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Russia: Decommissioning and Dismantlement
Prepared by Jill Tatko, CNS Graduate Research Assistant
Over the past three decades, the Soviet Union created the largest fleet of
nuclear submarines in the world. Yet arms reduction treaties, Russian government
policies, and a lack of resources are forcing a downsizing of Russia's nuclear
arsenal and military forces. In addition, most of the nuclear submarine fleet
is at or nearing retirement. The effective lifetime of an average Russian
nuclear-powered submarine is approximately twenty years. From 1990 to 1994,
Russia decommissioned between 15 and 25 nuclear submarines per year.[1]
As of May 2001, the Russian Navy had 200 nuclear-powered
submarines that were no longer on active duty. Of these,
170 awaited dismantlement and approximately 74 still contained nuclear fuel.[18]
The Russian Navy
is not prepared to face the task of disposing of the nuclear legacy left behind
by the Soviet military-industrial complex, and even some
high level Russian officials admit this unpreparedness.[2] The rapid,
simultaneous, grand-scale decommissioning of submarines of multiple generations
and classes not only complicates the dismantlement process, but also jeopardizes
the environment.[1] In addition, a number of problems are interfering with
and stalling the process of decommissioning and dismantling nuclear-powered submarines,
including inadequate spent fuel and radioactive waste handling capabilities, obstacles
in implementation, military reform, economic concerns, and compliance with international
agreements.
This process is very labor-intensive and costly. Decommissioned submarines require a partial crew to oversee general maintenance, monitor the reactor cooling system, and ensure environmental safety levels. The crew also prepares the submarine for additional dismantlement by unloading the fuel, oil, and batteries, and by steam-cleaning the fuel and oil tanks. The dismantlement of just one Yankee-class submarine requires 630,000 man-hours of work.[5,6,7] Dismantlement of nuclear-powered submarines takes place at the Nerpa Shipyard, in Murmansk Oblast, and at the Zvezdochka and Sevmash Shipyards in Severodvinsk, in Arkhangelsk Oblast. The Northern Fleet operates these three facilities. The Pacific Fleet runs the fourth facility at Zvezda near Vladivostok, Primorskiy Kray. Although the dismantlement rate should be about 10 nuclear submarines per year, as of December 2000, the rate was only four to seven per year.[19] SPENT FUEL AND RADIOACTIVE WASTE HANDLING PROBLEMS Sufficient spent fuel and radioactive waste handling capabilities are required to enable environmentally safe decommissioning. The lack of modern facilities for research, processing, transport, and storage of spent fuel and radioactive waste may have negative environmental and security impacts.[8] Since 1995, no spent fuel storage has been available on land for additional reactor cores from decommissioned submarines. In addition, Russian Navy policy reserves limited available shipboard and shore-based storage for refueling operational submarines. Inadequacies in spent fuel storage space at naval facilities arise from the fast pace of Russia's submarine decommissioning and the slow pace of the transfer of the spent fuel to the RT-1 reprocessing facility at Mayak. Experts say that it takes three to five years before all spent fuel is removed from a decommissioned, laid-up submarine. This problem has caused decommissioned submarines and service ships to become long-term de facto spent fuel storage facilities.[1,4,6] There are several characteristics of irradiated highly enriched naval fuel that make it attractive to potential smugglers or proliferators. Reactors containing low-irradiated fuel and spent fuel remain in operation on decommissioned submarines, in part because irradiated fuel in naval nuclear reactors requires a significant cooling time. Low-irradiated fuel in submarines decommissioned before the end of their service lives retains a large quantity of highly-enriched uranium (HEU). Separation of HEU from low-irradiated fuel is much easier than chemical reprocessing required for plutonium separation and can be done at smaller facilities. Naval reactor fuel assemblies are smaller and easier to handle than power reactor assemblies. A primitive nuclear explosive device manufactured from U-235 is more likely to be successful than a primitive device made of plutonium.[17] There are at least five radioactive waste storage sites associated with the Northern Fleet and two with the Pacific Fleet. Studies are underway regarding construction of an additional, long-term storage facility for high-level, solid radioactive waste on Novaya Zemlya near Bashmachnaya Bay. The tentative storage design consists of deep burial furrows shielded with gravel.[1] (Please see the Spent Fuel and Radioactive Waste section for more information.) OBSTACLES TO IMPLEMENTATION Non-implementation and breakdowns in implementation constitute another significant problem in the decommissioning and dismantlement process. No formal plans even existed for the decommissioning and dismantlement of nuclear-powered submarines until 1986, when the Supreme Soviet issued Decree No. 095-296, which outlined formal dismantlement procedures. An additional decree in 1988 took safety precautions into account. In July 1992, new comprehensive guidelines were delineated and presented in the form of Russian Federation Decree No. 514.[7] Finally, on 31 August 1992, Russian Federation Decree No. 644-47, "On Providing for the Comprehensive Recycling of Decommissioned Atomic Submarines and Russian Federation Ministry of Transportation Vessels with Nuclear Facilities on Board," established the procedure for the implementation of the submarine recycling program.[6] Multi-agency responsibility and split federal, regional, and local jurisdiction over nuclear-powered submarine decommissioning and dismantlement cause problems to emerge at the implementation stage as well. Because the general public in the regions surrounding nuclear-powered submarine bases is concerned about the potentially dangerous environmental situation, the agencies involved and local governments tend to keep silent on the issue, and sometimes even encase the problem in secrecy, as demonstrated in the Nikitin treason case.[1,4] In an attempt to rein in the fragmented approach to submarine dismantlement, in May 1998, the Russian government nominated the Ministry of Atomic Energy (Minatom) as the main coordinator for nuclear submarine dismantlement and related nuclear material handling and storage activities.[14,15] Minatom has drafted a proposal that calls for dismantlement of all currently decommissioned submarines by 2005.[15] The proposal involves 13 Russian shipbuilding and repair enterprises located primarily in the Northern and Pacific Fleets, as well as in other areas of northern Russia.[14] Minatom estimates the total cost of the project at $1.5 to $2 billion.[15] The proposal calls for the federal budget to fund 30 to 40% of the program, foreign assistance from countries including the United States and Great Britain to fund a portion, and revenues generated from the sale of scrap metal from dismantled submarines to fund the remainder.[14,15] Minatom created a special department responsible for submarine dismantlement and related issues and agencies in both the Northern and Pacific Fleets.[16] MILITARY REFORM The Russian military faces a crisis situation and badly needs reform. Large portions of the former Soviet military-industrial complex are undergoing conversion to civilian control. There have been numerous wage arrears, personnel cutbacks, and a reduced level of technical expertise. These problems, combined with the high cost of maintenance and upgrading nuclear submarines, make it impossible to keep Russia's fleet of nuclear-powered submarines running.[7] While military expansion occurred at increasing rates during the Soviet era, there appeared little regard for potential problems, such as environmental degradation. The navy never clearly thought out the implications that nuclear-powered submarine dismantlement would have on radioactive waste management and disposal practices.[9] As a consequence, the agencies involved in the naval fuel cycle, radioactive waste handling and dismantlement are left without a cohesive and organized plan for the oversight of the dismantlement process. Responsibility for the decommissioning and dismantlement of nuclear-powered submarines falls in the hands of many agencies, including the Russian Navy, the Ministry of Atomic Energy, the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Environmental Protection, and Gosatomnadzor. These agencies experience problems of coordination, competition for control and for funds, and conflicts about interpreting the guidelines. In addition, ongoing military reform and complicated military engagements, such as the war in Chechnya and the peacekeeping mission in Bosnia, distract the Russian military from tackling environmental problems and only exacerbate the complications of decommissioning and dismantlement.[4] ECONOMIC CONCERNS While Russia continues to experience the growing pains associated with the political transformation from a communist to a democratic society and the economic transformation to a market economy, military financial problems have become a function of the economic problems at large. The economic instability in Russia is the major obstacle regarding the decommissioning and dismantlement process and the environmental safety of Russia's nuclear fleet. The cost of dismantling one nuclear submarine in the US fleet is calculated at $27 million, and the average Russian nuclear submarine costs $2 million to $5 million to dismantle.[1] Dismantlement work (including fuel cycle activities and waste storage and transportation) was estimated in 1998 to require a total of $2.2 billion; $1.4 billion for the Northern Fleet and $800 million for the Pacific Fleet. The Russian budget, however, had only provided $500 million for both fleets as of 1998, leaving a shortfall of $1.7 billion to complete the task.[2] While expenses for removing reactors are high, the cost of safely maintaining one decommissioned vessel runs up to about 4 million rubles (approximately $642,000 as of 3 July 1998) per year, according to Murmansk Governor Yuriy Yevdokimov.[13] The sale of scrap metal obtained in the dismantlement process only covers 20 to 30% of the price of dismantlement.[10,11] In April 1996, Aleksey Yablokov, then head of the Russian Security Council's interagency commission for environmental safety, reported that Russia needed 1.5 trillion rubles (approximately $300 million) to process retired nuclear submarines and reactors.[12] To alleviate the problems associated with the decommissioning and dismantlement of nuclear-powered submarines, a number of countries have pledged both financial assistance and technical cooperation. For instance, the US Department of Energy Material Protection, Control and Accounting program is helping to provide both modern equipment and radioactive waste storage assessments. In the Northern Fleet, programs initiated by Russia's Scandinavian neighbors are concentrating on safety and clean-up. Meanwhile, Japan is providing financial assistance in the Pacific to deal with nuclear weapons dismantlement, which includes weapons based on nuclear submarines. (Please see the Foreign Assistance section for more information.) COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS International agreements may also complicate the decommissioning and dismantlement process. In addition to the age of the vessels and the economic hardships associated with maintaining a nuclear fleet, if START II is implemented, it will contribute further to the pressure to decommission and dismantle Russia's nuclear-powered submarines.[8] While intended to protect the environment, the London Dumping Convention, which regulates waste dumping at sea, has also slowed the dismantlement process. One of the Soviet Union's primary methods of radioactive waste disposal consisted of dumping at sea. However in October 1993 President Yeltsin promised to work to end this practice by 1997.[20] Public and foreign pressure in response to Russian radioactive waste dumping in the Sea of Japan in just one week later, on 16 October 1993, spurred Russia to cancel future plans to dump liquid radioactive waste (LRW).[21] Contracting parties to the London Convention banned the sea dumping of all types of radioactive waste at a November 1993 meeting, although Russia and several other nations did not sign the ban at that time.[22] The loss of the option to dump at sea, although better for the marine environment, exacerbates Russia's dire radioactive waste storage problems, which in turn, slows down the dismantlement process. CONCLUSION The process of decommissioning and dismantling Russia's aging nuclear submarine fleet poses a number of problems for the already stressed Russian Navy. As opposed to the previous practice of simply disposing of the submarines and their reactors, now the Russian Navy is required to address nuclear security and environmental safety in dismantlement. In addition to the technical demands and the financial and time constraints, inadequate capabilities for handling spent fuel and radioactive waste, obstacles to implementation, military reform, and compliance with international agreements complicate the decommissioning and dismantlement of nuclear-powered submarines. While Russia is finally focusing domestic attention on these problems and is cooperating with other countries both to relieve critical situations temporarily and to find a long-term, viable solution, safe and successful dismantlement will result only from the prolonged dedication of political will and resources to tackle the problem. Sources: [1] "Nuclear Wastes in the Arctic: An Analysis of Arctic and Other Regional Impacts From Soviet Nuclear Contamination," OTA-ENV-623, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, September 1995, pp. 117-121, 124, 128, 131-132, 220-221. [2] James Clay Moltz, Report on the conference "Perspectives on International Cooperation in the Dismantlement of Nuclear Submarines," Moscow, Russia, 11 December 1998. [3] Joshua Handler, "The lasting legacy: Nuclear submarine disposal," Jane's Navy International, January/February 1998, pp. 16, 18. [4] Oleg Bukharin and Joshua Handler, "Russian Nuclear-Powered Submarine Decommissioning," Science & Global Security, Volume 5, 1995, pp. 245-271. [5] Interview with Vice Admiral Valeriy Grishanov, Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Navy in charge of shipbuilding and armaments, Moscow Russian Television Network, 7 April 1996; in FBIS-TEN-96-004. [6] Boris Makeyev, "Problems of the Decommissioning of Atomic Submarines," Center for Geopolitical and Military Forecasting, 1 June 1994, pp. 1-4, 17. [7] Thomas Nilsen, Igor Kudrik, and Aleksandr Nikitin, "The Russian Northern Fleet Sources of Radioactive Contamination," The Bellona Foundation, 28 August 1996. [8] Georgi Kostev, Nuclear Safety Challenges in the Operation and Dismantlement of Russian Nuclear Submarines, Committee for Critical Technologies and Non-Proliferation, Moscow, 1997, pp. 74-75. [9] Alexey V. Yablokov, "Environmental Security: The Problems of Northwestern Russia." Plenary Paper for the 47th Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs, August 1997. [10] Margarita Alenina, Vladimir Gavrilov, Pavel Filatov, and Igor Zhikarevich, "Major Areas of Activity of the International Foundation for the Promotion of Conversion and Ecology," Military Parade, September-October 1997, pp. 122-124. [11] Ret. Colonel Aleksandr I. Kurchatov, "Naval Chernobyls: Are We Sensibly Destroying Nuclear-Powered Submarines?" Nesavisimoye voyennoye obozreniye, 30 May 1996, No. 10, p. 5; in "Better Methods for Nuclear Submarine Dismantlement Needed," FBIS-UMA-96-138-S, 30 May 1996. [12] "Russia Will Need...," Interfax, 15 April 1996; in "Official on Funds Needed to Dispose of Nuclear Submarines," FBIS-TEN-96-005, 15 April 1996. [13] Maksim Galant, Russian Public Television First Channel Network, 2 July 1998; in "Fleet Said Lacking Funds To Scrap Nuclear Submarines," FBIS-SOV-98-184. [14] "Problemoy utilizatsii atomnikh podvodnikh lodok teper budet zanimatsya Minatom RF - postavleniye pravitelstva," Interfax, 29 May 1998. {Updated 10/9/98 JET} [15] Olga Antonova, "Minatom monopoliziruyet unichtozheniye starykh podlodok," Vremya MN, 6 June 1998, p. 2. [16] James Clay Moltz, Report on the Conference on "Perspectives on International Cooperation in the Dismantlement of Nuclear Submarines," Moscow, Russia, 11 December 1998. {Updated 3/31/99 HA} [17] Presentation by Russian nuclear scientist at Global 99 conference, Jackson Hole, Wyoming, 29 August-3 September 1999, RUS990829. {Updated 10/14/99 JET} [18] Numbers extrapolated from total number of submarines constructed and data on numbers of active submarines and submarines awaiting defueling obtained through NISNP discussions with Pacific Northwest National Laboratory scientist, May 2000, RUS000501. [19]The Monterey Institute of International Studies and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Nuclear Successor States of the Soviet Union: Status Report on Nuclear Weapons, Fissile Material, and Export Controls, No. 6, June 2001, p. 50. [20] Reuters, "Russia Readies 2nd 'Burial' of Nuclear Waste in Sea of Japan," Los Angeles Times, 20 October 1993, p. 20, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, http://web.lexis-nexis.com. [21] "Russia Halts Radioactive Dumping in Sea of Japan," Daily Telegraph, 22 October 1993, p. 17, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, http://web.lexis-nexis.com. [22] Kirsti-Liisa Sjoeblom and Gordon S. Linsley, "The International Arctic Seas Assessment Project: Progress Report," IAEA Bulletin, Vol. 37, No. 2, http://www.iaea.org/.../Bull372/sjoeblom.html.{Updated 8/13/2001 CC}
Page last updated 5 March 2003
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Decommissioning and Dismantlement
