This file is no longer
being updated. For major recent developments, please see the
Russia: Foreign Assistance Programs file.
For more information on MPC&A issues in Russia please see the
MPC&A
section of the NIS Nuclear Profiles Database.
3/2003: TWO OUT
OF 50 PLANNED MPC&A OPERATIONS MONITORING (MOM) SYSTEMS WERE INSTALLED AT
RUSSIAN SITES
In March 2003, the US General
Accounting Office released a report on DOE progress in improving the security of
Russian weapons of mass destruction sites. With regard to the installation of
Operations Monitoring (MOM) systems, recommended to DOE in a
February 2001 GAO report, GAO stated that although DOE planned to install MOM systems at 50
sites by the end of fiscal year 2002, only two such systems were installed as of
February 2003 at
civilian academic institutes that store nuclear material. As DOE noted,
Minatom,
which supports the MOM system in general, did not grant DOE permission to begin
installation at its facilities. This, according to DOE officials, has delayed
implementation of the MOM systems at Minatom facilities for nearly 2 years.
10/15-26/2001: CONTRACTS SIGNED ON CONSTRUCTION
OF KOLA TECHNICAL CENTER
During its 15-26 October 2001 visit to the
Kurchatov
Institute, a US delegation, consisting of DOE
officials and experts from the Oak
Ridge National Laboratory and Pacific
Northwest National Laboratory, signed contracts concerning the design of the
Kola Technical Center. The center will provide technical support
for MPC&A
activities on the Kola Peninsula and will be staffed by navy and local
civilian personnel. It will also provide facilities for training
purposes, spare parts storage for MPC&A equipment, and minor
equipment repair. Construction is supposed to start in spring 2002; the
center should start operations by spring 2003. The Kola Technical Center
will become a pilot project for the development of two other technical centers
in Vladivostok and Kamchatka.
2/28/2001: GAO SAYS THAT DOE EFFORTS IN MPC&A ARE CONSIDERABLE BUT NOT SUFFICIENT
On 28 February 2001, the US General Accounting Office (GAO) released a report assessing efforts by the US Department of
Energy (DOE) to improve MPC&A in Russia. The report acknowledges DOE's efforts to
reduce the risk of theft of nuclear materials, indicating, however, that
further enhancements are needed. The report presents a detailed description of various aspects of MPC&A
activities implemented by DOE. In addition to installation of
security systems at Russian nuclear facilities, DOE provides assistance in
long-term operations and maintenance of systems installed. As noted in the
report, DOE initially planned to assist each site for up to three years. Due to poor economic conditions, some sites might require
prolonged operational support. DOE also assists
Minatom and
Gosatomnadzor with establishing
regulations and enforcement mechanisms for nuclear material security, developing
a national inventory of nuclear materials, training personnel on nuclear material
security, and improving the security of transportation of nuclear materials.
DOE promoted the Material Conversion and Consolidation Initiative that would place nuclear
materials in fewer buildings in an attempt to decrease overall costs of MPC&A program.
However, Minatom's reluctance to identify which sites and buildings will close,
and the reluctance of sites in Russia to give up their nuclear materials prevent
effective implementation of the Initiative.
According to the report, DOE expects to complete the MPC&A program in 2020 at a
total cost of about $2.2 billion.
One of the major obstacles to
implementation of the MPC&A program is the restriction of access to certain
buildings. DOE did not install security systems in 104 buildings, since Minatom restricted access to
these buildings, containing several hundred metric
tons of nuclear material, because of Russian national security concerns. According to DOE officials, access is needed in order to design effective
security systems and to monitor proper use of equipment provided by DOE. To overcome
the problem of access, DOE introduced alternative ways of
providing assurances that may include photographs and videotapes, visual
inspection by a single member of the project team, and written certifications by
site directors. As of February 2001, this approach was being tested at sensitive buildings in
Sarov and
Snezhinsk.
According to the report, a second problem with DOE's MPC&A activities is the
absence of monitoring mechanisms that would ascertain that installed security
systems operate properly and effectively.
11/17/2000: MPC&A PROGRAM SECURES 10 METRIC
TONS OF WEAPONS-USEABLE MATERIAL
For details on upgrades to the Central Storage
Facility, see the 11/17/2000
entry in the Novosibirsk Chemical Concentrate Plant
developments section
10/2/99: NEW MPC&A AGREEMENT SIGNED
On 2 October 1999, US Energy Secretary Bill Richardson
and Russian Minister of Atomic Energy Yevgeniy Adamov signed the Agreement
Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the
Russian Federation Regarding Cooperation in the Area of Nuclear Material Physical
Protection, Control and Accounting. This new agreement extends US-Russian
MPC&A cooperation and establishes a Joint Coordinating
Committee. Under the agreement, if US access to facilities where activities related
to the program are being conducted is restricted by Russia, DOE and Minatom must
develop alternative, nonintrusive approaches that will allow the work to continue.[1]
The MPC&A program will receive $150 million in
FY 2000. During the next two years, 30MT of materials will be consolidated into
fewer buildings at fewer sites, and 2MT of weapons-grade materials will be converted
into non-weapons-usable forms. Transportation upgrades on 48 trucks and 33 rail
cars, the submarine dismantlement feasibility study, and the Federal Information
System for tracking materials will also be completed. Security upgrades are scheduled
at sites in the ten nuclear cities, at 22 civilian power and research reactor
sites, and at 10 Russian Federation Navy sites.[2]
8/30/99: DOE SIGNS
LETTER OF INTENT WITH MINATOM ON MCC
PROJECT
On 30 August 1999 the US Department of Energy signed a
letter of intent with Russia's Ministry of
Atomic Energy concerning the future
direction of the Material Conversion and Consolidation (MCC) project.
The MCC project, a part of the US Department of
Energy's Material, Protection, Control and Accounting (MPC&A) program,
is intended to increase the security of Russian fissile
material by consolidating it in fewer buildings at each site and at fewer
sites throughout Russia in general. Conversion of highly-enriched
uranium to low-enriched uranium is another priority of the MCC project.
7/24/98: DOE AND
MVD SIGN MEMORANDUM OF COOPERATION
On 24 July 1998, the US Department of Energy (DOE) and
the Russian Federation Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) signed a memorandum of cooperation
concerning the physical protection of nuclear materials that are not in weapons
form. Signed within the framework of the DOE
MPC&A program in Russia, the memorandum includes DOE and MVD
cooperation in the areas of infrastructure, equipment, communications
improvements, and training. The first phase of cooperation, a technical
workshop of experts from the MVD and DOE, is scheduled for September 1998.
12/3/97: RUSSIAN-AMERICAN CENTER FOR MPC&A TECHNICAL
SUPPORT BEING ESTABLISHED
A Russian technical support center for MPC&A programs
is being formed in Novosibirsk. This center will be established with the
Siberian branch of the Russian Federal Inspectorate for Nuclear and Radiation
Safety (Gosatomnadzor) and the Budker
Institute of Nuclear Physics (BINP). The project is being developed
within the framework of an agreement
signed by the US Department of Energy and Gosatomnadzor at the June 1995 meeting
of the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission (GCC). This
US-Russian cooperative plan provides for the building of several such centers
across Russia. Specifics about the center are to be discussed at a US-Russian
conference in Akademgorodok near Novosibirsk on 8-11 December 1997. Contracts
and a general agreement for the center are to be signed on the basis of this working
conference.
12/18/96: US PROCURING RELIABILITY TESTING EQUIPMENT
FOR RUSSIAN NUCLEAR WORKERS
The Pentagon's Defense Special Weapons Agency (DSWA),
is looking to US contractors to provide testing equipment
for the Russian Ministry of Defense 'Personnel Reliability
Program.' The equipment sought includes 60 alcohol breathalysers, enough portable
drug test indicators to handle 10,000 samples annually
and five polygraph computer systems. It is to be used for Russian civilian and
military workers who come into contact with nuclear weapons. The purchase
of such equipment is funded by monies from the CTR program
and is aimed at assessing the dependability
of Russian nuclear workers.
9/19/96: MC&A: AUTOMATED INVENTORY PROTOTYPE OPERATIONAL
As part of the materials control and accounting project, the Russian Ministry
of Defense will designate up to 10 regional centers and 100 field sites to establish
an automated tracking system for nuclear warheads slated for dismantlement. The
inventory is now done manually. Twenty-five personal computers have been delivered
and the prototype became operational in 10/96. Installation of the tracking system
is expected to be complete in the fourth quarter of FY 98.
7/14-7/16/96: US-RUSSIAN MPC&A OFFICIAL STATEMENT SIGNED
US Energy Secretary O'Leary and Russian Minister of Atomic Energy Mikhaylov
signed a joint statement on extending efforts to enhance MPC&A to four additional
Russian nuclear material storage facilities, and to improve MPC&A measures
during transportation.
7/96: NEW US-RUSSIAN MPC&A AGREEMENTS
The US Secretary of Energy and the Russian Minister of Atomic Energy signed
agreements on expanding efforts to enhance MPC&A system to four additional
sites: the Mining and Chemical Combine in Zheleznogorsk, the Moscow Institute
of Theoretical and Experimental Physics, the St. Petersburg Central Design Bureau
of Machine Building, and the Research and Design Institute of Power Engineering
(NIKIET).
4/5/96: DOE WILL GIVE FUNDS TO SECURE MORE SITES IN RUSSIA
The US Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Nonproliferation and National
Security requested $94 million in fiscal year 1997 for MPC&A activities in
the countries of the former Soviet Union. According to Director Joan Rohlfling,
DOE will sign agreements to work on 10-15 civilian and military sites in Russia,
including 5-7 naval bases. DOE estimated that the amount of fissile materials
secured in the former Soviet Union will have increased from 8 tons in 1995 to
hundreds of tons in 1996.
2/29/96: UNITED STATES WILL SPEND MILLIONS TO UPGRADE SAFETY IN CIS FACILITIES
US Deputy Secretary of Energy Charles B. Curtis announced that the United
States will spend $330 million over the next six years to upgrade security at
40 to 50 nuclear facilities in Russia, Kazakhstan, Georgia, Belarus, Latvia, Ukraine,
and Uzbekistan. The program will include the installation of sophisticated monitoring
equipment. Curtis stated that two-thirds of these facilities only have "guards,
gates, and guns" as security measures. US aid for such upgrades increased from
$2 million in 1994 to $70 million in 1995 and is expected to reach $100 million
in 1996.
10/23/95: UNITED STATES PLEDGES TO ASSIST RUSSIAN FACILITIES
During their meeting in Hyde Park, New York, Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin
agreed to several objectives concerning nuclear materials security. The objectives
include: expanding measures to enhance security at five Russian nuclear weapons
facilities; increased lab-to-lab activities; and the creation of an MPC&A
training center. $47 million has been committed to the measures: $30 for MPC&A
under CTR, and $17 million for lab-to-lab.
9/28/95: PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVE FOCUSES ON MPC&A IN NIS
President Clinton announced a directive to "accelerate cooperation with Russia
and the other newly independent states to strengthen the security surrounding
nuclear weapons and fissile material." Included in the directive are efforts to
speed up current projects underway between the US Department of Defense and the
Russian Defense Ministry; strengthen ties between US and Russian law enforcement
agencies; and to enhance cooperation between the US NRC and Gosatomnadzor, to
develop a national MC&A system.
6/95: US WEAPONS LABORATORIES TO ASSIST NUCLEAR CONVERSION
A conversion program by year 2000 mapped out by the Russian
Federal Nuclear Center in Snezhinsk (formerly Chelyabinsk-70) includes 92 projects.
The All-Russian Scientific Research Institute of Technological Physics will develop
civil technology as well as systems for nuclear safety. Many conversion contracts
have been signed with leading US weapons laboratories, and about 20 conversion
projects for several million dollars financed by the International Scientific
and Technological Center are being carried out.
1/20/95: MPC&A AGREEMENT IS AMENDED AND WILL INCLUDE MORE SITES
The MPC&A implementing agreement between Minatom and the US DOE was amended
in order to include non-irradiated direct use materials such as HEU and plutonium;
a higher funding limit of $30 million was implemented. Also, Ambassadors Goodby
and Yegorov signed the Preliminary Agreement to Extend Assistance in order to
include Elektrostal's HEU (FBR and Navy Fuel), and sites at Dimitrovgrad, Mayak,
Novosibirsk, Obninsk, and Podolsk.
1/95: DOE TO FUND MPC&A PROGRAM
The US DOE will receive $300,000 for its material protection, control and
accounting (MPC&A) funding for its programs with the CIS in FY95; this falls
under the auspices of the DOE Lab-to-Lab program. The US and Russia are negotiating
terms for the establishment of a national MPC&A training center in Obninsk.
1995: COMPONENTS OF THE MPC&A TRAINING PROGRAM
Accomplishments of the Sandia National Laboratory MPC&A training in Russia
include: a five-day basic physical protection system design training for 7 specialists
at Elektrostal; physical protection workshop conducted with Eleron for 80 participants
in Moscow; vulnerability assessment training conducted with Lawrence Livermore
National Laboratory to 14 participants from Kurchatov Institute, 10 participants
from Eleron, 16 participants at Chelyabinsk-70, and 16 participants at the Institute
of Physics and Power Engineering in Obninsk.
8/28/94: MC&A PROGRAM IS FRUSTRATED BY US-RUSSIAN
CONFLICTS
US officials maintain that since Russia lacks the experienced personnel to
keep track of the approximately 1,000 tons of bomb grade uranium and 700 tons
of plutonium it possesses, it cannot guarantee that no nuclear material has been
diverted. An American MC&A project to assist Russia has been frustrated by
US conflicts with Russian experts, low funding, and a lack of attention given
to the issue by the American government. Only $58 million of the $988 million
in Nunn-Lugar money was allocated for export controls and MC&A in Russia,
Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine. Of that $58 million, $4.2 million has been spent
thus far on MC&A and export controls, and only $1 million has been spent in
Russia. Russia refused an additional American offer of $22 million, saying that
it does not need any advice on export controls. The US is willing to spend another
$100 million to prevent further incidents of nuclear smuggling. Viktor Mikhaylov,
head of Minatom, has reportedly avoided including Western experts in Russia's
work to develop an MC&A system for fear of domestic political reprisals from
ultra-nationalists who may take power in the future. Minatom refused an offer
to install US equipment for keeping track of enriched uranium at the naval fuel
fabrication facility at Elektrostal.
11/94: UNITED STATES HOSTS SECOND MPC&A MEETING
A second MPC&A technical working meeting was held in Washington, DC with
Russian and US representatives.
9/28/94: CLINTON AND YELTSIN PLEDGE COOPERATION ON MPC&A IN RUSSIA
Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin agreed at their Washington, DC summit meeting
to cooperate in improving the security of nuclear materials in Russia so as to
prevent further instances of nuclear smuggling. They pledged to work together
to develop bilateral and multilateral controls by means of information exchange.
Cooperative programs between US and Russian national laboratories in the areas
of physical protection, control, and accounting of nuclear materials (MPC&A)
will also begin in the near future. President Clinton stated that the US is prepared
to provide an additional $20 million for MC&A upgrades; this is in addition
to the previous agreement to give Russia $10 million for MPC&A. The national
labs, under the auspices of the US Department of Energy (DOE), were given $2 million
in FY94 for lab-to-lab cooperation in MC&A. According to the White House,
the DOE intends to provide the labs with in excess of $50 million for FY95-96.
6/94: NUNN-LUGAR FUNDS PLEDGED TO MC&A PROGRAM
The United States pledged $30 million in Nunn-Lugar funds for improving the
MC&A system in Russia.
2/94: MPC&A MEETING IN MOSCOW
As part of the DOE Lab-to-Lab Program to improve MPC&A in Russia, the
first technical working meeting was held in Moscow.
9/2/93: AGREEMENT IS SIGNED
The Material Protection, Controls and Accounting Agreement was signed.
8/93: MIKHAILOV PREPARED TO COOPERATE WITH WESTERN LABS
Viktor Mikhailov stated that he is ready to cooperate with
the West on nuclear military conversion activities despite the fact that he faces
stiff opposition at home. Experts from the Lawrence Livermore and Los Alamos National
Laboratories have visited Arzamas-16 and Chelyabinsk-70 and have identified several
areas of possible cooperation.
6/92: MC&A AGREEMENT SIGNED
As part of the DOE Lab-to-Lab program, Russia and the United States signed
an umbrella agreement regarding MC&A.
3/92: MC&A EXCHANGE BETWEEN RUSSIA AND UNITED STATES
The first MC&A exchange between Russia and the United States took place
in Moscow. This is under the auspices of the DOE Lab-to-Lab program.
Last updated 19 September 2003
This file is no longer
being updated. For major recent developments, please see the
Russia: Foreign Assistance Programs file.
Comments or questions? Contact Elena Sokova at MIIS
CNS: esokovaATmiis.edu
This material is produced independently for NTI
by the Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the
Monterey Institute of International Studies and
does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has
not been independently verified by NTI or its directors, officers,
employees, agents. Copyright © 2002 by MIIS.
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