Russia:  Nuclear Exports to Iran: Enrichment, Mining, and Milling


To return to the main Nuclear Exports to Iran entry, see the Nuclear Exports to Iran file.

Uranium Enrichment
In December 1998, press articles citing US intelligence sources reported that Russia's Scientific Research and Design Institute of Energy Technologies (NIKIET) and the Mendeleyev University of Chemical Technology were negotiating with Iran over the sale of a facility to convert uranium into uranium hexafluoride (UF6) for subsequent enrichment. US nonproliferation experts stated that this sale, if carried out, would significantly upgrade Iran's capability to enrich uranium for possible use in nuclear weapons.[4,5]

The secret protocol on nuclear cooperation signed in January 1995 by Russian Minister of Atomic Energy Viktor Mikhailov and Reza Amrollahi, director of the Atomic Energy Agency of Iran, reportedly included an agreement to provide Iran with a gas centrifuge uranium enrichment facility.[1]  The United States strongly objected to this provision of the agreement, and at the May 1995 summit meeting in Moscow with President Bill Clinton, Russian President Boris Yeltsin announced that the centrifuge export deal had been cancelled.  Russian officials, however, denied that the deal had ever existed.[2, 3]

In January 2001 US Secretary of Energy Bill Richardson warned Russian Minister of Atomic Energy Yevgeniy Adamov against selling laser equipment to Iran which, in the view of US experts, could be used for uranium enrichment purposes. Although Russian officials claimed that US allegations were unfounded and that lasers would not be used in a covert Iranian uranium enrichment program, they nevertheless prevented the sale, and notified the United States in March 2001 that instead of going to Iran, the equipment was returned to the Yefremov Scientific Research Institute for Electrophysical Apparatus (NIIEFA) in St. Petersburg from a customs storage site.[6]
Sources:
[1] David Albright et al., Plutonium and Highly Enriched Uranium 1996: World Inventories, Capabilities, and Policies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 355-361.
[2] Alexander M. Sullivan, "Clinton Cites Progress on Security Issues at Moscow Summit," USIA News Release, 10 May 1995.
[3] David Albright, "An Iranian Bomb?" Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, no. 51, March-April 1995,  p. 22.
[4] Carla Anne Robbins and Andrew Higgins, "Fission for Cash: Money Hungry Russia Finds a Foreign Market for Nuclear Knowledge," Wall Street Journal, 15 December 1998, p. 1.
[5] Bill Gertz, "Russia warned on deals with Iran," Washington Times, 15 December 1998, p. A5.
[6] Michael Knapik, "Russia tells U.S. officials it will not export lasers to Iran," Nucleonics Week, Vol. 42, No. 10, 8 March 2001.{Revised 12/15/98 FW} {Updated 9/3/2002 MJ}
 
Uranium Mining and Milling
In July 1997, US intelligence sources reported that Russia was advising and assisting Iranian efforts to mine uranium ore in the Saghand region of Yazd province. Russia initially denied these reports,[1] but in November 1998, Mikhailov confirmed that Minatom had designed a small-scale (100-200MT/year) uranium mine for Iran.[3]  Iran has no known facilities for uranium mining or milling on a significant scale, and allegations that secret facilities for this purpose exist in Yazd province cannot be substantiated.[2]
Sources:
[1] R. Jeffrey Smith, "Administration Concerned about Russia's Nuclear Cooperation with Iran," Washington Post, 3 July 1997, p. A3.
[2] Andrew Koch and Jenette Wolf, "Iran's Nuclear Facilities: A Profile," unpublished paper, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, 1998.
[3] "Press Conference with First Deputy Minister of Nuclear Energy Viktor Mikhailov, PIR Center Officials Regarding Russia-Iran," Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, http://web.lexis-nexis.com/universe, 25 November 1998. {revised 12/23/98 FW}

Last updated 6 November 2002
For more recent developments, see the Nuclear Exports to Iran Developments file.

Comments or questions? Contact Michael Jasinski at MIIS CNS: Michael.Jasinski@miis.edu

This material is produced independently for NTI by the Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies and does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been independently verified by NTI or its directors, officers, employees, agents. Copyright © 2002 by MIIS.

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