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Russia: Fulltext: Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction
Original
Source: http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/bian/bian.html
Unclassified Report to Congress on
the Acquisition of Technology Relating to
Weapons of Mass Destruction and
Advanced Conventional Munitions
1 January Through 30 June 1998
The Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) hereby submits this report
in response to a Congressionally directed action in Section 721 of the
FY 1997 Intelligence Authorization Act, which requires:
"(a) Not later than 6 months after the date of the enactment of this
Act, and every 6 months thereafter, the Director of Central Intelligence
shall submit to Congress a report on
At the DCI's request, the DCI Nonproliferation Center (NPC) drafted this
report and coordinated it throughout the Intelligence Community.
As directed by Section 721, subsection (b) of the Act, it is unclassified.
As such, the report does not present the details of the Intelligence Community's
assessments of weapons of mass destruction and advanced conventional munitions
programs that are available in other classified reports and briefings for
the Congress.
Following are summaries by country of acquisition activities (solicitations,
negotiations, contracts, and deliveries) related to weapons of mass destruction
(WMD) and advanced conventional weapons (ACW) that occurred from 1 January
through 30 June 1998. We chose to exclude countries that already
have substantial WMD programs, such as China and Russia, as well as countries
that demonstrated little WMD acquisition activity of concern. The
countries deemed of most concern are listed in alphabetical order.
Egypt continues its effort to develop and produce the Scud B and Scud
C and to develop the two-stage Vector short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs).
Cairo also is interested in developing a medium-range ballistic missile
(MRBM). During the first half of 1998, Egypt continued to obtain
ballistic missile components and associated equipment from North Korea.
This activity is part of a long-running program of ballistic missile cooperation
between these two countries.
India has tried to alleviate problems caused by foreign export controls
by relying primarily on indigenous resources for the development and production
of its ballistic missiles. Although striving to achieve independence
from foreign suppliers, India's ballistic missile programs still benefited
from the acquisition of foreign equipment and technology. India sought
items for these programs during the reporting period from a variety of
sources worldwide, including many countries in Europe and the former Soviet
Union.
India also continued to seek nuclear-related equipment, materials, and
technology during the first half of 1998, some of which could be used in
nuclear weapons applications. The most sought-after goods were of
Russian- and UK-origin. India continues to pursue the development
of advanced nuclear weapons, as evidenced by the underground nuclear tests
that it conducted in May 1998. The acquisition of foreign equipment
could benefit India in its efforts to develop and produce more sophisticated
nuclear weapons.
Iran remains one of the most active countries seeking to acquire WMD
technology and ACW. During the reporting period, Iran focused its
efforts to acquire WMD-related equipment, materials, and technology primarily
on two countries: Russia and China. Iran is seeking to develop
an indigenous capability to produce various types of nuclear, chemical,
and biological weapons and their delivery systems.
During the reporting period, entities in Russia and China continued
to supply missile-related goods and technology to Iran. Tehran is
using these goods and technologies to achieve its goal of becoming self-sufficient
in the production of MRBMs. The July flight test of the Shahab-3
MRBM demonstrates the success Iran has achieved in realizing that goal.
Iran already is producing Scud SRBMs with North Korean help and has begun
production of the Shahab-3. In addition, Iran's Defense Minister
has publicly acknowledged the development of the Shahab-4 ballistic missile,
with a "longer range and heavier payload than the 1,300-km Shahab-3."
Iran obtained material related to chemical warfare (CW) from various
sources during the first half of 1998. It already has manufactured
and stockpiled chemical weapons, including blister, blood, and choking
agents and the bombs and artillery shells for delivering them. However,
Tehran is seeking foreign equipment and expertise to create a more advanced
and self-sufficient CW infrastructure.
Tehran continued to pursue purchasing dual-use biotechnical equipment
from Russia and other countries, ostensibly for civilian uses. Its
biological warfare (BW) program began during the Iran-Iraq war, and Iran
may have some limited capability for BW deployment. Outside assistance
is both important and difficult to prevent, given the dual-use nature of
the materials and equipment being sought and the many legitimate end uses
for these items.
During the first half of 1998, Iran also actively sought modern battle
tanks, surface-to-air missiles, aircraft, and other weapon systems and
spare parts from the former Soviet Union (FSU), China, and Europe.
Iran's armed forces employ weapons from a wide variety of sources, including
old US weapons, FSU aircraft seized from Iraqi pilots fleeing the Gulf
war, and Chinese antiship cruise missiles. As with its WMD programs,
Tehran is seeking relevant production technology to lessen its dependence
on foreign sources.
Russian entities continued to market and support a variety of nuclear-related
projects in Iran during the first half of 1998, ranging from the sale of
laboratory equipment for nuclear research institutes to the construction
of a 1,000-megawatt nuclear power reactor in Bushehr, Iran, that will be
subject to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards.
These projects, along with other nuclear-related purchases, will help Iran
augment its nuclear technology infrastructure, which in turn would be useful
in supporting nuclear weapons research and development.
Russia has committed to observe certain limits on its nuclear cooperation
with Iran. For example, President Yel'tsin has stated publicly that
Russia will not provide militarily useful nuclear technology to Iran.
Beginning in January this year, the Russian Government has taken a number
of steps. For example, in May 1998, Russia announced a decree intended
to strengthen compliance of Russian businesses with existing export controls
on proliferation-related items.
During the reporting period, China continued to work on one of its two
remaining projects--to supply Iran's civil nuclear program with a zirconium
production facility. This facility will be used by Iran to produce
cladding for reactor fuel. As a party to the Nuclear Nonproliferation
Treaty, Iran is required to apply IAEA safeguards to nuclear fuel, but
safeguards are not required for the zirconium plant or its products.
During the US-China October 1997 Summit, China pledged not to engage in
any new nuclear cooperation with Iran and to complete cooperation on two
ongoing nuclear projects in a relatively short time. This pledge
appears to be holding. In addition, China promulgated new export
regulations in June 1998 that cover the sale of dual-use nuclear equipment.
The regulations took effect immediately and were intended to strengthen
control over equipment and material that would contribute to proliferation.
Promulgation of these regulations fulfills Jiang Zemin's commitment to
the United States last fall to implement such controls by the middle of
1998.
Iran claims to desire the establishment of a complete nuclear fuel cycle
for its civilian energy program. In that guise, it seeks to obtain
whole facilities, such as a uranium conversion facility, that, in fact,
could be used in any number of ways in support of efforts to produce fissile
material needed for a nuclear weapon. Despite outside efforts to
curtail the flow of critical technologies and equipment, Tehran continues
to seek fissile material and technology for weapons development and has
set up an elaborate system of military and civilian organizations to support
its effort.
Iraq has purchased numerous dual-use items for legitimate civilian
projects--in principle subject to UN scrutiny--that also could be diverted
for WMD purposes. Since the Gulf war, Baghdad has rebuilt key portions
of its chemical production infrastructure for industrial and commercial
use. Some of these facilities could be converted fairly quickly for
production of CW agents. The recent discovery that Iraq had weaponized
the advanced nerve agent VX and the convincing evidence that fewer CW munitions
were consumed during the Iran-Iraq war than Iraq had declared provide strong
indications that Iraq retains a CW capability and intends to reconstitute
its pre-Gulf war capability as rapidly as possible once sanctions are lifted.
Iraq continues to refuse to disclose fully the extent of its BW program.
After four years of denials, Iraq admitted to an offensive program resulting
in the destruction of Al Hakam-a large BW production facility Iraq was
trying to hide as a legitimate biological plant. Iraq still has not
accounted for over a hundred BW bombs and over 80 percent of imported growth
media-directly related to past and future Iraqi production of thousands
of gallons of biological agent. This lack of cooperation is an indication
that Baghdad intends to reconstitute its BW capability when possible.
Baghdad is developing two ballistic missiles that fall within the UN-allowed
150-km range restriction. The Al Samoud liquid-propellant missile--described
as a scaled-down Scud--began flight-testing in 1997. Technicians
for Iraq's pre-war Scud missiles are working on the Al Samoud program and,
although under UNSCOM supervision, are developing technological improvements
that could be applied to future longer-range missile programs. The
Ababil-100 solid-propellant missile is also under development, although
progress on this system lags the Al Samoud. After economic sanctions
are lifted and UN inspections cease, Iraq could utilize expertise from
these programs in the development of longer-range missile systems.
We assess that Iraq continues to hide documentation, and probably some
equipment, relating to key aspects of past nuclear activities. After
years of Iraqi denials, the IAEA was able to get Iraq to admit to a far
more advanced nuclear weapons program and a project based on advanced uranium
enrichment technology. However, Baghdad continues to withhold significant
information about enrichment techniques, foreign procurement, and weapons
design.
Libya continued to obtain ballistic missile-related equipment, materials,
and technology during the first half of 1998. Outside assistance
is critical to keeping its fledgling ballistic missile development programs
from becoming moribund. Nevertheless, the UN embargo has restricted
the flow of ballistic missile goods and technology reaching Libya.
Libya remains heavily dependent on foreign suppliers for precursor chemicals
and other key CW-related equipment. UN sanctions continued to severely
limit that support during the first half of 1998. Still, Tripoli
has not given up its goal of establishing its own offensive CW capability
and continues to pursue an independent production capability for the weapons.
Libya also sought to obtain spare parts and other support for its military
aircraft and naval vessels from sources in the FSU and Eastern Europe.
Once again, the UN embargo has greatly affected Tripoli, restricting its
ability to keep Libya's Air Force operational.
During the reporting period, North Korea attempted to obtain raw materials
for its ballistic missile programs. Otherwise, it sought little in
the way of dual-use equipment and technology for its own weapons programs.
Pyongyang does not require significant outside assistance to produce ballistic
missiles or weapons of mass destruction. North Korea produces and
is capable of using a wide variety of CW agents and delivery means and
is capable of supporting a limited BW effort.
We assess that North Korea has produced enough plutonium for at least
one, possibly two, nuclear weapons. The United States and North Korea
are canning spent fuel from the Yongbyon complex for ultimate shipment
out of the North in accordance with the 1994 Agreed Framework. That
reactor fuel may contain enough plutonium for additional weapons.
Pakistan sought a wide variety of dual-use nuclear-related equipment
and materials from sources throughout the world during the first half of
1998. Islamabad has a well-developed nuclear weapons program, as
evidenced by its first nuclear weapons tests in late May 1998. (The
United States imposed sanctions against Pakistan as a result of these tests.)
Acquisition of nuclear-related goods from foreign sources will be important
for the development and production of more advanced nuclear weapons.
Chinese and North Korean entities continued to provide assistance to
Pakistan's ballistic missile program during the first half of 1998.
Such assistance is critical for Islamabad's efforts to produce ballistic
missiles. In April 1998, Pakistan flight tested the 1,300-km Ghauri
MRBM, which is based on North Korea's No Dong missile. Also in April
1998, the United States imposed sanctions against Pakistani and North Korean
entities for their role in transferring Missile Technology Control Regime
Category I ballistic missile-related technology.
During the reporting period, Sudan sought to acquire a wide variety
of military equipment from sources in North Korea, Eastern Europe, and
the FSU. The shopping list included tanks, armored fighting vehicles,
aircraft, antitank guided missiles, surface-to-air missiles, and a wide
variety of ammunition. Sudan is seeking older, less expensive weapons
that nonetheless are advanced compared with the capabilities of the weapons
possessed by its opponents in the long-running civil war.
Sudan has been developing the capability to produce chemical weapons
for many years. In this pursuit, Sudan obtained help from other countries,
principally Iraq. Given its history in developing CW and its close
relationship with Iraq, Sudan may be interested in a BW program as well.
Syria continued to seek CW-related precursors from various sources
during the reporting period. Damascus already has a stockpile of
the nerve agent sarin and may be trying to develop more toxic and persistent
nerve agents. Syria remains dependent on foreign sources for key
elements of its CW program, including precursor chemicals and key production
equipment.
During the first half of 1998, Damascus continued work on establishing
a solid-propellant rocket motor development and production capability.
Foreign equipment and assistance have been and will continue to be essential
for this effort.
In addition, Russia continued to deliver advanced antitank guided missiles
to Syria. The vast majority of Syria's arsenal consists of weapons
from the former Soviet Union. Russia wants to keep its predominant
position as the key supplier of arms to Syria.
During the first half of 1998, China continued to take steps to strengthen
its control over nuclear exports. China promulgated new export control
regulations in June 1998 that cover the sale of dual-use nuclear equipment.
This follows on the heels of the September 1997 promulgation of controls
covering the export of equipment and materials associated exclusively with
nuclear applications. These export controls should give the Chinese
Government greater accounting and control of the transfer of equipment,
materials, and technology to nuclear programs in countries of concern.
China pledged in late 1997 not to engage in any new nuclear cooperation
with Iran and to complete work on two remaining nuclear projects--a small
research reactor and a zirconium production facility--in a relatively short
period of time. During the first half of 1998, Beijing appears to
have implemented this pledge. The Intelligence Community will continue
to monitor carefully Chinese nuclear cooperation with Iran.
During the reporting period, Chinese entities provided a variety of
missile-related items and assistance to several countries of proliferation
concern. China also was an important supplier of ACW to Iran through
the first half of 1998.
Chinese entities sought to supply Iran and Syria with CW-related chemicals
during this reporting period. The US sanctions imposed in May 1997
on seven Chinese entities for knowingly and materially contributing to
Iran's CW program remain in effect.
China has provided extensive support in the past to Pakistan's WMD programs,
and some assistance continues. China's involvement with Pakistan
will continue to be monitored closely.
Russian firms supplied a variety of ballistic missile-related goods
and technical know-how to foreign countries during the reporting period.
For example, Iran's earlier success in gaining technology and materials
from Russian companies accelerated Iranian development of the Shahab-3
MRBM, which was first flight tested in July 1998.
During the first half of 1998, Russia remained a key supplier for civilian
nuclear programs in Iran and, to a lesser extent, India. With respect
to Iran's nuclear infrastructure, Russian assistance would enhance Iran's
ability to support a nuclear weapons development effort. Such assistance
is less likely to significantly advance India's effort, given that India's
nuclear weapons program is more mature. By its very nature, even
the transfer of civilian technology may be of use in the nuclear weapons
programs of these countries.
Russia remains a key source of biotechnology for Iran. Russia's
world-leading expertise in biological weapons makes it an attractive target
for Iranians seeking technical information and training on BW agent production
processes.
Russia also was an important source of conventional weapons and spare
parts for Middle Eastern countries like Iran and Syria, that are seeking
to upgrade and replace their existing conventional weapons inventories.
Following intense and continuing engagement with the United States,
Russian officials have taken some positive steps. Russia has committed
to observe certain limits on its nuclear cooperation with Iran, such as
not providing militarily useful nuclear technology. In January 1998,
the Russian Government issued a broad decree prohibiting Russian companies
from exporting items known or believed to be used for developing WMD or
related delivery systems, whether or not these items are on Russia's export
control list. In May 1998, Russia announced a decree intended to
strengthen compliance of Russian businesses with existing export controls
on proliferation-related items. These actions, if enforced, could
help to counter the proliferation of WMD and their delivery systems.
However, there are signs that Russian entities have continued to engage
in behavior inconsistent with these steps. Monitoring Russian proliferation
behavior, therefore, will have to remain a very high priority for some
time to come.
Throughout the first half of 1998, North Korea continued to export
ballistic missile-related equipment and missile components and materials
to countries of concern. Pyongyang attaches a high priority to the
development and sale of ballistic missiles, equipment, and related technology.
North Korea has little else to export to raise significant amounts of hard
currency besides ballistic missiles and other weapons.
During the first half of 1998, Western nations were not as important
sources for WMD-related goods and materials as in past years. Increasingly
rigorous and effective export controls and cooperation among supplier countries
have led foreign WMD programs to look elsewhere for controlled dual-use
goods. Spare parts for dual-use equipment and widely available materials
and scientific equipment were the most common items sought.
Foreign WMD procurement managers in countries of concern have responded
to Western export controls by seeking dual-use goods largely from Russia
and China. In addition, the countries of concern are looking more
to each other as a source of ballistic missiles systems, critical missile
components, and related technology. In these cases, assistance from
countries like China and Russia may still be needed to integrate the components
and technologies into an effective operational weapon system.
Countries determined to maintain WMD programs over the long term have
been placing significant emphasis on insulating their programs against
interdiction and disruption. Many of them are trying to reduce their
dependence on imports by developing indigenous production capabilities.
Although these capabilities may not always be a good substitute for foreign
imports--particularly for more advanced technologies--in many cases they
may prove to be adequate.
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 This material is produced independently for NTI
by the Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the
Monterey Institute of International Studies and
does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has
not been independently verified by NTI or its directors, officers,
employees, agents. Copyright © 2002 by MIIS.
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