Russia:  Details of Infrastructure, Timing and Cost of the Reactor Options

Pit Conversion, Pre-processing and MOX Fabrication

Russia has no facility that can convert plutonium metal pits to the oxide form that is the raw material for the fuel fabrication process. In addition to pit conversion, other facilities will be needed to prepare non-pit plutonium for disposition. Russia has only small scale MOX fuel fabrication facilities with an 80 kg annual plutonium handling capacity. For the disposition campaign, a MOX fabrication facility with a 2.5 to 5 metric ton annual plutonium handling capacity must be built, coresponding to about 50 to 100 metric tons of Heavy Metal (MTHM) fuel produced per year. This implies a pit conversion facility capable of handling about 700 to 1500 pits per year.

The NAS study estimates the total cost of pit conversion and MOX fabrication to be about $0.7 to $1.3 billion (in 1992 dollars) for a 50 MTHM/yr capacity plant built in the United States.[1] A fuel displacement credit is included in this calculation, reflecting the cost savings realized through the reduction in low enriched uranium (LEU) fuel requirements. The DOE cost estimate is $1.9 billion (1996 dollars, with no uncertainty estimate provided) for a larger 118.2 MTHM/yr MOX facility and a 5 metric ton per year metal to oxide conversion plant in the United States, including an LEU fuel displacement credit.[2] These figures can be expected to be somewhat less in Russia due to lower labor costs: roughly, the NAS study has estimated a two thirds reduction in cost.[3] Accounting for this reduction, front-end processing and MOX fabrication in Russia will cost from $0.5 to $1.3 billion, depending on the scale of the MOX plant. (There are large uncertainties in these estimates; therefore the inflation correction factor from 1992 and present dollars of about 10% is neglected.)

The time estimates for design, siting, construction and licensing of the front end processing and the MOX plant range from seven to ten years from a go-ahead date.[4,5,6] Russia plans to build pilot facilities in cooperation with France and Germany. See the industry initiatives section for more information.

Reactor Construction or Retrofitting

There is only one fast reactor in Russia, the 560 MWe BN-600 model at Beloyarsk. This HEU-fueled reactor is 20 years old, has numerous safety problems, and will be difficult to convert to MOX fuel use.[7] This reactor is nonetheless still under consideration for the disposition program. In addition, as yet unbuilt fast reactors could be designed to operate with MOX fuel manufactured from weapons-grade plutonium. Plans exist to build a 750 MWe BN-800 fast reactor as part of an overall expansion of nuclear power in Russia, but funds are unavailable. One Russian study estimates that one BN-800 reactor designed to accept weapons plutonium would require 44 years to disposition 50 metric tons of plutonium.[8] (In this study it is assumed that the plutonium is consumed rather than merely transformed into spent fuel.) However, to build a new breeder would take about a decade, and would cost about $600 million per reactor. Prior attempts to build such reactors have halted due to lack of funding and local opposition. The expense and likely time delay relative to other options makes the use of breeders problematic.

Russian Light Water Reactors

Of the existing Russian LWRs,  only the 950 Megawatt (MWe) VVER-1000 has sufficient capacity and suitable safety characteristics to be considered for plutonium disposition.[9] There are seven of these in Russia: four at Balakovo, two at Kalinin and one at Novovoronezh.

The length of time required for disposition in these reactors depends on the output of the MOX plant, the amount of fuel loaded per reactor, the plutonium fraction in the fuel, and the number of reactors employed. Assuming a 3.4 percent plutonium content in the MOX fuel, four VVER-1000 reactors with one third of their core loaded with plutonium could irradiate one metric ton of plutonium per year, implying a 50 year irradiation time (neglecting the design and construction times).[10] If the entire core were loaded with MOX fuel, the disposition time would drop to about 17 years. However, loading with 100% MOX cores may involve substantial changes in the reactor control system, implying further expense and delay.

No Russian LWR has been loaded with MOX fuel. If used for military plutonium disposition, the VVER-1000 reactors will therefore have to be relicensed and possibly retrofitted to accept MOX fuel. For US reactors, the NAS study estimates a cost of about $130 million per reactor for licensing, and an additional $500 million in modification costs and lost electricity revenue per reactor if substantial retrofitting is required.[11] Scaling down to reflect the reduced cost of construction and operation in Russia, and assuming four reactors are used, the reactor modification and licensing cost would be $0.34 to $1.7 billion. Many reactors in Russia are already operating at a loss due to default by consumers and insufficient government subsidy. Thus loss of electricity revenue is a largely hypothetical consideration in the Russian case. Instead, additional cost will come from having to temporarily provide alternate power sources while reactors are modified for plutonium disposition.

The time estimates for reactor re-licensing, testing, and modification range from 6 to 12 years. Regulatory constraints may be less severe in Russia, so that licensing may take less time. Once reactors and a MOX fuel supply are available, irradiation of 50 metric tons of plutonium is estimated to take 12-24 years.[4,5,6]

Foreign Light Water Reactors

In addition to the seven VVER 1000s in Russia, other foreign reactors such as European LWRs or Canadian CANDU reactors might be used.[12] This could decrease the total irradiation time, but would result in wider distribution of the plutonium, in some cases to non-nuclear weapons states. Wider distribution could result in regulatory and political delays, and could increase the risk of theft and terrorist sabotage during transportation and disposition.

Sources:
[1] Holdren, John, et. al., Management and Disposition of Excess Weapons Plutonium: Reactor-Related Options (Washington DC: National Academy Press, 1994), p. 300.
[2] US DOE,  The Technical Summary Report for Surplus Weapons-Usable Plutonium Disposition, DOE-MD0003 Revision 1, http://web.fie.com/htdoc/fed/doe/fsl/pub/text/any/doedn013.htm, 31 October 1996, p. 4-5.
[3] Holdren, John, et. al., Management and Disposition of Excess Weapons Plutonium: Reactor-Related Options (Washington DC: National Academy Press, 1994), p. 291.
[4] Holdren, John, et. al., Management and Disposition of Excess Weapons Plutonium: Reactor-Related Options (Washington DC: National Academy Press, 1994), p. 258.
[5] US DOE,  The Technical Summary Report for Surplus Weapons-Usable Plutonium Disposition, DOE-MD0003 Revision 1, http://web.fie.com/htdoc/fed/doe/fsl/pub/text/any/doedn013.htm, 31 October 1996, p. 5-6.
[6] US-Russian Independent Scientific Commission on Disposition of Excess Weapons Plutonium, Final Report, Annex: Managing, and Financing Disposition of Excess Weapons Plutonium  (Washington DC: the White House, September 1997), pp. 23-26.
[7] Holdren, John, et. al., Management and Disposition of Excess Weapons Plutonium: Reactor-Related Options (Washington DC: National Academy Press, 1994), p. 164.
[8] V. Murogov, V Kagramanian, N. Rabotnov, "The Use of Weapon and Reactor Plutonium in WWER and BN Type Reactors," in Managing the Plutonium Surplus: Applications and Technical Options, R. Garwin, M. Grubb, E. Matanle, Eds., (Dordrecht, the Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1994), p. 77-84.
[9]  Holdren, John, et. al., Management and Disposition of Excess Weapons Plutonium: Reactor-Related Options (Washington DC: National Academy Press, 1994), p. 140.
[10]  I. K. Levina, V. V. Saprykin, A .G. Morozov,  "The Safety Criteria and VVER Core Modification for Weapon Plutonium Utilization,"in Mixed Oxide (MOX) Exploitation and Destruction in Power Reactors, E. Merz, C. Walter and Gennadiy Pshakin, Eds. (Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1995), p. 85.
[11]  Holdren, John, et. al., Management and Disposition of Excess Weapons Plutonium: Reactor-Related Options (Washington DC: National Academy Press, 1994), p. 304.
[12] Nikolai N. Egorov, "Perspectives From Russia on the US Decision and an Overview of Russia's Program for the Disposition of Weapon Materials Released for Storage and Disposition," talk presented at the Fourth Annual International Policy Forum: The Management & Disposition of Nuclear Weapon Materials, (Lansdowne, VA, Exchange-Monitor Publications, February 1996), p. 5.

Comments or questions? Contact Elena Sokova at MIIS CNS: esokovaATmiis.edu
 

This material is produced independently for NTI by the Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies and does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been independently verified by NTI or its directors, officers, employees, agents. Copyright © 2002 by MIIS.

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