Mayak Production Association 
Archived Developments
Mayak Chemical Combine
Production reactors
Fissile Material Component Fabrication Plant
Reprocessing Facilities:
RT-1 Spent Fuel Reprocessing
Facility
Radioisotope Plant
Plant
B
Plant BB
Archived Spent Fuel Developments
MOX Fuel Production Facilities
Archived MOX Fuel Developments
Fissile Material Storage Facility
Archived FMSF Developments
Vitrification Plant
Archived Radioactive Waste Developments
Chelyabinsk-60 Research Facility
South
Urals Nuclear Power Plant
For major recent developments, see the
Nuclear Fuel Cycle Developments file.
The closed city of Ozersk, formerly Chelyabinsk-65, is the location of the
Mayak Production Association (PO Mayak). Construction of the closed city
began in 1945 and in 1948 the first reactor (Reactor A) at PO Mayak became
operational. Ozersk is located approximately 70km north of Chelyabinsk.
The population of Ozersk is approximately 85,000, with the estimated number of
employees at PO Mayak ranging from 12,000 to 17,000 people.[1,2,3].
Ozersk, formerly Chelyabinsk-65 (previously known as Chelyabinsk-40)
Address: 31 Prospekt Lenina, Ozersk, Chelyabinsk Oblast, 456065
Telephone: (35151) 31659
Fax: (35151) 33826
email: mayak@ai.ru
http://hp.x-atom.ru/mayak, http://www.ozersk.ru/mayak
Federal Atomic Energy Agency
The Mayak Production Association incorporates the
Mayak Chemical Combine (consisting of production
reactors, a fissile material component
fabrication plant, reprocessing facilities,
MOX fuel production facilities, a
vitrification plant, and fissile material
storage facility);
the Chelyabinsk-60 Research Facility, and the still
under construction South
Urals Nuclear Power Plant.
The Mayak Production Association, known informally as Mayak, fabricates
plutonium and HEU pits and produces tritium for the Russian nuclear weapons
program.[1,7]. It is also the only Russian facility that reprocesses spent
nuclear fuel from nuclear submarines, icebreakers, and from Russian and
Soviet-made nuclear power reactors.[8] As of 1987, Mayak employed approximately
20,000 people.[2] According to the 2000 edition of the Nuclear Business
Directory, the number of employees has fallen to 15,000.[6] In November
2001, Mayak employed nearly 14,500 people, 36% of whom were women, 16% were
young specialists under 30. Twenty-five percent of the personnel had higher
education.[10]
Mayak facilities
include plutonium and tritium production reactors; fuel reprocessing facilities;
a plutonium processing, finishing, and component manufacturing plant (Plant
20); mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel fabrication plants; and nuclear waste treatment
and storage facilities.[1] All five of the plant's uranium-graphite plutonium production reactors
have been permanently shut down.[3] Two tritium-producing reactors (Ruslan and Lyudmila) are still in
operation. They also produce a wide range of radioactive isotopes.[6] Mayak
is also one of the two principal storage sites for HEU and plutonium recovered
from dismantled weapons (the second storage site is at SKhK).[7]
In addition, Mayak has a reactor-grade
plutonium stockpile of approximately 30MT that has accumulated from its
civil reprocessing program,[3,5] although, accounting
for a 1MT annual increase in stocks, the movement "For Nuclear Safety"
puts the figure at 40MT.[5] Mayak is involved in
the oxidation and purification of HEU from dismantled nuclear warheads under
the US-Russia HEU Agreement.[9] Mayak is one of the few enterprises
that is allowed to produce and sell radioisotopes.[2] As of March 2000, Russian Federation
government orders comprised less than 30 percent of Mayak's production.[4] Mayak activities also include
conversion of weapons-grade plutonium into MOX fuel, production of uranium
dioxide, modernization of the RT-1 spent fuel reprocessing plant, manufacture of
electric devices and control and monitoring equipment for pipelines.[10]
PO Mayak participates in the
US Department of Energy MPC&A program. Initial MPC&A cooperation began
in July 1994. An official MPC&A agreement between DOE and
Minatom was concluded in June 1995.[1,2] In the initial stages of MPC&A
cooperation, DOE and Minatom identified four areas at PO Mayak where upgrades
were needed: Plant 235 (which contains the RT-1
spent fuel reprocessing plant), the Isotope Production Reactor Plant, the
Isotope Production Plant, and the HEU Oxidization and Purification Facilities
(Plant 1)[2,3]. In 1998, DOE determined that two of the four facilities
did not present a serious proliferation threat; consequently, just two areas
within PO Mayak were targeted to receive upgrades: the RT-1 spent fuel
reprocessing plant and several buildings for HEU oxidation and purification,
which DOE officials cumulatively refer to as Plant 1, while Mayak officials
refer to it as several buildings of Plant 20.[2]
As of July 1999, Minatom had suspended further approval for upgrade work at
Plant 1 and negotiations were underway to re-establish planned upgrades.[4]
For a detailed description of the MPC&A work performed at PO Mayak in
1997-1998, please see the DOE's December 1997 document,
United States/Former Soviet
Union Program of Cooperation on Nuclear Material Protection, Control, and
Accounting: Partnership for Nuclear Security and the DOE's
September 1998 document,
United
States/ Former Soviet Union Program of Cooperation on Nuclear Material
Protection, Control, and Accounting: Partnership for Nuclear Security.
This section is no longer being updated. For major recent developments, see the
Nuclear Fuel Cycle Developments file.
10/1/2003: NEW GOSATOMNADZOR HEAD VISITS MAYAK
On 1 October 2003, the new head of Gosatomnadzor, Andrey Malyshev,
arrived in Mayak for a three-day working visit. During the visit he inspected the Techa reservoir
system,
Plant 235, Plant 23, and met with the staff.[1,2] Malyshev stressed that Mayak's production process is under
Gosatomnadzor supervision and that Mayak
activities must come into compliance with up-to date requirements for radiation safety. However,
he added, the accumulation of previous environmental and radiation safety
problems is of such a scale that their resolution is beyond Mayak's
capabilities. These problems should be a state concern, he argues,
because Mayak is the place where Russian's nuclear shield was created and many sacrifices were made for that purpose. Speaking
of current issues, Malyshev said that
the Techa reservoir system still lacks
official status.[3] The license issued to Plant 235 on 5 March 2003 requires the
strict fulfillment of concrete measures to reduce the amount of liquid
radioactive waste dumped into the Techa system and reservoirs 9 and 17.
These measures are monitored by Mayak on a monthly basis.[2] [For more
information, see the 3/5/2003 entry, below.] On a more positive note, the problem
of shutting down uranium-graphite reactors
has been solved at Mayak, unlike anywhere else in the world. On the
need for the
South Urals Nuclear Power Plant,
Malyshev said that since the energy market
is to be deregulated in 2006, the power plant's economic ineffectiveness will
force its eventual shut down.[3]
4/8/2003: US EXPERTS MONITOR MPC&A
UPGRADES AT MAYAK
On 8
April 2003,
a team of experts from the US Pacific Northwest, Los Alamos
and Sandia national
laboratories arrived at PO Mayak to monitor
the implementation of a joint action plan on MPC&A
upgrades. According to the Mayak press service, since the beginning
of bilateral cooperation on MPC&A almost eight years ago, the United States
has assisted in the construction of a modern laboratory, installation of electronic control systems
and equipment, and introduction of
other measures at Mayak aimed at the prevention of unauthorized access to nuclear materials
and facilities.
4/5/2003: DRUG ABUSE ISSUE
RAISED AT MAYAK
On 5 April 2003, following general allegations
of drug use at nuclear facilities,
Chelyabinskiy rabochiy
interviewed several officials at Mayak. According to Chelyabinskiy
rabochiy, there are measures in place at
nuclear facilities to detect drug abuse in facility employees. The
Ministry of
Public Health demands rigorous medical screening for potential employees. There are also periodic medical check-ups for current employees. In spite
of these measures, official records are not kept to show what drug abuse was
found. Igor Kurovskiy,
Mayak's deputy director of personnel and social issues, contends that though Mayak
does not maintain records of drug abuse, it is in control of employee drug
abuse and promptly fires those found to be under the influence.
4/2/2003: RUMYANTSEV OUTLINES
MAYAK'S TASKS
On 2 April 2003, a Minatom commission chaired by Minister Aleksandr Rumyantsev
reviewed PO Mayak activities in 2002. According to Mayak spokesman Yevgeniy
Ryzhkov, the commission was satisfied with Mayak's financial and economic
progress. At a follow-up
press conference Rumyantsev outlined several priority tasks for Mayak. He said
that a joint
Mayak-Gosatomnadzor plan to gradually reduce
liquid radioactive waste disposal into the Techa reservoir system must be
implemented, the reconstruction
of the RT-1 plant should be completed to allow the reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel
(SNF) from VVER-1000 reactors, and Mayak should increase the
production of radioactive isotopes. Rumyantsev also announced that the
construction of the South Urals nuclear power plant
(NPP) would restart in 2004.
According to Rumyantsev, instead of BN-800 reactors as previously planned, the
future NPP will use VVER-1000 reactors, reducing construction costs by one and
a half times.
4/1/2003: OZERSK NEWSPAPER CLAIMS THAT US
EQUIPMENT WAS STOLEN FROM MAYAK
Citing the local Ozersk newspaper Kamerton, Antiatom.ru reported that Macintosh
equipment supplied by the United States for the Fissile
Material Storage Facility at PO Mayak had been stolen from a container
within the guarded zone around the facility. The incident
occurred on 1 April 2003, just before the visit of Minister of Atomic Energy Aleksandr Rumyantsev
to Mayak.
3/5/2003: GOSATOMNADZOR RENEWS
MAYAK'S LICENSE
On 5 March 2003, Gosatomnadzor (GAN)
renewed Mayak's Plant 235 operating license for 2003. In late 2002, GAN refused to
renew it for environmental reasons (for details see the
1/1/2003 entry). The license renewal is contingent on
the phase-out of the disposal of liquid radioactive waste in the Techenskiy reservoir
system by 2008-2010. Mayak Director Vitaliy Sadovnikov told Nuclear.ru that GAN
would introduce monthly inspections with regard to the amount of disposed waste. GAN
announced that the decision to renew the license was coordinated with
the Ministry of Natural Resources, the Ministry of Health, and
Minatom.[1,2]
2/19/2003: SOLDIER COMMITS SUICIDE IN OZERSK
On 19 February 2003, Ural-press-inform reported that a soldier from military
unit 3446, which guards Ozersk, had committed suicide. The Military Prosecutor's office is
investigating why this second-year soldier hung himself. It was the second death in
this unit in 2003: in January, a first-year soldier died while on duty. Acute
coronary insufficiency was reported as the cause of death.
1/1/2003: GOSATOMNADZOR REFUSES
TO RENEW MAYAK'S LICENSE ON ENVIRONMENTAL GROUNDS
On 1 January 2003, PO Mayak's Plant 235 halted the reprocessing of spent nuclear
fuel (SNF) following the refusal of the Russian
Federal Inspectorate for Nuclear and Radiation Safety (Gosatomnadzor or GAN) to
renew the plant's operating license for 2003. GAN
officials announced that the decision was prompted by Mayak's ongoing dumping of low- and medium-level liquid radioactive waste into Lake Karachay and the Techenskiy
water
reservoir system.[1,2]
According to Nikolay Shingarev, head of
Minatom's Intergovernmental Cooperation and Information Policy Directorate,
the license will most likely be renewed after Minatom agrees to install new waste processing
technology at Mayak and submits a plan to mitigate the waste problem.[3] Mayak Director Vitaliy
Sadovnikov expressed his support for GAN's decision, which should, in his opinion,
prompt government action in resolving critical environmental issues at Mayak.[1] Russian environmentalists
expect that Minatom will use the occasion to demand
federal funds for the construction of the South Urals nuclear
power plant, promoted by Mayak and Minatom as way to deal with the
overfilled waste system.[4]
11/19/2002: GENERAL CRITICIZES
OZERSK SECURITY REGIME
On 19 November 2002, Chelyabinskiy rabochiy republished an interview with
Major General Aleksandr
Ustinov, commander of the Ministry of Internal Affairs' troop division guarding Ozersk. The interview was first
published in the paper's Ozersk issue on 9 November, and concerned the threat
of a possible terrorist attack on a Russian nuclear facility by Chechen separatists. Ustinov told the newspaper that he could guarantee the security of
PO Mayak from terrorists, but not that of the closed city of Ozersk. According to Ustinov,
the Chelyabinsk Oblast and Ozersk administrations do not go beyond empty talk in
addressing issues of city security. No money is allocated for
refurbishing and reinforcing the Ozersk checkpoint and the controlled zone around
the city: the frontier posts marking the zone and the alarm systems are
obsolete, and in some places, the frontiers are not marked at all. This leads
to frequent violations of the access regime. According to Chelyabinskiy rabochiy,
Ustinov may face discharge for what his superiors regard as an
inappropriate frankness.
9/9/2002: OUTDATED POWER SUPPLY
SYSTEM MAY CAUSE ACCIDENTS AT MAYAK
On 9 September 2002, Bellona
reported that
Natalya Poteryayeva from the
Movement for Nuclear
Safety had told
that Mayak's power supply system is insecure and could cause serious accidents
at PO Mayak. A regional power grid failure had already caused a blackout at
Mayak in September 2000 (for details about this incident, see
the 9/9/2000 entry below). According to Poteryayeva, the 110kW
overhead transmission lines supplying power to Mayak were built in the 1930s-40s,
and the service lives of the utility poles supporting them were exceeded in the 1970s-80s. Outdated lines also
service the
Fissile Material Storage Facility (FMST). Power supplier Chelyabenergo plans
to replace the old power lines by 2014, citing a lack of funding (principally
delinquent payments by consumers) as a reason for the delay. According to Poteryayeva, however, the replacement alone will not
ensure
Mayak is protected. In her opinion, a 220kW substation connecting Mayak to both Sverdlovenergo and Chelyabenergo
power supplies should be
built; the Mayak substation, relay protection and backup systems should be
reconstructed; and FMST power transformers should be connected to Mayak's main substation
by independent lines.
5/30/2002: LUGAR AND NUNN VISIT
MAYAK
On 30 May 2002, on the eve of the tenth anniversary of the Nunn-Lugar
program, a group of US congressmen led by Senator Richard Lugar and former
Senator Sam Nunn,
who is co-chairman of the Nuclear Threat Initiative, visited PO Mayak. The delegation
toured the construction site of the Fissile Material Storage Facility and was
briefed on the disbursement of funds allocated by the United States for this
project.
[ITAR-TASS, 30 May 2002; in "Russia: US Congress members visit nuclear
facility in Chelyabinsk," FBIS Document CEP20020530000009.] {Entered 8/14/2002
DA}
2/21/2002: MAYAK GENERAL DIRECTOR ON PLANT SECURITY
On 21 February 2002, Director
General of PO Mayak Vitaliy Sadovnikov held a press conference to brief the Ozersk media on an interagency meeting on nuclear industry development, radiation safety,
and social protection organized by the Chelyabinsk
Oblast administration in Chelyabinsk on 12 February 2002. (For details about
the meeting, see the 2/12/2002 entry in the
Closed Cities
and Weapons Complex Developments section.)
He told the journalists that the participants discussed funding for social
programs, radiation clean-up programs, nuclear safety, and
physical protection issues. Special attention was given to Mayak's
physical protection systems. According to Sadovnikov, no investment has been
made into the combine's security system
for many years. In his view, both Mayak
management and municipal authorities should be involved in the upgrading of physical protection
at Mayak, especially in the light of the heightened threat of terrorism. Sadovnikov believes
that Ilya Klebanov's removal from the Deputy Prime Minister position will not
delay the construction of the South-Urals nuclear power plant, which is expected
to boost Mayak
production and solve the problem of the Techenskiy reservoir
system.
2/2002: GOVERNOR SUMIN WANTS
MINATOM FACILITIES TO SHARE REVENUES
WITH THE OBLAST
According to Chelyabinskiy
rabochiy, Chelyabinsk Oblast Governor Petr Sumin plans to
sign a revenue-sharing agreement with Minatom. In
his view, the oblast budget should receive up to one percent of PO Mayak's earnings. The
draft agreement is based on a 1992 Russian Government decree,
in force until the mid-1990s, that provided for mandatory allocations from
nuclear facilities' revenues to regional social programs.
1/3/2002: NTV REPORTS ON SECURITY AT MAYAK
On 3 January 2002, the Moscow TV station NTV aired a
report on security at PO Mayak. The report emphasized multilevel security
arrangements at Mayak, including access restrictions and special perimeter
equipment, such as hidden video cameras, radiation detectors, and control gates at entrance checkpoints. All information concerning the
security systems and the work of the plant in
general is classified as top secret. It is strictly prohibited to film the
plant's equipment, entrance, and internal checkpoints. According to
Boris Chernykh, the head of the production and technical
department, only an insane person would try to remove plutonium dioxide by hand because it is
very dangerous and poisonous. Besides, only a limited number of
personnel has access to plutonium. All Mayak employees are divided into
several categories regarding their access to facilities. In addition, Chernykh
told NTV, the so-called three
person access rule is applied when dealing with radioactive and fissile
materials. There must be at least three persons with three different keys to
enter a storage facility. The NTV correspondent claimed that it would be impossible to
remove plutonium storage containers from the plant unnoticed since
their weight ranges from several dozen kilograms to several tons. NTV also
reported that, according to the Mayak personnel, no single case of theft of a
special container had
been registered there in the last 50 years.
11/11-17/2001: DOE AND MAYAK EXPERTS TEAM
UP TO UPGRADE MPC&A AT MAYAK
From 11 to 17 November 2001,
a team from the US
National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) visited PO Mayak to monitor MPC&A upgrades
under the
US-Russia 1999 MPC&A agreement
and the
1993 HEU agreement. The team examined the upgrades at RT-1 and Plant 20 and
discussed future upgrades at sites dealing with nuclear materials.[1] At a press
conference Mayak Deputy Director Aleksandr Prishchepov
said that a joint team of US and local specialists developed and implemented a wide range of MPC&A
upgrades, such as provision of up-to-date communication equipment to Mayak's military guard and
modern measuring instruments for the RT-1 plant analytical laboratory,
computerization of nuclear materials control and accounting, and enhancements to
the physical
protection of trains and trucks involved in fissile material transport. Both
upgraded and old MPC&A
systems undergo regular functional tests. According to Prishchepov, next on
the upgrades list is the
installation of satellite communication between fissile material
transportation units and Mayak's dispatcher service to prevent communication
interference by terrorists. Patrick Cahalane, a DOE official and head of the MPC&A team,
praised the MPC&A improvement activities at Mayak and pledged further support
for the project on DOE's behalf.[1,2]
11/2001: MAYAK UNDERGOES GOSATOMNADZOR
INSPECTION
In November 2001,
Gosatomnadzor
carried out a
comprehensive two-week inspection at PO Mayak. Inspection team included representatives of Gosatomnadzor,
Minatom,
the Ural and Siberian Federal Okrugs, and regional health, environmental and
firefighting agencies. The group inspected Mayak's Plants 20, 22, 23, 156 and 235, the
reservoir system, and lake Karachay. Andrey
Lavrinovich, who headed the inspection, told PrO Mayak
that no serious violations of MPC&A standards or nuclear safety and security
regulations had been found.
However, a 28-item recommendation list was issued as a result of the inspection.
Safety concerns reflected in the recommendations pertain to the reservoir
system, old burial sites for solid radioactive waste, and containers for liquid radioactive waste.
11/1/2001: HEAD OF OZERSK'S GUARDS INFRINGED CHECK-POINT REGIME
On 1 November 2001, Chelyabinskiy
rabochiy reported that Colonel Vladimir Kushnarenko, the commander of
regiment 3445, which guards Ozersk, was accused by the local FSB department of
sanctioning illegal access to the city. The colonel reportedly
authorized the waiver of the special passes required to enter Ozersk for four
Moldovan citizens working on the construction of the Aivengo entertainment
center, performers at the Chelyabinsk night club Bagira, and even some US citizens
attending a local wedding. According to the newspaper, Kushnarenko used to drive
beyond the Ozersk checkpoint himself and bring in people in his car. Once he
arranged an Irtyash lake tour on patrol boats for relatives of a
local oil tycoon. The military prosecutor's office initiated an investigation
into the colonel's abuse of duty.
9/28/2001: MINISTER OF ATOMIC ENERGY VISITS PO
MAYAK
On 28 September 2001, Russian Minister of Atomic
Energy Aleksandr Rumyantsev visited PO Mayak in Ozersk. The agenda for the
visit included discussion of social and economic development of Minatom
closed cities, and Ozersk in particular; Mayak's production capacity,
including conversion projects; and clean-up of radiation-contaminated
territories at Mayak. Speaking at a press conference, Rumyantsev gave
high praise to Mayak's technological capabilities and promised Minatom's
assistance in upgrading the production infrastructure of the facility. In
response to a question about renewing construction of the
South-Urals Nuclear Power Plant, Rumyantsev said that Minatom's plan for
nuclear power development up to 2010 does not provide for this.[1] According to Vitaliy Sadovnikov,
director general
of PO Mayak, Minatom also agreed to assist in the reconstruction of the RT-1
plant, Mayak's spent nuclear fuel reprocessing facility.[2]
8/20/2001: ATTEMPTED THEFT OF RAILROAD TRACKS LEADING TO MAYAK
The theft of 200 meters of rails from the railroad to
the Mayak industrial zone was prevented by a railroad track inspector on 20
August 2001 in Ozersk. The thieves had already dismantled and cut the rails
and were about to transport them from the site when the inspector arrived.
According to Ozersk.ru, the attempt was discovered purely by chance because this part of
the railroad is only used as a ramp for runaway empty cargo cars after they
are unloaded at Mayak and is not inspected on a regular basis. The inspector
immediately reported the incident to the local police, and all five thieves
were arrested the same day. The thieves intended to sell the rails for scrap
metal for 20,000 rubles ($682 as of 8/20/2001). The actual damage to the
railway is estimated at 88,400
rubles ($3,011).
5/10/2001: EUROPEAN UNION: PO
MAYAK DOES NOT MEET EU SAFETY REQUIREMENTS
On 10
May 2001,
Margot Wallstrom, EU Commissioner
for the Environment, announced
in Moscow that the European Union was concerned about the safety of reprocessing
foreign spent nuclear fuel (SNF) in Russia. According to the Commissioner, PO Mayak does not
meet EU safety standards. Mayak spokesman Yevgeniy Ryzhkov disagreed with Wallstrom's statement. According to Ryzhkov,
Mayak has been reprocessing SNF for 30 years, and its technologies are similar
to those used by France
and Great Britain. He admitted, however, that some of the military technologies inherited by Mayak have deficiencies.[1,2]
4/30/2001 MAYAK PLANS TO DOUBLE
COBALT-60 EXPORTS
During an interview with local
newspaper PrO Mayak, Mayak Deputy Director Valeriy Asnovskiy announced plans to
double the export of cobalt-60 isotopes in order to become less reliant on state
defense orders. The plant is one of the few cobalt-60 production facilities in
Russia and currently exports more than 90% of its cobalt-60 production. Asnovskiy
also announced plans to repair the 1,000MW
light-water reactor Lyudmila to help increase overall isotope production by one and a
half to two
times the current rate.
4/21/2001: REGIONAL LEGISLATORS VISIT MAYAK FACILITIES
A group of deputies from Chelyabinsk Oblast's
Legislative Assembly visited PO Mayak to familiarize themselves
with the enterprise's activities before deciding on regional legislation related to
spent nuclear fuel. They visited the still-under-construction South
Urals Nuclear Power Plant, the fissile materials storage
facility,
and the RT-1 spent fuel reprocessing
plant. According to ITAR-TASS, the
delegation was pleased to learn that the Mayak uses "very modern technologies" and
assessed its work as
"very professional." Legislators and the Mayak administration agreed to
continue close coordination regarding policy in the nuclear complex.
3/17/2001: ADAMOV VISITS PO MAYAK
On 17 March 2001 the Minatom commission on
evaluating Mayak's activities for 2000 visited Ozersk; among other issues, they
discussed the
modernization of the RT-1 Plant and set goals for Mayak for 2001. At the
press conference, Minister Yevgeniy Adamov reaffirmed that Mayak remains
one of the main Minatom enterprises that works on state defense orders. Adamov
also made note of the importance and economic efficiency of spent fuel
processing and expressed hope that
federal legislation
will be passed to allow the import of spent fuel from abroad. Adamov said
that fuel just removed from the reactor contains a
thousand times more fissile material than a metric ton of ore; half of Russia's
nuclear energy industry uses reprocessed fuel. He emphasized that Mayak
has an advantage in the reprocessing market due to the cheap raw
materials and cheap labor force. Adamov estimated that reprocessing spent
nuclear fuel could earn Russia $20 million in 20 years and would increase
the amount of work at Mayak by three times and the average salary of its workers would grow from
the current 5,000 rubles ($174.5 as of 17 March 2001)
to 15,000 rubles ($523.4 as of 17 March 2001). Developments at Mayak would also create
new jobs and boost the local economy, especially in the mechanical and construction
industries. Adamov guaranteed
that 30% of the proceeds from spent fuel reprocessing would be reinvested in
Mayak, another 30% would go to local business, and another 30% would be used for
ecological programs. The Mining and Chemical Combine
(GKhK)
in Krasnoyarsk would share the reprocessing orders with Mayak. Adamov
assured journalists that the decision to modernize the RT-1 spent fuel reprocessing
plant has already been made, but the implementation strategy is still under
consideration. He also said that no funding for the construction of
the South
Urals Nuclear Power Plant is planned until 2005,
postponing the completion of the first reactor until 2015, and the second -
until an even later
date. Adamov criticized the Mayak administration for slow
activity in the production of radioactive isotopes. He noted that the radioactive
isotopes market is "worth $200 billion" and is yet to be "captured" by Mayak.
9/9/2000: OVERLOAD IN POWER GRID CAUSES REACTORS AT MAYAK
TO SHUT DOWN
Due to an overload in the Urals energy grid in
Sverdlovsk Oblast on 9 September 2000, two nuclear enterprises in the
Southern Urals region experienced power outages for varying periods of
time. The Mayak Production Association (MPA) and the Beloyarsk
Nuclear Power Plant were affected.[1,2] Mayak was without external power for 45
minutes, and as a result, its two working reactors
went into automatic shutdown mode. There are varying reports regarding when the
back-up electricity generators that support the cooling systems were
started. On 12 September, Chelyabinskiy Rabochiy cited Mayak
Director Vitaly Sadovnikov as saying that Mayak's back-up electricity
generators became operational in about 30 minutes after the initial power loss
[3] and that the "semi-military discipline at the enterprise saved us
from major mishaps."[4] On 16 September, Deputy
Minister of Atomic Energy Bulat Nigmatulin contradicted Sadovnikov and said that the back-up power
systems began immediately after external power was lost.[5] Operations at
Mayak returned to normal on 12 September when both reactors returned to their
normal operating level.[6] Plant officials reported there was no release
of radiation.[5]
7/23-8/6/2000: ANTI-NUCLEAR ENVIRONMENTALIST CAMP
PROTESTS PO MAYAK ACTIVITIES
From 23 July 2000 to 6 August 2000, activists from
Russian and international environmental non-governmental organizations
established an anti-nuclear camp several kilometers from the outskirts of
Ozersk to
demand that Minatom and PO Mayak officials abandon the South Urals nuclear power
plant construction project, reject nuclear waste imports, stop MOX fuel development,
and provide social benefits to local residents affected by radioactive
contamination.[1,2] Environmental activists also picketed regional Administration
headquarters in Chelyabinsk.[3] Beginning on 3 August, protesters joined a petition drive to
hold a nationwide referendum on the question of whether Russia should import
foreign nuclear spent fuel for reprocessing and storage.[4]
7/20/2000: ADAMOV VISITS PO MAYAK, DISCUSSES FINANCES
AND ENVIRONMENT
On 20 July 2000, Minister
of Atomic Energy Evgeniy Adamov and representatives from Chelyabinsk
Oblast, Gosatomnadzor, the
Russian Academy of Sciences, and the Ministry of Emergency Situations visited
PO Mayak to discuss financing for the facility and the regional environmental
situation.[1] Speaking before reporters, Adamov said that the federal budget
does not provide funding to investigate and resolve local environmental
problems, stating that financing for environmental projects in Chelyabinsk
Oblast comes from the HEU deal and
from spent fuel reprocessing proceeds.[2] Adamov called for amending existing
Russian legislation that prohibits import of spent nuclear fuel for
reprocessing. (For details on legislation and its affect on proceeds from
spent fuel, see the entry from 4/21/2000 below.) Adamov also reported that the
government had included the unfinished South
Urals nuclear power plant in its strategy for the development of nuclear
energy in Russia, but he noted that the plant was "not among the first in
line" for funding.[3]
5/24/2000: DEPUTY GENERAL DIRECTOR INTERVIEWED ON
PERSONNEL AND EMPLOYMENT AT MAYAK
In an interview dated 24 May 2000, PO Mayak's Deputy
General Director of Personnel and Benefits Igor Kurovskiy noted that in
the course of the last decade, Mayak has been losing personnel at a high
rate. He attributed the reduction to fewer state defense orders and to
the introduction of more efficient equipment and technology. In 1999, Mayak
hired 576 new employees and 545 employees and pensioners left the combine.
According to Kurovskiy, the average Mayak employee was 44 years old, the
average age of engineers and other technical workers was 47 years, and
13 percent of Mayak's workforce were eligible for retirement pensions.
He added that in some departments, pension eligible employees made up 20
percent or more of the personnel. Small pensions typically force older
workers to delay their retirement, and in response, the trade union committee
has offered to significantly supplement the state pensions for retirees
with a long tenure at Mayak. Kurovskiy reported that although demand for
young specialists had declined by approximately half since 1993, he believed
that PO Mayak still had a deficit of qualified young specialists. He attributed
this deficit to Mayak's stringent educational, professional, and disciplinary
requirements. Kurovskiy added that Mayak had purchased equipment to detect
alcohol and narcotics use and had trained its medical personnel how to
use the equipment.
4/21/2000: REGIONAL LEGISLATORS
DISCUSS FINANCING, TOUR MAYAK
On 21 April 2000, a delegation from Chelyabinsk Oblast's
Legislative Assembly met with officials from PO Mayak to discuss the loss
of revenue from reprocessing spent fuel from foreign nuclear power stations.
Mayak has not concluded any reprocessing contracts with foreign partners
for FY 2000, and the officials warned the delegation that hard currency
receipts from reprocessing "are right at zero." Although Mayak officials
noted that possibilities of renewing contracts with Bulgarian, Hungarian,
and Finnish partners appeared unlikely, they did not rule out the possibility
of concluding a contract with the Czech Republic for FY 2001. According
to a presidential decree, 25 percent of the hard currency revenues from reprocessing
imported spent fuel must be split between resolving environmental problems at Mayak
(12.5 percent) and addressing social issues within Chelyabinsk Oblast (12.5
percent). According to Mayak officials, the proceeds from reprocessing
spent fuel at the combine made up more than 97 percent of the oblast's
hard currency budget. Mayak officials criticized Chelyabinsk Oblast
administrators, who recently proposed legislation that would levy an additional
25 percent tax on all fuel reprocessed at Mayak, including spent fuel from
Russian nuclear power plants. Specialists at Mayak stated that the enterprise
charges Russian nuclear power plants just enough to cover reprocessing
costs, and therefore, the proposed tax would cause Mayak to lose money.
Oblast legislators and Mayak officials are preparing a joint appeal to
the Russian president to draw attention to the combine's financial problems.
Members of Chelyabinsk Oblast's Legislative Assembly also want to amend
Mayak's system of payments for fuel reprocessing, allowing Mayak to contribute
a portion of its profits to the oblast budget rather than the oblast requiring
a payment based on the percentage of proceeds earned from fuel reprocessing.
During their visit, legislators toured several work areas within PO Mayak,
including the unfinished
South
Urals nuclear power plant, the construction site of the fissile
material storage facility, and the RT-1
Spent Fuel Reprocessing Facility.
2/7/2000: PLUTONIUM PRODUCTION MORATORIUM DISCUSSED
Negotiations regarding a moratorium on extraction
of plutonium from spent nuclear reactor fuel in Russia took place on 7
February 2000 between the US Department of Energy (DOE) and Minatom
officials. An initial $100 million distribution, funds which are part of
the proposed DOE 2001 budget, includes $45 million for proposed construction
of dry storage facility for spent fuel, $30 million for the construction
of a plant to convert weapons-grade plutonium into non-weapons-grade and
its storage, and $20 million for research into possible alternatives to
current Russian nuclear fuel cycle practices. Minatom press service head
Yuriy Bespalko in an interview to Chelyabinskiy rabochiy newspaper
refused to either confirm or deny that Minatom is ready to agree to such
a moratorium. A moratorium on fuel reprocessing may mean closing the Mayak RT-1
spent fuel reprocessing facility, leaving hundreds of workers unemployed.
As much as 30MT of plutonium has been accumulated at Mayak as a result
of reprocessing spent fuel from Russian and foreign power reactors. Accounting
for a 1MT annual increase in stocks, the Russian non-governmental organization
"For Nuclear Safety" puts the figure at 40MT. (For more information and related
developments, please see the General Fuel Cycle
Developments file.)
12/18/99: THEFT OF RADIOACTIVE STEEL AT PO MAYAK
On 18 December 1999, Kommersant reported that
the theft of over 1MT of radioactive stainless steel in the form of equipment
parts slated for replacement had been uncovered at PO Mayak. The thieves evaded detection, loaded the items into a car, and drove from Mayak to
a scrap metal collection center, which refused to purchase the metal after
a dosimeter reading showed that the radioactivity level was 500 times the permissible
limit. The thieves transported the steel back to the
Mayak sanitary zone and dumped it into a river, where it was later discovered.
A committee has been formed to investigate the theft, which came one month
after the theft of metals from PO Mayak's Plant 235 (see development from
17
November 1999 below).
11/17/99: THEFT OF RADIOACTIVE
METALLIC COMPONENTS REPORTED
On 17 November 1999, Ozerskiy vestnik reported
the theft of old equipment and worn metallic components from PO Mayak's
Plant 235. A commission of officials from PO Mayak, the internal affairs
directorate, and the State Sanitary and Epidemiological Inspectorate (GSEN)
found the stolen metals at a local scrap metal collection center. According
to Ozerskiy vestnik, the metals exceeded permissible radiation levels
by 3400 times. The commission seized the metals, closed down the scrap
metal collection station, fined its director, and began decontamination
of the site. GSEN officials have recommended that Ozersk close all local
scrap metal collection centers.
10/12-14/99: MINATOM TRAINS FOR RADIATION ACCIDENT
IN "URAL-99" EXERCISE
On 12-14 October 1999 emergency-response personnel
conducted a two-day training exercise, called "Ural-99", near Novogornyy
in Chelyabinsk Oblast. According to the exercise's scenario, a terrorist
group derails a train, causing a fire and the release of radioactive materials.
In carefully coordinated steps, response teams assessed the accident, allocated
personnel and technical resources, contained the radioactive materials
using a specially-designed robotic vehicle (built and operated by a team
from VNIITF),
and decontaminated the area. Command personnel communicated with Moscow
and the nuclear centers by cellular phone.[1,3] The Minatom Crisis Situation
Center, whose state-of-the-art communication and data processing equipment
was partly financed with US assistance, was used for the first time during
the exercises.[2] Most of the 800,000 ruble budget (approximately $31,000
as of 14 October 1999) for the exercise was spent on special equipment
that will remain in the region.[2,4] The exercises were directed by Minatom,
and jointly sponsored by the Ministry
of Emergency Situations and the Ministry
of Railways.[4] Over a dozen other regional and federal agencies and
organizations participated, including specially trained teams from Mayak,
VNIITF, Trekhgornyy, Lesnoy,
and the Chelyabinsk Oblast Administration.[1,3] Representatives from France,
Belarus, and Kazakhstan were present as observers, as were members of the
regional press.[1]
9/99: MUNICIPAL OFFICIALS AND MVD UNITS
IMPLEMENT COUNTER-TERRORISM MEASURES IN OZERSK
On 15 September 1999, soldiers from the Ozersk
internal troops unit began inspecting basements, warehouses, attics, apartment
buildings, public transport, and conventional weapons storage areas as part of
the city's counter-terrorism program, Vikhr-antiterror (Anti-terror Whirlwind).[1] In
addition, municipal officials have limited entry into the closed city to
residents and their relatives.[2] During the two-week campaign, the guard unit
detained 17 persons who attempted to illegally enter the city.[3] Ozersk
vestnik reported that the guards, whose monthly salary totals 45 rubles
($2 as of 15 September 1999), had been offered bribes as high as 200
rubles ($8 as of 15 September 1999) not to search cars and to let
non-residents enter the city. On 22 September 1999, the city council approved
Decree No. 193 On measures for combating terrorism in Ozersk,
recommending that additional check points be installed on the roads leading to
the city and proposing that PO Mayak officials upgrade the entry permit
system, which the city would help finance.[4]
4/7/99: PROBLEMS PLAGUE MVD TROOPS GUARDING PO
MAYAK
On 7 April 1999, Novyye izvestiya reported
that one soldier from the MVD Ozersk Internal Troops Unit had died and
two others were in serious condition after drinking antifreeze, which they
had mistaken for alcohol. According to Novyye izvestiya, the conscripts
purchased a bottle of bluish liquid while on guard duty, secluded themselves
in a storeroom, and drank the "alcohol." The paper noted that such incidents
are occurring more often among MVD units guarding Russia's nuclear facilities.
In September 1998, counterintelligence services uncovered an underground
narcotics route into the MVD unit guarding PO Mayak. That same month, a sergeant
on guard duty at Mayak shot two of his subordinates (see development
from
20 September 1998 below). In December 1998,
a MVD soldier stole an assault rifle and left his unit; he was apprehended
two hours later.
1/26/1999: MAYAK WORKERS CAUGHT WITH DRUGS
On
26 January 1999, Chelyabinskiy rabochiy reported
that the local police had detained an employee of Mayak's
Plant 20 with ten doses of
heroin. The detainee confessed to regular use and sale of heroin. Later the
same day, police detained another Mayak worker, from Plant 22, who was found to
have opium poppy on him.
1/14/99: MAYAK OFFICIAL INTERVIEWED ON
PRIVATIZATION RUMORS
During an interview published on 14 January 1999,
Chelyabinskiy rabochiy questioned PO Mayak Chief Engineer Aleksandr Suslov
about rumors that individual plants within Mayak would be privatized. In
response, Suslov stated Mayak would oppose such plans, warning that
privatization would be impossible and inadvisable for several reasons. He
noted that the Mayak complex, like many other Minatom enterprises, produces
goods and services for the commercial civilian sector, and for the
state-financed defense sector. Suslov argued that if these two sectors were
separated as a result of privatization, Mayak would not be able to transfer
financial resources from commercial fuel cycle program to its underfunded
defense programs. Moreover, because Mayak's plants and supporting facilities
are part of an interdependent complex, Suslov stated that it would be
difficult to apply both commercial and state management principles within the
same facilities.
9/20/98: GUARD AT MAYAK FACILITY SHOOTS THREE
MEN AND ESCAPES
On 20 September 1998 Sergeant Vitaliy Pryakhin, a member of Unit 3446,
which guards PO Mayak, shot and killed two guards and injured one more,
then escaped, having taken the victims' ammunition and his submachine gun.[1,2]
Senior officers of the Ministry of Internal Troops did not make a statement
until two days after the incident occurred. Over 900 people have been taking
part in the search.[3] As of 13 October, Pryakhin had not been found.[2]
Sergeant Pryakhin was drafted in Chelyabinsk in December 1996 and was to
be discharged soon;[1] the order was received by the unit on 21 September
1998.[4] Pryakhin's motive has not been established.[5] The military
prosecutor for the Urals region is in charge of the investigation.[1]
7/25-8/7/98: STRIKING MINERS BLOCK RAILWAYS AND
ENERGY SUPPLIES TO PO MAYAK
Begining on 25 July 1998, miners protesting Chelyabinskugol's
failure to pay wage arears blockaded a section of the Trans-Siberian Railway,
thus preventing the delivery of coal to the Argayash Power Plant,
which supplies steam and electricity to the PO Mayak complex.[1,2] In Ozersk
(Chelyabinsk-65), the city's power plant only had enough coal to supply
energy to PO Mayak, but not the rest of the city.[3] While electricity
supplies were considered relatively safe, Russian telelvision reported
that the situation looked much less certain with the water and steam supplies.[4]
On 4 August 1998, a shortage of power triggered automatic protection systems
to shut off Mayak's two tritium-producing reactors.[5] In the 5 August
1998 television interview, however, the management at PO Mayak called the
situation "alarming but under control," noting that the combine has duplicate
back up systems and safety procedures.[4] PO Mayak Acting Director
Aleksandr Suslov said that the strikes threatened Russia's nuclear and
radiation safety, especially given the fact that reactors from decommissioned
nuclear submarines in Russia's Far East were scheduled to be transported
to PO Mayak by train. Although the containers and the cars have safeguards
in place to prevent radiation leakage, he warned that it would be undesirable
to subject the train to the sudden stops caused by the blockades.[2] Containers
with spent fuel from the Kola
Nuclear Power Plant were also scheduled to arrive to PO Mayak in mid-August.[5,6].
On 7 August 1998, Deputy Primse Minister Boris Nemtsov told Chelyabinsk
Oblast Governor Petr Sumin that the federal government would transfer money
only to those regions where the railway blockade had ended, and the news
prompted Chelyabinsk miners to call off their strike.[7]
4/98: MPC&A PHYSICAL INVENTORY LABORATORY SHIPPED
TO MAYAK
A mobile laboratory developed under
the US Department of Energy's
MPC&A program and intended to update and improve accounting of PO Mayak's stockpile of plutonium
dioxide was shipped from the United States in April 1998. The lab is to begin operations in the spring of 1998 and
will use nondestructive measurement techniques.
6/11/97: MIKHAILOV SUGGESTS SELF-FINANCING FOR MAYAK
Viktor Mikhailov, Russian Minister of Atomic Energy, has suggested the
possibility of self-financing for the Mayak Chemical Combine. Georgiy
Kaurov, the head of Minatom’s public relations department, specified that
under the US-Russia HEU deal, 12 metric tons of HEU will be blended down
and sent to the United States in 1998, which will provide employment and
income for Mayak. (For more information see The
US-Russia HEU Deal)Minatom
is also seeking funds to finance the construction of a new melter at the
plant to vitrify liquid radioactive waste.
6/13/97: RUSSIAN MINISTRY OF ATOMIC ENERGY WILL PROVIDE CHELYABINSK
OBLAST WITH FUNDS
The Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy signed an agreement with Chelyabinsk
Oblast, under which Minatom will provide the local administration with
$5 million over the next three years. The funds are to improve socioeconomic
development in Chelyabinsk Oblast, and to protect and improve the local
environment. The agreement calls for the local administration and Minatom
to cooperate to develop programs to rehabilitate contaminated environmental
areas of Chelyabinsk Oblast. The two will work together in an effort to
prevent future environmental problems. According to Minatom, this agreement
is the first of its kind.
6/9/97: RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT IN DEBT TO MAYAK
Minister of Atomic Energy Viktor Mikhailov and Minatom representatives
met with Mayak officials today to discuss the Mayak plant's financial problems.
The Russian government owes the Mayak facility about 300 billion rubles
for state orders fulfilled by the plant. As a result, Mayak owes workers
1.3 million rubles in back wages. However, income from reprocessing foreign
spent nuclear fuel has enabled the facility to pay workers some of their
back wages. Mayak continues to struggle financially and plant officials
are concerned that workers will suffer more if the state does not pay the
facility.[1] According to Mikhailov, Mayak's
current debt to various organizations is 350 billion rubles.[2]
In addition, Mayak recently shut down its RT-1 vitrification plant (see
below) and a new one will not be built for some time. Because spent fuel
reprocessing cannot proceed without an operating vitrification facility,
a prime source of income is jeopardized by the shutdown.[2]
4/7/97: UNACCOUNTED HEU FOUND AT MAYAK
According to Gosatomnadzor, on 7 April 1997, two
pieces of HEU were found during an examination of empty TUK-30 shipment
casks at PO Mayak. It was reported that the total weight of the found unaccounted
HEU is 142g. For details, see 19990040
entry in the NIS Nuclear Trafficking database.
4/1/97: MAYAK ACCUSED OF BREAKING LAW ON USE OF
NUCLEAR ENERGY; CHARGES DENIED
According to the 1 April 1997 issue of Vecherniy
Chelyabinsk, on 5 March 1997 Mayak transferred radioactive materials
to Novouralsk
(Sverdlovsk-44), without the necessary permission from Gosatomnadzor.
According to Gosatomnadzor, Mayak violated the federal law "On the use
of nuclear energy." In the 9 April 1997 issue of Vecherniy Chelyabinsk,
Mayak public relations head Yevgeniy Ryzhkov denied Gosatomnadzor's accusations.
Ryzhkov said that Mayak notified Gosatomnadzor before transporting radioactive
materials to Novouralsk, which was done as part of a Gore-Chernomyrdin
Commission program. According to Ryzhkov, the materials were transported
in keeping with Gosatomnadzor's requirements for physical protection and
nuclear and radiation safety. Ryzhkov stated that the problem occurred
due to a power vacuum: Gosatomnadzor has no authority over defense
industry activities, while the Ministry of Defense has yet to set up a
regulatory agency for these activities. A lack of regulatory documents
prompted Gosatomnadzor to postpone granting permission for the transfer
in order to create the necessary documentation, which took until 21 March
1997. Ryzhkov stated that Mayak "deceived no-one and hid nothing."
Page last updated 23 March 2004
The development section in this file is no longer being updated. For major
recent developments, see the
Nuclear Fuel Cycle Developments file.
Comments or questions? Contact Elena Sokova at MIIS CNS: Elena.SokovaATmiis.edu
This material is produced independently for NTI
by the Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the
Monterey Institute of International Studies and
does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has
not been independently verified by NTI or its directors, officers,
employees, agents. Copyright © 2003 by MIIS.
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