Russia

This section of the database provides information on civil and military uranium and plutonium production, nuclear fuel fabrication, general fuel cycle developments, and disposition of weapons-grade nuclear material in Russia.

In the Soviet era, plutonium for weapons purposes was produced in 13 reactors, located at the Mayak Production Association in Ozersk (formerly Chelyabinsk-65), the Mining and Chemical Combine at Zheleznogorsk (formerly Krasnoyarsk-26), and the Siberian Chemical Combine in Seversk (formerly Tomsk-7). Of these, three remain in operation. An agreement to modify the three remaining reactors at Seversk and Zheleznogorsk was signed at the Gore-Chernomyrdin meeting in September 1997. However, in 2000 Russia indicated that due to technical and financial problems, it would prefer to replace these reactors with fossil fuel-operated power plants and would need additional time and funds to implement this option.[7] As of July 2001, the three plutonium reactors remain operational and no final decision about their shut-down has been reached. (For more information, see the relevant facility files and the Nuclear Fuel Cycle Developments file.)

Uranium is enriched to low levels at the Angarsk Electrochemical Combine in Irkutsk, at the Electrochemical Plant in Zelenogorsk (formerly Krasnoyarsk-45), the Ural Electrochemical Combine in Novouralsk (formerly Sverdlosk-44) and the Siberian Chemical Combine. Historically, all of these but Angarsk produced HEU for weapons.[3] There are no publicly available official estimates of the amount of weapons-grade HEU produced by Russia. Albright et al. estimate a stockpile from 735 to 1365 metric tons (t) of weapons grade-equivalent HEU, including the 500t slated for sale to the United States under the 1993 US-Russian HEU Agreement.[5] In 1989, the Soviet government announced the cessation of production of HEU for weapons.[4] Currently, the main product of all four uranium enrichment facilities is low-enriched uranium for nuclear fuel. In addition to enrichment activities, all but the Angarsk facility are engaged in downblending of the HEU into LEU under the US-Russian HEU Agreement. All the facilities that produced plutonium or HEU for nuclear weapons are located in Russia's closed nuclear cities. (For more information on uranium and plutonium production and use, see the Weapons-Grade Fissile Material Overview and Chart.)

Like the weapons-grade HEU stockpile, the size of the total plutonium stockpile in Russia is uncertain. The separated military plutonium stockpile is estimated at 106 to 156t.[1] In 1994, Russia agreed to stop using the newly produced plutonium in nuclear weapons.[6] The civil stockpile of separated plutonium, almost all of which is located at Mayak, was about 30t in 1995, with a current annual production rate of 0.6t.[2] According to the September 2000 Plutonium Disposition Agreement, the United States and Russia took an obligation to dispose of 34t of excess weapons-origin plutonium either by burning it as mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel or immobilizing it. (For more information see the Plutonium Disposition Overview and MOX Fuel Overview, as well as the Nuclear Fuel Cycle Developments file.)

Russia is a strong proponent of the so-called "closed" nuclear fuel cycle. It reprocesses spent nuclear fuel in order to recover plutonium and uranium, considers plutonium a strategic commodity, and conducts research to develop a nuclear power reactor capable of reusing the same nuclear fuel on continuous basis. Mayak is the site of the RT-1 plant, Russia's only operating large-scale reprocessing plant for civil (VVER-440) reactor and naval reactor fuel. The second reprocessing plant, RT-2 in Zheleznogorsk, is still under construction. (For more information on spent nuclear fuel reprocessing, see the relevant Mayak and the Mining and Chemical Combine files and the spent nuclear fuel and waste section.)

This section also includes information on uranium and MOX fuel fabrication, uranium mining and milling and related facilities. (As of October 2000, individual mining and milling facility files are no longer being updated. However, an archive of these facility files remains available. For major recent developments, see the Nuclear Fuel Cycle Developments file.)

Sources:
[1] David Albright, Frans Berkhout,William Walker, Plutonium and Highly Enriched Uranium 1996: World Inventories, Capabilities and Policies (New York: Oxford University Press Inc., 1997), p. 58.
[2] Valeriy Bogdan, Viktor Murogov, Vladimir Kagramanyan, Mikhail Troyanov, "Ispolzovaniye plutoniya v Rossii," Yadernyy Kontrol, 11/95, pp. 13-17.
[3] Thomas Cochran, Robert S. Norris, Oleg Bukharin, Making the Russian Bomb: From Stalin to Yeltsin, (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1995) p. 186.
[4] Thomas Cochran, Robert S. Norris, Oleg Bukharin, Making the Russian Bomb: From Stalin to Yeltsin, (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1995), p. 52.
[5] David Albright, Frans Berkhout ,William Walker, Plutonium and Highly Enriched Uranium 1996: World Inventories, Capabilities and Policies (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 399.{entered 11/5/97 ab}
[6] 1994 Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Russian Federation Concerning the Shutdown of Plutonium Production Reactors and the Cessation of Use of Newly Produced Plutonium for Nuclear Weapons, http://www.eia.doe.gov/gorec/gcc8.html.
[7] "U.S., Russia Agree to Coal-Fired Plant Option for Seversk Pu Reactor," Post-Soviet Nuclear & Defense Monitor, 13 November 2000, pp. 14-15. {Updated 7/10/01 ES}

Comments or questions? Contact Elena Sokova at MIIS CNS: esokovaATmiis.edu

This material is produced independently for NTI by the Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies and does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been independently verified by NTI or its directors, officers, employees, agents. Copyright © 2003 by MIIS.

HOME | CONTACT US | SITE MAP