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Russia: Nuclear and Missile Exports: Missile Exports to China

Russia:  Missile Exports to China


Overview Ballistic Missile Components Training and Know-How

In 1992, reports stated that China had extensive contacts with Russia relating to the purchase of SAMs, engines, advanced missile guidance technology, and other missile-related technology and equipment. US officials worried that China would use Russian technology to upgrade its tactical ballistic and cruise missiles, and possibly export the improved missile systems.[1,2]  Russia did not deny the sale of S-300 SAMs, but vigorously denied the other allegations, saying that it had never sold missiles or missile technology to China. Reports also indicated that several hundred, perhaps as many as several thousand, Russian specialists were working in China. Many of these experts were reportedly working in Chinese missile plants to improve the accuracy of Chinese missiles.[3,4] In November 1993, China and Russia signed a five-year military cooperation agreement which included an exchange of experts. US intelligence sources continued to be concerned that Russian missile scientists were assisting China, and that Russia was providing important missile technology and equipment, including solid rocket fuel, cruise missile engines, and technical assistance for improving missile launch from submerged submarines.[2] (Russia has sold a number of cruise missiles and SAM systems to China, but as these systems are not covered under the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), they fall outside the concerns of this report.  See the CNS China Profiles database for more information on Russian sales of these missiles.)

In 1995 and 1996, according to Russian sources, Russian and Ukranian companies sold China engines used in ICBMs and space launch vehicles, and attempts by China to purchase or otherwise acquire technical drawings and other components of the SS-18 ICBM were also widely reported.[5,6,9]  The United States reacted strongly to these reports, stating that transfers of SS-18 technology would violate both the START I Treaty and the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), and would greatly improve China's ability to threaten the United States.  US officials further stated that although China's interest in the SS-18 was ostensibly for space launch purposes, US intelligence officials believed it was directly related to China's strategic nuclear force modernization.[1,5,6] In any event, US officials continue to press China to join the MTCR and still express concerns over Chinese transfers of missile technology to Iran, Pakistan, or other states of proliferation concern.[7,8]
Sources:
[1] "China's Missile Imports and Assistance From Russia," CNS China Profiles database.
[2] "China's Missile Imports and Assistance From Abroad," CNS China Profiles database.
[3] "Eksport Obychuykh Vooruzheniy," PIR Center (Moscow), June 1996, p.5.
[4] "Brains Drained," US News and World Report, 6 June 1994, p. 24.
[5] Igor Borenko, Krasnaya zvezda, 24 May 1996, p. 3.
[6] Joseph C. Anselmo, "US Eyes China Missile Threat," Aviation Week and Space Technology, 21 October 1996, p. 23.
[7] Michael Laris, "U.S. Team in China Said to Raise Issue of Missile Trading," The Washington Post, 13 November 1998, p. A36.
[8] "Statement of the Director of Central Intelligence George J. Tenet As Prepared for Delivery Before theSenate Armed Services Committee Hearing on Current and Projected National Security Threats," 2 February 1999. {entered 11/12/98 FW}
[9] Aleksey Rey and Konstantin Makiyenko, "O kontraktakh v Aviakosmicheskoy i voyenno-tekhnicheskoy sfere mezhdu Rossiyey i KNR," Yadernyy kontrol, Vol.40, No.4, July-August 1998, pp. 82-86. {updated 4/14/99 FW} 

Ballistic Missile Exports Summary Table

Status

Exports

Manufacturer

Exporter

Recipient
Components
Reported RD-123 rocket engines NPO Pivdenmash (Ukraine) NPO Pivdenmash (Ukraine) Unknown
Reported RD-170 rocket engines NPO Pivdenmash (Ukraine) NPO Pivdenmash (Ukraine) and NPO Energomash Unknown
Reported Propulsion and guidance components for SS-18, SS-24, and SS-25 ICBMs Various Unknown Unknown
Training and know-how
Reported Russian specialists working in Chinese facilities N/A Unknown Various facilities

Related material on the CNS website:
CNS China Profiles Database, available by subscription with the CNS Databases on CD-ROM or at the NTI website: http://nti.org/db/china/imrus.htm.
Mingquan Zhu, The Evolution of China's Nuclear Nonproliferation Policy, The Nonproliferation Review Fall 1997, volume 4, number 2, at http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/npr/vol04/42/zhu42.pdf.

Page last updated 29 April 1999
For more recent developments, see the General Missile Export Developments file.

Comments or questions? Contact Michael Jasinski at MIIS CNS: Michael.Jasinski@miis.edu

CNSThis material is produced independently for NTI by the Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies and does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been independently verified by NTI or its directors, officers, employees, agents. Copyright © 2002 by MIIS.

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