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Russia: Missile Exports to Iran 
Components
Propulsion
Guidance
Materials
Maraging Steel and Special Alloys
Composite Materials
Manufacturing Equipment
Testing EquipmentThe Russian government insists there has been no significant transfer of missile technology to Tehran, although it admits that Iran has actively tried to acquire Russian technology and that some individual Russian specialists may have worked in the Iranian missile program. Russian officials have repeatedly insisted that Russia is fulfilling its obligations under the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)[1,2] and President Yeltsin "categorically denied" US allegations of supplying Iran with missile components and technologies.[3] Nevertheless, reports continue to surface in both Russian and Western media (with many Western reports based largely on leaked Israeli and US intelligence assessments) suggesting the Russian government has either turned a blind eye to the activities of Russian defense firms in this area, or has actually assisted their efforts. Available information does not resolve whether transferring missile technology to Iran is an official policy, or merely an activity carried out by individual companies, possibly in collusion with corrupt officials. However, together with revelations about a 1995 sale of Russian missile guidance components to Iraq, reports of the transfer of missile technology raise concerns over the possibility of the Russian government's involvement at some level as well as lax enforcement of export controls. It should be noted that many reports of Russian transfers of missile technology or materials often quote unnamed US or Israeli intelligence sources. While this should not lead one to discount the reports automatically, the possibility that reports relying on such sources may be politically motivated should be kept in mind. In any event, no legal exports of missile components or related equipment from Russia to Iran have been officially acknowledged. The more serious allegations of unlicensed exports involve guidance and engine components, high-strength steel and special alloys, and manufacturing and test equipment. Additionally, two Russian defense firms are known to have sent specialists to Iran, and reports indicated that Iranian students have received training in missile technology at Russian technical institutes. In July 1998, the Russian Government Commission on Export Control launched an investigation of nine companies and institutions suspected of violating Russian export control laws. Under pressure from the U.S. Congress to take action, the Clinton administration penalized seven of these companies with trade sanctions.[4] In addition, another round of investigations was conducted in 2002 regarding 13 cases presented by the United States but no violations were found.[13] However, the enterprises investigated by the Russian government do not include several large and influential organizations—including the Russian Space Agency; Rosoboronexport, the state-owned arms export company; and the Federal Security Service—that Western and Israeli sources have charged with complicity in covert transfers of Russian missile technology to Iran.[5,6] Reports and commentary in the Israeli press charged that Russian technology was incorporated into the Shahab-3 missile that Iran tested in July 1998.[7,8] The United States supported this charge, stating that SS-4 MRBM technologies have been used for this missile.[14] Iranian officials, however, denied that Russia cooperated with Iran in the production of the missile.[9] Iran's defense minister further claimed that the Shahab-3 was developed "without help from any foreign country,"[10] but this claim is dubious; most experts agree that the Shahab-3 is essentially a North Korean Nodong medium-range ballistic missile with few, if any, modifications.[11,12,13] Nevertheless, the possibility that Russian technology or know-how may have been used to enhance the performance of the Shahab-3, or to enable Iran to manufacture some components domestically, reinforces the need for Russia to maintain and fully implement its commitment to control the proliferation of ballistic missile technology. Secret Iranian documents presented to the Federation of American Scientists (FAS) have confirmed suspicions that Iran's Hoot underwater missile is derived from the Russian VA-111 Shkval missile.[15] The FAS disclosed reports of several Shkval trials that were conducted by Iran in 2004.[15,16] These documents also contain a 2007 contract awarded to Iran's Aerospace Industries Organization relating to the development and production of model hydro-reactive compound engines for the Hoot missile.[15] Iran has officially denied there has been any assistance from Russia and states that there is no link between the two countries' missile systems. These allegations create concern that Russia is failing to maintain and fully implement its commitment to control the proliferation of ballistic missile technology and recent missile sales have only increased this anxiety. In December 2005 Russia signed a $700 million contract to deliver 29 TOR-M1 missiles, and fulfilled its obligations at the end of 2006.[21,22] In addition, Rosoboronexport negotiated another agreement in 2007 to provide Iran with a Russian S300 surface-to-air missile system.[17] While Iran declared that the system's delivery had already been made, Russia flatly denies these claims.[18] According to the Kremlin, pressure from the United States and Israel has forced it to temporarily postpone the sale.[18,19] However, this agreement currently remains on the table.[19,20] Sources:
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