Russia

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Russia Nuclear and Missile Exports Iran
	Russian Exports to Iran
	Nuclear Exports Summary Table Enrichment, Mining, and Milling Nuclear Material Reactors Training and Know-How General Nuclear Export Developments
	Missile Exports Summary Table Components Manufacturing and Testing Training and Know-How General Missile Export Developments

Russia-Iran: Missile Components

Russia: Missile Exports To Iran: Components

To return to the main Missile Exports to Iran entry, see the Missile Exports to Iran file.


In September and October 1997, articles in the Western press reported that the scientific production associations Trud (located in Samara) and Energomash transferred technology related to the RD-214 rocket engine, used in the SS-4 medium-range ballistic missile, to Iran.[1,2] These reports were quickly denied by Russian spokesmen and officials, [3,4,5] including President Boris Yeltsin and Prime Minster Viktor Chenomyrdin.[6]

Sources also report that the Russian firm Samara State Scientific and Production Enterprise-NK Engines (affiliated with NPO Trud) received engineering drawings for turbopump components from an Iranian concern and contracted to produce the requested parts. Soon after NK Engines received additional technical information about the parts from their Iranian customers, they realized that the parts were for a rocket engine, most likely the RD-214, and applied for an export license. The application was rejected, the parts were not sent to Iran, and the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) seized all documents relating to the cancelled transaction.[7]
Sources:
[1] Steve Rodan, �Secret Israeli Data Reveals Iran Can Make Missile in Year,� Defense News, 6-12 October 1997, p. 4.
[2] Bill Gertz, �Russia, China Aid Iran�s Missile Program,� Washington Times, 10 September 1997, p. 1.
[3] �Utverzhdeniya o peredache Rossiyey Iranu raket i raketnykh tekhnologiy ne imeyut dostatochnykh osnovaniy,� Voprosy bezopasnosti, no. 14, 30 September 1997.
[4] ITAR-TASS, 15 September 1997; in �Russian Designers Deny Supplying Missile Technology to Iran,� FBIS-TAC-97-258.
[5] Interfax, 11 September 1997; in �No Russian Space Agency Expert �Has Even Been To Iran,�� FBIS-TAC-97-254.
[6] Interfax, 26 September 1997; in �Yeltsin Rejects US Nuclear, Missile Iran Transfer Charge,� FBIS-SOV-97-269
[7] MPT interview with US missile experts, 15 January 1998, RUS980115. {entered 8/26/98 FW}

Guidance Components

In 1996, press reports citing U.S. intelligence sources stated that the Inor Production Association had contracted to provide Iran with lasers and mirrors used in missile guidance systems, as well as other components, materials, and manufacturing equipment.[1] According to press reports in September and October 1997, citing Israeli intelligence sources, the Polyus Scientific Research Institute (located in Moscow) also supplied missile guidance components to Iran.[2] Inor and Polyus were placed under special investigation for violation of Russian export control laws in July 1998 and subjected to US sanctions by executive order that same month.[3,4]
Sources:
[1] Bill Gertz, "Russia Disregards Pledge to Curb Iran Missile Output," Washington Times, 22 May 1997, p. A3.
[2] Steve Rodan, �Secret Israeli Data Reveals Iran Can Make Missile in Year,� Defense News, 6-12 October 1997, p. 4.
[3] ITAR-TASS, 15 July 1998.
[4] White House, Office of the Press Secretary, "Statement by the President Expanding the President's Executive Order on Weapons of Mass Destruction," 28 July 1998. {entered 8/20/98 FW}

Materials:

Maraging Steel and Special Alloys

A May 1997 US press report stated that the Inor Production Association had contracted to provide Iran with maraging steel, a high-strength steel used in missiles and other high-stress applications.[1] Later reports charged that Inor had supplied Iran with 620kg of special metal alloys and shielding foil.[2,3] Rosvooruzheniye spokesman Valeriy Kartavtsev called reports of Rosvooruzheniye's involvement with Iranian missile programs "absurd."[4] However, no one connected with Inor came forward to deny these reports.

On 26 March 1998, Azerbaijani customs officials seized 21 MT of high-strength steel sheets en route to Iran. Western sources described this material as maraging steel, suitable for use in missile fuel tanks or solid fuel missile casings, and implicated the Russian companies Yevropalas 2000 and MOSO in the illicit shipment. One press account reported that although US intelligence officials had tipped off their Russian counterparts of plans to make the shipment, this information was not relayed to Azerbaijani officials, who only seized the steel because of irrigularities in shipping documents.[5] The chance seizure of the shipment therefore raised concerns on the efficacy of Russian export controls, but FSB public relations chief Aleksandr Zdanovich later downplayed the incident, reporting that the steel was of a type "used everywhere for household needs" for which no special export license was required.[6] Nevertheless, Inor, Yevropalas 2000, and MOSO were placed under special investigation for suspected violations of Russian export control laws in July 1998.[7]

It should be noted that while maraging steel is a dual-use commodity with many industrial applications, it is also an important component in the gas centrifuges used for uranium enrichment in Iraq and Pakistan.[8] It is therefore difficult to determine whether the sheets of Russian maraging steel intercepted in Azerbaijan were intended for use in Iran's missile program, nuclear program, or civilian industry.
Sources:
[1] Bill Gertz, "Russia Disregards Pledge to Curb Iran Missile Output," Washington Times, 22 May 1997, p. A3.
[2] Bill Gertz, �Russia, China Aid Iran�s Missile Program,� Washington Times, 10 September 1997, p. A1.
[3] Steve Rodan, �Secret Israeli Data Reveals Iran Can Make Missile in Year,� Defense News, 6-12 October 1997, p. 4.
[4] ITAR-TASS, 15 September 1997; in �Russian Designers Deny Supplying Missile Technology to Iran,� FBIS-TAC-97-258.
[5] Michael R. Gordon with Eric Schmitt, "Missile-Quality Russian Steel Was Nearly Shipped to Iran," New York Times, 25 April 1998.
[6] Anatoliy Yelizarov, �We Do Not Trade in Missiles in Contravention of the Law: Interview with Major General Aleksandr Zdanovich, Chief of the Federal Security Service Public Relations Center,� Rossiyskaya gazeta, 1 July 1998, p. 8; in �FSB Aide Denies Dual-Use Export Charges,� FBIS-SOV-98-182.
[7] ITAR-TASS, 15 July 1998.
[8] "A talk with A. Q. Khan: Pakistan's top nuclear scientist talks about nuclear weapons," Foreign Report, no. 2506, 30 July 1998. {entered 8/24/98 FW}

Composite Materials

In April 1998, a New York Times article reported that the Grafit State Scientific Research Institute (NII Grafit), an institute in Moscow that developed graphite-based materials and composites used in ballistic missiles and the nosecone of the Buran space shuttle, attempted to ship material used for ballistic missile warheads to Iran, but the material was intercepted in transit in Austria.[1] The interception of this shipment, which again cast doubt on the effectiveness of Russian controls on the export of dual-use materials, resulted in the inclusion of the Grafit Institute on the list of institutions suspected of violating Russia's export control laws in July 1998 and subsequent US sanctions. [2,3]
Sources:
[1] Michael R. Gordon with Eric Schmitt, "Russia Fails to Intercept Missile Material Bound for Iran," New York Times, 25 April 1998.
[2] ITAR-TASS, 15 July 1998. [3] White House, Office of the Press Secretary, "Statement by the President Expanding the President's Executive Order on Weapons of Mass Destruction," 28 July 1998. {entered 8/20/98 FW}

Page last updated 13 January 1999
For more recent developments, see the Missile Exports to Iran Developments file.

Comments or questions? Contact Michael Jasinski at MIIS CNS: Michael.Jasinski@miis.edu

This material is produced independently for NTI by the Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies and does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been independently verified by NTI or its directors, officers, employees, agents. Copyright © 2002 by MIIS.

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