For a more complete list of international organizations, information, and
updates please see the
Russia profile
at the NTI Disarmament Database and the
Inventory
of International Nonproliferation Organizations and Regimes compiled by the
Center for Nonproliferation Studies. Membership is listed alphabetically after
the Conference on Disarmament entry (click on right hand side links for easier
navigation).
http://disarmament.un.org/wmd/index.html
The Russian Federation inherited the status of the
Soviet Union as a nuclear-weapons state member of the NPT. The Soviet
Union signed the NPT on 5 March 1970 as a depositary government.
Russia supported the decision at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension
Conference to extend the NPT indefinitely.[1] Russia also supported a
joint statement with other member states at the 2000 NPT Review Conference
calling for an “unequivocal undertaking” to accomplish the total elimination of nuclear weapons.[2]
For additional information, please see
Russia profile
at the NTI Disarmament Database.
1/23/2001: RUSSIA OPPOSES TIME FRAME
PROPOSALS FOR ELIMINATING NUCLEAR WEAPONS
Foreign Ministry representative Aleksandr
Yakovenko said on 23 January 2001 that Russia opposes proposals to
establish a time frame for the elimination of nuclear weapons. He
called such attempts "counterproductive and unrealistic."
At the same time, Yakovenko stated that Russia is ready to develop
reasonable and constructive measures towards further steps in nuclear
disarmament, and is in favor of strengthening the nonproliferation regime.
Yakovenko referred to President Putin's proposal made in September 2000 to
develop ways to exclude weapons-grade materials from the nuclear fuel cycle.
http://www.iaea.org
Russia inherited the Soviet Union's IAEA status. The Soviet
Union became a member of the IAEA on 8 April 1957. Russia has allowed the IAEA
to inspect a limited number of civilian nuclear facilities following a
10 June 1985
voluntary offer agreement between the Soviet Union and
the IAEA. On 16 October 2007, Russia acceded to the
IAEA
Additional Protocol, which would pave way for safeguarding at selected
Russian nuclear facilities.
http://disarmament2.un.org/cd
Russia is a member of the CD.
For additional information, please also see
Russia profile
at the NTI Disarmament Database.
http://www.un.org/sc/1540/
On 28 April 2004, the United Nations Security Council unanimously adopted
Resolution 1540, which obliges states to refrain from supporting by any
means non-State actors from developing, acquiring, manufacturing, possessing,
transporting, transferring or using nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and
their delivery systems. Russia is a member of the 1540 Committee.
http://www.state.gov/t/isn/c18406.htm
Launched by Russian President Vladimir Putin and U.S. President George W. Bush
on 15 July 2006, the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism
intends to
build the capacity of willing partner nations to combat the global threat of
nuclear terrorism. As of December 2007, the Global Initiative (GI) has 64
partner nations, all of which seek to implement the following principles:
Develop, if necessary, and improve accounting, control and physical protection
systems for nuclear and other radioactive materials and substances;
Enhance security of civilian nuclear facilities;
Improve the ability to detect nuclear and other radioactive materials and
substances in order to prevent illicit trafficking in such materials and
substances, to include cooperation in the research and development of national
detection capabilities that would be interoperable;
Improve capabilities of participants to search for, confiscate, and establish
safe control over unlawfully held nuclear or other radioactive materials and
substances or devices using them
Prevent the provision of safe haven to terrorists and financial or
economic resources to terrorists seeking to acquire or use nuclear
and other radioactive materials and substances;
Ensure adequate respective national legal and regulatory frameworks
sufficient to provide for the implementation of appropriate criminal
and, if applicable, civil liability for terrorists and those who
facilitate acts of nuclear terrorism;
Improve capabilities of participants for response, mitigation, and
investigation, in cases of terrorist attacks involving the use of
nuclear and other radioactive materials and substances, including
the development of technical means to identify nuclear and other
radioactive materials and substances that are, or may be, involved
in the incident; and
Promote information sharing pertaining to the suppression of acts of
nuclear terrorism and their facilitation, taking appropriate
measures consistent with their national law and international
obligations to protect the confidentiality of any information which
they exchange in confidence.
http://www.mtcr.info
Russia was formally admitted
to the MTCR, which restricts the transfer of missiles, components,
and related production technology with respect to missiles able to carry a nuclear, chemical, or biological
payload over 500 kg to a distance greater than 300 km, at a plenary meeting held in Bonn from 10/10/95-10/12/95.[1]
Russia's admission to the MTCR was conditional on the establishment of a new
export control system, which was accomplished by the 1993 Presidential Decree
"List of Equipment, Materials and Technologies Used for Developing Missile
Weaponry, the Export of Which is Controlled and Licensed," and the governmental
edict "Procedures for Controlling the Export from the Russian Federation of
Equipment, Materials, and Technologies Used for Developing Missile Weaponry." [2]
Russia signed the 1963
Vienna Convention on Civil Liability
for Nuclear Damage on 8 May 1996, with a liability
ceiling of $3 million. Under the Convention, primary liability for damage
resulting from a nuclear reactor accident remains with the country operating
the reactor.[1,2,3,4,5] On 4 December 1996,
Russian President Yeltsin sent the Vienna Convention to the Duma for ratification.[6]
On 12 May 1997, the Duma Committee on International Affairs sent Deputy
Speaker Aleksandr Shokhin a memo in which they requested that reviewing
the bill to ratify the convention be postponed until more information is
gathered on the financial, economic, and other consequences of ratifying
the Convention.[7] The Committee on International Affairs has created
a bill for a resolution to recommend that President Yeltsin investigate
the possibility of dealing with this matter on a bilateral basis (as do
the United States, France, and China, which are not parties to the Convention).[7,8]
The
Convention
on Nuclear Safety (INFCIRC/449), adopted in Vienna on 17 June 1994,
was drawn up by the Secretariat of the IAEA and 84 IAEA member states. The goal
of the Convention is to legally commit participating states that operate nuclear
power plants to maintaining a high level of safety. Parties must submit
reports on the implementation of their obligations for "peer review" at meetings
held at the IAEA. The Convention entered into force on 24 October 1996.
http://www.nuclearsuppliersgroup.org/
The Soviet Union was a founding member of the NSG in 1975. In accordance its
commitment to the amended 1992 NSG guidelines, Russia is banned from exporting
nuclear materials to countries that do not have all of their nuclear facilities
under IAEA safeguards. It is also required to ensure that all dual-use
(nuclear/non-nuclear) exports have export licenses.
3/20/2001: MINISTER OF ATOMIC ENERGY ADAMOV
DISCUSSES NSG WITHDRAWAL
In an interview on 20 March 2001, Minister of Atomic
Energy Adamov discussed the possibility of Russia's withdrawal from the
Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). Adamov said that negative pressure from
NSG countries over sales to Iran is seriously damaging Russia's economic
interests and a review of the regime should be carried out. He further
added that nobody has ever built nuclear weapons from a civilian nuclear reactor
and that the accusation that Russia is contributing to a nuclear weapons program
in Iran is baseless.
http://www.londonconvention.org
On 29 December 1972, the Soviet Union signed the
Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other
Matter, commonly known as the London Convention, which banned the dumping of
medium- and high-level radioactive waste at sea. However, Russia as of June
2004 Russia had not adhered
to the 1993 amendment banning the dumping of low-level wastes as well.
However, since 1994 the
Russian Navy has been observing a moratorium on radioactive waste dumping.
In October 2003 at the 25th Consultative Meeting of Contracting Parties to the
London Convention the Russian delegation said that Moscow would be able to
accept the amendments when its nuclear waste management program could handle all
types of new and existing radioactive wastes. Current Russian plans
presuppose that such measures will be completed in in 2005-2006. (For the
text of the 1993 amendment, click here. For
information on foreign assistance to Russia for the construction of facilities
to process radioactive wastes, see the
Naval Foreign Assistance
overview.)
http://www.oosa.unvienna.org/index.html
Russia is a member of the Outer Space Treaty, which was signed by the Soviet
Union in 1967.
Russia is a member of the 1963 PTBT.
Russia is a member of the
Physical Protection Convention.
On 31 May 2004, Russia joined the
Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). The initiative was launched by U.S.
President Bush during a May 2003 speech in Krakow, Poland. The
PSI is a partnership of countries that, using their own laws and resources,
coordinate their actions to halt shipments at sea, in the air, and on land of
dangerous technologies to and from states and non-state actors of proliferation
concern.
This international partnership was originally driven forward by a core group of
11 countries: Australia, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Poland,
Portugal, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
On 4 September 2003, following the third meeting of the Proliferation Security
Initiative (PSI) partnership in Paris, France, the group announced a
Statement of Interdiction Principles for
the Proliferation Security Initiative.
In their statement, PSI participants called on all states concerned with the WMD
proliferation threat to join in committing to:
Effectively interdict WMD, delivery
systems, and related materials to and from entities of proliferation concern;
Exchange information rapidly on
suspected proliferation actions, dedicate sufficient resources to the effort,
and maximize coordination with other interdiction participants;
Strengthen national legal authorities to
accomplish interdictions and strengthen international laws and frameworks; and
Take specific actions in support of
interdiction efforts to:
not transport targeted cargoes or aid in
their transport;
board and search any vessel under their
jurisdiction in another state's waters suspected of carrying targeted cargoes;
seriously consider allowing its own
vessels to be boarded and searched by other states when targeted cargo is
suspected;
board and search other states' vessels
in its territorial waters and harbors;
require aircraft suspected of carrying
targeted cargoes in transit over their airspace to land for inspection and
possible seizure of such cargoes -- or deny such aircraft transit rights in
advance; and
if their ports, airfields, or other
facilities are used to ship proliferant cargo to suspected proliferators,
inspect the suspected cargo craft and seize such cargo.[1,2]
Russia is a signatory to the
Seabed Treaty.
Russia proposed creation of the
International Convention for the Suppression of
Acts of Nuclear Terrorism ("The Nuclear Terrorism Convention"), which entered
into force on 7 July 2007.
http://www.wassenaar.org
The Wassenaar Framework Agreement was signed in December
1995 by the NATO member states (except for Iceland), Russia, Poland, Hungary,
the Czech Republic, and Slovakia.[1,2] The
first plenary session was held in April 1996, at which time the new regime
was to be formally established. However, Russian objections to certain
export control procedures postponed the formal inauguration of the Arrangement
until Russia withdrew its objections at the 11-12 July 1996 plenary session.[3]
As of the July plenary session, the Wassenaar Arrangement had 33 members:
the original 28 founding countries plus Argentina, Bulgaria, South Korea,
Romania, and Ukraine.[3,4]The multilateral regime to control the export of weapons
and sensitive technologies replaces the Cold War era Coordinating Committee
for Multilateral Export Control (COCOM) set up by NATO to prevent the transfer
of advanced military technology to the former Warsaw Pact countries.[1]
8/3/96: RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT
APPROVES NOTIFICATION PROCEDURE
On 3 August 1996, the Russian government
issued Decree No. 923 to approve the Statute on the Procedure for Notification
by the Russian Federation of Deliveries of Conventional Weapons in Accordance
with the Wassenaar Arrangement.
7/11-12/96: RUSSIA WITHDRAWS
PRIOR OBJECTIONS TO WASSENAAR
During the second round of negotiations of the signatories
to the Wassenaar Arrangement, Russia withdrew its prior objection to a
proposed advance notification procedure for deliveries involving restricted
weapons and dual-use technologies. As proposed, the procedure stipulates
that any member who grants a license for the export of dual-use technology
to a non-member who was denied such transfers in the past three years must
notify the other Wassenaar members within 30-60 days after the license
is granted. This change in the Russian position led to the agreement of
31 member-countries on a preliminary framework for the regime. Arms
Control Today noted that Russia has expressed reservations concerning
the group's munition list, stating that the country considers it a "reference
list" only.
4/2/96: RUSSIA OBJECTS TO WASSENAAR ARRANGEMENT
ON VARIOUS GROUNDS
At a meeting in Vienna of parties to the 12/95 Wassenaar
Arrangement on the international mechanism
for control of dual-use items and technology export, Russia blocked the
negotiations. Russia insisted on changing the text of the agreement on
which the other 30 parties had previously agreed. Russia was the only party
to refuse to comply with the established transparency measures when it
refrained from submitting data on its exports to Cuba, China and Iran.
Specifically, Russia objected to the article on responsibility of member-states
to inform their partners even in the case of declining a license for dual-use
technology transfer. In response to heavy criticism by the United States,
the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that as some of Russia's
partners are unprepared to accept full transparency measures Russia consequently
will not take any unilateral initiatives on this issue.
5/95: UNITED STATES CONDITIONALLY SUPPORTS RUSSIAN MEMBERSHIP
IN COCOM SUCCESSOR
Russia intends to be a founding member of COCOM's successor
regime. The United States has supported this goal as long as Russia reduces
its conventional arms sales to Iran.
9/93: RUSSIA IS RESTRICTING SALE OF HIGH TECH WEAPONS
US officials believe that Russia has begun to take steps
to join in a new organization designed to curb trade in high-tech weapons.
Strobe Talbott, Ambassador-at-Large to the CIS, stated that Russia and
the other newly independent states would not be accepted into a new COCOM-like
body until they demonstrated that they would not transfer potentially destabilizing
weapons and materials. Russia's decision not to sell sensitive rocket technology
to India last summer and its agreement to observe the requirements of the
Missile Technology Control Regime are positive indications.
http://www.zanggercommittee.org
The Soviet Union was a founding member of the Zangger Committee,
and as its successor state Russia is also a member.
1/98: RUSSIAN AMBASSADOR TO CD ON FISSILE MATERIAL CUTOFF TREATY
At the Conference on Disarmament's first plenary of 1998, Russian Ambassador
Grigoriy Berdennikov stated that Russia feels a fissile material cut-off treaty
(FMCT) "is the next step to be taken" by the CD in order to eliminate
nuclear weapons.
10/5/96: RUSSIA SIGNS PELINDABA TREATY
Russia signed the Pelindaba Treaty establishing an African
nuclear-weapon-free zone. When the treaty opened for signature, Russia initially
opposed the treaty, expressing concern over the status of Diego Garcia island,
which the US uses as a B-52 bomber base.
4/11/96: RUSSIA REFUSES TO SIGN PELINDABA TREATY
Russia refused to sign the Pelindaba Treaty, which makes
Africa a nuclear-free zone, in response to the US reservation excluding the
British-administered Indian Ocean island of Diego Garcia, where the US has
a military base. A Russian diplomat stated that Russia will sign the agreement
after formulating its own reservations.
10/92: TATARSTAN DECLARES ITSELF A NUCLEAR FREE ZONE
The parliament of the republic of Tatarstan has declared
the region a nuclear-weapon-free zone, assuming the responsibility not to
produce or store fissionable material or components for weapons of mass destruction.
Last updated 14 January 2008
Comments or questions? Contact Anya Loukianova at MIIS CNS: Anna.LoukianovaATmiis.edu
This material is produced independently for NTI
by the Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the
Monterey Institute of International Studies and
does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has
not been independently verified by NTI or its directors, officers,
employees, agents. Copyright © 2002 by MIIS.
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