11/18/2003: ADDITIONAL GROUP OF IRANIAN
SPECIALISTS TO RECEIVE TRAINING AT NOVOVORONEZH
On 18 November 2003, Vyacheslav Yefryushkin, the deputy chief engineer at the
Atomtekhenergo Novovoronezh Training Center, announced that another group of Iranian specialists was to
undergo training at the center, where more than 350 specialists had
already been trained. In addition, over 200 specialists had
received first-hand training by Russian instructors directly at Bushehr.
Yefryushkin
further stated that 140 of the specialists had already been assigned
positions at Bushehr.[1] Earlier, ITAR-TASS reported that a total of 700
specialists will have been trained at the center by 2005, when the power plant
is supposed to go on line.[2] (For more information, see the
7/10/2003 and 6/16/2003
entries, below.) Sources:
[1] "Gruppa iranskikh spetsialistov dlya stroyashcheysya AES v Bushere pristupila k zanyatiyam v uchebnom tsentre v Novovoronezhe," ITAR-TASS,
18 November 2003; in Integrum Techno,
http://www.integrum.com.
[2] "Poslednyaya gruppa iranskikh smennykh inzhenerov dlya raboty na AES v Bushere
zavershila obucheniye na Novovoronezhskoy AES," ITAR-TASS, 29 October 2003; in
Integrum Techno,
http://www.integrum.com. {Entered 02/11/2004 RS}
11/10/2003: NEGOTIATIONS
CONCERNING PRICE OF NUCLEAR FUEL AND ITS RETURN TO CONTINUE On 10 November 2003, Iran's Supreme National Security Council Secretary Hassan Rowhani repeated his country's intention to conclude
negotiations concerning the return of spent fuel from
the Bushehr nuclear power plant to Russia in the near future,
hinting at the continued failure to come to an agreement after numerous
meetings with
Russian authorities in the past month.[1,2,3] Earlier,
Minatom officials had stated that the
price of nuclear fuel and the return of spent fuel were being debated. They
characterized as injudicious Iran's demand that enough uranium to run the
plant for the next few years be delivered within one month of signing the
contract on the return of spent fuel. While this would be physically possible,
since a storage facility has been constructed at Bushehr, Russian officials
required an agreement concerning the price of the fuel before that fuel is delivered.[2]
On 19
November 2003, Russian Minister of Atomic
Energy Aleksandr Rumyantsev declared that a contract on the return of
spent nuclear fuel would not be signed in the near future, citing the Iranian preoccupations with
the fulfillment of their IAEA obligations as the reason.[4] The issue remains
unresolved and will be further discussed during Rumyantsev's meeting with Iranian
officials in Teheran in early 2004.[5] Sources:
[1] Arkadiy Dubnov, "Sensatsiya o sotrudnichestve Tegerana s MAGATE
prozvuchala v Moskve," Vremya novostey, 11 November 2003, p.5; in "Yadernoye
samoogranicheniye Irana," WPS Oborona i bezopasnost, 14 November 2003; in Integrum Techno,
http://www.integrum.com.
[2] "Rossiya i Iran delayut eshche odnu popytku opredelit datu i mesto
podpisaniya protokola o vozvrate rossiyskogo topliva s AES v Bushere,"
ITAR-TASS, 11 November 2003; in Integrum Techno,
http://www.integrum.com.
[3] "Rossiya i Iran v sredu v Moskve obsudyat datu i mesto podpisaniya
protokola o vozvrate otrabotavshego topliva s AES v Bushere," ITAR-TASS, 28
October 2003; in Integrum Techno,
http://www.integrum.com.
[4] "Rossiya soglasna otstrochit podpisaniye s Iranom protokola o vozvrate
obluchennogo yadernogo topliva iz Bushera," ITAR-TASS, 19 November 2003; in Integrum Techno,
http://www.integrum.com.
[5] Ravil Musin, "U Irana i Rossii net raznoglasiy po voprosu sotrudnichestva v oblasti
yadernoy energetiki, zayavil predstavitel iranskogo MID," ITAR-TASS, 1
February 2004; in Integrum Techno,
http://www.integrum.com.
{Entered 02/12/2004 RS}
10/30/2003: QUESTIONS REMAIN
REGARDING BUSHEHR SCHEDULE Nuclear.ru reported on 30 October 2003 that the latest round of
discussions between Iran and Russia, held in Moscow on 29 October 2003, had failed
to yield a definitive agreement on a construction schedule for the
Bushehr nuclear power plant (NPP).
Iran reportedly expressed an interest in moving up the
date that the plant goes online and to this end requested that the
Russian government, and specifically
Minister of Atomic
Energy Aleksandr Rumyantsev, assume direct responsibility for oversight of
the construction plans. Russian representatives in turn pointed out that Iran
officially has not approved the existing work schedule, despite the fact that
it has been reviewed by technical experts. Work nevertheless has proceeded in
accordance with this schedule, and the two sides decided to resume
consideration of the issue at the next meeting of the Russian-Iranian
coordination council, which likely will be convened in Tehran in January
2004.[1] These discussions followed several reports that it increasingly is
likely that the launch of the first unit at Bushehr will be delayed until as late
as the second half of 2005.[1,2,3] The reports attributed the prospect of
postponement to a variety of reasons, mostly of a technical nature.[2,4] [This information conflicts with previous
statements that Russia planned to launch the first
unit by the end of
2004.] For example, Viktor Kozlov, the general director
of Atomstroyeksport,
the Russian general contractor for Bushehr, cited problems with manufacture
and delivery of equipment by Russian suppliers as one of the factors hindering
the project.[5] At the same time, Russian officials unanimously denied the
existence of a political subtext to the delay. In particular, representatives
of the Ministry of Atomic
Energy consistently emphasized that the concern expressed by the United States and
the international community about a possible Iranian nuclear weapons program
has not influenced the Russian stance on Bushehr.[2,4,5] Sources:
[1] "V. Govorukhin: Data podpisaniya Iranom dopolnitelnogo protokola k DNYAO
mozhet byt obyavlena v Moskve," Nuclear.ru Web Site,
http://www.nuclear.ru/comments/full.html?id=82, 30 October 2003.
[2] "Rossiya otlozhila zapusk iranskoy atomnoy elektrostantsii," Regions.ru,
14 October 2003; in Integrum Techno,
http://www.integrum.com.
[3] German Solomatin, "Glava Minatoma RF: Rossiya vplotnuyu podoshla k
podpisaniyu s Iranom dokumenta o vozvrate otrabotannogo yadernogo topliva s
AES v Bushere," ITAR-TASS, 29 May 2003; in Integrum Techno,
http://www.integrum.com.
[4] "Soglasheniye s Iranom o vozvrate otrabotannogo yadernogo topliva s
Busherskoy AES mozhet byt podpisano uzhe v blizhaysheye vremya- Rumyantsev,"
ITAR-TASS, 20 June 2003; in Integrum Techno,
http://www.integrum.com.
[5] German Solomatin, "Rossiyskiy generalnyy podryadchik stroitelstva AES v
Bushere ukazaniy ot Minatoma na svertyvaniye rabot ne poluchal," ITAR-TASS, 4
June 2003; in Integrum Techno,
http://www.integrum.com.
{Entered 12/10/2003 EMC}
10/29/2003: CONSTRUCTION OF BUSHEHR UNIT 2 CONSIDERED
On 29 October 2003, Minatom issued a statement concerning talks held between
Russian Minister of Atomic
Energy Aleksandr Rumyantsev and the
Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Islamic Republic of Iran Golamreza Safei. According to the statement,
plans for a second reactor unit at Bushehr
were on the agenda.[1] After a
subsequent meeting between Russian and US officials, the latter claimed
during a press conference that there were
no plans for the construction of further nuclear reactors at Bushehr, and
that statements to this regard by Minatom were politically motivated.[2]
However, on 10 November 2003, Iran's Supreme National Security Council
Secretary Hassan
Rowhani was reported as saying that negotiations concerning the construction of a
second reactor would start in the near future.[3] Rumyantsev would not
comment on the prospect of building additional reactors at Bushehr until Iran
after signs the Additional Protocol. However, another Minatom official
announced that the issue would be discussed further during a visit to Tehran
by Rumyantsev in early 2004.[4,5]
Sources:
[1] "Soobshcheniye," Minatom Web Site,
http://www.minatom.ru, 29 October 2003. [2] "SShA planiruyut obsudit s glavoy Minatoma RF v tom chisle voprosy
sotrudnichestva Moskvy i Tegerana v oblasti yadernoy energetiki," ITAR-TASS, 5
November 2003; in Integrum Techno,
http://www.integrum.com.
[3] "Rossiya peredala Iranu tekhniko-ekonomicheskoye obosnovaniye stroitelstva
vtorovo energobloka AES v Bushere," ITAR-TASS, 10 November 2003; in Integrum Techno,
http://www.integrum.com.
[4] Aleksandr Rumyantsev, "S nami sorevnyutsya samyye moshchnyye kompanii
v atomnom biznise," Kommersant, 21
November 2003; in Integrum Techno,
http://www.integrum.com.
[5] "Resolyutsiya MAGATE dayet vozmozhnost aktivizirovat rossiysko-iranskoye
sotrudnichestvo v atomnoy energetike, uvereny v Minatome RF," ITAR-TASS, 27
November 2003; in Integrum Techno,
http://www.integrum.com.
{Entered 2/12/2004 RS}
9/16/2003: RUMYANTSEV COMMENTS
ON ARAK HEAVY WATER FACILITY ITAR-TASS reported on 16 September 2003 that
Russian Minister
of Atomic Energy Aleksandr Rumyantsev, at a press conference at
International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) headquarters in Vienna, announced that Russia had not provided any assistance to Tehran in
its efforts to construct a heavy water factory in Arak. He indicated that
Russia had refrained from extending technical assistance to the project, despite
an Iranian request to conduct a feasibility study, and also did not supply any
equipment for the facility. Rumyantsev did disclose that his ministry knew
about the construction of the facility and referred to Iranian plans to pursue a reactor based on
CANDU (CANada Deuterium
Uranium) technology, which would require heavy water.[1] [It appears unlikely,
however, that Canada would agree to build a CANDU reactor in Iran in the near
future. In addition, the sole heavy-water zero power reactor (HWZPR) that Iran
currently maintains at the
Esfahan nuclear technology/research center requires only an insignificant
amount of heavy water.[2]] Despite these latest statements by Minister
Rumyantsev, it has been reported in the past that Russian nuclear research
institutes sought to sell Iran a 40MW heavy-water research reactor and
to provide advice on heavy-water production.[2,3] There also were reports that
two Russian nuclear engineers were
recruited in the early 1990s by the Iranian Atomic Energy (IAEO) to help build a secret facility near Arak.
(CNS believes that this refers to the heavy-water production facility in Arak.) [1] Yuriy Kozlov, German Solomatin, "Rossiya ne
predostavlyala Iranu nikakogo sodeystviya v sooruzhenii zavoda tyazheloy vody
v Arake- glava Minatoma," ITAR-TASS, 16 September 2003; in Integrum Techno,
http://www.integrum.com.
[2] Vasiliy Lata, Anton Khlopkov, "Iran: Raketno-yadernaya zagadka dlya Rossii,"
Yadernyy kontrol, No.2 (68), Vol. 9, Summer 2003, p.44.
[3]
Carla Anne Robbins, Andrew Higgins,
"Fission for Cash: Money Hungry Russia Finds a Foreign Market for Nuclear
Knowledge," Wall Street Journal, 15 December 1998, p. 1;
in ProQuest,
http://www.proquest.com]
{Entered 12/1/2003 EMC}
7/10/2003: IRANIAN SPECIALISTS
RECEIVE TRAINING IN NOVOVORONEZH ITAR-TASS reported on 10 July 2003 that more than 500 Iranian nuclear
specialists have received instruction in approximately 30 different
disciplines at a training center in
Novovoronezh. [CNS
believes that this likely refers to the
Atomtekhenergo Novovoronezh Training Center.] It is anticipated that an
additional 200 specialists will receive training in Novovoronezh by the time
that the first reactor block at the Bushehr
nuclear power
plant (NPP), where all of the specialists will work, comes on line,
reportedly scheduled for 2004.[1] Many of these individuals previously received degrees from leading US
and European universities and completed training courses in Iran. The
specialists, however, lack knowledge about the everyday operations of nuclear
power plants and do not have experience in dealing with emergency situations.
The facility in Novovoronezh has equipment that allows students to simulate
operating a NPP. As such it provides the Iranian specialists with an
opportunity to familiarize themselves with the security measures and systems
in place at Russian NPPs in anticipation of the role that they will assume
alongside Russian colleagues during the first few months of day-to-day
operations at Bushehr.[1,2] Sources:
[1] Yuriy Khots, "Boleye 500 spetsialistov-atomshchikov iz Irana zavershili
professionalnuyu podgotovku v Novovoronezhe," ITAR-TASS, 10 July 2003; in Integrum Techno,
http://www.integrum.com.
[2] Dmitriy Vinitskiy, German Solomatin, "Na rossiyskikh yadernykh obyektakh proshli obucheniye
700 iranskikh spetsialistov, soobshchil vitse-prezident Irana," ITAR-TASS, 1
July 2003; in Integrum Techno,
http://www.integrum.com. {Entered 12/1/2003 EMC}
6/16/2003: RUSSIA DENIES
ALLEGATIONS CONCERNING TRAINING OF IRANIANS The British newspaper The Guardian reported on 16 June 2003 that Russia is
providing training to hundreds of Iranian specialists that will be involved in
the operation of the Bushehr nuclear
power plant. The article suggests that
the training, conducted at institutions across Russia, may result
inadvertently in the transfer of sensitive information.[1] According to unnamed
US and British officials, this knowledge, such as classified techniques of
nuclear fuel production, might aid Iran in light of suspicions that the Iranian civilian
nuclear energy program masks a nuclear weapons program.[1,2] In response to the charges, however, representatives of the
Obninsk State Technical
University of Atomic Energy outside of Moscow, one of the institutions
involved, insisted that trainees
enrolled in its programs learn only the general principles of operating a
nuclear reactor. The course of study also includes an introduction to
technical Russian language terminology that would allow the trainees, who
arrive in groups of 30 for three-month periods, to interact with Russian
personnel engaged in the Bushehr project. Andrey Nesterov, vice president for
academic affairs at Obninsk, stressed that the trainees do not
have access to classified information because the university does not house
any restricted-access facilities. He also emphasized that the training takes
place within the framework of a contract between the Russian and Iranian
governments.[2,3] (For more information, see the Russia:
Nuclear Exports to Iran: Training and Know-How section.) Sources:
[1] Nick Paton Walsh, "Russian lessons," The Guardian online
edition,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/international/story/ 0,3604,978077.00.html, 16 June 2003.
[2] NTV, 25 June 2003; in "Russian college says no nuclear 'secrets' being
given to Iranian students," FBIS Document CEP20030625000290.
[3] Mayak Radio, 25 June 2003; in "Russian Institute Says Iranian Trainees
Taught Terminology, Not Nuclear Science," FBIS Document CEP20030625000130. {Entered
11/13/2003 EMC}
6/16/2003: IRANIAN SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL
WILL NOT BE PROCESSED AT MAYAK According to Mayak Production
Association spokesperson Yevgeniy Ryzhkov, spent fuel from the Bushehr
nuclear power plant will not be sent to Mayak for reprocessing, as has been previously speculated. ["Mayak plant refuses to process nuclear fuel from
Iran," Pravda.ru Web Site,
http://english.pravda.ru/main/2003/06/16/48228.html, 16 June 2003.] {Entered 8/14/2003 DS}
5/30/2003: RUSSIA, IRAN CALL
FOR US TO JOIN BUSHEHR PROJECT ITAR-TASS reported on 30 May 2003 that Russia has invited the United States
to join ongoing construction of the
Bushehr nuclear power plant in
Iran. The report cited Russian Minister
of Atomic Energy Aleksandr Rumyantsev, who indicated that Russia has put
forth this proposal on several occasions during expert level talks with the
United States. Rumyantsev framed US involvement in terms of the potential commercial
benefits, as Iran considers plans to build an additional five reactors,
and as the obligation of developed countries to cooperate with countries that
adhere to the nuclear nonproliferation regime and are in good standing with
the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA).[1] Several days later, Iran echoed the invitation to
the United States to participate in the development of Bushehr, but characterized
such cooperation as a means of assuaging US concerns about the nature of the
Iranian nuclear program. In any event, in its response to the latest Russian
proposal the United States declined to help build the reactor at Bushehr.[2] Sources:
[1] Veronika Voskoboynikova, "Aleksandr Rumyantsev: Rossiya predlagayet SShA
prisoyedinitsya k stroitelstvu AES v Irane eksklyuziv," ITAR-TASS, 30 May
2003; in Integrum Techno,
http://www.integrum.com.
[2] Konstantin Machulskiy, "MID Irana predlozhil SShA prinyat uchastiye v
stroitelstve atomnoy elektrostantsii," ITAR-TASS, 2 June 2003; in Integrum Techno,
http://www.integrum.com.
{Entered 11/6/2003 EMC}
5/14/2003: RUSSIA PUSHES
FORWARD ON BUSHEHR; IAEA ROLE HIGHLIGHTED Russian Minister
of Atomic Energy Aleksandr Rumyantsev stressed in an interview with
ITAR-TASS on 14 May 2003 that Russia sees no reason to halt construction of
the Bushehr nuclear power plant
despite increasing questions about the nature of the Iranian nuclear
program. He emphasized that the
International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) is overseeing work on the first reactor
block by Russian specialists.[1] The IAEA conducted 60 inspections throughout Iran in the course of 2002 that did not yield any violations of the nuclear nonproliferation regime,
according to Russian reports.[2] Rumyantsev indicated, however, that Russia would be willing to discuss the
concerns of the international community within the framework of the IAEA, if
provided with convincing evidence that Tehran is pursuing a nuclear weapons
program.[1] At the
same time, the Russian Foreign Ministry and members of the
State Duma
reiterated that only the IAEA has the authority to assess Iran's degree of
compliance with its obligations under the
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons (NPT), which affords Russia and Iran the right to
cooperate on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Nonetheless, Russia unquestionably
remains interested in the preservation of the nuclear weapons status quo.[2,3] As
a result, according to an unnamed high-ranking defense official, Russia,
contrary to statements by US officials, intends to take steps to ensure that
its cooperation with Iran does not enable Tehran to develop its nuclear
weapons program. This includes its insistence that Iran return spent
nuclear fuel from Bushehr to Russia.[4,5] In a meeting with the Iranian Ambassador
to Moscow, Gholam Reza Shafei, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Georgiy Mamedov
also expressed concern and urged Iran to engage the IAEA on outstanding issues
related to its nuclear program.[6] Sources:
[1] German Solomatin, "U Rossii net osnovaniy prekrashchat stroitelstvo AES v
Irane- glava Minatoma RF eksklyuziv," ITAR-TASS, 14 May 2003; in Integrum Techno,
http://www.integrum.com.
[2] Robert Serebrennikov, "Dlya Rossii poyavleniye u Irana yadernogo oruzhiya
ili yadernykh tekhnologiy v takoy zhe stepeni nepriyemlemo, kak i dlya SShA,
zayavlyayut v Gosdume," ITAR-TASS, 29 May 2003; in Integrum Techno,
http://www.integrum.com.
[3] Dmitriy Vinitskiy, "MID RF: otsenku soblyudeniya Iranom Dogovora o
nerasprostranenii yadernogo oruzhiya mozhet dat tolko MAGATE," ITAR-TASS, 29
May 2003; in Integrum Techno,
http://www.integrum.com.
[4] "Ofitsialnyy rossiyskiy voyennyy predstavitel oproverg utverzhdeniya o
tom, chto RF ne protivodeystvuyet poyavleniyu v Irane yadernogo oruzhiya,"
ITAR-TASS, 23 May 2003; in Integrum Techno,
http://www.integrum.com.
[5] "Otrabotannoye yadernoye toplivo s AES v Bushire budet vyvozitsya v
Rossiyu," Regions.Ru, 23 May 2003; in Integrum Techno,
http://www.integrum.com.
[6] "Iran-Rossiya: yadernoye sotrudnichestvo pod voprosom," MIGnews, 27 May
2003; in Integrum Techno,
http://www.integrum.com.
{Entered 11/6/2003 EMC}
4/23/2003: NUCLEAR FUEL
SHIPMENT TO IRAN DELAYED ITAR-TASS reported on 23 April 2003 that nuclear fuel will not be delivered
to Iran in early 2004, as planned earlier. The fuel has already been produced and is being stored at
the Novosibirsk Chemical
Concentrate Plant, according to
TVEL President Aleksandr Nyago. The ostensible reason given for the delay
was that the fuel
storage facility at the Bushehr nuclear power plant is not yet ready.[1]
However, the delay may be linked to ongoing discussions concerning spent
fuel return and
International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) oversight of Iranian nuclear facilities. Iran originally
expected the nuclear fuel shipment in May 2003.[2] Sources:
[1] Vadim Manenkov, "Yadernoye toplivo iz Rossii dlya stroyashcheysya v Irane
AES budet postavleno v 2004 godu, soobshchil prezident kompanii 'TVEL',"
ITAR-TASS, 23 April 2003; in Integrum Techno,
http://www.integrum.com.
[2] "Rossiyskiy uran uyedet v Iran," Vremya novostey, 13 March 2003, p.
5; in WPS Yadernyye materialy, No. 9, 21 March 2003. {Entered 5/14/2003 MJ}
4/22/2003: IRAN TO OWN NUCLEAR FUEL Russian Minister of Atomic Energy Aleksandr
Rumyantsev said on 22 April 2003 that Russia will start supplying nuclear fuel
to Iran as soon as the last details of commercial contracts are worked out.
According to Rumyantsev, Russia and Iran have agreed that spent nuclear fuel
is to be returned to Russia. The two countries will sign an appropriate
agreement shortly. Rumyantsev agreed with Iran's claim to be the legal owner
of the fuel it purchases, and that Russia will have to repurchase it in order
to have it returned. Rumyantsev stated that the contract will be amended
accordingly, adding that Iran's nuclear fuel cycle activities ought to be
placed under
International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) oversight. ["Minatom: RF budet postavlyat yadernoye toplivo v Iran, no
schitayet neobkhodimym kontrol MAGATE za yadernym toplivnym tsiklom v etoy
strane," ITAR-TASS, 22 April 2003; in Integrum Techno,
http://www.integrum.com.]
{Entered 5/14/2003 MJ}
3/20/2003: RUSSIA AND IRAN CONSIDER LONG-TERM NUCLEAR COOPERATION RIA Novosti reported on 20 March 2003 that Russia and Iran intend
to develop a program that would provide for long-term cooperation on research
and the peaceful use of nuclear energy. The
Minatom press service
noted that representatives of Iran and Russia reached such an agreement during
the course of a recent joint trade and economic
cooperation commission meeting in Tehran. Deputy Minister for Atomic Energy Andrey Malyshev
discussed with his Iranian colleagues plans to expand cooperation on nuclear
energy, which is limited at the present time to construction of the first
reactor of the Bushehr nuclear
power plant (NPP). In addition to completion of Bushehr Unit 1, plans for longer-term cooperation
might would include a feasibility study concerning construction of a second
reactor at Bushehr, measures to ensure safe operation of the NPP, and efforts
to cooperate on research in a variety of spheres related to nuclear science and technology.
(For more information, see the 3/7/2003,
9/17/2002, and the 7/26/2002
entries, below.) [Eduard Puzyrev, "Rossiya i Iran razrabotayut dolgosrochnuyu programmu
sotrudnichestva v oblasti issledovaniya i ispolzovaniya mirnogo atoma," RIA
Novosti, 20 March 2003; in Integrum Techno,
http://www.integrum.com.]
{Entered 11/3/2003 EMC}
3/20/2003: MINATOM COMMENTS ON IRANIAN ENRICHMENT EFFORTS On 20 March 2003,
Minatom denied it had plans to aid Iran in enriching
uranium. The denial was issued shortly after the media reported that
Deputy Minister for Atomic Energy Andrey Malyshev had expressed readiness to build
uranium enrichment facilities in Iran. According to Minatom, although Malyshev
participated in a meeting of the Russian-Iranian trade and economic cooperation
commission, he did not make the statements that were attributed to him.[1] On
25 March 2003, a Minatom representative officially announced that the
centrifuges acquired by Iran were of Western, not Russian, origin. Minatom
also reiterated its position that it is only assisting Iran in the construction of
one nuclear reactor at the Bushehr nuclear power plant, and is not providing assistance on
developing Iranian uranium deposits, constructing nuclear facilities in the
center of the country, or uranium enrichment.[2] Furthermore, Russian Minister
of Atomic Energy Aleksandr Rumyantsev said, citing Western press reports, that
the Iranian centrifuge equipment may have been built using technology stolen
from the British-Dutch firm
Urenco and equipment provided by the firm. Urenco denied the allegations
it has supplied enrichment technology and equipment to Iran.[3] Rumyantsev
stated that he is concerned about the Iranian enrichment facilities for
economic reasons. With its own nuclear fuel cycle, Iran would not be
dependent on Russia for supplies of nuclear fuel. This, according to
Rumyantsev, would put into doubt Russia's strategic partnership with Iran.
Rumyantsev appeared less concerned about the nuclear proliferation aspect of
the facilities, stating that while centrifuges could be used to produce highly
enriched uranium (HEU),
available information suggested they were still in the early stages of
development. According to Rumyantsev, they would be capable of producing HEU
only in several years.[4] Nevertheless, Rumyantsev was sufficiently concerned
to call for greater transparency of Iran's enrichment efforts and
International Atomic Energy
Agency
oversight of its nuclear fuel cycle.[5] Sources:
[1] "Minatom RF oprovergayet soobshcheniya o planakh sotrudnichestva s Iranom
po obogashcheniyu urana," Interfax, 20 March 2003.
[2] German Solomatin, "Imeyushchiyesya u Irana tsentrifugi dlya obogashcheniya
urana ne rossiyskogo, a zapadnogo proizvodstva, zayavlyayut v Minatome,"
ITAR-TASS, 25 March 2003; in
Integrum
Techno,
http://www.integrum.com.
[3] Nikolay Gorelov, "Rossiyskiy atomnyy ministr vozmushchen postavkami
yadernykh tekhnologiy," Vremya novostey, 27 March 2003, pp. 1, 5; in WPS
Oborona i Bezopasnost, 31 March 2003;
in Integrum
Techno,
http://www.integrum.com.
[4] Ivan Lebedev, "Yadernaya programma Irana vyzyvayet u glavy Minatoma RF
obespokoyennost po ekonomicheskim prichinam," ITAR-TASS, 9 April 2003;
in Integrum
Techno,
http://www.integrum.com.
[5] "Minatom: RF budet postavlyat yadernoye toplivo v Iran, no schitayet
neobkhodimym kontrol MAGATE za yadernym toplivnym tsiklom v etoy strane,"
ITAR-TASS, 22 April 2003; in Integrum
Techno,
http://www.integrum.com.
{Entered 5/14/2003 MJ}
3/14/2003: RUMYANTSEV ON
IRANIAN WEAPONS PROGRAM ALLEGATIONS Bellona reported on 14 March 2003 that Russian
Minister of Atomic Energy Aleksandr Rumyantsev acknowledged that Iran might have a nuclear weapons
program underway. According to Rumyantsev, Iran has not been informing Russia of
all nuclear-related projects it was pursuing and, therefore, Russia had no
information about the existence of dual-use facilities that could be used for
producing weapons-grade material. Rumyantsev's statement came shortly after a
visit to Iran by
International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) Director General Mohamed ElBaradei, who visited the uranium
enrichment facility in Natanz, and
an Iranian announcement that it planned to
exploit domestic uranium deposits and reprocess spent nuclear fuel. The Iranian
intention to produce and reprocess nuclear fuel domestically undermines the
earlier guarantees that spent nuclear fuel would be returned to Russia. The Natanz
facility, the existence of which was made known by an Iranian opposition group, may
be capable of producing sufficient enriched uranium for one nuclear weapon per
year.[1] At the same time, Rumyantsev defended Iran's decision to create a
nuclear fuel cycle. He stated that Iran has long made known its intentions in
that area, and reiterated his previous position that IAEA inspections have not
uncovered any evidence of a nuclear weapons program. Rumyantsev did not share the
US position that Iran, a country with large natural gas deposits, had no need
to pursue nuclear energy. The minister did allow that the issue of centrifuges
required further clarification, since they represent dual-use technology.[2] Sources: [1] Charles Digges, "Minatom Finally Concedes Iran May Have
a Nuclear Weapons Programme," Bellona Web Site,
http://www.bellona.no/en/
international/russia/nuke_industry/co-operation/29009.html,
14 March 2003.
[2] Yuriy Kozlov, "Govorit o tom, chto Iran imeyet programmu po sozdaniyu yadernogo oruzhiya
poka net osnovaniy, schitayet ministr po atomnoy energii Rossii," ITAR-TASS,
11 March 2003;
in Integrum
Techno,
http://www.integrum.com.
{Entered 4/3/2003 MJ}
3/7/2003: RUMYANTSEV PLEDGES TO CONTINUE COOPERATION WITH IRAN Russian Minister of Atomic Energy Aleksandr Rumyantsev announced on 7 March
2003 that Russia will not stop nuclear cooperation with Iran (which, according
to the source, plans to build up to 10 additional reactors) under any
circumstances. Rumyantsev also said that Russia intends to bid for the
construction of the second Bushehr nuclear power plant unit.
[German Solomatin, "Rossiya ni pri kakikh usloviyakh ne otkazhetsya ot sotrudnichestva s Iranom
v oblasti ispolzovaniya atomnoy energii v mirnykh tselyakh," ITAR-TASS, 7
March 2003;
in Integrum
Techno,
http://www.integrum.com.]
{Entered 4/3/2003 MJ}
2/11/2003: MINATOM ON IRANIAN FUEL CYCLE DEVELOPMENT Deputy Minister of Atomic Energy Valeriy Govorukhin told ITAR-TASS on 11
February 2003 that Iran was not yet capable of creating a domestic
nuclear fuel cycle. Govorukhin said that Iran has repeatedly
asked Russia to help develop its uranium deposits, but Russia has turned down
these requests.
Further, he said that Iranian statements that it intends to exploit uranium deposits are most likely
political in nature, since Iran lacks financial resources and technological
expertise for such an endeavor.[1] Govorukhin's comments were supported the
next day by the Minister of Atomic Energy Aleksandr Rumyantsev, who said that
while Iran is capable of processing uranium ore, it lacks the ability to perform
enrichment. Rumyantsev stated that Russia has no plans to render assistance to
Iran in that area.[2] [For information on Iran's nuclear programs, please see
the Iran
country profile.] Sources:
[1] German Solomatin, "Minatom RF: Iran ne raspolagayet vozmozhnostyami sozdaniya sobstvennogo
uranovo-toplivnogo tsikla," ITAR-TASS, 11 February 2003;
in Integrum
Techno, http://www.integrum.com.
[2]
"Minatom RF: Iran poka ne obladayet tekhnicheskimi vozmozhnostyami dlya
obogashcheniya urana," Regions.ru, 12 February 2003; in Integrum
Techno,
http://www.integrum.com.
{Entered 4/3/2003 MJ}
2/5/2003: UNITED STATES OFFERS INCENTIVES TO RUSSIA Bellona reported on 5 February 2003 that the US Department of State offered
Russia support for its spent fuel
import plan if it stops nuclear technology
assistance to Iran. Under the proposal, the United States would not oppose the
importation of US-controlled spent nuclear fuel to Russia for storage and
reprocessing. The share of US-controlled spent fuel is estimated at between
70%-90%. [For more information, see the
Spent Fuel Import Project Overview file.] [Charles Digges, "US publicly offers SNF to Russia if
Moscow abandons Iran," Bellona Web Site,
http://www.bellona.no/en/international/russia/nuke_industry/
waste_imports/28221.html, 5 February 2003.] {Entered 4/3/2003 MJ}
1/14/2003: UNITED STATES, IAEA
REACT TO SPENT FUEL AGREEMENT US Ambassador to Russia Alexander Vershbow said on 14 January 2003 that
the United States approves of the agreement to return spent nuclear fuel from
the Bushehr nuclear power plant (NPP) to Russia. He also expressed hope that Russia will continue to
strive to ensure the safety of the reactor and prevent the leakage of
sensitive technologies to Iran. According to Vershbow, the US government is
concerned that Russian specialists might be sharing their knowledge with
Iranians, and that the knowledge could be used to advance the Iranian nuclear
weapons program. Even cooperation under the auspices of the
International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) does not remove that
risk.[1] IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei also praised the agreement on 16
January 2003, and said he will visit Iran on 25 February 2003, where he will
encourage Iranians to increase transparency of their nuclear programs.[2] Sources:
[1] Kseniya Kaminskaya, "SShA odobryayut soglasheniye RF s Iranom o vozvrashchenii pererabotannogo
yadernogo topliva i prizyvayut eye ne postavlyat chuvstvitelnuyu tekhniku,"
ITAR-TASS, 14 January 2003; in
Integrum
Techno,
http://www.integrum.com.
[2] "Rukovoditel MAGATE nazval 'khoroshey meroy vozvrashcheniye ispolzovannogo
yadernogo goryuchego s iranskoy AES v Bushere v Rossiyu," ITAR-TASS, 16
January 2003; in Integrum
Techno,
http://www.integrum.com.
{Entered 1/23/2003 MJ}
1/4/2003: NUCLEAR FUEL READY FOR IRANIAN REACTOR RIA Novosti reported on 4 January 2003
Minatom's announcement that fuel
elements for reactors under construction in Iran and China were ready for
shipment. According to Minatom, the fuel elements will be sent under the
supervision of the
International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA)
as soon as Russian specialists begin the final stage of
construction of the reactors. [Eduard Puzyrev, "V Rossii uzhe izgotovleny toplivnyye elementy dlya
montiruyushchikhsya v Kitaye i Irane pervykh energoblokov AES," RIA Novosti, 4
January 2003; in
Integrum
Techno,
http://www.integrum.com.]
{Entered 1/23/2003 MJ}
12/26/2002: PRELIMINARY AGREEMENT ON
SPENT FUEL RETURN SIGNED On 26 December 2002, Russia and
Iran signed a preliminary agreement on the return of spent nuclear fuel from the
Bushehr nuclear power plant (NPP) to Russia. Under the agreement, Russia
will supply Iran
with nuclear fuel for a period of 10 years. The two countries also agreed to form a
commission to evaluate the possibility of building another reactor in Iran.
The agreement was signed in Tehran by
Russian Minister of Atomic Energy Aleksandr Rumyantsev and Iranian Vice President
and Head of Iran's Atomic Energy Organization Gholamreza Aghazadeh.[1] Upon his return to Moscow, Rumyantsev said that the text of
the agreement was being coordinated with the Russian
Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, and that the final agreement would probably be signed in about a
month, during the next session of the Russian-Iranian intergovernmental
commission.[2] In Iran, Rumyantsev also visited the Bushehr NPP to
inspect the progress of work on completing the plant. While at the plant,
Rumyantsev inspected the working and living conditions of
the Russian specialists.[3] Iranian media reported that the
Russian delegation expressed its readiness to begin the construction of six additional
reactors in Iran before the Bushehr NPP is completed,[4] and to accelerate the
construction of the Bushehr NPP.[5] According to Kommersant, however,
Rumyantsev made no specific promises on the construction of a second unit at
the Bushehr NPP, but rather emphasized completion of the first unit.[6] At a press
conference held after the visit, Rumyantsev said that Russia was willing to
discuss the construction of six additional reactors in Iran with other members
of the nuclear suppliers
group,[7]
but that the additional reactors would only be built in
the distant future.[8] During the discussions, an agreement was also made to
send Iranian experts to Obninsk to receive training in operating physical
protection systems to be installed at Bushehr Unit 1.[7] Sources:
[1] "Rossiya i Iran podpisali soglasheniye o vozvrate OYaT s AES v Bushere,"
RIA RosBiznesKonsalting, 26 December 2002; in
Integrum
Techno, http://www.integrum.com.
[2] "Rossiya i Iran soglasovali okonchatelnyy tekst soglasheniya po postavkam
yadernogo topliva na AES v Bushere," Regions.Ru, 27 December 2002; in
Integrum
Techno,
http://www.integrum.com.
[3] Alena Kornysheva, "Nuclear Oasis on Shore of Persian Gulf," Kommersant,
25 December 2002, p. 14; in "Russia: Rumyantsev Visit Removes 'Main Obstacle'
to Fuel Deliveries for Bushehr," FBIS Document CEP20021225000055.
[4] Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran Radio 1, 26 December 2002; in "Iran:
Radio comments on 'technical' outcome of nuclear cooperation with Russia,"
FBIS Document IAP20021226000001.
[5] IRNA, 25 December 2002; in "Russia, Iran to speed up construction of
nuclear power plant in Bushehr," FBIS Document IAP20021225000028.
[6] Alena Kornysheva, "Aleksandr Rumyantsev Examines Iranian Territory. It is
Strewn With Diamonds," Kommersant, 24 December 2002; in "Russian
Minister 'Did Not Promise Anything Specific' on 2d Unit for Bushehr," FBIS
Document CEP20021224000062.
[7] "Russia Ready To Discuss Jointly With Other Members of Nuclear Club a
Program for the Construction of Six Power Units for Nuclear Power Stations in
Iran," Nuclear.ru, 26 December 2002; in "Results of Russian Atomic Energy
Minister Rumyantsev's Iranian Visit Outlined," FBIS Document
CEP20021230000225.
[8] "Russian ministry thinks Iran will build new nuclear facilities in distant
future," Interfax, 27 December 2002. {Entered 1/23/2003 MJ}
12/15/2002: RUSSIA CLAIMS NONINVOLVEMENT IN SUSPECT IRANIAN FACILITIES The Russian Ministry of Atomic
Energy announced on 15 December 2002 that it had no involvement in the
construction of a uranium enrichment plant in Natanz or a heavy water plant in
Arak. Minatom's statement was issued in response to US concerns that the
Iranian facilities might be part of an Iranian nuclear weapons program. (For
more information, please see
"Russian Nuclear Exports to Iran: U.S.
Policy Change Needed.") [German Solomatin, "Rossiya ne imeyet otnosheniya k atomnym obyektam v Irane,
vyzvavshim bespokoystvo spetssluzhb SShA, zayavlyayut v Minatome RF,"
ITAR-TASS, 15 December 2002; in Integrum
Techno, http://www.integrum.com.]
{Entered 1/23/2003 MJ}
12/6/2002: ISRAEL BELIEVES RUSSIAN WMD TECHNOLOGY TRANSFERS TO IRAN SLOWING Ha'aretz
reported on 6 December 2002 that Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon told a
group of journalists that leaks of nuclear technology from Russia to Iran have
slowed down. Israel also believes that Iran has become worried about the
decreasing level of Russian nuclear assistance, and that much of the Russian WMD-usable
technology enters Iran in the form of dual-use products. [Aluf Benn,
"Nuclear Tech Leaks To Iran Are Slowing Down, PM Reports," Ha'aretz,
online edition, http://www.haaretzdaily.com/, 6 December 2002.] {Entered 1/23/2003 MJ}
10/31/2002: TEN-YEAR AGREEMENT
ADVANCES Energy Compass reported on 31 October 2002 that Russia had announced
it had made progress toward signing a 10-year agreement on cooperation with
Iran. The 10-year plan, which was originally announced in
July 2002 and to which the United States has raised objections, includes provisions for
Russian assistance in the construction of six additional reactors in Iran. ["Russia moves closer to nuclear deal with Iran," Energy
Compass, 31 October 2002; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe,
http://www.lexis-nexis.com/.] {Entered 11/26/2002 MJ}
10/28/2002: PROGRESS REPORTED IN SPENT FUEL TALKS, US CONTINUES PRESSURE NuclearFuel reported on 28 October 2002 that the Russian
Ministry of Atomic
Energy had announced that the Iranian government had agreed to Russian terms on the return of
spent nuclear fuel from the Bushehr NPP. Minatom also said that an additional
intergovernmental agreement under IAEA auspices would be required before
Russia would deliver the first batch of fuel. In September 2002 Nikolay Shingarev,
head of Minatom's Intergovernmental
Cooperation and Information Policy Directorate, said that
the reactor was almost complete and the first batch of fuel could be sent
before the end of 2002. The prospect of such a deal did not end
US criticism of the cooperation. It was noted that even with an agreement to
return spent fuel in place, the fuel would still remain in Iranian
custody for several years while cooling, and Iran could abrogate the agreement
with Russia and seize it. The United States therefore
continued to insist that Russia curtail its nuclear assistance to Iran.
Following a visit of Under Secretary of State John Bolton to Russia, the State
Department announced that the United States might support the
import of spent fuel
from third countries to Russia if Russia stopped its cooperation
with Iran. The value of spent fuel import contracts has been estimated at over $10
billion, as compared to $800 million for the Bushehr NPP contract. However, Shingarev said that Minatom
had not been presented with any such proposal.
According to Shingarev, Bolton said the United States could not offer such a
deal, and that Russia would not accept it even if it was offered. Minatom
representative Yuriy Bespalko was skeptical about the reported proposal,
saying that a US promise to end opposition to spent fuel imports could not
outweigh an ongoing lucrative contract with Iran. [Ann MacLachlan, "Bushehr spent fuel accord said to be
advancing as U.S. seeks Russian exit," NuclearFuel, Vol. 27, No. 22, 28
October 2002.] {Entered 11/26/2002 MJ}
10/24/2002: REPORT CLAIMS
RUSSIAN PARTICIPATION IN IRANIAN WEAPONS PROGRAM Intelligence Online, a French Web Site, released a report on 24 October
2002 detailing Iranian efforts to develop nuclear weapons. The report claims
that two Russian nuclear engineers, Aleksey Volvev and Andrey Kalashnikov, and one
Ukrainian engineer, Vladimir Mirnyy, were recruited in the early 1990s by the
Iranian Atomic Energy (IAEO). The Russian and Ukrainian engineers' expertise
enabled IAEO to build a secret facility near the city of Arak in 1996.
Intelligence Online claims the report was produced by Persian Gulf countries
unfriendly to Iran, who seek to prevent a possible US-Iranian alliance driven
by the US desire to enlist Iran's assistance against Iraq. ["Veil Lifted on Iran's Nuclear Program," Intelligence
Online online edition, http://www.intelligenceonline.com/, 24 October 2002; in "French Website Details Iran's
'Clandestine' Nuclear Arms Program," FBIS Document EUP20021024000363.] {Entered
11/22/2002 MJ}
9/23/2002: LACK OF AGREEMENT ON RETURNING SPENT FUEL THREATENS
TO DELAY BUSHEHR PROJECT According to a report in the Middle East Newsline on 23 September
2002, Iran has not acceded to Russian requests to sign an agreement providing for
the return of
the low-grade spent nuclear fuelto be
produced by the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant (NPP).[1] According to the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy,
the spent fuel would be placed in a repository
at a chemical and mining plant in the Krasnoyarsk region following an initial three years
in a spent fuel pond at the NPP.[2] [CNS believes that the fuel would be
returned to a storage facility at the
RT-2
Spent Fuel Reprocessing Plant at the
Mining and Chemical Combine (GKhK)
in Zheleznogorsk to the northeast of Krasnoyarsk.] The proposed agreement
would formalize protocols on the return of spent fuel signed by the Russian
and Iranian Ministries of Atomic Energy in October 1998 and June 2002.[3] Such an agreement,
in the form of an addendum to the existing intergovernmental contract for
construction of the NPP, would begin to address US concerns that
the Bushehr project would allow Iran to advance its nuclear weapons program.[1,3] In
response to Iranian unwillingness to sign the agreement, Russian officials stated that Russia "will not supply
[nuclear]fuel to the Bushehr nuclear power plant until an agreement on
its return to Russia is signed."[2] However, Minister of Atomic Energy
Aleksandr Rumyantsev reiterated that Russia is strongly committed to
completing the project and implied that an agreement with Iran can be reached.[3]
These latest developments, which contradicted
earlier assurances by the Russian government that Iran had consented to the
return of spent fuel, called into question plans
for the NPP to comeon line by 2005.[1] Sources:
[1] "Iran Refuses to Sign Guarantee on Nukes," Middle East Newsline, Vol. 4,
No. 357, 23 September 2002.
[2] "Moscow, Teheran Coordinating Documents on Return of Used Fuel," Interfax,
19 September 2002.
[3] "Rossiya k kontsu 2003 goda mozhet zapustit Busherskuyu AES-Minatom,"
Interfax, 23 September 2002. {Entered 10/29/2002 EMC}
9/17/2002: RUSSIA REAFFIRMS COMMITMENT TO NUCLEAR
COOPERATION WITH IRAN Interfax reported on 17 September 2002 that Russia intends
to continue nuclear cooperation with Iran. In particular, construction of the first
reactor block of the Bushehr
Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) will go ahead as planned, despite pressure from the
United States to curb ties with Iran. A 1,000MW turbine produced by
the Leningrad Metallurgical Plant is scheduled to be installed at the NPP in
October 2002, and assembly of the first reactor block should be concluded by
the end of 2003-beginning of 2004.[1] Discussions during a visit to Moscow in
early September by US Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and
International Security John Bolton produced an exchange of information about
US proposals to reduce Russian-Iranian nuclear cooperation, but did not yield
an agreement.[2] Russian Minister of Atomic Energy
Aleksandr
Rumyantsev has stressed that construction of the Bushehr NPP currently is the only
Russian-Iranian nuclear project, and First Deputy Minister
of Atomic Energy Lev Ryabev has underlined further that Iran and Russia do not cooperate
militarily in the nuclear area.[3,4] Earlier in 2002, however,
the Ministry of Atomic Energy presented Iran with a feasibility study on the
construction of a 1,000MW VVER-1000 reactor and announced its
preparedness to help build an additional five reactors in the course of
the next 10 years. These developments raised concerns in Washington that
cooperation with Russia may facilitate Iranian efforts to develop nuclear
weapons.[1] In contrast, Russia views the Bushehr project as a commercial
undertaking and insists that it is observing international safeguards as
evidenced by the findings of approximately 60 IAEA inspections carried out in
Iran in 2002. Nevertheless, Rumyantsev has underlined the need to
resolve outstanding US-Russian differences on the issue of cooperation with
Iran, preferably through a compromise which would take into account the
interests of both countries.[5] Sources:
[1] "Rossiya budet sotrudnichat s Iranom v yadernoy oblasti s prezhney
intensivnostyu - Minatom," Interfax, 17 September 2002.
[2] "Rossiya dala otvet na predlozheniya SShA po sokrashcheniyu
sotrudnichestva s Iranom v yadernoy oblasti," Interfax, 13 September 2002.
[3] "Rossiya k kontsu 2003 goda mozhet zapustit Busherskuyu AES - Minatom,"
Interfax, 23 September 2002.
[4] "Atomic Energy Ministry Prepared Documents on Returning Spent Nuclear Fuel
to Russia from Iran," Interfax, 12 August 2002.
[5] Alena Kornysheva, "Amerika podarila yadernyye otkhody Rossii,"
Kommersant, No. 166, 16 September 2002;
in Integrum
Techno,
http://www.integrum.com.
{Entered 11/1/2002 EMC}
9/12/2002: DOE, MINATOM TO COOPERATE IF IRAN ASSISTANCE STOPPED Nucleonics Week reported on 27 September 2002 that a working group
headed by William Magwood IV, Director of the Department of Energy's (DOE)
Office of Nuclear Energy, and
First Deputy Minister of Atomic Energy Lev Ryabev
prepared a report that is to be submitted to the presidents of both countries
outlining incentives to encourage Russia to cease cooperation with Iran.
According to the report, Russia would be allowed to join the DOE's
Generation IV next-generation reactor development project in
return for addressing US concerns regarding Russia's cooperation with Iran. In
addition, the United States would join the
IAEA's International Project
on Innovative Nuclear Reactors and Fuel Cycles (INPRO)
program that was initiated and
funded by Russia, which seeks innovative reactor and fuel cycle designs.
[Ann MacLachlan, "U.S., Russia would join advanced reactor
efforts if Iran is settled," Nucleonics Week, Vol. 43, No. 37, 12
September 2002.] {Entered 11/26/2002 MJ}
8/2/2002: RUSSIAN-IRANIAN
COOPERATION ON ABRAHAM'S AGENDA
On 2 August 2002, US Secretary of Energy Spencer Abraham met with Russian
Minister of Atomic Energy Aleksandr Rumyantsev and discussed a wide range of
issues, including possible expansion of Russian-Iranian nuclear
cooperation.[1] During the talks Abraham said that the US government viewed
the cooperation with "utmost concern." Abraham also said that Iran's interest
in nuclear power was motivated solely by its pursuit of nuclear weapons.[2]
Rumyantsev defended Russia's activities in this area, saying that so far they
are limited to the construction of just one reactor at the Bushehr NPP,
while the 10-year cooperation plan simply outlines possibilities for further
cooperation.[1] Sources:
[1] Interfax, 2 August 2002; in "Russian Atomic Energy Min, US Energy Sec
Discuss Russian-Iranian Cooperation," FBIS Document CEP20020802000189.
[2] "Russia: Washington Angry Over Iran Links," Transitions Online Web Site,
http://www.tol.cz/, 5 August 2002. {Entered 8/26/2002 MJ}
7/26/2002: RUSSIA TO EXPAND NUCLEAR COOPERATION WITH IRAN The Associated Press reported on 26 July 2002 that the Russian government
had released a 10-year proposal for cooperation with Iran which, if implemented,
would considerably expand the scope of nuclear cooperation between the two
countries. In addition to the construction of three additional reactors at
Bushehr NPP, the program also envisions two reactors at the planned Ahwaz NPP.
According to the head of Minatom's
Intergovernmental Cooperation and Information
Policy Directorate, Nikolay Shingarev, Russia
will bid for the additional reactors after the first Bushehr reactor is
completed. The cooperation plan was approved by Prime Minister Mikhail
Kasyanov, and requires approval by senior Russian and Iranian leadership,
which may take place at a meeting in Tehran planned for September 2002.[1] A
Ministry of Atomic Energy representative said that Iran has not requested
Russia build any additional reactors.[2]
Atomstroyeksport Director
Viktor Kozlov said that Iran has not made any decisions regarding the
construction of an NPP at Ahwaz, but was still evaluating such an option.
According to Kozlov, Iran has provided Russia with background information on Ahwaz
and other potential NPP sites, including soil and seismic data. Earlier in
2002, Russia provided Iran with feasibility studies on constructing additional NPPs in Iran.[3]
The initial US reaction to the announcement was muted and
conveyed the belief that the plan did not represent a finalized plan of
action, but rather was a reflection of an internal Russian debate.[4] Some
have interpreted the bold plan as an attempt to attract additional financial
aid from the West in return for ending nuclear cooperation with Iran.[5] On 31
July 2002, the Russian Foreign Ministry stated that the 10-year plan only
identified potential courses of action available to the two countries, whose
implementation will depend on a number of factors, including political
ones.[6] Sources:
[1] Angela Charlton, "Russia Expands Nuke Ties With Iran," Associated Press,
26 July 2002.
[2] "Russia plans to build second nuclear plant in Iran: report," Agence
France Presse, 26 July 2002; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, http://www.lexis-nexis.com.
[3] "Iran hasn't officially offered Russia to build NPP at Ahwaz -
Atomstroiexport," Interfax, 29 July 2002.
[4] Carol Giacomo, "Mild U.S. reaction to Russia-Iran nuclear deal," Reuters,
29 July 2002; in Johnson's Russia List, No. 6376, 30 July 2002.
[5] Andrey Zlobin, "And Old Friend Is Better," Vremya novostey, 29 July
2002; in "Further Russian Bushehr Nuclear Projects Seen as Possible Ploy," FBIS
Document CEP20020729000344.
[6] "Alexander Yakovenko, The Official Spokesman of Russia's Ministry Of
Foreign Affairs, Answers A Question From CNN Regarding The Prospects Of
Cooperation By The Russian Federation With Iran In The Field Of Peaceful Uses
Of The Atom," Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 31 July 2002; in RANSAC
Nuclear News, 2 August 2002. {Entered 8/26/2002 MJ}
7/22/2002: RUSSIA TO TAKE
BACK IRANIAN SPENT FUEL NuclearFuel
reported on 22 July 2002 that Russia and Iran appear to have an understanding
that spent fuel from the Iranian nuclear reactors will be returned to Russia.
Although Russia has claimed that provisions for returning the fuel were
included in the Bushehr
agreement when it was signed in the early 1990s, news reports in 2002 have suggested
that no such provisions existed. However, Russian officials have consistently
said that all spent fuel will be returned to Russia. It appears that
although Russia and Iran reached such an agreement several years ago, at
the time Russia was still bound by the law prohibiting the importation of
spent fuel for processing and storage. This
law changed in 2001, and
the two countries are reportedly working out the final takeback
arrangements. According to Robert Einhorn,
a Clinton administration nonproliferation assistant secretary of state, it is
highly likely that the two countries will reach an agreement, and that a
failure to do so would undermine Russia's willingness to continue its nuclear
assistance. ["U.S.-Russia
talks on Iran continue; takeback of Iran fuel now settled," NuclearFuel,
22 July 2002.] {Entered 8/1/2002 MJ}
7/12/2002: RUSSIA'S NUCLEAR
ASSISTANCE TO IRAN MAY BE CURTAILED
On 12 July 2002 Minister of Atomic Energy Aleksandr Rumyantsev
said that Russia's nuclear cooperation with Iran will end once the Bushehr NPP
is completed. The minister acknowledged that the United States was pressuring
Russia to end the cooperation.
Rumyantsev, however, also said
that the decision to curtail cooperation with Iran did not preclude possible
construction of additional reactors at the Bushehr NPP.
Addressing the issue of spent nuclear fuel, Rumyantsev
said that Russia and Iran signed an agreement in June 2002 on returning spent
fuel to Russia, and that by November 2002 Russian legislation will be modified to allow the
return of the spent fuel. The announcement of assistance
curtailment coincided with Vladimir Putin's
speech at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in which he said that the United
States and Russia had a common understanding of threats to global stability
and shared a similar view on the nature of world threats. [Dmitriy
Zaks, "Russia-Iran nuclear cooperation to end with Bushehr: minister," Agence
France Presse, 21 July 2002; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, http://www.lexis-nexis.com.]
{Entered 8/26/2002 MJ}
6/19/2002: RUSSIA SUSPECTED OF FUNNELING TECHNOLOGIES
THROUGH CHINA AND NORTH KOREA Middle East Newsline reported on
19 June 2002 that the United States suspects Russia of using China and North
Korea as conduits for transferring nuclear and missile technologies to Iran.
US intelligence sources cited in the report claim that while the pace of
Russian missile and nuclear technology transfers to Iran has decreased, there
is concern that China and North Korea are being used by Russian companies as subcontractors to assist Iranian WMD programs. In doing so, Russian
companies would be following the Chinese example of using North Korea as a
means of aiding Pakistani ballistic missile programs. ["Russia believed transferring WMD tech to N. Korea," Middle
East Newsline, Vol. 4, No. 228, 19 June 2002.] {Entered 7/26/2002 MJ}
5/29/2002: US
INTELLIGENCE ON PROLIFERATIONMISUSED BY RUSSIA On 29 May 2002, Middle East Newsline
cited Richard Perle,
a senior advisor to the US Department of Defense, as stating that US government
provision to Russia with intelligence information on WMD
proliferation to Iran had resulted in the loss of the intelligence sources. A
congressional source said that the Russian government had used the information
provided by the United States to mount an effort to stop US collection of
intelligence information on proliferation in 1998 and 1999, considerably reducing the amount of collected
information. According to the same source, the US
government stopped providing intelligence information to Russia during the
Clinton administration. ["U.S. sent data
to Russia on Iran WMD," Middle East Newsline, Vol. 4, No. 198, 29 May 2002.]
{Entered 7/26/2002 MJ}
5/28/2002: RUSSIA TO TRAIN 100
IRANIAN ENGINEERS Russian Atomic Energy Minister Aleksandr Rumyantsev
announced on 28 May 2002 that during the next several years Russia will train
up to 100 Iranian engineers to operate the Bushehr NPP.
After the first reactor becomes operational in 2004 or 2005, the reactors will
be operated jointly by Russian and Iranian specialists for the first six
years. After that transition period the Iranians will take over full
responsibility for its operation. ["Russia
to train Iranian nuclear power plant operators," Interfax, 28 May 2002.] {Entered 8/1/2002 MJ}
5/24/2002: RUSSIAN
COOPERATION WITH IRAN ON PUTIN/BUSH SUMMIT AGENDA The issue of Russian nuclear
cooperation with Iran was raised during the
24 May 2002 Moscow summit. President Putin defended the policy of cooperation, stating that
construction of the Bushehr NPP would not help the regime develop
weapons-grade plutonium, while arguing
that Russian cooperation with Iran did not differ from US cooperation with
North Korea. Former Defense Minister Marshal
Igor Sergeyev said that Russia's security would be more at risk from countries
like Iran than that of the United States. Deputy Minister of
Atomic Energy Yevgeniy Reshetnikov stated that the enriched nuclear fuel would be shipped back to Russia once used,
further reducing the risk of nuclear proliferation.[1]
First Deputy Chief of the General Staff General Yuriy Baluyevskiy
stated that without strategic armaments or ICBMs, Iran cannot pose a threat to
the United States from Iranian territory.[2] Deputy Minister of
Atomic Energy Yevgeniy Reshetnikov also averred that the Bushehr nuclear power plant complies with all
requirements of the International Agency of Atomic Energy. During 2001, there
were 59 IAEA missions to Bushehr alone.[3] In response to
allegations ithat Russia is supplying missile and nuclear
technologies to Iran, Andrey Nikolayev, Chairman of the
State Duma Defense Committee, stated that Russia is
adhering to the Non-Proliferation Treaty.[4] Viktor Kremenyuk, an analyst with
Moscow's USA-Canada Institute, stated that since Russia does not have
access to the European nuclear market, Iran, China, and India are the only
countries to which Russians can sell their technology.[1] [1] Eric Helque,
"Putin rebuffs US concern over Iran nuclear threat," Agence France Presse,
24 May 2002;
Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe,
http://www.lexis-nexis.com. [2] Sergey Ostanin,
Alexander Konovalov, "Russia to cooperate with Iran without breaking treaties
- general," ITAR-TASS, 24 May 2002; Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe,
http://www.lexis-nexis.com. [3] Vladimir Rogachev, ITAR-TASS,
24 May 2002; in "Russia's construction of Iranian reactor
said conforming to IAEA standards," FBIS Document CEP20020524000206. [4] Agentstvo
voyennykh novostey, 24 May 2002; in "Duma official says Russia adheres to
nuclear nonproliferation treaty," FBIS Document CEP20020524000086. {Entered
7/29/2002 SF}
4/26/2002: LMZ COMPLETES TURBINE FOR BUSHEHR Interfax reported on 26 April 2002 that the Leningrad Metallurgical Plant (LMZ) has
completed a 1,000MW turbine weighing 2,000t and measuring 51m
in length for the Bushehr NPP. The turbine
will undergo testing in the near
future. A similar turbine has already been delivered to China for use in the
Lianyungang NPP, while a
third turbine is under construction. Talks on delivering
equipment for the third and fourth units of Lianyungang NPP are reportedly ongoing. [Interfax, 26 April 2002; in "Russia: Leningrad Company Manufacturing Parts for
Nuclear Power Plant in Iran," FBIS Document CEP20020426000006.] {Entered
5/24/2002 MJ}
4/4/2002: RUSSIAN DEFENSE, FOREIGN MINISTERS DENY CLAIMS OF DUAL-USE EXPORTS TO IRAN For additional information please
see the 4/4/2002 entry in the Russia: Missile
Exports to Iran Developments section. {Entered 5/24/2002 MJ}
2/22/2002: CIA REPORT DETAILS
RUSSIAN NUCLEAR COOPERATION WITH IRAN On 22 February 2002 the CIA
released an unclassified report on the
acquisition of WMD
technologies detailing Iran's continuing efforts
to acquire nuclear technologies from Russia. According to the report, Iran has
been focusing on Russia as a source of nuclear-related equipment, expertise,
and materials. Apart from Russia's work on completing the Bushehr NPP,
Russian organizations have also assisted Iranian research institutions in
developing various components of the nuclear fuel cycle. These efforts,
according to the report, help Iran develop its nuclear technology
infrastructure, which could in turn be applied to nuclear weapons research.
Although the Russian government has been taking measures to curb proliferation
activities by, among other initiatives, adopting a new export control law in
1999, financially-strapped Russian firms have on occasion been effective in
circumventing the controls. There have also been some cases of the Russian
government failing to enforce its export control laws. In one case a Russian
company accepted an Iranian contract to supply laser uranium enrichment
equipment, which could be used to produce weapons-grade uranium. The sale was
stopped due to US government protests (for more information see the
3/8/2001 entry
in this section).
["Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to
Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, 1 January
Through 30 June 2001," Central Intelligence Agency Web Site,
http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/bian/bian_jan_2002.htm, 22 February
2002.] {Entered 5/23/2002 MJ}
2/15/2002: BUSHEHR NPP TO START OPERATION IN SEPTEMBER 2003 Russia's Ministry of Atomic Energy announced on 15 February 2002 that the Bushehr NPP will begin operation in September 2003. The main shell of the
water-cooled reactor was delivered in November 2001, and the remaining major
components of the plant are to be delivered within the next few months. ["Iran's Bushehr plant to start operations September 2003: Moscow," Agence
France Presse, 15 February 2002.] {Entered 5/24/2002 MJ}
2/6/2002: IRANIAN SCIENTISTS VISIT NIKIET IN
CONNECTION WITH REACTOR DEVELOPMENT The Sunday Times reported on 6 February 2002
that Iranian nuclear scientists visited the
NIKIET nuclear research and
development institute located in Moscow. The article alleged that
the scientists were using the visit to obtain information to help Iran's
nuclear weapons program.[1] [CNS believes that the purpose
of the visit to NIKIET was for information or training concerning the Bushehr NPP in Iran.] NIKIET is the main
research center in Russia that designs nuclear power reactors. It is involved with the construction of the Bushehr
power reactor and is expected to provide training for Iranian
specialists to operate the power reactor.[2]
Sources: [1] Sarah Baxter & Mark Franchetti,
"Russia, Iran run N-school exchange," The Sunday Times, 6 February
2002, pg. 9; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe,
http://web.lexis-nexis.com. [2] Igor Korotchenko, "Far-Fetched U.S.
Claims: Russia Is Not Participating in Implementing Iran's Nuclear and Missile
Programs," Nezavisimaya gazeta online edition,
http://www.ng.ru,
27 February 1999; in "U.S. Claims on Iran Arms Projects Refuted," FBIS Document
FTS19990308000140. {Entered 3/7/2002 RG}
11/9/2001: ATOMSTROYEKSPORT DIRECTOR DISCUSSES
RUSSIAN NUCLEAR PROJECTS IN INDIA AND OTHER COUNTRIES In an interview with Vek on 9 November 2001,
Atomstroyeksport General Director Viktor Kozlov
said that the Bushehr NPP in Iran is nearing completion, and the future
construction of a second unit at Bushehr is also anticipated. For more
information on Kozlov's comments, see the 11/9/2001 entry in the
General Nuclear Export Developments
file.
4/17/2001: FOUNDATION LAID FOR BUSHEHR STEAM
GENERATOR On 17 April 2001 an Iranian engineering company
began pouring 3,000 cubic meters of concrete for the foundation of the
steam generator for the Bushehr NPP. A ceremony attended by a group of
Iranian Parliament members was held prior to the beginning of this
operation, which is being conducted under Russian supervision. Iranian Nuclear
Power Organization Deputy Chief Asadollah Saburi said that the foundation work
is the first actual operation on the site conducted by the Russians, who up
to now have been engaged in site studies and surveys to determine the extent
of modifications needed to adapt or change the reactor infrastructure, which was
built in accordance with the original Siemens design, to accept
Russian-produced equipment. Saburi also said that no contract has yet been
awarded for building the second reactor at the Bushehr NPP. [IRNA, 16 April 2001; in "Iran: Ceremony marks start of
Bushehr nuclear reactor steam generator construction," FBIS
Document IAP2001041000093.] {Entered 5/3/2001 MJ}
4/16/2001: NEW MINISTER OF ATOMIC ENERGY
REAFFIRMS COMMITMENT TO BUSHEHR NPP During a press conference on 16 April 2001,Yevgeniy
Adamov's successor at the Ministry of Atomic Energy, Aleksandr Rumyantsev,
reaffirmed Russia's commitment to complete the Bushehr NPP.[1] While
acknowledging the US government's concern over this issue, Rumyantsev
reiterated Russia's position that the NPP's construction does not violate
any international agreements, and expressed hope that the plant's
construction would be completed on schedule.[2] The new minister also
discussed the prospect of constructing additional NPPs in Iran, although no
agreements have been concluded yet.[1] Sources: [1] "Russian Atomic Energy Ministry Pledges to Finish Construction of
Nuclear Power Plant in Iran on Time," Interfax, 16 April 2001. [2] "Construction of Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant Will Not Break
International Agreements--Rumyantsev," Interfax, 17 April 2001.
{Entered 5/3/2001 MJ}
4/9/2001: NEGOTIATIONS ON CONSTRUCTION OF
SECOND UNIT TO BEGIN IN DECEMBER On 4 April 2001 Interfax reported that in December
2001 Russia
expects to begin talks with Iran on the construction of a second nuclear reactor. The
primary goal of these negotiations would be to determine where to build the
second unit. According to Deputy Minister of Atomic Energy Yevgeniy Reshetnikov, the least expensive alternative for Iran is to construct it
at the
Bushehr NPP. The main concern, however, is that in the proposed
location there is a low demand for electricity, which means that the energy
produced would have to be sent to other regions. To address this issue, Iran had already
begun extending power
lines to the areas in need of energy. Reshetnikov also confirmed that
the construction of the first nuclear reactor is to be completed in the
first half of 2004.
["RF v dekabre planiruyet provesti
peregovory s Iranom o stroitelstve novogo atomnogo bloka," Interfax, 4
April 2001.] {Entered 10/12/2001 IA}
3/15/2001: IRANIAN PRESIDENT WANTS BUSHEHR CONSTRUCTION
ACCELERATED While visiting Izhorskiye Zavody in St. Petersburg,
Iranian President
Sayed Mohammed Khatami called for accelerating the rate of construction of
the Bushehr plant. Khatami also announced that Iran is considering ordering
another NPP, with two reactors, and expressed interest in petrochemical
industry equipment produced at the plant. Responding to Khatami's comments,
Izhorskiye Zavody General Director Yevgeniy Sergeyev stated that his company
is on schedule and has already completed 90% of the work on the reactor
vessel, which is to be completed in 2001, although some other aspects of the
NPP's construction have fallen behind schedule. According to Sergeyev, these
delays are mainly due to problems in integrating Russian equipment into the
original Siemens design. Iran reportedly assured Izhorskiye Zavody that it
would award the contract for a second reactor vessel for the Bushehr NPP as soon
as the first one is completed.[1] Commenting on the Iranian requests to
accelerate the rate of construction, Deputy Minister of Atomic Energy Bulat
Nigmatulin stated in a press conference held on 17 March 2001 that Minatom
hoped to put the Bushehr NPP into operation in 2003. Nigmatulin also
confirmed the reports that Iran is interested in obtaining a second
Russian-built NPP.[2] However, the second reactor was not mentioned in the
joint statement issued upon the conclusion of Khatami's visit to Russia.
Apart from pledging continued adherence to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and
the desire to continue cooperation in the area of peaceful use of nuclear
energy, the statement also addressed a number of other areas of
cooperation.[3] Sources: [1] "Prezident Irana vyskazalsya za uskoreniye stroitelstva AES v
Bushere," Interfax, 15 March 2001. [2] "Minatom Rossii rasschityvayet v 2003 godu sdat v ekspluatatsiyu
Busherskuyu atomnuyu stantsiyu v Irane," Interfax, 17 March 2001. [3] "V sovmestnom kommunike Rossiya i Iran zayavlyayut o namerenii
prodolzhit sotrudnichestvo v oblasti mirnogo ispolzovaniya atoma,"
Interfax, 16 March 2001. {Entered 5/3/2001 MJ}
3/8/2001: RUSSIA TELLS US OFFICIALS IT WILL
NOT EXPORT LASER TECHNOLOGY TO IRAN On 8 March 2001, Russian officials informed the
United States that laser equipment designated for export to Iran will not be
sent and has been returned to the Yefremov
Scientific Research Institute for Electrophysical Apparatus (NIIEFA) in St. Petersburg
from a customs storage site. US Energy Secretary Bill Richardson had
warned Russian Atomic Energy Minister Yevgeniy Adamov at a meeting in January
2001 that if the lasers were exported, the United States would not support
Russian plans to import spent nuclear fuel from other nations for storage. Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy officials
repeatedly asserted that the lasers could not be used to support an Iranian
clandestine uranium enrichment program and that US opposition to the export
was unfounded.
[Michael Knapik, "Russia tells U.S.
officials it will not export lasers to Iran," Nucleonics Week,
Vol. 42, No. 10, 8 March 2001.] {Entered 4/27/01 RG}
3/7/2001: ARTICLE DESCRIBES RUSSIAN EFFORTS AT
BUSHEHR An article in the 7 March 2001 issue of Izvestiya
describing the Russian efforts to complete the Bushehr NPP stated that as of
March 2001 some 1,300 workers from Russia and other CIS states (including
Ukraine, Belarus, Armenia, Kazakhstan, and Tajikistan) were employed at the
work site. That number is expected to increase to 1,700 by the end of 2001.
In addition, the article claims that the Bushehr construction means work for
an additional 20,000 people in Russia, and that the contract saved a number of
large Russian firms from demise. Vladimir Dudnik, who supervises the
construction, claims that he needs twice the number of personnel currently
present on the site, but lacks the infrastructure to accommodate them. The
Russian workers are housed in their own compound surrounded by a 3.5m-tall
fence and four rings of barbed wire. The compound includes a school for the
workers' children, although apparently not all workers brought their
families with them. [Sergey Leskov, "Obyekt vyzhivaniya," Izvestiya
online edition, http://www.izvestia.ru/izvestia/article/241004/, 7 March
2001.] {Entered 5/7/2001 MJ}
1/18/2001: SIXTY PERCENT OF EQUIPMENT FOR BUSHEHR
NPP DELIVERED According to information released by Atommash, Russian firms have delivered 60 percent of
the equipment ordered by the Iranian government for the construction of the
Bushehr NPP. In addition to the recently delivered reactor foundation
structures, Atommash obligations to Iran also include the delivery of four
reactor cooling tanks, the reactor fuel reloading system, and a range of technical services. ["OAO 'Atommash' v nastoyashcheye vremya vypolnilo okolo
60% zakaza Irana na postavku oborudovaniya dlya Busherskoy AES," SKRIN
"Emitent", 18 January 2001; in Integrum Techno, http://www.integrum.ru/.]
{Entered 1/22/2001 MJ}
11/30/2000: RUSSIA TO BUILD SECOND UNIT AT
BUSHEHR NPP On 30 November 2000 Interfax reported that Russia is
to receive a contract for the construction of a second power unit at the
Bushehr NPP. This development was announced by Ministry of Atomic Energy
Press Secretary Andrey Yedemskiy. Experts estimate the value of the contract
at $1 billion. ["Rossiya postroit vtoroy blok
Busherskoy AES v Iranie, soobshchili v Minatome," Interfax, 30 November
2000.] {Entered 1/22/2001 MJ}
8/9/2000: CIA REPORT SAYS RUSSIA SUPPLIED
IRAN WITH NUCLEAR ASSISTANCE IN 1999 A CIA report to Congress released on 9 August 2000
reported that Russia
remained a key supplier for Iran's civilian nuclear programs in 1999.
For more information, see the 8/9/2000
entry in the General Nuclear Export
Developments file.
{Entered 1/24/01 RG}
2/2000: NONPROLIFERATION CENTER SAYS RUSSIAN TECHNOLOGY
SUPPORTS IRANIAN NUCLEAR AND MISSILE PROGRAMS The Nonproliferation
Center's semiannual report to Congress said that Russia remains a major supplier
of nuclear and ballistic missile technology to Iran. According to the report,
Iran's earlier acquisition of Russian technology and materials accelerated its
Shehab-3 (Shahab-3) missile program, and Russia continued to supply Iran with
missile technology and training. The report also concluded that Russian
civilian nuclear technology enhanced Iran's capacity to support development of
nuclear weapons. While Russia improved its export control laws in the first half
of 1999, the Russian government's ability and commitment to enforce nonproliferation
controls remain uncertain, and economic conditions continued to put pressure on
Russian companies to evade export controls.
[Nonproliferation Center, Director
of Central Intelligence, "Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition
of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional
Munitions," http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/bian/bian_feb_2000.html,
February 2000.]{Entered 3/2/00 FW}
9/24/99: LENINGRAD METAL WORKS TO SUPPLY
TURBINES TO BUSHEHR PLANT The St. Petersburg company Leningrad Metal Works
(LMZ) has signed a contract with Atomstroyeksport to supply a 1000MW turbine
worth $38 million for Iran's Bushehr nuclear power plant. LMZ won
the contract in competition with the Kharkiv Turbine Works. The turbine
will be delivered in the second half of 2000. The recently organized
company LMZ-Engineering will be responsible for the design, start up, and
adjustment work on the turbine. According to LMZ’s press service,
LMZ-Engineering is also currently holding talks with the Koodankulam
nuclear power station in India to supply another 1000MW turbine.
The Indian order would be worth more than $100 million.
[ITAR-TASS, 24 September 1999; in "Russian
Company to Supply Nuclear Turbine to Iran," FBIS Document FTS19990925000885,
25 September 1999]{entered 11/30/99 FW}
9/6/99: IRAN DENIES THREAT TO HALT NUCLEAR COOPERATION
WITH RUSSIA The English-language Iran Daily quoted Iranian
Ambassador to Russia Mehdi Safari as saying, "As long as the Russians do
not fulfill their initial commitment to complete the Bushehr plant, no
new contracts will be signed with them."[1] However, on 8 September
1999, the official Iranian news service IRNA reported that Iran denied
this threat by its ambassador to Russia.[2] A representative of the
Iranian Embassy in Russia further told the Interfax news agency that Iran
will continue to develop cooperation with Russia in all areas.[3]
Iran and Russia have blamed each other for several delays in constructing
the VVER-1000 reactor in Bushehr. Originally planned for completion
in 2002, completion is now planned for May 2003.[1]
Sources: [1] "Iran Says May Not Give Russia
New Nuclear Deals," Reuters, 6 September 1999 [2] "Iran Denies Russia Nuclear Cooperation
Threatened," Reuters, 8 September 1999. [3] "Posolstvo Irana oprovergayet soobshcheniya
o tom, chto Tegeran prigrozil ne oodpisyvat s Moskvoy novykh kontraktov
v atomnoy oblasti," Interfax, 7 September 1999. {Entered 11/30/99 FW}
9/1/99: IRANIANS TO BEGIN TRAINING AT NOVOVORONEZH In September 1999, Russia will begin training Iranian
specialists at the training facility of the Novovoronezh
nuclear power plant, which has a training center with an exact replica
of the Balakovo Unit 4 reactor. By August 2001, a total of 342 Iranian
specialists will be trained to work at the Bushehr nuclear power plant.
Although the plant design is incomplete, the reactors will be similar to
those at the Balakovo nuclear
power plant. For this reason, Balakovo was chosen, even though
this is Balakovo’s first experience training foreign specialists.
Because Russia is responsible for the safe operation of the Iranian facility,
the training course will emphazize safe operation of the plant.
[Sergey Sergievskiy, "Iranskiye stazhery
na Balakovskoy AES," Nezavisimaya gazeta online edition, http://news.mosinfo.ru/news/ng,
1 September 1999.]{Entered 11/30/99 FW}
3/17/99: ADAMOV OFFERS DEAL TO LIFT SANCTIONS ON NUCLEAR INSTITUTES Minister of Atomic Energy Yevgeniy Adamov said in an interview with the
New York Times on 17 March 1999 that Russia had proposed that the United
States lift all sanctions imposed on two leading Russian nuclear research
centers in exchange for the complete cessation of the centers' cooperation
with Iran. The aim of the proposal is to reinstate valuable contracts between
the United States and the institutions. Adamov proposed signing a separate
agreement for each institution: one for the Scientific
Research and Design Institute of Energy Technologies (NIKIET)and one
for the D.I. Mendeleyev
Russian Chemical-Technological University. NIKIET was preparing a contract
to sell a research reactor to Iran, but the Russian government decided
not to sell the reactor. A US expert said that NIKIET was the focus of
US concerns, because it is the principal Russian entity that could have
provided assistance beyond the Bushehr nuclear power plant. The D.I. Mendeleyev
Russian Chemical-Technological University provided unclassified information
on heavy water technologies to Iran.[1] According to a senior US official,
Adamov allegedly has Prime Minister Primakov's support for putting forward
the proposals.[2] Adamov also said that Russia had questions for the United
States regarding its activities in the nuclear energy sector in Pakistan.[2]
Under Adamov's proposal, a procedure would be established to resolve future
disputes regarding the provision of Russian nuclear technology to Iran.
The US Department of Energy has reportedly been so worried about the safety
implications of the sanctions that it secretly appealed to the White House,
asking that some exceptions be made so that important safety work could
go forward, a US official said.[3]
Sources: [1] Michael R. Gordon, "Russia to Offer U.S. Deal to End
Iran Nuclear Aid," New York Times, 17 March 1999. [2] "Russia to Expand Peaceful Nuclear Programs in Iran,"
Interfax, No.2, 17 March 1999. [3] "Moskva gotova svernut raboty s Iranom v obmen na snyatiye
SShA sanktsiiy v otnoshenii dvukh rossiyskikh yadernykh NII," Interfax,
No.1, 17 March 1999. {entered 4/27/99 FW}
2/13/99: ST. PETERSBURG PLANT TO SUPPLY EQUIPMENT TO BUSHEHR ITAR-TASS reported that Izhorskiye Zavody in St. Petersburg had started
producing equipment for the Bushehr nuclear power plant. The order was
placed by Atomstroyeksport in December 1998, and the first advance payment
has already been made. Nikolay Domichev, a spokesman for Izhorskiye Zavody,
said that the equipment for the primary circuit of the reactor would be
supplied to Iran in late 2001. The sanctions imposed by the United States
on Russian institutions have had no impact on the project. In fact, a decision
was made to speed up the work on the Iranian order. The reactor vessel,
the steam generator vessel, the reactor vessel head, and the equipment
inside the vessel will be assembled in St. Petersburg. Experts from Izhorskiye
Zavody are expected to take part in the installation of the equipment on
site. The senior managers of the facility believe that there is no reason
for Iran to confine itself to one 1,000MW reactor in Bushehr. Intergovernmental
protocols have been signed on intentions to deliver three VVER-610 reactor
units to Iran.
[Sergey Alekhin, "Izhorskiye Zavody: We Shall Build Reactor
for Iran," Rossiyskaya gazeta, 13 February 1999, p.3; in "Petersburg
Plant To Supply Equipment for Bushehr," FBIS Document FTS19990215000317.]
{Entered 3/11/99 CF}
2/1/99: IRANIANS TO RECEIVE NUCLEAR TRAINING AT NOVOVORONEZH According to the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy, 30 Iranian specialists
are scheduled to arrive in Moscow in early February to receive training
for operation of the Bushehr nuclear power plant. The Iranians will be
trained at a training center at the Novovoronezh
nuclear power plant; the training center has received assistance from
Japan in upgrading its equipment. Under the terms of a Russian-Iranian
contract signed in 1995, several hundred Iranians will be trained in Russia.
Minister of Atomic Energy Yevgeniy Adamov said that the Bushehr plant will
be fully staffed by 2000-2001. One thousand Russians work at the Bushehr
site, and the first unit of the plant is 30 to 40 percent complete. Minatom
has allocated $150 million for construction of the Bushehr plant in 1999,
up from $100 million in 1998.
["Iranians to Learn How to Operate Nuclear Power Plant in
Russia," Interfax, No.3, 1 February 1999.]{entered 3/11/99 FW}
1/29/99: IRAN RECRUITS ENGINEERS FOR NUCLEAR TRAINING IN RUSSIA Advertisements placed in the Iranian press by the Iranian Atomic Energy
Organization state that Iran seeks to recruit engineers to receive training
in Russia for the Bushehr nuclear power plant. The advertisements
said that a total of 225 engineers were needed, with expertise in physics,
nuclear physics, mechanical engineering, or computer science. Applicants
must be Iranian nationals, and successful candidates will be sent to Russia
after a short period of training in Iran. The advertisements appeared
despite the recent imposition of sanctions on Russian research institutes,
and threats to curtail space cooperation, by the United States.
[Agence France Presse, 29 January 1999, in "Iran Recruits
Engineers for Nuclear Training in Russia," Russia Today, 29 January
1999, http://www.russiatoday.com.]{entered
2/22/99 FW}
1/20/99: ADAMOV SAYS US SANCTIONS UNSUBSTANTIATED Russian Minister of Atomic Energy Yevgeniy Adamov said on 20 January 1999
that the United States had not provided any information to substantiate
the imposition of sanctions against Russian institutes accused of transferring
missile technology to Iran. At a meeting with Yabloko party deputies, Adamov
said that the United States has not produced any evidence of violations
of international agreements by Russian nuclear enterprises over the past
year and a half, and that the Russian special services exercise close daily
supervision over organizations working with nuclear technology. Adamov
reaffirmed that Russia does not want neighboring states to acquire nuclear
weapons, and hoped that the current controversy over Iran would not adversely
affect Minatom's constructive dialogue with the US Department of Energy.
["SShA ne predstavili informatsii o narushenii Rossiey mezhdunarodnykh
dogovorov--Minatom," Interfax, No.1, 20 January 1999.]{entered 3/22/99
FW}
1/14/99: YABLOKOV SAYS COOPERATION WITH IRAN INCLUDED MILITARY COMPONENT Environmentalist Aleksey Yablokov said on 14 January 1999 that the United
States may have legitimate reasons to suspect Russian institutes of cooperating
with Iran in “strategic areas.” Yablokov said that initial Minatom plans
for cooperation with Iran included a military component. President Boris
Yeltsin said in 1994 that this military component would be removed, but
individual Russian defense organizations became involved in supplying nuclear
technology to Iran. Yablokov noted that an Iranian spy was arrested
in Moscow in 1998 for obtaining technical information on missiles, and
that one of the sanctioned institutes, the Moscow Chemical Technology University
[sic, referring to the D.I.
Mendeleyev Russian Chemical-Technological University] is known to be
developing a chemical component of missile fuel.
["U SShA yest sereznyye osnovaniya podozrevat otdelnyye organizatsii
Rossii v sotrudnichestve s Iranom v strategicheskikh oblastyakh—ekolog
Yablokov," Interfax, No.1, 14 January 1999.]{entered 7/7/99 FW}
1/13/99: FOREIGN MINISTRY SAYS ALLEGATIONS AGAINST RUSSIAN INSTITUTES
UNFOUNDED A Russian foreign ministry spokesman said on 13 January 1999 that the recent
US sanctions against Russian research institutes suspected of providing
nuclear and missile technology to Iran (the Scientific Research and Design
Institute of Energy Technologies (NIKIET),
the Moscow Aviation Institute, and the
D. I. Mendeleyev Russian Chemical-Technological University) contradict
US-Russian agreements on nonproliferation and export control and "will
not go unanswered." According to the spokesman, Russian investigators have
determined that the charges against the institutes are unfounded, and that
the institutes' activities are legal and comply with Russia's international
nonproliferation obligations.
["Vvedeniye SShA sanktsiy v otnoshenii trekh rossiyskikh
institutov mozhet lish oslozhnit rossiysko-amerikanskiye otnosheniya i
ne budet ostavleno bez otveta--MID RF," Interfax, No.2, 13 January 1999.]{entered
3/22/99 FW}
1/9/99: MINATOM TO START CONSTRUCTION OF FIRST BUSHEHR REACTOR Russian Minister for Atomic Energy Yevgeniy Adamov announced that in 1999,
Minatom will start constructing the VVER-1000 reactor for the first reactor
facility at the Bushehr nuclear power plant in Iran. According to
Adamov, the construction costs will reach $150 million. Minatom would
prefer to use their own NPP design and construction equipment. Adamov
also noted that by 2000-2001 Minatom will hire Russian and Iranian experts
to operate the NPP. At present, 1000 Russian experts are employed
at the Bushehr NPP. Reviewing the results of 1998, Adamov said that
construction costs amounted to $100 million. At present, Minatom has completed
30-40 percent of the first reactor facility.
["Minatom RF v 1999 godu pristupit k sooruzheniyu reaktora
na stoyashcheysya v Irane AES," Interfax, 9 January 1999.]{entered 2/22/99
FW}
12/1/98: MIKHAILOV SAYS RUSSIA HELPED IRAN DESIGN URANIUM MINE At a press conference on nuclear and missile contacts between Russia and
Iran held at the National Press Institute on 30 November 1998, First Deputy
Minister of Atomic Energy Viktor Mikhailov discussed the history of cooperation
with Iran in the nuclear industry and answered questions. Mikhailov believes
it is important to complete the construction of the Bushehr NPP. However,
he does not completely accept Iran's approach to how the construction should
be conducted. Cooperation with Iran is important for Russia both in terms
of politics and economics. In 1992-1997 Russia designed a uranium mine
for Iran with an annual output of 100 to 200MT. Mikhailov also said that
Iran is currently seeking Russian assistance in uranium and isotope enrichment.
["Press Conference with First Deputy Minister of Nuclear
Energy Viktor Mikhailov, PIR Center Officials Regarding Russia-Iran," Kremlin
International News broadcast, 1 December 1998; in Lexis-Nexis Academic
Universe, http://web.lexis-nexis.com.]{entered
2/22/99 FW}
11/25/98: IRAN ASKS RUSSIA FOR THREE MORE REACTORS According to Segodnya, Iran has called for speeding up the construction
of the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant, which is to be completed by the middle
of May 2003. Russian Minister of Atomic Energy Yevgeniy Adamov, during
a visit to Iran, once again confirmed that Russia will continue the construction
of the Bushehr NPP with one VVER-1000 reactor despite US and Israeli opposition.[1]
During his visit to Iran, Adamov signed a new $800 million contract for
the completion of this NPP.[2] Adamov also confirmed that Iran had asked
Russia to build up to three more 1,000MW reactors. The contract on
this project, if signed, will be worth $2-3 billion. Russia claims
that the NPP is for non-military use, but the United States continues to
express concerns about Russia's cooperation with Iran's nuclear sector.[1]
Sources: [1] Aleksandr Koretskiy, "Rossiya sdelayet Iran velikoy atomnoy
derzhavnoy," Segodnya, online edition, http://www.ipres.ru/news/sg,
No.263, 25 November 1998. [2] Andrew Jack, Stephen Fidler, "Moscow asked to bid for
contract," Financial Times, 26 November 1998; in Lexis-Nexis Academic
Universe, http://web.lexis-nexis.com/universe.{entered
2/22/99 FW}
3/18/97: IRAN PAYS FIRST INSTALLMENT ON BUSHEHR PLANT Russia's Deputy Minister for Atomic Energy Yevgeniy Reshetnikov said on
18 March 1998 that Iran had made the first advance payment of $60 million
to Russia for the construction of the Bushehr nuclear power station and
has paid for the work of the Russian experts who prepared the construction
site. Reshetnikov said that the reactor vessel had been manufactured
and that work had begun on steam generators and other equipment.[1] Work
to assemble a nuclear reactor and other equipment will begin in mid-1998.
Several dozen Russian specialists are currently at Bushehr, and the number
of Russians working there will be increased gradually.[2]
[1] ITAR-TASS report by Veronika Romanenkova, 21 March 1997,
in FBIS-SOV-97-080. [2] Interfax, 19 March 1998, in "Iran Pays First Installment
on Busher Nuclear Plant," FBIS-SOV-97-078. {entered 8/14/98 FW}
3/18/96: BUSHEHR PLANT TO BE FINISHED ON TIME DESPITE PROBLEMS Anatoliy Zhilinsky, head of the Tehran office of Zarubezhatomenergostroy,
said on 18 March 1996 that the Bushehr plant would be completed on time,
55 months from the signing of the January 1995 nuclear cooperation accord
between Russia and Iran. Zhilinsky said that Iranian subcontractors
would spend about a year restoring existing facilities at Bushehr, after
which Russian specialists would take over. One of the main problems
with construction of the plant, according to Zhilinsky, was that technical
documentation for the German made equipment originally installed at Bushehr
was not available. If Iran could not obtain the documentation, because
Germany was unwilling to provide it, Russian made equipment would have
to be used instead. Zhilinsky further stated that it would have been easier
to build a new power station "from scratch," but Iran insisted on completion
of the existing station.
[ITAR-TASS world service broadcast, 18 March 1996, in "Russian
Nuclear Aid to Iran 'Not Confined' t
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Nuclear Exports to Iran entry, see the