Archive: 1998 Update on Russian Export Controls: Summary

To return to the current Russian export controls section, see the Russia: Export Controls file.
1998 Summary Decrees and Resolutions General Licenses Granted

June 1998

Although Russia does not yet have a comprehensive export control law in place, a number of important export control decrees and resolutions were passed in 1997 and the first half of 1998.  The Government Commission on Export Controls circulated a draft export control law among the relevant ministries and government bodies in fall 1997. The draft was severely criticized, and some Russian export control specialists reportedly have questioned the need for a comprehensive export control law.[1,2]  These new decrees and resolutions fall into four categories:

1) decrees that introduce relatively minor changes to existing guidelines, procedures, and control lists;
2) decrees related to customs and border controls;
3) decrees that specifically address the control of exports to Iraq; and
4) decrees designed to strengthen controls on missile technologies.

Since early 1997, awareness has increased in Russia regarding the need to strengthen customs and border controls generally, and to reinforce controls over fissile and radioactive materials specifically.  This awareness has been reflected in the legislation, as well as in the large number of articles about customs and border control issues published in the open press.  To demonstrate the need for improved border controls, a Russian Duma resolution on the condition of the state borders made reference to multiple attempts to smuggle dual-use items out of Russia.  Of the regulations listed in the section on important new decrees and resolutions, two State Customs Committee Orders from May 1997 are among the most significant.  Order No. 242 provides detailed instructions on how to ensure customs control over fissile and radioactive materials, and Order No. 241 limits the number of customs divisions that are authorized to process fissile and radioactive materials. Although the mere adoption of guidelines does not guarantee their implementation, it is notable that enough importance was attached to the issue to merit publication of specific guidelines.
 
Two decrees from fall 1997, Presidential Decree No. 972 and Government Resolution No. 1403, were designed to clarify Russia's position on the export of controlled items to Iraq. The decrees reinforce Russia's intention to honor the restrictions on exports to Iraq that were imposed by the UN Security Council. These decrees can be interpreted as a direct response to the discovery that perhaps as many as 800 missile gyroscopes from the Research and Testing Institute of Chemical Machine-Building in Russia were sold to Iraq in 1995.  A Russian investigation into the unauthorized export of the gyroscopes was concluded in October 1997.  The investigation did not recommend any prosecution under the new Russian Criminal Code.[3,4,5] However, less than one month later, the Russian Government issued Resolution No. 1403, which explained the procedures for exporting controlled goods to Iraq, and reiterated Russia's commitment to UN Security Council Resolutions No. 661, 687, 707, and 715, all of which introduce bans and restrictions on the export of certain items to Iraq.

The single most significant export control resolution issued since early 1997 is Government Resolution No. 57 from 22 January 1998, which introduces the legal concept of a "catch-all" clause into the Russian export control legislation. A "catch-all" clause essentially ensures that there is a legal basis for preventing exports of certain goods and services, even if those goods and services are not on any control lists, if there is reason to suspect that those goods and services will be used to facilitate the development of weapons of mass destruction. Although this resolution applies equally to nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons materials, it can be seen primarily as Russia's response to US pressure to prevent the transfer of missile technology to Iran. In addition to Resolution No. 57, additional decrees and resolutions were introduced to strengthen government oversight and direction of the missile and space industry. Lastly, the Federal Service for Currency and Export Controls (VEK) issued a requirement for the development of internal export control compliance programs at all Russian enterprises that trade in sensitive goods. Given that the Ministry of Atomic Energy issued similar guidelines in mid-1996 for its own nuclear-related enterprises, it is likely that the new VEK guidelines were targeted specifically at the missile and space industry.
Sources:
[1] Erika Ribansky, "The Evolution of Russia's Export Control System," unpublished paper, April 1998.
[2] Nuclear Successor States of the Soviet Union: A Nuclear Weapon, Fissile Material and Export Control Status Report, Monterey Institute of International Studies and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, No. 5, March 1998, p. 94.
[3] Vladimir Orlov, "Russia, Iran, Iraq, and Export Controls: Facts and Conclusions," The Monitor, Vol. 4, No. 2-3, p. 30.
[4] Vladimir Orlov and Anna Otkina, "Lessons of 'The Gyroscope Deal,' " Yaderniy Control Digest, No. 7, Spring 1998.
[5] Willam Potter, "The Case Russia Forgot," The New York Times, 3 April 1998, p. A23. 

Comments or questions? Contact Kenley Butler at MIIS CNS: Kenley.Butler@miis.edu

This material is produced independently for NTI by the Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies and does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been independently verified by NTI or its directors, officers, employees, agents. Copyright © 2002 by MIIS.

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