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Russia: Nuclear Exports to Iran: Reactor Developments

Russia: Missile Exports To Iran: Developments

To return to the main Missile Exports to Iran entry, see the Missile Exports to Iran file.

10/23/2009 RUSSIA RECONSIDERING S300 DELIVERY TO IRAN
A 2007 agreement between Russia and Iran to deliver the S300 missile system to the Islamic Republic is placed on hold after increased international pressure. Rosoboronexport negotiated the sale of an unknown number of the surface-to-air missile systems, enabling Iran to protect its nuclear facilities in the event of an attack. While Iran made several declarations that the system’s delivery had already been made, Russia flatly denies these claims. According to the Kremlin, pressure from the United States and Israel has forced it to temporarily postpone the sale. However, the agreement currently remains on the table.

Sources:
[1] "Iran nuclear sanctions unlikely," BBC News, 28 October 2009, news.bbc.co.uk.
[2] Herb Keinon, "Russia to re-think S-300 sale to Iran," The Jerusalem Post, 19 August 2009, www.jpost.com.
[3] "Russia may go ahead with Iran missile deal," United Press International, 23 October 2009, www.upi.com.
[4] "Russia denies a deal to sell missiles to Iran," The International Herald Tribune, 29 December 2007.

1/21/2009 SECRET IRANIAN DOCUMENTS REVEAL RUSSIAN ASSISTANCE IN IRANIAN HOOT MISSILE DEVELOPMENT
In January 2009, the Federation of Atomic Scientists revealed secret Iranian documents that confirmed the long-held suspicion that Iran's Hoot underwater missile is derived from the Russian VA-111 Shkval missile. These documents contained reports on several Shkval trials conducted by Iran in January and February 2004, as well as a 2007 contract awarded to Iran's Aerospace Industries Organization. This covered the "design, production and testing of model hydro-reactive compound engines [presumably the missile's gas generator] for the Hoot missile," While the Russian Shkval missile is capable of carrying a nuclear warhead, it is unclear whether the Iranian Hoot has the same capability. Iran denies receiving any assistance from Russia.

Sources:
[1] Doug Richardson, "Leaked documents show origins of Iran's Hoot missile," Jane's Missiles and Rockets, 3 February 2009
[2] "Iran's Testing of Russian Shkval Torpedo Documented," Secrecy News from the FAS Project on Government Secrecy, 21 January 2009

1/23/2007 RUSSIA DELIVERS TOR-M1 MISSILES TO IRAN
Under a contract signed in 2005, Russia completed its delivery of 29 TOR-M1 missiles to Iran at the end of 2006. The Russian Ministry of Defense attempted to allay concerns by assuring the international community that the mobile air defense systems could not be used by terrorist groups because of their technical characteristics.

Source: "Russia fulfills Iran missile deal," BBC News, 23 January 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk.

12/5/2005 RUSSIA SIGNS CONTRACT TO DELIVER TOR-M1 MISSILES
In December 2005, Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov announced that a $700 million contract to deliver TOR-M1 missiles to Iran had been signed. Iran had agreed to purchase 29 mobile air defense systems, despite criticisms from the United States and Israel.

Source: "Russia confirms Iran missile deal," BBC News, 5 December 2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk.

11/13/2002: IRANIAN OPPOSITION ALLEGES RUSSIAN MISSILE AID TO IRAN
On 12 November 2002, The Telegraph reported that the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI) has alleged that Russia has enabled Iran to extend the range of its ballistic missiles. According to NCRI, Russian and North Korean engineers have participated in ballistic missile test launches from a range in central Iran. Furthermore, according to NCRI, the new Shehab-4 missile is based on the Soviet R-12 ballistic missile [NATO designation SS-4 'Sandal'], and uses Russian technologies, as well as Russian-manufactured high-grade steel and special alloys. An unspecified Russian company has also been alleged to supply $7 million of SS-4 parts to Iran. The Telegraph also reported that US intelligence services believe Russian assistance includes the provision of rocket engines for a longer-ranged Shehab-3 variant.

Source: Phillip Sherwell, "Russia Adds Range To Iran's Latest Missiles," The Telegraph, 12 November 2002; in RANSAC Nuclear News, 13 November 2002.

5/25/2002: RUSSIAN SCIENTIST QUESTIONS IRANIAN MISSILE ACCURACY
In an article in Izvestiya on 25 May 2002, the Deputy General Designer of the Moscow Institute of Thermal Technology, Lev Solomonov, stated that he does not believe that Iran can develop indigenously an accurate targeting system for its Shehab-3 ballistic missile. According to Solomonov, whose institute designed the Topol-M intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) [NATO designation SS-27 'Sickle'; START I designation RS-12M Variant 2], Iran likely would need outside assistance to master the complex scientific, industrial, and technological capabilities that contribute to ballistic missile strike accuracy. The highly advanced technical nature of developing a strong targeting system contrasts with the relatively straightforward technology required to produce the actual Shehab-3 missiles. The Shehab-3 has a range of 1,300 kilometers (808 miles) and is based upon a North Korean modification of the Russian-produced R-11 missile [NATO designation SS-1b 'Scud'].

Source: Dmitriy Safonov, "Iran ignoriruyet rossiysko-amerikanskiye razoruzhencheskiye initsiativy," Izvestiya, 25 May 2002, p. 6; in Integrum Techno, www.integrum.com.

4/4/2002: RUSSIAN DEFENSE, FOREIGN MINISTERS DENY DUAL-USE EXPORTS TO IRAN
On 4 April 2002 Russian Defense Minister Sergey Ivanov denied reports about Russian supplies of nuclear and missile technology to Iran. He made the denial while on a visit to Greece. Ivanov said the reports of technology transfers were a "myth" and that despite numerous allegations, no facts were ever produced to confirm such cooperation between Russia and Iran.[1] One day later, in the course of a press conference following talks with Iranian Foreign Minister Kamal Kharazi, Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov similarly denied US allegations of transfers of dual-use materials or technologies from Russia to Iran for use in nuclear weapon and missile programs, calling such allegations "groundless." According to Ivanov, Russia's cooperation with Iran is taking place in accordance with international agreements and with full transparency.[2]

Sources:
[1] Interfax, 4 April 2002; in "Russia: Defense Minister denies nuclear missile technology supplied to Iran," FBIS Document CEP20020404000163.
[2]"Foreign Minister Denies Russia Provided Dual-Use Goods to Iran," Interfax, 5 April 2002; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, www.lexis-nexis.com.

2/22/2002: CIA REPORT POINTS TO RUSSIAN MISSILE ASSISTANCE TO IRAN
An unclassified CIA report released on 22 February 2002 indicated that Russian organizations continued to supply missile-related technologies, expertise, and equipment to Iran. The report suggested that Iran's efforts to develop new variants of the Shehab ballistic missile combined with continuing cooperation with Russian firms, point to a desire to develop long-range ballistic missile capability. Russian assistance may also increase Iran's indigenous missile design and production capabilities and lessen its dependence on external assistance.

Source: "Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, 1 January Through 30 June 2001," Central Intelligence Agency Web Site, www.cia.gov, 22 February 2002.

1/13/2002: FORMER SOVIET SCIENTISTS ASSISTED IRAN IN MISSILE DEVELOPMENT
The Washington Post reported on 13 January 2002 that throughout the 1990s engineers and scientists from the former Soviet Union traveled to Iran to provide technological information for missile development.[1] Vadim Vorobey, an expert on composite materials at the Moscow Aviation Institute, reported in an interview with the Washington Post that scientists and engineers were invited to Iran to give lectures at Iranian universities, while others were offered contracts for specific projects. Vorobey traveled to Iran numerous times between 1996 and 2000 to give lectures and to work for the Iranian Energy Ministry on projects related to missile development. His travels were arranged officially through the Russian Foreign Ministry and were not opposed by the Russian government. Vorobey continued his work until 2000, when he was finally forbidden to provide any more services to Iran.[2] According to Vorobey, Iran's missile program was very disorganized and its capabilities remained at a very basic level. In his opinion, scientists were brought to Iran to give the false impression that Iran was achieving advanced missile capabilities. Vorobey was very doubtful that Iran could obtain an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) in the next 10 years. He also claimed that he and others only provided basic information on missile technology and stopped short of giving secret information prohibited by international regimes.[1]

Sources:
[1] Michael Dobbs, "A Story of Iran's Quest for Power: A Scientist Details the Role of Russia," Washington Post, 13 January 2002, p. A1.
[2] Michael Dobbs, "Collapse of Soviet Union Proved Boon to Iranian Missile Program," Washington Post, 13 January 2002, p. A19.

10/1/2001: IRANIAN DEFENSE MINISTER VISITS MOSCOW AND SIGNS AGREEMENT ON MILITARY-TECHNICAL COOPERATION
On 1 October 2001, Iranian Minister of Defense Ali Shamkhani arrived in Moscow on a four-day official visit, during the course of which both parties signed a framework agreement on military-technical cooperation.[1] Prior to the summit, Shamkhani visited several defense enterprises, where he was shown a wide-ranging selection of arms.[2] Kommersant reported that Iran is planning primarily to purchase tactical air defense weapons, tactical strike aircraft and infantry fighting vehicles.[3] However, Tehran is also displaying great interest in high-tech missile systems such as Iskander short-range ballistic missile, the S-300 long-range air defense missile system, and supersonic antiship missiles such as Moskit [NATO designation SS-N-22 'Sunburn'] and Yakhont [NATO designation SS-NX-26].[4,5] At Shamkhani's request, Russia conducted a number of demonstrations at the Kapustin Yar testing range, including S-300V and S-300PMU air defense missile systems.[1] Anticipating that the United States and several other nations might strongly object to the sale of such weapons, Russian officials emphasized that they only intend to sell items of an exclusively defensive nature.[5] The signed framework agreement is the first major arms trade initiative since the annulment of the Gore-Chernomyrdin Memorandum in November 2000, under which Russia pledged not to supply Iran with conventional arms. The new framework agreement is expected to lead to several new contracts and long-term cooperation between Russia and Iran. Russian experts estimate that this venture could bring in $300-400 million a year.[6] This would make Iran the third largest buyer of Russian weapons after China and India.[5]

Sources:
[1] Ivan Safronov, "Iran Stunned by Results of Firing Tests of Russian Missiles," Kommersant, 9 October 2001; in "Iran Defense Minister Attends Russian Missile Firing Tests, Signs Agreement," FBIS Document CEP20011011000230.
[2] Aleksey Nikolskiy and Michail Kozyrev, "Something to Fire From," Vedomosti, 2 October 2001; in "Possible Iranian Purchases of Russian Arms Detailed," FBIS Document CEP20011003000343.
[3] "O vizite v Rossiyu ministra oborony Irana," Interfax-Agentstvo Voyennykh Novostey, www.militarynews.ru, 2 October 2001.
[4] "Ministry oborony Rossii i Irana podpishut soglasheniye o VTS," Interfax, 2 October 2001.
[5] "'Chuvstvitelnoye' sotrudnitchestvo," Vedomosti, No. 159, 3 September 2001; in Universal Database of Russian Newspapers, http://udb.eastview.com.
[6] "Ministr oborony Irana pribyvayet v Moskvu s ofitsialnym vizitom," Interfax, 26 September 2001.

12/1/2000: PROGRESS IN LIMITING PROLIFERATION TO IRAN REWARDED BY US LAUNCH QUOTA ELIMINATION
For more information please see the 12/1/2000 entry in the Russia: Delivery Vehicle Facilities: M.V. Khrunichev State Space Scientific Production Center.

8/9/2000: CIA REPORT SAYS RUSSIA ACCELERATED IRANIAN BALLISTIC MISSILE PROGRAM IN 1999
A CIA report to Congress released on 9 August 2000 stated that Russian entities continued to supply ballistic missile-related goods, technology, and expertise to Iran in 1999. For more information, see the 8/9/2000 entry in the General Missile Export Developments file.

2/2/99: CIA DIRECTOR SAYS RUSSIAN TECHNOLOGY BOOSTS IRANIAN MISSILE PROGRAMS
Testifying before the US Congress on 2 February, Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet said that despite US sanctions, Russia was "backsliding" on its commitments to restrict the transfer of missile technology to Iran. While Tenet said there were some positive signs in Russia's performance on this issue in 1998, there was no sustained improvement, and that in the six months prior to February 1999 expertise and materials from Russia have assisted Iranian missile programs in training, testing, and other areas. Tenet said this assistance was continuing and will play a crucial role in Iran's programs to develop sophisticated, long-range missiles. On 8 February, the CIA released an unclassified report to Congress upon which Tenet's testimony was based. The report lays out US concerns over nuclear and missile technology transfer to Iran. (Both the full text of Tenet's testimony and the the CIA Nonproliferation Center's Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, are available in the NIS Nuclear Profiles full-text documents section.)

Source: James Risen, "C.I.A. Sees a North Korean Missile Threat," New York Times, 3 February 1999, p. A6.

1/29/99: GORE AND PRIMAKOV DISCUSS MISSILE TECH TRANSFER
US Vice-President Al Gore and Russian Prime Minister Yevgeniy Primakov discussed nonproliferation and other topics while attending the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland. Gore emphasized US concerns over Russian missile technology transfers to Iran and linked these transfers to commercial cooperation in space launches. A senior US official said that while $700 million in existing space contracts will not be cancelled, the question of whether or not Russia can control the flow of missile technology to Iran jeopardizes the growth of commercial space cooperation.

Source: "Davos--Gore Meets Primakov over Budget, Missiles," Reuters, 29 January 1999.

1/14/99: FSB SAYS SANCTIONED INSTITUTES DID NOT VIOLATE EXPORT CONTROLS
The Public Relations Center of the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) stated that thorough checks on the three institutes accused of supplying nuclear and missile technology to Iran (the Scientific Research and Design Institute of Energy Technologies (NIKIET), the Moscow Aviation Institute, and the D. I. Mendeleyev Russian Chemical-Technological University) have shown that the organizations did not violate nonproliferation export control requirements. The FSB statement suggested that the US sanctions may have resulted from misunderstandings or incomplete work by US intelligence agencies, and said that the decision to impose sanctions indicates US bias against Russian agencies that cooperate with Iran and other foreign countries.

Source: "FSB RF zayavlyayet ob otsutstvii narusheniy trebovaniy eksportnogo kontrolya tremy rossiyskimi organizatsiyami," Interfax, No.1, 14 January 1999.

1/14/99: RAKHMANIN DENIES MISSILE EXPORT ALLEGATIONS
Russian foreign ministry spokesman Vladimir Rakhmanin rejected US accusations that Russia is helping Iran's missile programs as "unfounded." Rakhmanin criticized the linkage of alleged cooperation with Iran to US-Russian agreements on commercial satellite launches as "far-fetched," noting that no allegations of supplying missile technology to other countries have been leveled against the major Russian organizations providing launch services for US satellites, or against their subcontractors. Limiting US-Russian cooperation on satellite launches would adversely affect the interests of the US aerospace industry, Rakhmanin said.

Source: "MID RF nazval nadumannymi popytki Vashingtona uvyazat sotrudnichestvo s Moskvoy v oblasti zapuska kosmicheskikh sputnikov s iranskoy temoy," Interfax, No.3, 14 January 1999.

1/13/99: SARKISOV SAYS MENDELEYEV UNIVERSITY DID NOT TRANSFER MISSILE TECHNOLOGY
Pavel Sarkisov, rector of the D.I. Mendeleyev Russian Chemical-Technical University, said that his university had nothing to do with the sale of missile technology to Iran. Sarkisov said that the university deals with the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy, that the Department of Physical Chemistry trains specialists and conducts studies of zirconium for the nuclear industry, but this research is not secret and does not involve the export of nuclear technology. Sarkisov added that the university has no contracts with Iran in the areas of zirconium research or the burial of spent nuclear fuel, and has not trained personnel for Iran in the past 15 years, although an Iranian post-graduate at the university is conducting non-military-related research on the synthesis of polystyrene.

Source: "RKhTU im. Mendeleyeva oprovergayet fakt prodazhi raketnykh tekhnologiy Iranu," Interfax, No.2, 13 January 1999.

1/13/99: SERGEYEV DENIES MISSILE TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER TO IRAN
Russian Minister of Defense Igor Sergeyev said that control over nonproliferation of nuclear missile technologies does exist in Russia. Commenting on the imposition of sanctions by the United States on three Russian research institutes (the Scientific Research and Design Institute of Energy Technologies (NIKIET), the Moscow Aviation Institute, and the D. I. Mendeleyev Russian Chemical-Technological University), Sergeyev said that those institutes could not supply Iran with missile technologies that they do not possess. Sergeyev further commented that the US decision to apply sanctions was a pretext for something not yet clear, and that while every country has the right to apply sanctions, what the United States has done is unethical.

Source: "V Rossii yest kontrol za nerasprostraneniyem raketno-yadernykh tekhnologii-Minoborony," Interfax, No.1, 13 January 1999.

12/10/98: MASLYUKOV SAYS RUSSIA WILL STOP MISSILE EXPORTS TO IRAN IF US OFFERS PROOF
First Deputy Prime Minister Yuriy Maslyukov said that Russia was willing to tighten controls on exports of missile technology to Iran if the United States provided proof of illicit transfers. Iran was discussed at the start of two days of talks between Maslyukov and US Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott in Moscow. Russian Space Agency Director Yuriy Koptev also took part in the talks.

Source: "Russia--Will Curb Missile Exports to Iran if Proven," Russia Today, 11 December 1998; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, web.lexis-nexis.com.

Updated November 13, 2009

Comments or questions? Contact Thomas Young at MIIS CNS: Thomas.Young@miis.edu

CNSThis material is produced independently for NTI by the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies and does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been independently verified by NTI or its directors, officers, employees, agents. Copyright © 2010 by MIIS.

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