Russia:  Archived Plutonium Disposition Developments (1997-2003)

This file is no longer being updated.  For major recent developments, see the Nuclear Fuel Cycle Developments file.

To return to the main Plutonium Disposition entry, see the Plutonium Disposition Overview file.

11/6/2003: RUSSIA SUSPENDS PLUTONIUM DISPOSITION AGREEMENT
On 6 November 2003, Interfax, referring to an unnamed Minatom representative, reported that Russia has suspended the Plutonium Disposition Agreement with the United States due to financial problems. The source noted that the $200 million US contribution towards this program is not enough to start implementing the $2 billion agreement that includes building a MOX nuclear fuel production plant, retrofitting nuclear reactors, and more.
["Russia Suspends Weapons-Grade Plutonium Disposal," Interfax, 6 November 2003.] {Entered 12/11/03 DS}

7/24/2003: US ALLOWS PLUTONIUM MANAGEMENT AGREEMENT TO EXPIRE
The United States allowed the 1998 Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Russian Federation on Scientific and Technical Cooperation in the Management of Plutonium that has been Withdrawn from Nuclear Military Programs (See full text of agreement) to expire on 24 July 2003, because Russia did not agree to US requests for liability protection for U.S. workers involved in the program.  According to a National Nuclear Security Administration spokesperson, cancellation of the program will not have an impact in the short term, since work that was already planned will continue as scheduled.  A US State Department spokesperson added that a conditional three-month extension has been applied to the program; however, all new projects will be assessed on a case-by-case basis.
[Charles Digges,"Technical Agreement for Plutonium Disposition Allowed to Lapse by US," Bellona Foundation Web Site, http://www.bellona.no/, 30 July 2003.] {Entered 8/21/2003 DS}

4/28/2003:  funding for Russian mox plant anticipated by year end
A senior unnamed US administration official indicated that progress is being made on securing $1 billion for construction of the Russian MOX fuel fabrication facility.  According to the official, funding commitments were expected to be in place by the end of 2003.  As of April 2003, commitments totalled $800 million, with $400 million from the United States and roughly another $400 million coming from the United Kingdom, France, and Japan.  Canada and Italy have reportedly made private commitments, included in the current total, which are to be announced at or before the G8 summit in Evian, France.
[Daniel Horner and Ann MacLachlan, "Full G8 Funding for Construction of Russian MOX Plant Seen by Year End," NuclearFuel, Vol. 28, No. 9, 28 April 2003, pp. 3-4.] {Entered 5/28/03 CB}

4/24/2003: NNSA MOVES FORWARD WITH US MOX OPTION
On 24 April 2003, the US Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) issued an Amended Record of Decision, indicating that it will proceed with the disposition of 34 metric tons (t) of US weapons-grade plutonium by converting it to MOX fuel.  This amends the previous Record of Decision which included the disposition of 6.5t of the 34t via immobilization.
["NNSA Moves Ahead with Plutonium Disposition Program," NNSA Press Release, 24 April 2003, http://www.nnsa.doe.gov/.] {Entered 5/28/03 CB}

4/24/2003: RUSSIA, US DEVELOPING NEW THORIUM-PLUTONIUM FUEL
On 24 April 2003, The Moscow Times reported that Minatom had recently revealed that, for the past nine years, it has been developing a commercial reactor fuel that combines weapons-grade plutonium with thorium, a naturally-occurring metal. The project is being coordinated by Minatom and overseen by Gosatomnadzor, Russia's state nuclear inspection agency.[1,2]  The United States has been the sole source of funding for the project, contributing $5 million from government and private sources.[1]

Valeriy Rachkov, deputy head of Minatom's Nuclear Science and Engineering Department, claims that thorium-plutonium fuel could be burned in existing reactors without any upgrades. Russia's VVER-1000 reactors are the most likely candidates to burn the thorium-plutonium fuel. There are currently eight such reactors in Russia--four in Saratov Oblast, two in Tver Oblast, and one each in Volgodonsk and Novovoronezh--with two new reactors under construction, and an additional one planned. The reactors would be able to burn about 700kg each of plutonium annually, a fraction of the amount of Russian plutonium either currently in storage or contained within to-be-dismantled warheads.[1] 

Seth Grae, president of Thorium Power, one of the private sources of thorium project funding, argues that the fuel would be less expensive, faster, and safer than MOX fuel. Grae believes that it could be ready for commercial use by 2006 at a cost of $200 million.[1]  Other proponents contend that using thorium fuel could reduce by 50% the time it takes to dispose of military plutonium via MOX fuel.[2] Grae also argues that the thorium fuel design consumes all potentially weapons-usable byproducts, reducing the proliferation threat.[1]

Thorium fuel, though, is not without its critics. Environmentalists, who oppose all types of nuclear energy, reject the thorium fuel concept. Others, including independent nuclear expert Vladimir Kuznetsov, are skeptical about various aspects of the project, including the claim of a reduced proliferation threat.[2]

This year, project scientists expect to produce a working process model and test fuel samples, provided that funding is available. US Congressman Curt Weldon, a strong supporter of thorium fuel, has been lobbying for $3.5 million in funding from the US government. However, the US Department of Energy stated that no funds had been allocated for the thorium project this year.[1]
Sources:
[1] Yevgeniya Borisova, "Russia Toys With a New Reactor Fuel," The Moscow Times, 24 April 2003.
[2] Charles Digges and Rashid Alimov, "Thorium-Based Fuel May Play Role in Plutonium Disposition," Bellona Foundation Web Site, http://www.bellona.no/ , May 2003. {Entered 5/7/2003 CB}

1/20/2003:  RUSSIA SIGNALS AGREEMENT WITH US MOX FACILITY DESIGN CONCEPT
At a December 2002 meeting of US and Russian officials, Russia indicated it may accept the US MOX plant design concept, but the US and Russia have yet to negotiate a formal agreement. A senior Minatom official noted that discussions were ongoing, but that progress had been slower than expected due to several remaining issues. One of the major issues, according to a US source, is how to successfully transfer US technology to Russia. Though talks continue, it is not clear when final agreement on the MOX plant design will be reached.
[Daniel Horner and Ann MacLachlan, "Russia Open to Idea of Using DCS Design of MOX Plant, but Talks Going Slowly," NuclearFuel, Vol. 28, No.2, 20 January 2003, pp. 16-17.] {Entered 3/19/2003 CB}

1/11/2003:  JAPAN PLEDGES FINANCIAL SUPPORT FOR RUSSIAN PLUTONIUM DISPOSITION
During a speech given at the Kurchatov Institute on 11 January 2003, Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi declared Japan's intent to allocate $100 million to the disposition of Russian plutonium under the US-Russian Plutonium Disposition Program.  Koizumi expressed hope that Japan's contribution might further research cooperation between Japan and Russia on the development of plutonium recycling technologies.
["Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi's Speech during the International Scientists Conference at the Russian Research Center Kurchatov Institute on 11 Jan 03," Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 11 January 2003; in "Koizumi's Speech at Russian Research Center on DPRK Nuclear Issue, Bilateral Ties," FBIS Document JPP20030113000029.] {Entered 4/2/2003 CB}

9/16/2002:  REPLICA OF US MOX PLANT PROPOSED FOR RUSSIAN PROGRAM
At a meeting on 4-6 September 2002 in Paris, the United States asked Russia to consider adapting the US mixed-oxide fuel (MOX) fabrication plant design to produce Russian fuel from military plutonium.  The motivation for the proposal was to reduce the cost of building a MOX plant in Russia, because two plants built with the same capacity and technology would be less expensive than two separate designs.  In a 12 September 2002 interview with NuclearFuel, Minatom senior expert Lyudmila Petrova stated that the response of Russian experts to the proposal was "extremely positive" but that technical and legal aspects should be studied in more detail.

The US MOX plant is essentially a copy of the Melox plant Cogema operates at Marcoule in southern France, except for a lower throughput and special modifications to process weapons-grade plutonium. The process of licensing the new technology and plant design in Russia could cause delays, according to Petrova. 

Funding for the construction and operation of the Russian MOX plant is to be provided by international contributions, but this funding has continually fallen short of needed levels.  New funding hopes are associated with the G-8 summit decision in June 2002 to pledge up to $20 billion for disarmament projects in the former Soviet Union. The Russian plutonium disposition program was included in the list of high-priority items.

Russia has requested additional information about the US MOX plant design proposal.  One of the issues of concern is whether a Melox clone plant will be able to produce fuel according to Russian specifications.  Another issue to be considered is the location of the MOX plant.  If the plant is erected at Mayak, the "special access regime" at the facility could increase project costs and create access problems for foreign participants.  Minatom's official position is that the MOX fuel manufacturing plant should be built at Mayak, the location where the plutonium conversion plant is to be constructed.  A possible solution to this conflict, according to Petrova, is to revert to the previous process of building a MOX plant with Cogema technology but designed by Russian specialists.  No working group has been established yet to examine the US proposal.
[Ann MacLachlan, "Replica of U.S. MOX Plant Proposed for Russian Program," NuclearFuel, Vol. 27, No. 19, 16 September 2002.] {Entered 10/16/02 CB}

9/16/2002:  RESULTS OF EXPERT GROUP ON ACCELERATED NUCLEAR MATERIAL DISPOSITION ANNOUNCED
On 16 September 2002, a joint statement was released by US Secretary of Energy Abraham and Russian Minister of Atomic Energy Rumyantsev announcing the recommendations of the Expert Group on Accelerated Nuclear Materials Disposition established by Presidents Bush and Putin at their May 2002 Summit in Moscow. The report identified several areas where joint cooperation could lead to a reduction in highly enriched uranium inventories beyond agreements already in place, as well as potential new areas of near-term cooperation for weapons-grade plutonium disposition. The Expert Group will continue to study additional options that could be relevant in the future, taking into account technical and financial issues, as well as potential impacts on the commercial nuclear fuel market. For specific recommendations, see the full text of the statement.
["Joint Statement:  Secretary Abraham, Minister Rumyantsev," US Department of Energy Web Site, http://www.energy.gov/, 16 September 2002.] {Entered 10/8/02 CB}

8/2002: NEW US-RUSSIAN PU DISPOSITION PLAN SIMILAR TO ORIGINAL ONE
According to NuclearFuel, US and Russian officials have completed a joint review of Russia's plutonium disposition program. This joint review followed a year-long National Security Council review of all US nonproliferation programs in Russia. The joint review reportedly endorsed a new action plan, which, like the initial program, will engage both light-water and fast reactors in the disposition of Russian military plutonium. The light-water reactors will be the four units of the Balakovo Nuclear Power Plant and one or more new reactors Russia is planning to build. The agreed-upon plutonium disposition plan envisions the use of the BN-600 fast reactor and the BOR-60 experimental fast reactor. MOX fuel fabrication, under the new plan, will most likely involve the pelletization rather than the vibropacking method.
[Daniel Horner, "New plan for Russian Pu disposition said to have deja vu focus on LWRs," NuclearFuel, Vol. 27, No. 16, 5 August 2002.] {Entered 8/19/02 DA}

6/2002: MOX FUEL TEST IN BELOYARSK REACTOR PROVES SUCCESSFUL
The Japan Nuclear Fuel Cycle Development Institute reported that it had successfully completed a 22-month experiment on burning MOX fuel made of 60kg of Russian weapons plutonium in the core of the Beloyarsk BN-600 fast reactor. Compacted granular fuel was used instead of conventional pellets.
[Atoms in Japan, June 2002; in "Japan reports progress in burning Russian weapons plutonium," Uranium Information Centre bi-monthly newsletter online edition, No. 4, http://www.uic.com.au/, July-August 2002.] {Entered 8/19/2002 DA}

6/1/2002: GERMANY PULLS OUT OF TRILATERAL PU DISPOSITION PROGRAM
The German government has decided not to renew the 1997 trilateral cooperation agreement between Germany, Russia and France on Russian plutonium disposition, which expired on 1 June 2002. As a result of the trilateral cooperation, the basic design of Demox, a MOX fuel fabrication facility, was completed. The German government's decision means that the Siemens MOX fuel fabrication plant at Hanau will no longer be available for the Demox project. Helmut Rupar, the Siemens official in charge of decommissioning the fabrication plant, told NuclearFuel that individual parts of the plant would be sold to Japan's Nuclear Fuel Industries for use in testing and training programs.[1] According to Post-Soviet Nuclear & Defense Monitor, the French government is exploring opportunities to renew the plutonium disposition effort, possibly by joining the US-Russian Plutonium Disposition Program. US officials responsible for this program do not view the loss of the Hanau equipment as detrimental to the program.[2] For more information on MOX, see the MOX Fuel Overview.
Sources:
[1] Mark Hibbs, "Germany ends trilateral Pu effort; NFI will get some Hanau equipment," NuclearFuel, 11 June 2002.
[2] "Trilateral pact on Russian MOX expires - Germany will not renew," Post-Soviet Nuclear & Defense Monitor, 27 May 2002, p. 20. {Entered 8/20/2002 DA}

5/28/2002: MINATOM AND DOE WILL SET UP EXPERT GROUPS ON SURPLUS NUCLEAR MATERIALS AND ON NUCLEAR REACTORS
On 28 May 2002, Minister of Atomic Energy Aleksandr Rumyantsev announced that a US Department of Energy (DOE) delegation would visit Moscow to establish two joint working groups as agreed at a Bush-Putin Moscow summit held in May 2002. In accordance with the Joint Declaration on the New Strategic Relationship adopted at the summit, the United States and Russia will set up an expert group to determine the amount of surplus weapons-grade fissile materials and recommend methods to reduce their inventories. Another expert group will deal with cooperation on advanced, environmentally safe nuclear reactors and new fuel cycle technologies.[1] On 5 June 2002, RIA Novosti reported that First Deputy Minister of Atomic Energy Mikhail Solonin and DOE Under Secretary for Nuclear Security John Gordon would head the expert group on surplus nuclear materials, and First Deputy Minister of Atomic Energy Lev Ryabev and DOE Under Secretary for Energy, Science, and Environment Robert Card would co-chair the group on nuclear reactors and technologies.[2]
Sources:
[1] Interfax, 28 May 2002; in "Russian Atomic Energy Ministry starts implementing summit decisions," FBIS Document CEP20020528000073.
[2] "Pervyye zamestiteli ministra RF po atomnoy energii Mikhail Solonin i Lev Ryabev naznacheny rukovoditelyami s rossiyskoy storony dvukh rossiysko-amerikanskikh ekspertnykh grupp po yadernym materialam i tekhnologiyam," Nuclear.ru Web Site, http://www.nuclear.ru, 6 June 2002. {Entered 8/1/02 DA}
 
5/2002: US-RUSSIAN WORKING GROUP REPORTS ON PU DISPOSITION IN RUSSIA
On 15 May 2002, Energy Daily reported on details of the January 2002 report by the Joint US-Russian Working Group on Cost Analysis and Economics in Plutonium Disposition (also see the 1/15/2002 entry below). The report outlines Russia's MOX fuel program. According to this program, estimated at $1.7 billion, Russia will construct two plutonium conversion plants, including one demonstration-scale facility and one industrial-scale facility to be built at PO Mayak, and three MOX fuel manufacturing plants, two of which will be small-scale facilities for the initial stages of the program, and the third one - an industrial-scale MOX production plant to be built in Zheleznogorsk. The Russian MOX fuel program envisages the use of three types of nuclear reactors for burning MOX fuel: a BN-600 fast reactor, a BOR-60 experimental fast reactor and four VVER-1000 reactors. According to the plan, spent MOX fuel will be first stored in wet short-term storage facilities at reactor sites and then moved to a long-term dry storage facility to be built in Zheleznogorsk. The program also covers transportation of plutonium from conversion sites to MOX fuel manufacturing sites, as well as MOX fuel shipments to reactor sites and spent MOX fuel shipments to the long-term storage facility.[1] According to NuclearFuel, the United States will not provide funding for the construction of the BN-800 fast reactor, which Russia intends to use in plutonium disposition.[2]
Sources:
[1] George Lobsenz, "Russia: Task force details plutonium disposition plan," Energy Daily, 15 May 2002; in Global Security Newswire, 16 May 2002, http://www.nti.org.
[2] "U.S. sets parameters for aid to Russian fast-reactor Pu disposition," NuclearFuel, 28 May 2002. {Entered 9/5/02 DA}

4/18/2002:  G7 MAKES PLUTONIUM DISPOSITION a FUNDING PRIORITY
According to a 18 April 2002 article in Nucleonics Week, the G7 Nonproliferation Working Group has begun discussions of the US "10 plus 10 over 10" proposal. The proposal is that the US would provide $10 billion, and its allies a similar amount, over 10 years, to fund nonproliferation and nuclear safety efforts in the former Soviet Union and other countries. The initiative's scope may include such projects as construction of a mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel plant in Russia which would use surplus weapons plutonium for the manufacturing of MOX fuel. Decommissioning of the remaining Russian plutonium production reactors is also on the G7 priority list. [The "10 plus 10 over 10" proposal was eventually approved at the June 2002 G8 summit.]
[“G7 Considers Big Nonproliferation and Safety Fund for Former USSR,” Nucleonics Week, Vol. 43, No. 16, 18 April 2002.]  {Entered 12/3/02 CB}

2/12/2002: FUNDING FOR PLUTONIUM DISPOSITION IN RUSSIA IS LIKELY TO INCREASE IN FY2003
The National Nuclear Security Administration has proposed $34 million in funding for Russia's plutonium disposition program in FY2003, but there will be a total of $98 million available for spending because of a $64 million carryover from FY2002. The funding will go towards re-fitting VVER-1000 and BN-600 reactors for mixed-oxide fueling, experiments with MOX fuel, and the design of an industrial-scale MOX fuel fabrication facility. However, the specific direction of the Russian program may change, as US officials meet with Russian representatives to discuss recommendations from the US Security Council Review to abandon using MOX fuel in VVER-1000 reactors and use it only in the Russian fast reactors BN-600 and BOR-60. The rest of the manufactured MOX fuel would be exported. Minatom supports the recommended changes, since Russia had only agreed to the original plan for using MOX in VVER-1000 reactors along with fast reactors because of strong pressure from the United States.
["Russian Pu Disposition Proposed for Boost in FY03 Budget Request", Post-Soviet Nuclear & Defense Monitor, Vol. 6, No. 4, February 12, 2002, p. 8.] {Entered 3/20/02 TH}
 
1/23/2002: US PLANS TO USE MOX FUEL FOR DISPOSITION OF PLUTONIUM UNDER AGREEMENT WITH RUSSIA
The United States will dispose of all 34t of its surplus weapons-grade plutonium by converting it into MOX fuel, according to US Energy Secretary Spencer Abraham.  His announcement formally cancels the immobilization option for the disposal of U.S. plutonium included in the September 2000 US-Russia agreement on plutonium disposition. The Department of Energy (DOE) reported that canceling the immobilization option will save the United States $2 billion in total program costs and accelerate the closure of former nuclear weapons complex sites.[1] The US program will cost $3.85 billion and will take 20 years.[2] The decision to abandon the immobilization option and concentrate solely on the MOX fuel irradiation came as a result of a review by the DOE of 40 different alternatives.[1]
Sources:
[1] "U.S. Will Dispose of Surplus Plutonium Inventory In MOX Fuel, Save $2 Billion in Disposition Costs," SpentFuel, Vol. 8, No. 391, 28 January 2002, pp. 1-2.
[2] "Immobilization Eliminated from U.S. Plutonium Disposition Program; U.S.-Supported Russian Program Could Include Export of Russian MOX," Nuclear Weapons & Materials Monitor, Vol. 6, No. 3, 28 January 2002, pp.1-2. {Entered 2/3/02 TH}

1/15/2002: JOINT STUDY SAYS USING RUSSIAN AND FOREIGN REACTORS INCREASES COST OF RUSSIAN PU DISPOSITION
According to a recent cost analysis by the Joint US-Russian Work Group on Cost Analysis and Economics in Plutonium Disposition, doubling the disposition rate from the initially proposed level of 2t per year to 4t by using foreign light-water reactors (LWR) in conjunction with Russian VVER-1000, BN-600, and BOR-60 reactors to burn Russian MOX fuel would increase the costs of plutonium disposition in Russia by $500 million above the initial estimate of $1.7 billion.  An alternative scenario that utilizes more Russian VVER-1000 reactors would add only $61 million to project costs and accelerate disposition completion by five to six years. In addition to the domestic burning of MOX and combined domestic and foreign MOX disposition scenarios, an export-only option is being considered that would have all Russian MOX fuel fabricated from weapons-grade plutonium burned in foreign LWRs. The export-only version is linked with leasing Russian MOX fuel to foreign countries with subsequent take-back, storage, and reprocessing of spent fuel.
["Using MOX in Russian and Foreign Plants Debunked by New Analysis," Post-Soviet Nuclear & Defense Monitor, Vol. 6, No. 1&2, 15 January 2002, pp. 18-19.] {Entered 4/26/02 TH}
 
12/2001: US ADMINISTRATION CONFIRMS COMMITMENT TO PLUTONIUM DISPOSITION PROGRAM
In late December 2001, the Bush administration completed its review of 30 nonproliferation programs with Russia, concluding that most programs are working well, but still need to reduce costs and streamline operations. In particular, the review emphasizes the need for the current plutonium disposition program in Russia to be less costly and more efficient. The review also reaffirmed the administration's commitment to the September 2000 agreement between the United States and Russia to each dispose of 34t of excess weapons plutonium.
["U.S. Affirms Commitment to Disposition, Explores Alternate Approaches to Russian Program," SpentFuel, Vol. 8, No. 388, 7 January 2002, pp. 3-4.] {Entered 2/3/02 TH}
 
11/2001: MINATOM DEFENDS USE OF BN-600 REACTOR FOR PLUTONIUM DISPOSITION AND IS READY TO FOREGO LIGHT-WATER REACTORS
Minatom stands firm on burning MOX fuel in the BN-600 fast neutron reactor, but is ready to drop the VVER-1000 reactors option. First Deputy Minister of Atomic Energy Valentin Ivanov informed Ed Siskin, assistant deputy administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration Office of Fissile Material Disposition, of this position during the latter's visit to Moscow in late November 2001. The proposal to forego the use of light-water reactors for burning MOX fuel was introduced during the review of the Russian Plutonium Disposition Program by the National Security Council. Russia considers burning MOX fuel in light water reactors less effective than in fast neutron reactors. Ivanov noted that Russia wants to keep the fast reactor option for plutonium disposition. Excluding the BN-600 reactor from the plutonium disposition program would negatively affect employment in the Russian nuclear sector. According to Ivanov, manufacturing of MOX fuel for VVER-1000 reactors and for the BN-600 reactor requires different production lines. Therefore, if the VVER-1000 option is abandoned, the Russian plutonium disposition program will no longer need the equipment from Siemens' MOX fuel manufacturing facility at Hanau, which will decrease program costs.
["Minatom flexible on burning MOX in LWR's as part of Pu Disposition," Post-Soviet Nuclear & Defense Monitor, 11 December 2001, p. 7.] {Entered 8/1/02 DA}
 
8/2001: SIEMENS NO LONGER FEELS OBLIGED TO MAINTAIN ITS MOX PLANT FOR EXPORT TO RUSSIA
Siemens management announced in early August 2001 that the company plans to stop maintaining its unused MOX fuel manufacturing facility at Hanau, Germany, and either sell or scrap its equipment. The facility's equipment, according to a preliminary agreement between the G-8 states and Russia, was intended for sale to Russia in order to construct industrial-scale MOX fuel manufacturing facilities that would use weapons-grade plutonium slated for disposition under the US-Russia plutonium disposition program. Siemens says that its decision is prompted by the lack of commitment to the plutonium disposition program from the G-8 countries and by their failure to secure financial resources for its implementation at the G-8 summit in Genoa in July 2001.[1,2] For more details on this decision by Siemens, see the 8/2001 entry in the MOX Fuel Developments section of the database. 
Sources:
[1] Mark Hibbs, "Berlin, Industry Now Anticipate Hanau MOX Plant Will Be Scuttled," NuclearFuel, Vol. 26, No. 17, 20 August 2001.
[2] Mark Hibbs, "Siemens Wants Hanau Site Evacuated by Next October," NuclearFuel, Vol. 26, No. 18, 3 September 2001. {Entered 10/29/01 ES}
 
7/23/2001: US NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL SUGGESTS REVISING THE US-RUSSIAN PLUTONIUM DISPOSITION EFFORT
According to an article in the Nuclear Weapons & Materials Monitor, the US National Security Council (NSC) has completed its review of US nonproliferation programs in Russia and recommended a major revision of the plutonium disposition program. The review argues that the projected costs for building MOX fuel fabrication facilities in Russia and modifying VVER-1000 rectors to burn this fuel are too high and most likely would increase over time; in addition it will take too long--17 years or more--to actually accomplish the disposition of 34 metric tons (t) of plutonium. The review suggests concentrating on developing advanced reactor technologies that would be capable of burning higher quantities of plutonium in the same, or an even shorter, time frame. This approach has long been advocated by the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy. Among the advanced reactor technology options is the further development of the Gas Turbine-Modular Helium Reactor (GT-MHR). Research and development of the GT-MHR, capable of burning weapons-grade plutonium to produce electricity, is being conducted by US, Russian, French, and Japanese experts. The review suggests that a demonstration model of the GT-MHR could be in operation by 2006 or 2007 and by 2010 the reactor could start burning 1t of plutonium and producing 1,100MW of power annually. Other advanced reactor technologies under consideration include technologies using different fuel cycles, including the thorium cycle, and breeder reactor technologies. The accompanying committee report advises "taking full advantage" of GT-MHR technology, hinting that this option is preferable. The just-adopted US Senate Energy and Water Appropriation bill has already provided $10 million for the joint GT-MHR project, and it conforms to the NSC recommendations. The new approach to plutonium disposition in Russia, if selected by the US government, will still demand international financial support, as the overall costs to implement the GT-MHR option could be between $2 billion to $3 billion. However, this path could have additional benefits in terms of safer, proliferation-resistant technology and full burn-up of plutonium. The overarching recommendation of the review is to take a comprehensive approach to plutonium disposition in Russia that should also tackle existing concerns in US-Russia nonproliferation cooperation, including the shut-down of plutonium production reactors, the moratorium on separating civil plutonium, voluntary IAEA safeguards for the Mayak fissile material storage facility, stopping production of plutonium in civil reactors by using new fuels or advanced reactors, and other related issues. 
["National Security Review suggests Adopting Initial Russian-Preferred Option for Pu Disposition," Nuclear Weapons & Materials Monitor, Vol. 5, No. 15, 23 July 2001, pp. 1-4.] {Entered 7/26/2001 ES}
 
7/18/2001: RUSSIAN PLUTONIUM DISPOSITION PROGRAM REMOVED FROM G-8 SUMMIT AGENDA
Vremya Novostey reports that on 18 July 2001, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the G-8 countries at their meeting in Rome decided not to include the issue of financial and organizational support for the plutonium disposition program in Russia in the final agenda of the G-8 summit in Genoa. The major reason for this move, according to the article, is the failure of Western countries to pledge sufficient funds for the program, even though the official explanation says that "the issue was not thoroughly worked through." The article cites a Reuters report that the United States is already considering "a cheaper option to secure Russian plutonium."
[Yekaterina Kats, "Ne soshlis v tsene," Vremya novostey; in Integrum Techno, http://www.integrum.ru] {Entered 7/26/2001 ES}
 
7/10/2001: RUSSIA MOVES FORWARD WITH RATIFICATION OF US-RUSSIA PLUTONIUM DISPOSITION AGREEMENT
On 11 May 2001 the Russian government approved a draft federal law on ratification of the US-Russia Plutonium Disposition Agreement.[1] Two months later, on 10 July, the State Duma's Foreign Affairs Committee prepared the agreement for ratification.[2] Ratification by the Duma is required because tax and customs exemptions stipulated in the agreement are in conflict with current Russian legislation. US and international funding for the plutonium disposition program in Russia is also contingent upon ratification of the agreement. The Ministry of Atomic Energy says that program implementation can begin just as soon as the agreement is ratified. However, according to an article in Vremya novostey, some Russian experts argue that the future of the agreement also depends on the new US administration's policy with regard to plutonium disposition and its willingness to finance the program.[1] According to First Deputy Minister of Atomic Energy Valentin Ivanov, the agreement is advantageous for Russia because, in the process of disposing of 34t of weapons-grade plutonium, at least 1,000 jobs should be created and a great deal of electricity will be produced.[3] 
Sources:
[1] Olga Antonova, "Plutoniy mozhno budet utilizirovat," Vremya novostey, 14 May 2001; in Integrum Techno, http://www.integrum.ru.
[2] "Soglasheniye mezhdu pravitelstvami Rossii i SShA ob utilizatsii plutoniya vynositsya na ratifikatsiyu," RiA-Novosti, 10 July 2001; in Minatom press digest, http://www.minatom.ru.
[3]  TV RTR, 6 February 2001; in "Russian Minister says plutonium recycling advantageous," FBIS Document CEP20010208000180. {Entered 8/20/2001 RA} {revised 9/26/2001 lgm}
 
6/4/2001: WORKING GROUP RELEASES NEW COST ANALYSIS FOR RUSSIAN PLUTONIUM DISPOSITION PROGRAM
The Joint US-Russian Working Group on Cost Analysis and Economics in Plutonium Disposition revised its previous estimates of costs for Russia to burn 34t of weapons-grade plutonium at a rate of 2t per year in existing Russian nuclear power plants to at least $1.8 billion (2000 dollars), Nuclear Weapons and Materials Monitor reported on 4 June 2001. According to the review, the project would cost at least $100 million more than the $1.7 billion estimate given in an April 2000 preliminary analysis. The actual operating costs could reach $2.8 billion, after accounting for inflation, cost overruns, and additional costs for monitoring and inspection of the disposition program and managing the funding program. The revised analysis incorporates some different assumptions than the preliminary analysis. The front-end costs of the disposition program are now estimated at 60% of the total lifetime costs, instead of the 33% estimated by the preliminary analysis. The revised analysis estimates a burn-up rate utility for one-third core loading of MOX, as opposed to the 40% loading factor previously estimated.
["Revised Analysis Raises Russia PU Disposition Costs to $2 Billion Plus," Nuclear Weapons and Materials Monitor, 4 June 2001, pp. 3-4] {Entered 1/24/2002 EC}
 
4/16/2001: DEPUTY MINISTER OF ATOMIC ENERGY HINTS THAT PLUTONIUM DISPOSITION AGREEMENT MAY BE REVISED IF INTERNATIONAL FUNDING IS SHORT
At a press conference on 16 April 2001 First Deputy Minister of Atomic Energy Valentin Ivanov said that Russia needs approximately $2 billion to implement the plutonium disposition program outlined in the September 2000 US-Russia Plutonium Disposition Agreement. These funds will be used to construct and operate "two facilities to process weapons-grade plutonium and one waste storage facility." Ivanov claimed that to date only $600 million were pledged by France, the United Kingdom, and Japan for plutonium disposition in Russia, significantly less than Russia anticipated. Ivanov also stated that if additional funds are not made available by April 2002, as stipulated in the Agreement, the United States and Russia would reexamine the program.[1] According to an anonymous Minatom official, cited by the newspaper Vedomosti on the day after the Ivanov's press conference, if Western countries do not collect the necessary funds, Russia will renounce the Agreement. The same source speculated that Russia would agree to only $1 billion in funding if it is allowed to export MOX fuel to use in foreign nuclear power plants.[2] On 8 February 2001, Ivanov himself made similar statements regarding possibly backing out of the US-Russia Plutonium Disposition Agreement.[3]
Sources:
[1] "Moskva: Zamglavy Minatoma RF: Na realizatsiyu programmu pererabotki oruzheynogo plutoniya Rossii potrebuetsya primerno 2 mlrd doll.," RosBiznesKonsulting, 16 April 2000; in Minatom press digest,  http://www.minatom.ru.
[2] "Biznes na plutonii khochet sdelat Minatom, grozya otkazom ot razoruzheniya," Vedomosti, 17 April 2001; in Minatom press digest, http://www.minatom.ru. 
[3] "Russia will not sell weapons-grade plutonium," Strana.ru Web Site, http://www.strana.ru, 8 February 2001. {Entered 4/23/2001 ES}
  
3/9/2001: G-8 MEETS TO DISCUSS FUTURE OF RUSSIAN PLUTONIUM DISPOSITION
During a meeting held in Brussels on 9 March 2001, G-8 officials working on plutonium disposition issues determined that funding for Russia's MOX fuel production plan was well short of the approximately $1 billion necessary to implement the project.  However, the officials did confirm that technical hurdles inherent in making MOX fuel from weapons-grade plutonium were being overcome.  The United States, France, and the United Kingdom have already pledged financial support for the program.  The G-8 has a self-imposed deadline of July 2001 to create a final financing plan for the project.  Several options to fund the project's operational stage are being explored by the group.  One of them, the so-called "western option," would have western reactors burn Russian MOX fuel and includes a plan in which Russia would form a partnership with one or more western companies to sell increased quantities of low-enriched uranium on world markets.  The French government remains skeptical of the western option since it skews the original focus of Russia's MOX program to burn Russian-made MOX fuel in Russian nuclear reactors.  France's concern is that the western option would essentially provide funds to a new competitor in the nuclear fuel world market.
["G-8 Financing Uncertainties Shadow Progress on Russian Pu Disposition," Nuclear Fuel, Vol. 26, No. 6, 19 March 2001, Platts Global Energy Homepage.]  {Entered 3/28/01 GD}
 
1/2001: MINATOM CONSIDERING CREATION OF SEPARATE AGENCY TO OVERSEE MOX FUEL
For more information, see the 1/2001 entry in Russia: MOX Fuel Developments.
[Yekaterina Kats, "International Dis-Agreements," Segodnya, 12 January 2001; in "RF Atomic Energy Ministry's Plans To Set Up Special MOX Department Viewed," FBIS Document CEP20010112000178.]  {Entered 3/28/01 GD}
 
11/10/2000: PUTIN'S PLAN FOR PLUTONIUM AND HEU DISPOSITION CONSIDERED BY IAEA DIRECTOR GENERAL
While meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow, IAEA Director General Mohamed El-Baradei stated that President Putin's proposal for discontinuing the use of weapons-grade nuclear material in commercial nuclear reactors by developing a proliferation-resistant reactor was interesting and "constructive."[1,2]  Putin originally proposed the plan in September 2000 in New York at the Millennium Summit (for more information, see the 9/6/2000 entry below). El-Baradei said the IAEA will support Russia's plan to develop the new reactor by investing approximately $2 million in fundamental research during the next three to five years.[2] The reactor would be safer and more reliable than current reactors and would allow repeated use of the same nuclear fuel as opposed to reloading it with fresh fuel. El-Baradei confirmed the assumptions of nuclear experts who say that at present this type of reactor exists only theoretically.[3] On 9 November, El-Baradei met with Russian Atomic Energy Minister Yevgeniy Adamov, at which time the two discussed Putin's proposal and funding for it. El-Baradei proposed that experts from Russia and the IAEA should meet in Vienna at the end of November to further discuss the Russian proposal.[2,4]
Sources:
[1] "IAEA Director General Supports Putin's Initiative," Interfax, 10 November 2000.
[2] Ana Uzelac, "IAEA Backs Controversial Neutron Reactor Plan," Moscow Times, 11 November 2000.
[3] Yekaterina Kats, "V poiskakh sponsora: MAGATE predlozhili oplatit yadernyye initsiativy Rossii,"  Segodnya, 11 November, 2000. 
[4] Petr Netreba, "We may not need to monitor atomic power," Kommersant, 10 November 2000; in "Atomic Energy Minister Adamov Lobbies IAEA Chief, Putin's Proposals are 'real gift to the world community', Importance of Power Engineering Focus Cited," FBIS Document CEP20001110000157. {Entered 11/20/2000 GD}
 
10/16/2000: INTERNATIONAL FUNDING FOR RUSSIAN PU DISPOSITION STILL SHORT OF MARK
The 16 October 2000 issue of NuclearFuel reported that, as discussed at the Belgian Nuclear Society's Plutonium 2000 Conference, international funding pledged for plutonium disposition in Russia to date falls far short of the estimated $1.8 billion Russia claims to be required for the project. The US Congress has already approved the first $200 million "down payment," and the US government has committed to another $200 million by 2004. The UK government made a commitment to provide 70 million pounds, or $100 million, for Pu disposition over the next 10 years. Japan earlier pledged $34 million for the use of MOX fuel in fast reactors in Russia. France will contribute Ffr450 million (about $60 million) over the next decade. Thus, the contribution from the international community will total about $600 million over 10 years, one-third of the estimated program cost. The Russian government's contribution to the project, according to First Deputy Minister of Atomic Energy Valentin Ivanov, is calculated at some $600 million, of which $100 million will be used for infrastructure, $350-450 million for the "potential difference between current uranium prices and those in 2020," and $60 million for the "loss of profits" at uranium fuel fabrication facilities.
["Russian Pu Disposition Fund Growing, but Still Short of Mark," NuclearFuel, Vol. 25, No. 21, 16 October 2000.] {Entered 11/21/00 OC}
 
9/20/2000: ADAMOV SAYS PLUTONIUM DISPOSITION COULD SLOW DOWN
On 20 September 2000 at the IAEA annual conference in Vienna, Russian Minister of Atomic Energy Yevgeniy Adamov warned that Russia's implementation of the US-Russia Plutonium Disposition Agreement may be slowed, because current Russian reactors cannot use mixed oxide (MOX) fuel. The required modification to Russia's nuclear power reactors will increase the cost of the plutonium disposition program in Russia to $2.5 billion. To avoid the high cost of using MOX fuel in domestic reactors, Russia is considering selling MOX fuel to other countries licensed to use the fuel. This would reduce the program costs and allow Russia to adhere to the deadlines outlined in the Plutonium Disposition Agreement.
["Moscow Says Plutonium Destruction Costs Could Soar," RFE\RL Newsline, 21 September 2000.] {entered 9/25/00 DK}
 
9/6/2000: AT UN SUMMIT, PUTIN PROPOSES DISPOSING OF PLUTONIUM AND HEU 
Speaking on 6 September 2000 at the UN Millennium Summit, Russian President Vladimir Putin proposed an initiative seeking to achieve three goals: to ensure sustainable energy supplies, to put an end to nuclear proliferation, and to improve the global environment. The plan is to be achieved by gradually excluding highly enriched uranium and plutonium from nuclear power generation. It is also expected to help eliminate stockpiles of plutonium from reprocessed spent nuclear fuel. The plan proposes developing technology to burn weapons-grade fissile materials, thus eliminating these materials in the long run. It is presumed that a reactor required for the purpose will be "a fast neutron reactor without a uranium blanket and using nuclear fuel of equilibrium composition which will be reprocessed after in-pile irradiation without having separated the pure plutonium." Minatom suggested that the BREST reactor could serve as a prototype of the new reactor.[2] This proposal is founded on closed nuclear cycle technology favored by Minatom. According to Putin's initiative, this would also allow the resolution of environmental problems associated with radioactive waste, as the waste remaining after the continuous burn-up of nuclear fuel in the proposed reactor would have a radioactivity level similar to the background radiation level. This project will require large-scale funding, and Russia has called for broad international cooperation and participation in the project under the auspices of the IAEA.[1] 
Sources:
[1] "Prezident RF vystupil s initsiativoy v sfere mirovoy energetiki, resheniya problem nerasprostraneniya yadernogo oruzhiya, ekologii," Interfax, No.4, 6 September 2000
[2] Roland Timerbayev, Dmitry Kovchegin, "Putin's Initiative at the UN Millennium Summit," Yaderny Kontrol Digest, Vol. 6, No. 1, Winter 2001, pp. 35-38. {Entered 3/13/2001 OC}
 
9/1/2000: GORE AND KASYANOV SIGN PLUTONIUM DISPOSITION AGREEMENT
On 1 September  2000, US Vice President Al Gore and Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov signed the US-Russian plutonium disposition agreement announced at the 4 June 2000 Moscow Summit. (For a summary of the agreement, see the entry for 6/4/00 below. Copies of the full text of the Plutonium Disposition Agreement, a White House Fact Sheet and the US-Russia Joint Statement are available in the Full-Text Documents section.)
[Office of the Vice President, "Vice President Al Gore Signs U.S.-Russia Plutonium Disposition Agreement," 1 September 2000.]{entered 9/21/00 DK}
 
7/21/2000: G-8 SUMMIT CALLS FOR PLUTONIUM DISPOSITION FINANCING
On 21 July 2000 at its summit in Okinawa, the G-8 called for the development of an international financing plan for the Plutonium Disposition Agreement that US President Bill Clinton and Russian President Vladimir Putin announced in June 2000. Plans call for industrial-scale facilities capable of a disposition rate of at least 2MT of weapons-grade plutonium per year to become operational in both the US and Russia by 2007. The financing plan, to be developed by the next G-8 summit (scheduled to be held in Genoa in 2001) will address the estimated cost of $1.7-1.9 billion over a minimum of 20 years for Russia to dispose of at least 34MT of plutonium.  The US Congress has appropriated more than $200 million for cooperation with Russia's disposition program, and the Clinton administration will request another $200 million in funding for 2001.
[Office of the White House Press Secretary, "Fact Sheet on the Disposition of United States and Russian Federation Weapons-Grade Plutonium," 21 July 2000.]{entered 8/3/00 FW}
 
6/4/00: CLINTON AND PUTIN ANNOUNCE PLUTONIUM DISPOSITION AGREEMENT
On 4 June 2000, US President Bill Clinton and Russian President Vladimir Putin announced the completion of an agreement for disposition of 68MT of weapons-grade plutonium. Each side agreed to dispose of 34MT of plutonium by either fabricating it into MOX fuel and burning it in reactors or immobilizing it in high-level radioactive waste for geologic disposal.  Russia intends to burn all 34MT as fuel, while the US plans to use 25.5MT as fuel and immobilize 8.5MT.  Both parties also agreed to begin operating industrial-scale facilities for converting and fabricating the plutonium into fuel by 2007.[1,2] Management and disposition of the plutonium will be monitored by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) after appropriate agreements with the Vienna-based agency are concluded.[2] The projected cost of the US disposition program is $4 billion over 20 years; the Russian disposition program will cost an estimated $1.7 billion, and the agreement recognizes the need for international financing to allow Russia to fulfill the terms of the agreement. Financing of the Russian program will be discussed at the G-8 Summit in Okinawa scheduled for July 2000.[1] US Vice-President Al Gore and Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov will officially sign the agreement at their next meeting.[2] (Copies of the US-Russia Joint Statement on plutonium disposition agreement and a White House Fact Sheet are available in the Full-Text section.)
Sources:
[1] Office of the White House Press Secretary, "Fact Sheet:  United States-Russian Federation Plutonium Disposition Agreement," http://www.whitehouse.gov, 4 June 2000.
[2] Office of the White House Press Secretary, "Joint Statement Concerning Management and Disposition of Weapon-Grade Plutonium Designated as No Longer Required For Defense Purposes and Related Cooperation," http://www.whitehouse.gov, 4 June 2000.{entered 6/8/00 FW}
 
9/2/99: CANADIAN PLAN PROGRESSES
On 2 September 1999, federal officials in Ottawa announced that Canada will begin testing MOX fuel produced from Rusian and US warhead plutonium at Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd.'s Chalk River laboratory by the end of 1999. Elaborate security precautions will be taken during the test. (For more information see the entry for 6/99, below.)
["Canada to test nuclear fuel derived from warheads," The Canadian Press; in News Cafe, Canada.com, 2 September 1999.] {Entered 9/14/99 VT}
 
6/99: RUSSIA AND UNITED STATES MAY ORGANIZE HEU-PU SWAP
According to NuclearFuel, some Russian and US officials are discussing the possibilities of using $200 million appropriated for plutonium disposition in Russia to pay Russia for blending down more HEU into LEU. The resulting US-owned LEU would then be exchanged for an equivalent amount of weapons plutonium, which will be controlled by the United States. This plutonium would consequently be burned as MOX fuel. This swap is designed to help USEC reduce its costs resulting from the US-Russia HEU Deal by several dollars per SWU, and "strengthen the overall fabric" of US-Russian nuclear relations.
[Michael Knapik, "Some In U.S., Russia Looking at Swap of Downblended HEU for Weapons Pu," NuclearFuel, Vol. 24, No. 13, 28 June 1999, pp. 15-16.] {Entered 8/10/99 VT}
 
6/99: RUSSIA, FRANCE AND GERMANY TO COOPERATE ON PU CONVERSION AND MOX FUEL FABRICATION
By 2000, Cogema of France, the French Atomic Energy Commission (CEA), Siemens of Germany, and the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy (Minatom) are to complete design studies and decide whether to construct a plutonium conversion facility (Chemox) and MOX fuel fabrication facility (Demox). According to Eric Proust of CEA, the French and German governments have agreed to provide a total of $12 million to support the design stage of the project. It has been proposed that Siemens supply Russia with hardware for the Demox facility from Germany's never-completed Hanau plant. According to First Deputy Minister of Atomic Energy Valentin Ivanov, Germany may send Russia 80 percent of that facility's equipment, with Russia to supply the remaining equipment. Proust said Italy has decided to join the group, and Belgium has also expressed interest in participating.
["France, Germany, Japan Already Providing Resources to Russia," Nuclear Weapons & Materials Monitor, Vol. 3, No. 3, 21 June 1999, p. 12.] {Entered 8/19/99 VT}
 
6/99: CANADA, USA AND RUSSIA TO COOPERATE ON BURN-UP OF RUSSIAN WEAPONS PU IN CANDU REACTOR
According to an unnamed senior member of the Chalk River research facility of the Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. (AECL) in Ontario, plutonium from dismantled Russian nuclear weapons will be fabricated into MOX fuel pins by the end of June 1999.  Russia and the United States will supply fuel pins containing a total of 120g of plutonium to Canada, where they will be fabricated into a single fuel bundle and irradiated.[1] Russian fuel is expected to arrive by ship at Cornwall, Ont., while US fuel will be shipped by truck through Sault Ste. Marie, Ont.[2]  The feasibility of using MOX fuel obtained from weapons grade plutonium is being studied under the Canadian Parallex research program.  The program is running behind schedule because of delays in fabricating the Russian plutonium fuel pins and securing export permits for shipping the fabricated fuel pins from Russia to Canada.  Also, the type of reactor to be used in the program has not yet been decided upon because Ontario Power Generation (OPG), formerly known as Ontario Hydro, had earlier proposed using its Bruce A Reactors, which are now no longer in service. The United States wants to coordinate its exports with Russia to avoid forcing Russia to wait for the time-consuming environmental certification required for the export of the US fuel pins.[1]
Sources:
[1]"Canadian Plan to Burn Russian Weapons Plutonium Progresses," Nuclear Weapons & Materials Monitor, Vol. 3, No. 13, 21 June 1999, p. 14.
[2]"Canada to test nuclear fuel derived from warheads," The Canadian Press; in News Cafe, Canada.com, 2 September 1999. {Entered 9/9/99 VT}
 
6/99: IVANOV ON PU DISPOSITION IN RUSSIA
First Deputy Minister of Atomic Energy for Radiochemistry Dr. Valentin Ivanov commented in an interview on the present and future of plutonium disposition in Russia. According to Ivanov, the Russian government wishes to dispose of its declared amount of excess plutonium as quickly as possible. Russia will declare 34MT (not 50MT as was previously negotiated) of excess weapons-grade plutonium, because the United States has declared the same quantity. Ivanov said it would be possible to burn up to 5MT of the declared plutonium a year: 2MT in the BN-800 reactor once it is built, 1MT in the BN-600, and 2MT in several VVER-1000 reactors. However, Ivanov stated that there is a 90 percent probability that the BN-600 reactor will burn only 300kg/year, and the VVER-1000 reactors are not yet licensed to use MOX fuel. Ivanov mentioned that the BN-600 reactor will work 10 to 15 more years, while the BN-800 reactor may be completed in eight to 10 years. According to Ivanov, Russia is currently irradiating 50kg in the BOR-60 reactor in Dimitrovgrad, and is planning to start MOX fuel burn-up in 2007. Speaking about other issues, Ivanov said Russia is interested in constructing a large international storage site for spent fuel for "very long-term storage" on Russian territory. Ivanov also mentioned that Russia has problems with low level radioactive waste (LLRW), but said that several sites, including "Novaya Zemlya, the Federal Islands, and underground test sites," could be used as LLRW storage sites.
["On Plutonium Disposition in Russia: Minatom's Valentin Ivanov," Nuclear Weapons & Materials Monitor, Vol. 3, No. 13, 21 June 1999, pp. 22-24.] {Entered 8/12/99 VT}
 
6/99: RUSSIA AND USA TO SIGN PU DISPOSITION PACT IN SEPTEMBER
Mike Guhin, US Department of State lead negotiator for plutonium disposition, announced at the Sixth International Policy Forum on the Disposition of Plutonium and HEU that a US-Russia agreement on plutonium disposition is expected to be signed in September 1999. The signing must be timed with the beginning of FY 2000 to "provide Congress with concrete evidence of progress to ensure approval of program funds for FY 2000."  The agreement will include mutual obligations, the establishment of technical criteria for disposition, timetables and goals of disposing of at least two tons of weapons-grade plutonium per year, the prohibition of any military reuse of plutonium, the prohibition of exporting plutonium as MOX fuel without the approval of the other side, and a verification and transparency regime. By 2000, there are plans to develop a strategy for disposition of no less than five tons of plutonium a year.  Completion of an agreement to support Russia's disposition efforts is expected before the summer 2000 G-8 meeting.
["U.S.-Russia Plutonium Pact Targeted for September Signing," Nuclear Weapons & Materials Monitor, Vol. 3, No. 13, 21 June 1999, p. 2.] {Entered 8/11/99 VT}
 
5/18/99: JAPAN AND RUSSIA TO COOPERATE ON PU CONVERSION RESEARCH
On 18 May 1999, the All-Russian Scientific and Research Institute of Atomic Reactors (SRIAR) and the Japan Nuclear Cycle Development Institute (JNC) signed a five-year contract on joint research on the conversion of excess weapons-grade plutonium into MOX fuel. By 2003, about 20kg of plutonium will be used in this research. Russia will produce MOX fuel using its vibration compaction technology and burn it in the BN-600 fast-breeder reactor. Then the efficiency of this method of plutonium disposition will be tested in post-irradiation experiments.[1] Japan will invest about $1.7 million into the implementation of this contract, and send experts to Russia.[2,3] Both countries will own the results of this research. The further development of this technology will make possible the disposition of 1.3MT of plutonium per year.[3] According to Nihon Keizai, Japan and Russia, in partnership with France, will conduct a feasibility study for the construction of a MOX fuel burning reactor.[4]
Sources:
[1] "Joint Russian-Japanese Research for Disposition of Excess Plutonium from Nuclear Dismantlement: JNC-Russian Research Institute Contract to Burn About 20kg in Fast-breeder Reactor," Genshiryoku Sangyo Shimbun, 27 May 1999, p. 1.
[2] Anatoliy Krasnov, ITAR-TASS, 19 May 1999; in "Russia, Japan Sign Accord on Weapons-Grade Plutonium," FBIS Document FTS19990519001527.
[3] Andrey Ilyashenko, RIA Novosti, 18 May 1999; in "Russia, Japan To Use Weapons-Grade Plutonium For Power," FBIS Document FTS19990518000294.
[4] "France, Japan and Russia Co-operate on 'breeder'," Bellona Nuclear Chronicle From Russia, April/May 1999, p. 10. {Entered 6/22/99 VT}
 
4/3/99: JAPAN WANTS TO HELP RUSSIA REPROCESS ITS WEAPONS-GRADE  PLUTONIUM
According to Mr. Yamato, a member of the Japan Nuclear Cycle Development Institute (JNC) board of directors, and Mr. Tsutomu Imamura, deputy director general of the Science and Technology Agency (STA), Japan and Russia are in the process of concluding an agreement on disposition of plutonium from dismantled nuclear weapons.[1] According to the 3 April 1999 issue of Nihon Keizai Shimbun, the STA has already sent the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy a plan for cooperation in carrying out this agreement.[2] Under the agreement, the JNC will assist Russia in remodeling the core of the BN-600 fast breeder reactor (FBR) at the Beloyarsk NPP so that it can be loaded with mixed oxide (MOX) fuel.[1,2] The primary objective is to help Russia burn a total of 20 MT of excess plutonium in the BN-600 reactor by 2020 and reduce the proliferation risk by converting weapons-grade plutonium removed from dismantled Russian nuclear weapons into fuel for nuclear power stations.[1,3] The first stage of the conversion requires the All-Russian Scientific and Research Institute of Atomic Reactors (SRIAR) in Dimitrovgrad to increase its annual manufacturing capacity four to five times in order to process weapons-grade plutonium into enough MOX fuel, using vibration packing technology. By 2002, the second stage of the project, converting 20 percent of the BN-600 core to use MOX fuel, will be completed. At that point, the reactor will burn 0.3 MT of plutonium annually.[4] In the last stage, the entire core will be converted to use MOX fuel. When this process is finished, 1.3 MT of plutonium will be burned per year.[1] Japan is also interested in acquiring the technology for this "advanced recycling system." According to Anatoliy Zrodonikov, Director of the Obninsk Institute of Physics and Power Engineering (IPPE), JNC will conduct joint research with IPPE on the vibration packing processing technology.[4]
Sources:
[1]"JNC to Help Dispose of Pu from Dismantled Russian Weapons," Atoms in Japan, April 1999, p. 10.
[2] "Japan Offers Russia Plutonium Recycling Project," BBC Soviet Union Economic, 5 April 1999; in Inquisit Agent Report, http://www.inquisit.com/.
[3] Vladimir Solntsev, "Russia, Japan to research into reprocessing plutonium," ITAR-TASS, 5 February 1999; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, http://web.lexis-nexis.com/.
[4] Nikkan Kogyo Shimbun, 24 February 1999; in "STA To Help Russia Process 0.3 Ton of Plutonium Annually," FBIS Document FTS 19990316001878. {Entered 5/24/99 VT}
 
9/11/98: RUSSIA TO INCLUDE EXCESS MILITARY PLUTONIUM IN NUCLEAR POWER FUEL CYCLE
On 11 September 1998, in a letter to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Mikhail Ryzhov, Governor of the Russian Federation in the IAEA Board of Governors, Chairman of Committee of International Relations of the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy, wrote that Russia's strategy for the use of plutonium stocks incorporates the use of excess military plutonium in the form of MOX fuel in the overall nuclear power fuel cycle. According to Ryzhov, Russia's nuclear fuel strategy is based on the concept of the closed fuel cycle. He also said that Russia's ultimate goal was to utilize plutonium's energy potential and completely convert waste and residues to a state unusable for military purposes and secure for environmental isolation. Ryzhov confirmed Russia's policy of compliance with international treaties and participation in international cooperation on problems of plutonium disposition.
["Communication Received From Certain Member States Concerning Their Policies Regarding the Management of Plutonium," IAEA Information Circular, INFCIRC/549/Add.9, 11 November 1998.] {Entered 6/22/99 VT}
 
9/7/98:  QUESTIONS ARISE ON FEASIBILITY OF US-RUSSIA PLUTONIUM AGREEMENT
Both Russian and US specialists are questioning the feasibility of the agreement on plutonium disposition signed by President Yeltsin and President Clinton on 2 September 1998, calling it a "face-saving document" that was the only achievement of Clinton's visit to Moscow.  While the agreement has its supporters in industry and government, even they acknowledge that a lack of funding continues to hamper the progress of the program.  Estimates for the cost of the program are in the range of hundreds of millions of dollars.  Felix Killar of the Nuclear Energy Institute said that building the facilities to produce the MOX fuel and glass or ceramic logs of plutonium waste would cost a couple hundred million dollars, and that lifetime costs for the entire program (20-30 years) could reach the $7-8 billion mark.  But Killar added that given the current crisis, transforming plutonium out of weapons usable form is more urgent than ever.  Japan, France, and Germany have expressed an interest in working with the United States and Russia, but the United States hopes to get other G-8 nations involved also.  Proposals for construction of a MOX factory have been submitted to Russia, but the question of how the proposals would be financed has not been answered.  Senator Domenici (R-NM), who was part of the US delegation in Moscow, sees the agreement as a very "significant achievement."   He hopes to convince other members of Congress that the United States should do something to help the Russians in this area.  Funds have already been allocated for construction of a MOX fuel plant in the United States.  However, there are dissenting opinions regarding the burning of MOX fuel in general.  President of the Nuclear Control Institute Paul Leventhal, who is against the use of plutonium in commercial ventures, feels that the plan to convert excess plutonium into MOX fuel is "sheer folly."  According to Leventhal, the distribution of excess plutonium to reactors in Russia during the current economic breakdown increases the threat of nuclear terrorism.
[Dave Airozo and Sergey Rybak, "Clinton, Yeltsin Agree on Pu Plan, But Where Will the Money Come From?" NuclearFuel, 7 September 1998, pgs. 3-4.]  {Entered 10/19/98 CM}
 
9/3/98:  MORE ON US-RUSSIA PLUTONIUM AGREEMENT
According to the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy, the removal of plutonium (50 metric tons each) from the military programs of Russia and the United States, and its conversion into fuel for nuclear power stations could have a positive economic effect.  The transformation of weapons-grade plutonium to reactor fuel would guarantee fuel supplies for nuclear power plants for many years.  The US-Russian agreement will allow Russia to continue development of technologies for mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel, a uranium-plutonium mixture.  Russia has been cooperating with France, Germany, and the United States in this sphere, and is already manufacturing MOX fuel at an experimental section of the Mayak Production Association in the Chelyabinsk region.
["Russian-U.S. Plutonium Agreement May Have Big Economic Effect," Interfax, 3 September 1998.]  {Entered 10/13/98 CM}
 
9/2/98:  RUSSIAN AND US PRESIDENTS SIGN STATEMENT ON RELEASE OF PLUTONIUM
On 2 September 1998 Russian President Boris Yeltsin and US President Bill Clinton signed the "Joint Statement of Principles For Management and Disposition of Plutonium Designated as No Longer Required for Defense Purposes"(See full text of Statement) providing for the extraction of 50 metric tons of weapons-grade plutonium, by each country, from dismantled nuclear warheads.  Pledging that the plutonium would never again be used in nuclear weapons, the countries plan to use it as fuel for nuclear reactors or mix it with radioactive waste (rendering it unusable) and place it in long term storage.  According to Viktor Mikhailov, Russia's First Deputy Minister of Atomic Energy, it will take 15-20 years to process the 100 metric tons of plutonium, but he feels that this is "the most promising and rational approach" to dealing with weapons grade plutonium.  Russia plans to produce fuel from its 50 metric tons of plutonium, while the United States will produce fuel from 43 metric tons and bury the remaining 7 metric tons as an experiment.  This agreement caps several years of debate on how best to dispose of the weapons-grade plutonium.  Russia had been unwilling to bury the plutonium, as the United States suggested,  because of the high costs associated with its production.  As of September 1998, Russia is cooperating with several other countries on the development of new technology to produce mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel suitable for different types of reactors.[1] (Please see the section on MOX fuel production for more information.)  Meanwhile, Igor Forofontov, coordinator of Greenpeace Russia spoke out against the joint decision.  He noted that Russia is not ready for the safe use of the plutonium.  As of 2 September 1998, Russian reactors have produced an average of two and a half metric tons of plutonium per year, and the amount that can be burned as fuel in one year is 150 kilograms.  In addition, he commented that the signed agreement calls for close cooperation with other countries and the readiness to work with the private sector.  However, the Constitution of the Russian Federation states that questions of nuclear energy are strictly under the jurisdiction of the Russian Federation.[2]
[1] Veronika Romanenkova, ITAR-TASS,  2 September 1998; in "Yeltsin, Clinton Sign Statement on Plutonium Reduction," FBIS-SOV-98-245.
[2] "Grinpis Rossii" kritikuyet sovmestnoye zayavleniye Yeltsina i Klintona o printsipakh utilizatsii oruzheynogo plutoniya," Interfax, 2 September 1998.  {Entered 10/13/98 CM}
 
9/1/98:  RUSSIA AND THE US MOVING TOWARD AGREEMENT ON PLUTONIUM DISPOSITION
In a meeting on 1 September 1998, Acting Russian Minister of Atomic Energy Yevgeniy Adamov and US Secretary of Energy Bill Richardson tried to bring the two countries positions' on the use of weapons-grade plutonium closer together.  The meeting was part of the high level summit taking place between Russia and the United States.  The two officials also discussed problems with cooperation in the area of nuclear power, as well as the economic and technical problems connected with the agreement signed on 18 February 1993 about the transfer of highly enriched uranium from Russia to the United States.
["Rossiya i SShA stremyatsya k sblizheniyu pozitsiy v oblasti strategii obrashcheniya s oruzheynym plutoniyem - press sluzhba Minatoma RF," Interfax, 1 September 1998.]  {Entered 10/20/98 CM}
 
4/1/98: PENA, ADAMOV INITIAL FIRST PLUTONIUM DISPOSITION AGREEMENT
At the Summit of the Eight Energy Ministers in Moscow from 31 March - 1 April 1998, US Secretary of Energy Federico Pena and Russia's Acting Minister of Atomic Energy Yevgeniy Adamov initialed the first bilateral agreement on plutonium disposition.  The agreement covers research and development as well as the construction of a US-supported pit conversion demonstration facility in Dimitrovgrad, Russia.  In addition, reports indicate that the sides have resolved language to allow for tax exempt status for the joint projects.  Presidents Yeltsin and Clinton plan to sign the agreement at the next summit in June, or at the next meeting of the US-Russia Joint Commission on Technical and Environmental Cooperation (formerly called the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission, but now informally called the Gore-Kiriyenko Commission).
["Pena, Adamov Initial First Plutonium Disposition Agreement," Post Soviet Nuclear & Defense Monitor, Vol. 5, No. 7, 13 April 1998, p. 1.]
 
11/97:  ACDA DIRECTOR ON PLUTONIUM DISPOSITION IN RUSSIA
According to US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Director John Holum, Russia and the United States face several challenges before the goal of Article VI of the NPT (elimination of nuclear weapons) is reached.  Russia must guarantee that all current weapons, nuclear facilities, and plutonium stockpiles meet MPC&A requirements.  The Joint US-Russian Plutonium Disposition Study and the Holdren-Velikhov Commission have concluded that Russia and the United States should reduce their plutonium stockpiles to a specific quantity (rather than by an equal amount). The two countries must achieve irreversible dismantlement; finance the project; coordinate the roles of the G-7 plus Russia (the P-8); maintain transparency; and meet nonproliferation objectives. Russia and the United States have taken steps toward achieving this first goal by committing in May 1995 not to re-use excess fissile materials in weapons.  In addition, by signing the Plutonium Production Reactor Agreement in September 1997, the United States and Russia vowed to halt weapons-grade plutonium production by 2000.  This agreement stipulates that Russia's three operating plutonium production reactors will not produce weapons-grade material for arms; the material will instead be placed in monitored, interim storage for later transformation into MOX fuel for nuclear reactors.  The agreement stipulates that the material will be monitored until it reaches MOX facilities, where it would then fall under various international verification measures.  Holum stated that the P-8 would try to make plutonium disposition financially feasible for Russia. Although the independent roles of the P-8 in doing this are not yet defined, France and Germany may build a pilot MOX plant in Russia, Canada is considering using its CANDU reactors to burn MOX fuel from Russia, and Japan has offered to provide technical expertise to Russia.  The third challenge, maintaining transparency in disposition technologies, can be met through secure information-sharing.  Finally, an international effort is needed to ensure that any spent MOX fuel will not be reprocessed to recover plutonium unless excess stocks of plutonium are depleted.  Holum said that the Trilateral Initiative and the Mayak transparency arrangements would also assist the plutonium disposition program.  Holum added that these challenges should be met before both the US and Russian presidential elections of 2000.
[John D. Holum, "Plutonium Disposition--Challenges Facing The Two Governments," US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 4 December 1997.] {Entered 11/9/98 LBN} 
 
6/97:  COMMISSION ISSUES REPORT ON FINANCING PU DISPOSITION
The US-Russian Independent Scientific Commission on Disposition of Excess Weapons Plutonium issued their final report in June 1997.  The report stated that the program's greatest obstacle is financing the $1 billion necessary for weapons-grade plutonium disposition in Russia. The report examined two approaches for funding plutonium disposition: one that relies on direct, equal G-8 contributions, and one that consists of a barter-type arrangement that would allow Russia to provide "low-cost uranium and enrichment services to the Western firms involved in constructing the [plutonium disposition] plants in payment for their services." Under such an arrangement, Russia would blend down more HEU from dismantled nuclear weapons. The commission stated that either approach, or a combination of the two, would work.  The report suggested that the United States and Russia sign a formal joint agreement to ensure plutonium stockpile reductions; agree that facilities slated for plutonium disposition be used only for that purpose, and that spent MOX fuel not be reprocessed until all weapons-grade plutonium has been disposed; and establish contracts with MOX fabrication plants in Europe to export MOX fuel to the United States and Russia for power reactors.  The report added that separated civilian plutonium and HEU worldwide be subject to transparency measures, MPC&A, and IAEA safeguards.  The commission recommended that an international legal entity be established in order to manage international participation in the financing and implementation of plutonium disposition and oversee the required operations and goals, while ensuring safety and verification standards.
["Joint Russian-US Commission Recommends Funding Pu Disposition With Future HEU Revenue," SpentFUEL, 27 October 1997, pp. 3-5.] {Entered 11/9/98 LBN}
 

Last updated 24 March 2004
This file is no longer being updated.  For major recent developments, see the Nuclear Fuel Cycle Developments file.

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This material is produced independently for NTI by the Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies and does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been independently verified by NTI or its directors, officers, employees, agents. Copyright © 2002 by MIIS.

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