ATV NUCLEAR SUBMARINE PROGRAM

Russian, Indian, and Norwegian sources reported in July 1998 that Russia was providing some form of assistance to India's ATV (Advanced Technology Vessel) nuclear submarine program, including assistance in the installation of propulsion reactors for the two submarines laid down in 1998. [1,2,3,4,6] Then-Minister of Atomic Energy Yevgeniy Adamov denied discussing nuclear propulsion with his Indian counterparts.[1] However, Adamov's denial did not exclude the possibility of technical assistance from the Russian Navy. The Russian and Indian Navies have a history of cooperation on nuclear submarine design and operations. In 1988-1991, the Soviet Union leased the K-43, a 670A Skat-class [NATO name 'Charlie I'] nuclear submarine to the Indian Navy.[1] The sub sailed under the name Chakra with a Soviet crew operating the propulsion reactor; the remainder of the crew was Indian.[4] (The NPT does not prohibit the transfer of technology for naval nuclear propulsion, creating what some experts regard as a serious loophole in the international nonproliferation regime.[5]) According to early reports, the design of the Indian ATV submarines, each of which will be propelled by one 190MW PWR reactor, is very similar to that of the new Russian Yasen class, and the subs may be armed with Russian SS-N-15/16 missiles.[3] [This would violate the MTCR unless the range is less than 300km.] However, a Russian nuclear submarine expert says that the hulls under construction are not of Russian design.[4] More recent sources hold that the submarine design is that of the Russian Antey-class [NATO name 'Oscar II'] SSGN.[7] The ATV is an intended launch platform for the nuclear-capable Sagarika missile, which is being developed by India's Aeronautical Development Establishment (ADE) in Bangalore with Russian assistance; the project itself was initially believed to have been headed by a Russian scientist.[8] Sagarika's range is about 300km and it is expected to be produced both as a cruise missile and a ballistic missile.[7] In early 1998, a group of Indian officers were posted to the Severnoye Mashinostroitelnoye Predpriyatiye (Sevmash) shipyard in Severodvinsk, where a Yasen-class submarine is under construction.[1,3] (A Kilo-class sub exported to India was under repair at the nearby Zvezdochka shipyard.[3]) According to the submarine expert, Sevmash negotiated with India regarding the possible  sale of nuclear propulsion reactors to the ATV program, but the proposed deal was not approved by authorities in Moscow.[4] Nevertheless, despite the ties between the two countries' submarine programs, the extent of Russian assistance to Indian nuclear submarine propulsion cannot be determined from open sources.

Due to the slow pace of the ATV program, India may once again resort to leasing Russian nuclear submarines. In 1999 reports surfaced that India was planning to purchase Russian nuclear submarines. At the time, Russian Navy officials issued denials, stating that India had made no inquiries about such a purchase.[9] However, the Russian Ministry of Defense revealed that the matter was discussed in September 1999 during a visit by senior Indian naval officers to St. Petersburg.[10] Reports of Indian plans to lease a Russian nuclear submarine circulated again in late 2000, [11], and, in February 2001, Rosoboroneksport Deputy General Director Viktor Komardin said that India had expressed an interest in leasing a nuclear submarine.[12] In June 2001, a Russian newspaper reported that India and Russia were planning to sign a contract by the end of 2001 for the completion of two unfinished Project 971 Shchuka-B [NATO name 'Akula'] nuclear-powered general purpose submarines.[13] Although the contract was not signed, in January 2002 Russian Navy Commander-in-Chief Admiral Vladimir Kuroyedov confirmed that Russia planned to lease two nuclear submarines to India. The terms of the contract included the training of Indian submarine crews in Russia and the lease of two submarines for five years, beginning in 2004.[14] In a January 2001 interview, Indian Chief of Naval Staff Admiral Madhvendra Singh refused to confirm or deny plans to lease Russian submarines. He did note, however, that skills acquired in the operation of Chakra have been lost, and that the Indian Navy would require at least 2.5 years to train another nuclear submarine crew. Therefore, India would like to lease a Russian nuclear submarine in order to train personnel for the future Indian nuclear submarine force.[15] Although it was widely expected that a nuclear submarine lease contract would be signed in February 2002, during Deputy Prime Minister Ilya Klebanov's visit to India, the contract did not materialize, and according to some reports the subject was not even raised at the meeting.[16] Some analysts have speculated that India's insufficient defense budget prevented it from concluding the deal, in spite of considerable interest.[17] However, in February 2002 an Indian newspaper reported that an Indian submarine crew has been undergoing training in Russia for about a year, and that its activities included sorties aboard a Project 971-class attack submarine.[18]
Sources:
[1] Sergey Golotyuk and Yuriy Golotyuk, "Yadernoye sotrudnichestvo Moskvy i Deli - kontsy v vodu," Russkiy Telegraf, 1 July 1998, p. 1.
[2] "Deli stroit atomnuyu submarinu," Krasnaya zvezda, 15 July 1998,  p. 3.
[3] "Russia helps India build nuclear submarine," Bellona Foundation website,  http://www.bellona.org/e/russia/nfl/news/980917-2.htm.
[4] NISNP interview with a Russian nuclear submarine expert, 20 October 1998, RUS981020.
[5] James Clay Moltz, "Closing the NPT Loophole on Exports of Naval Propulsion Reactors," Nonproliferation Review vol. 6, no. 1, Fall 1998, pp. 108-114.
[6] Vladimir Radyuhin, "India, Russia to expand defence cooperation," The Hindu, online edition, http://www.hinduonline.com, 14 November 1998. {revised 12/4/98 FW} {revised 2/3/99 FW}
[7] D.N. Moorthy, "In a Workshop at Hazira, Desi Underwater Missile Launcher Gets Ready for Trial," The Indian Express online edition, http://www.indian-express.com/ie20010528/nat21.html, 28 May 2001.
[8] Rahul Bedi, "Agni II Now in Production," Jane's Missiles and Rockets, Vol. 5, No. 8, 1 August 2001; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, http://web.lexis-nexis.com.
[9] "Indiyskaya programma razvitiya atomnogo podvodnogo flota: sotrudnichestvo s Rossiyey," Voprosy bezopasnosti, Vol. 47, No. 3, pp. 11-17, February 1999.
[10] RIA-Novosti, 20 September 1999; in "Defense minister denies planning to supply India with nuclear submarines," Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 22 September 1999, http://www.lexis-nexis.com/.
[11] "Rossiya i Indiya - strategicheskiye partnery," Nezavisimoye voyennoye obozreniye, 6 October 2000; in Integrum Techno, http://www.integrum.ru/.
[12] Yuriy Golotyuk, "My na lodke katalis...," Vremya novostey, 15 February 2001; in WPS Oborona i Bezopasnost, 19 February 2001; in Integrum Techno, http://www.integrum.ru/.
[13] Ivan Safronov, "India pomozhet Ilya Klebanovu zarabotat $4 mlrd," Kommersant, 5 June 2001; in Integrum Techno, http://www.integrum.ru/.
[14] Vladimir Urban, "'Nerpa' vsplyvet po komande khindi," Novyye izvestiya, 26 January 2002; in Universal Database of Central Russian Newspapers, http://www.eastview.com/.
[15] Rajat Pandit, "India getting two Russian N-subs?," The Times of India, 30 January 2002; in "Report says Indian likely to get two nuclear-powered submarines from Russia," FBIS Document SAP20020130000001.
[16] Lyuba Pronina, "India Offers Pledges, But Little Else," Moscow Times, 11 February 2002;  Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, http://www.lexis-nexis.com/.
[17] Vishal Thapar, "Russians Attach Strings to N-Submarines," Hindustan Times online edition, http://www.hindustantimes.com, 6 February 2002.
[18] Vishal Thapar, Fred Weir, "Indian Navy trains on Russian N-sub," Hindustan Times online edition, http://www.hindustantimes.com/, 22 February 2002. {Revised 1/31/2002 EF} {Updated 8/30/2002 MJ}

Page last updated 25 November 2002
For more recent developments, see the Nuclear Exports to India Developments file.

This material is produced independently for NTI by the Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies and does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been independently verified by NTI or its directors, officers, employees, agents. Copyright © 2002 by MIIS.

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