The Government-to-Government program, a precursor to the US Department of Energy's Material Protection, Control, and Accounting program, was initiated under the US Department of Defense in 1992. Formal US/Russian Federation MPC&A cooperation began on September 2, 1993, with an implementing agreement under the Cooperative Threat Reduction (or Nunn-Lugar) program between the US Department of Defense and the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy (Minatom).[1]  An initial $10 million was allocated from Nunn-Lugar funds.[2]  

The first cooperative MPC&A government-to-government program was initiated in 1994 at a low-enriched uranium production facility in Elektrostal, Moscow Oblast.  The United States, however, was disturbed at the slow progress in developing and upgrading Russian MPC&A systems and allocated an additional $20 million to establish cooperative MPC&A efforts at a facility in Sverdlovsk.  The Russian government was still quite wary of US intentions with regards to MPC&A and was feeling considerable pressure from certain groups to keep the United States away from the historically secretive Russian nuclear complex. As a result the Russian side rejected the proposal for MPC&A cooperation at Sverdlovsk. However, on 20 January 1995, Russia agreed to joint MPC&A work with the United States at five sites: the highly-enriched uranium fuel fabrication line at the Machine Building Plant (MSZ) in Elektrostal, the Mayak Production Association in Ozersk, formerly Chelyabinsk-65, the Institute of Physics and Power Engineering (Obninsk), the Luch Scientific Production Association (Podolsk), and the All-Russian Scientific and Research Institute of Atomic Reactors (SRIAR) in Dimitrovgrad-10.[2] 

By this time, however, the Government-to-Government program was receiving some harsh criticism in the United States for not moving ahead with its mandate quickly enough. There were several reasons for this. First, Minatom proved hard to work with as the main push of the program was often weighed down by official bureaucracy and regulations. Associated with this was the concern displayed by both the Russian and United States sides regarding divulging some of the very same nuclear secrets they had been hiding from each other for 50 years.  A third stumbling block in the path of progress were the stringent requirements spelled out by the Nunn-Lugar legislation.  According to that legislation, MPC&A funds were tied to frequent auditing practices and Russian compliance with certain arms control agreements.  Perhaps the largest obstacle to cooperation on MPC&A, however, was the "buy-American" clause in the Nunn-Lugar legislation.  According to this clause, whenever possible, funds for MPC&A training and equipment were to be spent in the United States and not in the former Soviet Union.  This provision was less than popular with the cash-strapped Russians, who had anticipated reaping not just the security benefits of cooperation with the United States, but the financial benefits as well.  

Eventually these problems were solved by the transfer of responsibility for the Government-to-Government program to the Department of Energy.  DOE proved more able to work with Minatom, and since the funding for the program was now coming from DOE, and was not DOD CTR money, it was not constrained by the aforementioned legislation. This shift occurred in September 1995 as DOE became Executive Agent for all US cooperative MPC&A efforts under Presidential Decision Directive 41.[1]

Under the Government-to-Government program, DOE also cooperated with the Russian Federal Inspectorate for Nuclear and Radiation Safety (Gosatomnadzor or GAN) to upgrade the Russian national MPC&A system. This included developing nuclear regulations, the GAN information system, and the Russian Federal Information System. Other cooperative projects with GAN included training facility inspectors, providing them with equipment, and upgrading MPC&A systems at six non-Minatom facilities.[1] The program also developed, in participation with Euratom, a Russian Methodological and Training Center at the Institute of Physics and Power Engineering in Obninsk that trains Russian specialists in MPC&A techniques.[1]

In February 1997, DOE consolidated its Government-to-Government and Lab-to-Lab programs into the Material Protection, Control & Accounting (MPC&A) program.[3]
Sources:
[1] Department of Energy, Office of Arms Control and Nonproliferation, Task Force Report: Program of Cooperation on Nuclear Material Protection, Control, and Accounting. Washington, D.C., December 1996.
[2] Graham Allison, et al., Avoiding Nuclear Anarchy:  Containing the Threat of Loose Russian Nuclear Weapons and Fissile Material, Cambridge, MA:  MIT Press, 1996).
[3] CNS Interview with DOE Official, July 1997.{Updated 4/11/01 KB}

Page last updated 13 April 2001

Comments or questions? Contact Kenley Butler at MIIS CNS: Kenley.ButlerATmiis.edu

This material is produced independently for NTI by the Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies and does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been independently verified by NTI or its directors, officers, employees, agents. Copyright © 2002 by MIIS.

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