On the occasion of the fifth meeting of the U.S.­Russian Joint Commission on Economic and Technological Cooperation (The Gore­Chernomyrdin Commission) in Moscow on

June 29­30, 1995, the Russian Federation Ministry of Atomic Energy and the United States Department of Energy reaffirmed their commitment to fulfilling the transparency requirements of the February 1993 Bilateral Agreement for United States Purchase of Russian Highly Enriched Uranium. They agreed that procedures to ensure that Russian highly enriched uranium is converted into low enriched uranium will be implemented at the Russian facilities where material subject to the Agreement will be processed. To increase transparency, the following additional procedures will be adopted:

technological access by U.S. monitoring personnel to facilities and equipment appropriate for monitoring the flow and contents of the pipes at or near the feed and blending points:

copies of all accounting, processing and operational control records related to all steps in the highly enriched uranium conversion process for all material sold to the United States under the Agreement; and,

provision of samples, taken under U.S. observation, of the highly enriched uranium, blend stock and low enriched product from the pipes at or near the blending point for analysis according to mutually­agreed procedures.

Similar, mutually­acceptable procedures will be adopted to provide transparency to the Russian Federation on operations at the Portsmouth enrichment facility related to storage and processing of low enriched uranium delivered under the Purchase Agreement.

Implementation of agreed procedures will be negotiated by the transparency Review Committee.

U.S. Secretary of Energy
 
 
 

Signed by Hazel R. O'Leary

Minister of Atomic Energy of the

Russian Federation
 

Signed by Viktor Mikhailov

Moscow, June 30, 1995

Source: URL: http://www.eia.doe.gov/gorec/gcc15.html

Comments or questions? Contact Cristina Chuen at MIIS CNS: Cristina.ChuenATmiis.edu

This material is produced independently for NTI by the Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies and does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been independently verified by NTI or its directors, officers, employees, agents. Copyright © 2002 by MIIS.

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