Russia:  Proliferation Concerns and Relation to the Civil Nuclear Fuel Cycle

The nuclear fuel cycle is called "closed" when plutonium is extracted from spent fuel and remanufactured into nuclear fuel for breeder or light water reactors, and "open" when spent reactor fuel is disposed of without plutonium recovery.

The existence of a plutonium processing infrastructure and the movement of tons of separated plutonium through the various stages of the closed fuel cycle raise substantial risks of theft and diversion of the kilogram quantities of plutonium needed for weapons construction. In recognition of this danger, the United States has developed a policy of not reprocessing spent fuel and of seeking to discourage civil plutonium use other countries.[1]

Conversely, Russia has long had plans to close its nuclear fuel cycle. However, given the current economic crisis in Russia, a closed fuel cycle (or even significant expansion of the existing open fuel cycle) is unlikely to be achieved without substantial foreign assistance. Because near-term assistance with nuclear infrastructure is most likely to come from the plutonium disposition campaign, Russia  hopes to use the program as a springboard for its efforts to close the fuel cycle.[2]

A closed fuel cycle requires a plutonium fuel fabrication plant, a reprocessing facility, and reactors that can operate using plutonium-based fuels. In the context of military plutonium disposition, the United States has shown a willingness to help build some of this infrastructure in Russia, in particular the MOX fabrication plant and retrofitted reactors described earlier, and has additionally decided to consider building the same infrastructure in the United States. The dual-track option has provoked a strong negative response in the NGO community. For example, in December of 1996, fourteen nonproliferation and environmental groups sent a joint letter to the then Secretary of Energy Hazel O'Leary urging her to consider the MOX option "...for insurance purposes only." [3] The primary concern of these groups is that the MOX option will provide economic and political incentive for an expansion of plutonium based fuel cycles both in Russia and the United States. This is considered undesirable by the groups due to what they consider to be overwhelming proliferation risks associated with the closed plutonium fuel cycle. They believe that the United States should refrain from using reactors to disposition plutonium, and should use its considerable economic leverage to persuade Russia to immobilize some, if not all, of its plutonium.

The current official US position is that the dual track option helps ensure reciprocity on the part of Russia, and leaves open an alternative should one method prove politically or technically untenable.[4] However, prior to the issuance of the Record of Decision, this position met with resistance even within the administration. For instance, the Director of the US Arms Control and Diarmament Agency  (ACDA) said that other countries “would hear only one message for the next 25 years: that plutonium use for generating commercial power is now being blessed by the United States.”[5] Similarly, in February 1997, the US Nuclear Regulatory Commissioner Edward McGaffigan said that choice of the MOX option by both Russia and the United States was "premature," and an "unwarranted bonus to nations who have long bucked US nonproliferation policy." [6]

In Russia, there is also some evidence of possible public opposition to the MOX option. A senior nuclear regulatory official has said that any accident in a plutonium handling or storage facility would very likely result in termination of the MOX program. Citing the Chornobyl nuclear disaster, Viktor Gubanov, head of the Department of Safety, Ecology, and Emergency Situations at Minatom, said in March 1997 that " .. if we allow any incidents to contaminate local areas, the public will force us to bury it, so everything depends on our safe operation."[7] Sources:
[1] The White House, "Nonproliferation and Export Control Policy," press release, 27 September  1993.
[2] Nikolai N. Egorov, "Separated Plutonium Utilization in Russia," http://www.nuke-energy.com/html/ufs1.html, October 1996, p. 1.
[3] "Coalition Of National Organizations Pledges Fight Against Use Of Military Plutonium In Power Reactors; Calls On Energy Secretary To Demonstrate Immobilizing Plutonium In Waste And To Rule Out Disposing Of It As Fuel," http://www.nci.org/nci/l122096.htm, 20 December 1996.
[4] Peter Passell, “U.S. Set to Let Reactors Use Bomb Plutonium,”  The New York Times, 22 November, 1996, p. 3.
[5] Dave Airozo, "Nonproliferation Concerns Muddle Clinton Administration Pu Policy", NuclearFuel, 2 December 1996, p. 7.
[6] Dave Airozo, "NRC Commisioner Questions Plan to Burn Russian U.S. Pu in Reactors", NuclearFuel, 24 February  1997.
[7] Dave Airozo, "Russia's Plans to Burn Weapons Pu would Change if Accident Occurred, NuclearFuel, 24 March 1997, p. 9.

Comments or questions? Contact Elena Sokova at MIIS CNS: esokovaATmiis.edu

This material is produced independently for NTI by the Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies and does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been independently verified by NTI or its directors, officers, employees, agents. Copyright © 2002 by MIIS.

HOME  |  CONTACT US  |  SITE MAP