites that are currently operating,
planned, or under construction that do not or will not
fall under IAEA safeguards;
4) Examines whether the exported dual-use equipment,
material, or technology corresponds with the stated end
use for the item, and whether that stated end use
corresponds to the sphere in which the item will
ultimately be applied;
5) Examines whether the exported dual-use equipment,
material, or technology will be used in the scientific
research, development, planning, production, testing,
operation, or technical servicing of any installation for
the enrichment or processing of spent nuclear fuel;
6) Examines whether the actions and policies of the
government in the country where the end user is located
reflect consistent support for nuclear nonproliferation
regimes, and whether the government consistently fulfills
its international obligations in the sphere of
nonproliferation of nuclear weapons;
7) Examines whether the importer (or end user) has been
engaged in any secret or unlawful acquisition of nuclear
components;
8) Examines whether the importer (or end user) has
previously been denied permission for an identical
transfer, and whether the importer (or end user) used any
previously approved transfer for purposes which were
incompatible with the Guiding Principles of the Nuclear
Suppliers Group.
In special cases -- after carefully evaluating the
dual-use item to be exported, the stated end use, and
other factors relevant to nonproliferation-- Eksportkontrol
may require that that Russian exporter be granted the
right by the importer to verify that the exported item is
being used by the declared end user in accordance with
the purpose stated in the contract.
After Eksportkontrol has issued a conclusion on
the export license application, VEK forwards the decision
to the exporter and to the MFER. The exporter must then
submit Eksportkontrol’s conclusion to the
MFER within the next six months. If Eksportkontrol issued
a positive conclusion, MFER will issue a one-time export
license to the exporter. Although the Russian Federation
issues both general and one-time licenses, all exports of
dual-use equipment, material, and technologies require a
one-time license.
The exporter must present this license to the Russian
customs agencies in order to receive customs
certification for the goods.
If the importer (or end user) ever wishes to re-export
Russian-origin dual-use equipment, materials, and
technologies to a third party, it must receive a permit
from the Russian exporter. The Russian exporter can only
issue such a permit if it has received permission to do
so from Eksportkontrol. In order to receive such
permission, the exporter must submit the following
information to Eksportkontrol:
• A letter requesting permission to issue a permit
for re-export that indicates the characteristics,
purpose, place of application, and end user of the item
to be re-exported.
• The numbers of Eksportkontrol’s original
conclusion and the license under which the export was
initially performed.
• The number of the contract (treaty or agreement)
under which the re-export will take place.
• the original or a notarized copy of a document in
which the end user in the third country guarantees that
the imported item will not be used in the creation of a
nuclear explosive device or in any component of the
nuclear fuel cycle that is not under IAEA safeguards
• the original or notarized copy of an import
certificate or similar document, issued by the government
of the end user country to which the dual-use nuclear
object will be re-exported, confirming the obligations of
the end user specified in the point above.
Any entity which violates these procedures for the export
of dual-use equipment, material, or technology is liable
in accordance with the current legislation of the Russian
Federation. Sources: [1] Unless otherwise noted, information
for this section was derived from the text of Government
Resolution No. 574 (May 8, 1996) of the Russian
Federation. [2] Please see page 5 of this report for a
description of Eksportkontrol. See also Marina
Belyaeva, "Russian Federation Control Over Export of
Nuclear Material," The Russian Federation Nuclear
Export Control System: Compendium, Center on Export
Controls, (Moscow 1996), p. I-15. [3] Kirichenko and Potter, "Nuclear
Export Controls..." [4] Correspondence from Elina Kirichenko,
December 11, 1996. [5] Unless otherwise noted information
from this section is derived from Government Resolution
No. 575 (May 8, 1996) of the Russian Federation. [6] The "creation of nuclear
explosive devices" is defined as scientific research
and development; and the planning, production, testing,
operation, and technical servicing of any nuclear
explosive device, subsystems of such a device, or its
components. [7] "Use in any component of the
nuclear fuel cycle that is not under IAEA
safeguards" is understood to mean the scientific
research, development, design, production, testing,
operation, or technical servicing of any reactor,
critical assembly, conversion installation, installation
for the production or processing of nuclear fuel,
installation for splitting isotopes of initial or special
fissionable materials, or individual installations where
initial or special fissionable materials are stored, if
the country does not have an obligation to accept IAEA
safeguards on those installations. Additionally, it is
understood to mean any installation for the production of
heavy water, if the country does not have an obligation
to accept IAEA safeguards on any nuclear material used or
produced in connection with the production of heavy water
at the installation, or if such an obligation is not
adhered to.
To return to the
current
Russian export controls section, see the 
