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Russian Missile Exports to China: Missile Know-How Russia: Missile Exports to China: Missile Training and Know-How


To return to the main Missile Exports to China entry, see the Missile Exports to China file

Missile Engine Technology

In February 1993 CIA Director James Woolsey testified that most reports of Russian missile technology transfers to China were hoaxes or exaggerations, although some technology sales had in fact taken place.  (Woolsey's testimony gave no further details.)[1] One of the most specific reports of missile technology transfer arose in 1996, when a group of Chinese agents was arrested and subsequently expelled for attempting to obtain designs for SS-18 engines from the Pivdenne Design Bureau (a.k.a. Yuzhnoye Design Bureau) in Ukraine.[2,3,4] In 1999, independent Russian analysts reported that the Chinese National Export-Import Company of Precision Machine Building along with two institutes of the Ministry of the Aerospace Industry, attempted to purchase technology for low-thrust liquid propellant rocket engines from the M.V. Keldysh Research Center in Russia. The same source reports that Chinese engineers attempted to buy drawings of the R-36MU (SS-18) from NPO Pivdenmash (a.k.a. NPO Yuzhmash) in 1995-1996 and that efforts also were made to acquire technology for manufacturing solid-propellent engines.[5]  Though the details of these attempts to buy and sell missile technology are difficult to verify, they raise serious concerns about both Russia's and Ukraine's commitment and ability to restrict the transfer of missile technology and the potential for re-export of missile designs or components from China to Pakistan, Iran, or other countries of proliferation concern.
Sources:
[1] Testimony by Director of Central Intelligence James Woolsey to the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee, 24 February 1993.
[2] Igor Borenko, Krasnaya zvezda, 24 May 1996, p. 3.
[3] Joseph C. Anselmo, "US Eyes China Missile Threat," Aviation Week & Space Technology, 21 October 1996, p. 23.
[4] James Lamson and Wyn Bowen, "'One Arrow, Three Stars': China's MIRV Programme," Jane's Intelligence Review, June 1997, pp. 266-269.
[5] Aleksey Rey and Konstantin Makiyenko, "O kontraktakh v Aviakosmicheskoy i voyenno-tekhnicheskoy sfere mezhdu Rossiyey i KNR," Yadernyy Kontrol, Vol.40, No.4, July-August 1998, pp. 82-86. {entered 4/14/99 FW}

Russian Missile Experts Working in China

In October 1993, reports appeard in the Western press claiming that China had recruited up to 3,000 Russian missile specialists to work in missile production and research facilities in China, where they received far higher salaries and greater benefits than they could get from Russian missile enterprises.[1] Similar reports appeared in the Russian press,[7] some citing a "secret document from the General Department of the CPC Central Committee Military Council."[2] Russian officials denied these reports,[3] but they surfaced again in 1994, this time citing US intelligence sources.[4,5] As the Chinese and Russian defense ministries signed a military cooperation agreement in 1993 that provided for an exchange of technical specialists,[3,6] it is very likely that some number of Russian specialists were and are working in China.  However, the number of these specialists, the specific facilities where they work, and the proportion recruited privately or on an individual basis as opposed to official exchange channels are unknown.
Sources:
[1] John J. Fialka, "US Fears China's Success in Skimming Cream of Weapons Experts from Russia," Wall Street Journal, 14 October 1993, p. A12.
[2] Vladimir Skosyrev, Izvestiya, 9 November 1993, pp. 1,3; in "Grachev Discusses Cooperation, Meets Officials in China, Visit Linked to Arms Buildup," FBIS-SOV-93-216.
[3] Pavel Spirin, ITAR-TASS, 15 October 1993; in "Unconfirmed Rumors of Russian Missile Builders Hired by PRC," JPRS-TND-93-034.
[4] "Brains Drained," US News and World Report, 6 June 1994, p. 24.
[5] Mikhail Ursov, "Russia Is Arming China," Moscow News, 7 October 1994, p. 8.
[6] "China's Missile Imports and Assistance From Russia," CNS China Profiles database. {entered 11/18/98 FW}
[7] Aleksey Rey and Konstantin Makiyenko, "O kontraktakh v Aviakosmicheskoy i voyenno-tekhnicheskoy sfere mezhdu Rossiyey i KNR," Yadernyy Kontrol, Vol.40, No.4, July-August 1998, pp. 82-86. {updated 4/14/99 FW}

Computer Simulation Technology for MIRV Development

In June 1996, a Japanese newspaper reported that China had purchased "computer simulation technology on nuclear warheads" from Russia in order to develop multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs) for its nuclear missiles.[1,2] The Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy immediately denied this report, and a Minatom spokesman said that "high-yield rapid action servers" capable of simultaneously staging a series of nuclear explosions are not produced in Russia.[2] Given the limitations on Russian computing capability revealed by Minatom's efforts to purchase US supercomputers for its weapons research laboratories,[4] reports of Russian transfers of supercomputer technology to China cannot be considered credible.
Sources:
[1] "China Exploded More Than Two Warheads--Paper," Reuters, 12 June 1996, in Executive News Service, 12 June 1996.
[2] James Lamson and Wyn Bowen, "'One Arrow, Three Stars': China's MIRV Programme," Jane's Intelligence Review, June 1997, pp. 266-269.{entered 11/18/98 FW}
[3] Anatoliy Yurkin, ITAR-TASS, 13 June 1996; in "Moscow Denies Giving PRC Nuclear Computer Technology," FBIS-SOV-96-115.
[4] Jeff Gerth and Michael R. Gordon, "Russian Nuclear Lab Evaded Rules to Get Computers," New York Times, 27 October 1997, p. 1.

 

Page last updated 30 April 1999

Comments or questions? Contact Michael Jasinski at MIIS CNS: Michael.Jasinski@miis.edu

CNSThis material is produced independently for NTI by the Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies and does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been independently verified by NTI or its directors, officers, employees, agents. Copyright © 2002 by MIIS.

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