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In February 1993 CIA Director James Woolsey testified
that most reports of Russian missile technology transfers to
China were hoaxes or exaggerations, although
some technology sales had in fact taken place. (Woolsey's testimony
gave no further details.)[1] One of the most specific reports of missile
technology transfer arose in 1996, when a group of Chinese agents was arrested and subsequently expelled for attempting to obtain designs for SS-18 engines from the Pivdenne
Design Bureau (a.k.a. Yuzhnoye Design Bureau) in Ukraine.[2,3,4] In 1999, independent
Russian analysts reported that the Chinese National Export-Import Company
of Precision Machine Building along with two institutes of the Ministry
of the Aerospace Industry, attempted to purchase technology for low-thrust
liquid propellant rocket engines from the M.V. Keldysh Research Center in Russia.
The same source reports that Chinese engineers attempted to buy drawings
of the R-36MU (SS-18) from NPO Pivdenmash
(a.k.a. NPO Yuzhmash) in 1995-1996 and that efforts also were made to acquire technology for manufacturing solid-propellent engines.[5] Though
the details of these attempts to buy and sell missile technology are difficult
to verify, they raise serious concerns about both Russia's and Ukraine's commitment and ability to
restrict the transfer of missile technology and the potential for re-export
of missile designs or components from China to Pakistan, Iran, or other
countries of proliferation concern.
Russian Missile Experts Working in China In October 1993, reports appeard in the Western press claiming that China
had recruited up to 3,000 Russian missile specialists to work in missile
production and research facilities in China, where they received far higher
salaries and greater benefits than they could get from Russian missile
enterprises.[1] Similar reports appeared in the Russian press,[7] some
citing a "secret document from the General Department of the CPC Central
Committee Military Council."[2] Russian officials denied these reports,[3]
but they surfaced again in 1994, this time citing US intelligence sources.[4,5]
As the Chinese and Russian defense ministries signed a military cooperation
agreement in 1993 that provided for an exchange of technical specialists,[3,6]
it is very likely that some number of Russian specialists were and are
working in China. However, the number of these specialists, the specific
facilities where they work, and the proportion recruited privately or on
an individual basis as opposed to official exchange channels are
unknown.
Computer Simulation Technology for MIRV Development In June 1996, a Japanese newspaper reported that China had purchased "computer
simulation technology on nuclear warheads" from Russia in order to develop
multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs) for its nuclear
missiles.[1,2] The Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy immediately denied
this report, and a Minatom spokesman said that "high-yield rapid action
servers" capable of simultaneously staging a series of nuclear explosions
are not produced in Russia.[2] Given the limitations on Russian computing
capability revealed by Minatom's efforts to purchase US supercomputers
for its weapons research laboratories,[4] reports of Russian transfers
of supercomputer technology to China cannot be considered credible.
Page last updated 30 April 1999 Comments or questions? Contact Michael Jasinski at MIIS CNS: Michael.Jasinski@miis.edu
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