History
US-Russia Plutonium Disposition Agreement
Implementation Issues
US Funding Developments
Sites
involved with plutonium disposition
The Trilateral Initiative
Introduction to Plutonium Disposition, article by
A. Bernstein
Plutonium Disposition Issue Brief
Plutonium
Disposition Full-Text Documents
Archived Plutonium Disposition Developments
MOX Fuel Overview
Archived MOX Fuel Developments
For major recent developments, see the
Nuclear Fuel Cycle Developments file.History
The United States and the Soviet Union accumulated large stockpiles
of weapons-grade plutonium throughout the Cold War, which are today no
longer necessary for nuclear weapons. The
United States has produced more than 111 metric tons (t) of plutonium, and
the Soviet Union and, subsequently, Russia are believed to have produced at least 150t.[17] In
1995, US President Bill Clinton announced that the United States possessed over
50t of
plutonium in excess of national security
needs. Russian Federation President Boris Yeltsin reciprocated by announcing in 1997 that Russia intended to remove
50t
of plutonium from its defense programs.[1,2,3] Both countries have pledged to take steps
so that this material is never again used for weapons.
Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin commissioned a
bilateral
panel in 1996 to recommend a course of action for plutonium disposition.
The panel reported in June 1997 that plutonium immobilization, mixed-oxide (MOX)
fuel fabrication and its use in civilian reactors, or a combination of the two
were the most practical options for plutonium disposition (please see the
full text of the
report for details). For an analysis of Russian and US plutonium
disposition
options and challenges, please see Dr. Adam Bernstein’s 1997 article Introduction
to Plutonium Disposition.
The Gore-Kiriyenko meeting of July 1998 further expanded
on previous meetings. Both sides
signed the US-Russian Agreement on Management
of
Used Plutonium in which they agreed to establish and expand
scientific cooperation for the management of excess plutonium.
A major breakthrough towards a bilateral agreement came
on 2 September 1998, when Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin signed a joint statement
on plutonium disposition during the seventh Clinton-Yeltsin summit. Negotiations concerning the creation of a
bilateral agreement continued
over the next two years, building upon the framework of the 1998 Clinton-Yeltsin
joint statement.[2,3]
US-Russia Plutonium Disposition Agreement
On 4 June 2000, Presidents Clinton and Putin announced that the negotiations
had successfully ended with an agreement on the disposition of weapons-grade
plutonium. US Vice President Al Gore and Russian Prime Minister
Mikhail Kasyanov officially
signed the US-Russia Plutonium
Disposition Agreement on 1 September 2000.
According to the agreement, both countries must dispose
of at least 34t of weapons-grade plutonium. The
United States plans to burn 25.5t as mixed oxide (MOX) fuel and immobilize the
remaining 8.5t. Russia intends to
burn all 34t as MOX fuel. Both countries must begin either immobilization or burning by 2007
at the rate of at least 2t per year. In the second phase, the disposition rate
should reach 5t per year.[2,5,7] The
agreement bans any reprocessing of irradiated MOX fuel until all 34t are disposed of. Any additional
plutonium designated in the future by either country as excess to
defense needs can be disposed of under the terms and conditions of the 1 September
2000 agreement.[2,5]
Verification, monitoring, and inspections are vital aspects
of the agreement. The September
2000 agreement sets forth broad principles upon which monitoring and inspection
would be based, but since facilities in Russia and the United States are not
scheduled to be online until 2007, details will be covered in a separate
“follow-on” negotiation to be held within a few years. The
United States and Russia are engaged in consultations with the International
Atomic Energy Agency to work out verification procedures.[4]
Implementation Issues
Several tasks must be accomplished before full-scale
implementation of the agreement can proceed in Russia: 1) evaluation of necessary
investment and operating costs; 2) site selection; 3) coordination of light
water reactor (LWR) technology and MOX fuel specifications; 4) acquisition
of licenses to use test assemblies in LWRs; 5) development of regulations with Russian
regulatory agency Gosatomnadzor (GAN);
and 6) completion of research focusing on MOX fuel use in LWRs and in the BN-600
fast reactor at the Beloyarsk Nuclear Power Plant (NPP).[7,8]
As of September 2001, no large-scale MOX production
facilities exist in Russia that can store and reprocess plutonium or
fabricate MOX fuel. One small, experimental production plant,
Paket, currently produces MOX fuel at
Mayak Production
Association in Ozersk. However, the throughput of the Paket plant is too small to ensure enough
MOX fuel production to meet the 2t per year initial disposition rate that the agreement calls for.[6] To
meet plutonium conversion and MOX fuel production needs, Russia intends to build a
facility for converting plutonium metal to an oxide form suitable for
fabrication of MOX fuel. According to
earlier decisions, Russia intends to locate the conversion facility at Mayak. In addition, an industrial-scale MOX fabrication facility has to be
designed and constructed. The location of this facility could be at Mayak or at the Mining and Chemical
Combine in Zheleznogorsk.[18] One of the options Russia is considering is
importing equipment from the German Hanau MOX fuel fabrication
plant.
Additionally, there are not enough reactors in Russia that
can burn MOX fuel from weapons-grade plutonium. Currently, only the BN-600 fast neutron
reactor at Beloyarsk NPP and the BOR-60 fast neutron research reactor at the Scientific
Research Institute for Atomic Reactors (SRIAR) in Dimitrovgrad can use
MOX fuel. The use of MOX fuel fabricated from weapons-origin plutonium in these
reactors is still being tested, and modifications to the BN-600 are needed to
convert it to a net plutonium burner that can dispose of up to 1.3t
annually. Potentially,
six VVER-1000 light water reactors (four units at Balakovo NPP and two units at
Kalinin NPP) could be modified to use MOX fuel and thus allow Russia to meet the 2t/year disposition rate.[6,18] In
February 2001, Minatom announced its intention
to build a BN-800 fast neutron reactor at Beloyarsk NPP by 2009. The BN-800 is a
modification of the BN-600 reactor and could also be used for plutonium disposition.[19]
As of 2001, research and
development (R&D) for the Russian plutonium disposition program, including
international cooperation projects, is focused on the following activities: 1)
design and pilot demonstration of plutonium metal to oxide conversion facility; 2)
development of a MOX fuel production method compatible with weapons-grade plutonium
and analysis of its use in VVER-1000 and BN-600 reactors; 3) assessment of BN-600 reactor
conversion and light water reactor modifications; 4) the Parallex
Project; 5) high temperature gas reactor research and development to
supplement plutonium irradiation capacity; and 6) development of plutonium immobilization technology.[10]
These activities are being undertaken by a number of
research institutes and nuclear facilities in Russia: the Bochvar
All-Russian Scientific Research Institute for Inorganic Materials (VNIINM), the
Scientific Research Institute for Atomic Reactors (SRIAR), the
Institute for Physics and Power Engineering (IPPE), the V.G.
Khlopin Radium Institute Scientific Production Association, the Kurchatov
Institute, the All-Russia
Research Institute for Nuclear Power Plant Operation (VNIIAES), the State
Specialized Design Institute (GSPI), the SNIIP
Scientific
and Engineering Center, the All-Russian
Planning and Design Research Institute of Energy Technology (VNIPIET),
the Experimental
Machine Building Design Bureau (OKBM), the Novosibirsk
Chemical Concentrates Plant (NZKhK), Luch Scientific
Production Association, the Siberian
Chemical Combine (SKhK), the Mining and
Chemical Combine (GKhK), and Mayak
Production Association (PO Mayak).[10] For
short summaries of these facilities' activities in the plutonium disposition program, see the DOE
map and chart on Sites Involved with Plutonium Disposition in Russia.
The main roadblock to disposing of Russian plutonium
is the
question of financing. Two independent studies--one by the US Department of
Energy and another by France, Germany,
and Russia--estimate the cost of the plutonium disposition program in Russia
at $1.7-1.9 billion over 20 or more years.[2,14] The September 2000 agreement "recognizes the
need for international financing and assistance" in order for Russia to
implement its plutonium disposition plans.[8] The G-8 countries are attempting to create an overall investment and funding
strategy for Russia’s plutonium disposition program.[9] As of May 2001, less than
$700 million had been secured to
support Russian plutonium disposition. The G-8 meeting in
Genoa in July 2001 was set as an intermediate deadline to finalize
international funding for the plutonium disposition program in Russia. However,
international funding pledges to the
effort were still below the mark, and the discussion of the plutonium
disposition program in Russia was removed from the Genoa meeting agenda.[20]
Minatom has criticized the G-8 for being slow in
pledging funds for the program. First Deputy Minister of Atomic Energy Valentin
Ivanov urged Western countries to resolve financing issue by April 2002.
According to Ivanov, if funding is not secured by that time, Russia may
reexamine the program. As an alternative option to plutonium disposition
implementation, Minatom officials propose allowing Russia to "lease" its MOX
fuel to Western customers in order to increase revenue for the plutonium disposition program. This way, they claim, international funding could be
reduced to $1 billion.[12,13]
In addition to financing, there are other outstanding issues which the G-8
group must overcome before the Russian plutonium disposition program begins. The
special plutonium disposition group, a G-8 body tasked with providing a funding
and management framework for Russian plutonium disposition, is working on several
unresolved issues: 1) the structure and operating
procedures of the international entity that will supervise the Russian program; 2)
the role of the donor countries, the makeup of the donor council, Russia's status
as a member of the group, and voting procedures for all members; and 3) the
nature and extent of the Russian contribution to the program.[15]
Several countries besides the United States have been
actively assisting Russia in its plutonium disposition efforts during the
past several years, and in most cases, cooperative efforts began well before
the September 2000
US-Russia Plutonium Disposition Agreement was signed. The
countries have focused upon one or more of the issues highlighted earlier
concerning Russia's R&D activities for plutonium
disposition. For example, Japan has been active in plutonium
disposition projects with the BN-600
reactor at the Beloyarsk NPP. Canada agreed to test
experimental Russian MOX fuel from weapons-grade plutonium in CANDU reactors
under the Parallex
Project.[16] A French-German-Russian group has focused on
plutonium conversion and MOX fuel fabrication facilities, and the use of VVER-1000
light water reactors and the BN-600 reactor to burn weapons-origin MOX
fuel.[2,11,16]
US Funding Developments The US Congress approved $200 million for the construction of
facilities in Russia to dispose of plutonium in the FY 1999 Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act
(P.L. 105-277). The Clinton administration requested another $200 million for
plutonium disposition efforts in Russia for FY 2001. However, the actual
spending in 2000-2001 on plutonium disposition facilities in Russia was
primarily limited to their design and planning and was funded separately
from the emergency funds:
$4,168 million in FY 2000 and $16,650 million in FY 2001.[22]
Table I: US
Funding of Russian Fissile Materials Disposition
| |
FY2000
[22] |
FY2001
[23] |
FY2002
[23] |
FY2003 (Budget Request)
[23] |
|
Russian Plutonium Disposition |
$4.168 million |
$12.851 million |
$42 million |
$64 million |
|
Support and Oversight in the
United States |
$20.777 million |
$16.809 million |
$14 million |
$33 million |
|
Advanced Reactor Technology |
$5 million |
$9.847 million |
$5 million |
$1 million |
|
Subtotal, Russian Surplus Fissile
Material Disposition |
$29.945 million |
$39.507 million |
$61 million |
$98 million |
|
Less Use of Prior-Year Balances |
- |
- |
-$42 million |
-$64 million |
|
Total |
$29.945 million |
$39.507 million |
$19 million |
$34 million |
|