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This material is produced by the Monterey Institute's Center for Nonproliferation Studies
 
Russia Fissile Material Production and Disposition Plutonium Disposition Article
Guide to the Article
Introduction
Risks Associated With Surplus Plutonium and the Benefits of Disposition
Quantities and Physical Forms of Surplus Stocks
Military Versus Civil Stocks of Spent Fuel: The Spent Fuel Standard
Preferred Disposition Technologies
The Permanence of Disposition
Interim Storage
Theft and Recovery of Plutonium After Disposition
Russia and US Actions
Infrastructure, Timing and Cost
Proliferation Concerns and Relation to the Civil Nuclear Fuel Cycle
Disposition Developments


Russia: Fissile Material: Plutonium Dispositon: Guide to the Article

Russia:  Guide to the Plutonium Disposition Article

This article discusses Russia's efforts to render its large stockpile of surplus military plutonium less susceptible to theft or reuse. It begins with a look at the risks associated with plutonium taken from dismantled warheads. This is followed by a review of plutonium stocks in Russia. The question of developing a standard of protection from theft and reuse is discussed, and the two technologies that are likely to be used to meet that standard are introduced. The long-term implications of disposition are considered, along with near-term plutonium storage requirements, and the ease of recoverability of plutonium once it is dispositioned. Russian, US, and nuclear industry activities related to plutonium disposition are reviewed, as are the cost, duration, and infrastructure requirements of the program. More detailed assessments of cost and timing are also provided, as well a review of some of the outstanding technical uncertainties. Finally the potential impact of the program on civil nuclear fuel cycles, and the activities of non-governmental organizations vis-a-vis plutonium disposition is discussed.
 

A two-page Executive Summary of this article is also available.

 

Comments or questions? Contact Elena Sokova at MIIS CNS: esokovaATmiis.edu

CNSThis material is produced independently for NTI by the Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies and does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been independently verified by NTI or its directors, officers, employees, agents. Copyright © 2002 by MIIS.

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