This file contains all
major developments relating to Russia's naval reactors beginning 1 August 2004.
All other development files have been discontinued. Archives of these
files can be found by following the links at the bottom of this page.
To return to the main
Russian Nuclear Submarine Fleets entry, see the
Russian Nuclear Submarine Fleets
file.
12/14/2007: RUSSIA ANNOUNCES COMPLETION OF DIESEL-ELECTRIC SUBMARINE TESTBED
WITH AUXILIARY NUCLEAR REACTOR
A 14 December 2007 press release from
Sevmash announced completion of a pilot B-90 submarine, named Sarov
after one of Russia’s
closed nuclear cities. The boat is the first ever diesel-electric submarine
that uses a nuclear reactor for auxiliary power supply.[1] The submarine, which
will serve as an unarmed test bed with the Russian Northern Fleet, was completed
in secret as part of the state defense order, and its costs have not been
revealed. [2,3] A spokesman for the Russian Navy stated that the boat was
intended for “developing and testing models of arms and military equipment being
developed or modernized: combat and noncombat unmanned submersibles as well as
other kinds of naval weapons and equipment and underwater equipment for various
purposes, their prototypes, and operating models fired from launchers.”[3].
According to the Sevmash press release, construction of the
submarine, designed by
Rubin Central Design Bureau for Marine Engineering, began in 1989 at
Krasnoye Sormovo Shipyard and was later completed at Sevmash. The boat is
expected to undergo sea trials and state tests in 2008; a 52-strong crew for the
submarine has already been trained. [3]
Information about the boat’s existence was reportedly leaked by
mistake on 6 September 2007 by government officials in
Sarov
on the website of the city’s administration, revealing technical details of the
boat as well as the name of its captain – Sergey Kroshkin. The information was
later removed from the website, while officials at
Sevmash and the Russian Navy refused to comment on the boat. However,
several sources reprinted the Sarov release, providing details of the new boat.
[4]
Sarov, a Project 20120 submarine, is reportedly similar to
the Project 877/636
Varshavyanka [NATO Name: ‘Kilo’] diesel submarine (which Russia has exported
abroad).[5] There are few details about the boat’s auxiliary nuclear reactor,
reportedly designated VAU-6, evidently designed to allow the diesel boat to
remain submerged for greater periods of time. The VAU-6, designed by NIKIET in
the late 1960s, is a boiling water reactor according to the NIKIET website (some
other sources state that it is a pressurized water reactor).[6,7] A one-loop
prototype 600 kW VAU-6 was constructed in 1971, and a second reactor in 1986.[7]
The latter was reportedly fitted on a Project 651E [NATO Name: ‘Juliett’].[6]
Press reports have indicated that several projects in the 1980s could have
served as the foundation for the design of the boat, among them, Krasnoye
Sormovo projects “Romashka” and “Sargan” (Kommersant speculated that
Sarov is indeed the completion of the “Sargan” project, arguing that the
shipyard’s budget indicated work on this project as late as 2006).[4,5]
10/11-13/2006: PROGRESS REMOVING RTGs
As of October 2006, Russia reported 563 radiological thermoelectric
generators (RTGs) remaining along Russian coasts. All RTGs have been removed
from Murmansk oblast, largely through a joint Russian-Norwegian effort funded by
Norway, France, and Canada. The remaining RTGs, used for navigational beacons,
are located on the Barents and White Sea coast (57, 30 of which are scheduled to
be removed by the end of 2006), Baltic (90), along the Norththern Sea Route
under the jurisdiction of Rosmorrechflot (218), in Krasnoyarsk and Yakutiya (36,
under Ministry of Defense jurisdiction), and in the Russian Far East (162).
Canada is funding the development a master plan by the Kurchatov Institute for
the removal of remaining RTGs, with the exception of nearly three dozen units
located at sites where solar and wind-powered replacements may not work. The
master plan is scheduled to be completed in January 2007. In addition to Norway,
France, Canada, other countries assisting in the removal of RTGs include: the United States (active
along the Northern Sea Route and the Russian Far East, as well as the creation
of an RTG database)
Germany and
Denmark (concentrating on the Baltic), the United Kingdom, Sweden (which is
concentrating on improving relevant regulations), and
Russia itself (which has removed 77 RTGs, disposed of 74, and undertaken searches for lost RTGs
as well as mitigation of the consequences of damaged RTGs.
10/15/2005: LOST RTG FOUND IN SEA OF OKHOTSK
A joint operation between the Russian Navy's Pacific Fleet, the Sakhalin Branch
of Red Army Scientific Research Institute on Mechanization, and the Sakhalin
branch of the Green party has found a radiological thermoelectric generator (RTG)
which was dropped from a helicopter accident in 1997. The RTG is submerged in
34.5 meters of water and is located 1.8 kilometers from the coast. The generator
did not suffer damage from the accident, and radioactivity levels around the
device are normal. The RTG weighs roughly 2.5 tons and is powered by
strontium-90. If financing is provided from the Ministry of Defense, the RTG
could be raised within the year.
A search for a second RTG that the Russian military lost in 1987 is unlikely due
to the large (20 kilometer) potential search area and the amount of time that
has passed. The depth of the waster in the relevant area is approximately three
to five meters, but the RTG has most likely been buried under 1.5-2 meters of
silt. [For information on the most recent incident involving an RTG dropped from
a helicopter, please see the 9/10/2004 entry, below.
For information on RTG disposal, see the 2/16-28/2005
entry, below. For thefts of RTGs, see the
Russia: Archived General Civilian Naval Reactor Developments section.]
2/16-18/2005: NEW COMMITMENTS TO
DISPOSE OF RTGs
On 16-18 February 2005, a workshop entitled "Security and Safety of Radioactive
Sources: Decommissioning and Replacement of Radioisotope Thermoelectric
Generators" was held in Oslo, Norway. The workshop was hosted by the Norwegian government, under the auspices
of the IAEA Contact Expert Group (CEG) for International Radioactive Waste
Projects in the Russian Federation. The CEG, which was established in 1996, has
generally focused on nuclear submarine dismantlement issues and related
environmental remediation. The February workshop was the first focused on the
problem of radioisotope thermoelectric generators (RTGs), sometimes referred to
as "nuclear batteries." RTGs use heat energy from the decay of the radioactive
isotope strontium-90 or the isotope plutonium-238 to generate power. Each RTG
has a radioactivity level of around 40,000 curies, making them some of the most
powerful radioactive sources in the world. Until recent years, nearly 1,000 RTGs
were located in northwest Russia and the Russian Far East to power navigational
beacons and lighthouses. Despite international efforts to replace these
radioactive sources with non-radioactive power sources, approximately 700 RTGs
are estimated to be in use in these applications.
Norway has been concerned
about the generators, many of which are neglected and not well secured, for
nearly a decade, and has been engaged in their removal since 1997. (For more
information, see the 9/10/2002 entry
in the Archived General Civilian Naval Reactor
Development file.) Oslo has
already spent more than 1 billion NOK (approximately $150 million as of February
2005) to improve nuclear safety and environmental protection in northwest Russia
within the framework of Norway’s Nuclear Action Plan, of which approximately 15 million NOK (about $2.4 million) have been spent to date
on RTG removal.[1,2] Specifically, Oslo has facilitated the removal of 60 RTGs
and the installation of environmentally friendly solar-cell panels in 37 Russian lighthouses.[1] The United States is engaged in
parallel efforts; in a program carried out by the U.S. DOE, 63 RTGs were removed
from northwest Russia in the summer of 2004. Plans call for the removal of 21
RTGs in the Russian Far East in the summer of 2005, which will be the first such
activity in this region. DOE is awaiting a proposal from Russia regarding
continued work in northern Russia.[3] Norway intends to remove 31 RTGs from
Murmansk during the summer of 2005.[4]
In a major announcement toward the end of
the workshop, Norway committed to financing the replacement
of all RTGs in Murmansk and Arkhangelsk Oblasts and the Nenets Autonomous Okrug,
a total of 110 RTGs, powered by about 150 radionuclide heat sources. (Some of
the RTGs incorporate more than one strontium source.)[4,5] Canada and the United
States are in discussions regarding the removal of RTGs east of the Nenets
Autonomous Okrug (in the Yamalo-Nenets, Krasnoyarsk, Yakutiya, and Chukotka
regions).[3] Other countries, in particular France and Germany, have expressed
interest in this field as well, and are looking for ways to contribute to the
removal of RTGs in the near future.[2]
The February workshop, which brought together representatives of nearly a dozen
countries, was an important first step in coordinating the growing international
interest in helping to handle the RTGs. As the
Russian Federal Atomic Energy Agency (Rosatom) has recently taken the lead
role in this area on the Russian side from the Ministry of Transport, the Navy,
and various hydrographic organizations that own the RTGs, there are some delays
in project planning while the structural transition takes place. Workshop
participants indicated that the workshop sessions were very useful in
coordinating international efforts, and similar events should take place in the
future.[3] One important outcome of the workshop was the establishment of an
international coordination group addressing these issues.[2]
11/14/2004: EXPLOSION ON BOARD PODOLSK RESULTS IN SAILOR'S DEATH
According to Kamchatskoye vremya, on 14
November 2004 an explosion on board of the Podolsk, a strategic nuclear submarine
also known as K-223,
caused the death of one sailor and injured two others. The submarine was
docked at Vilyuchinsk and was undergoing routine maintenance upon return from a patrol mission.
The report indicated that
the explosion was caused by the burst of a 1.5 metric ton pressurized fresh water tank,
possibly caused by the malfunction of aging water tank equipment, most likely the
pipeline delivering oxygen to the tank. A technical examination to determine
the exact causes of the accident is underway at Vilyuchinsk. The explosion was
localized to the vicinity of the water tank and did not affect critical parts of
the submarine.
10/21/2004: MINISTER OF DEFENSE DENIES MEDIA REPORTS THAT RUSSIA WILL LEASE NUCLEAR SUBMARINE TO INDIA
On 21 October 2004, according to ITAR-TASS, an unnamed source in
Russia's military industrial complex said that Russia had signed a contract on
the lease of
a Project 971 (Bars, NATO Name Akula) class nuclear-powered submarine to India for a period of ten years. As
of October 2004, construction of the submarine was 80% complete and the nuclear reactor had
been active since 2000. The completion of construction has been stalled due to
a lack of funds. The source did not provide the cost of the deal,
timeline, or the weapon systems that might be fitted on the submarine.[1] Earlier, on 11
October 2004,
Kommersant reported that during a visit to the
Amur Shipbuilding Plant, where the submarine
is being built,
Federal Industry Agency head Boris Aleshin and the plant administration signed a protocol on
the completion of the two Bars submarines at the shipyard. According to
Kommersant, negotiations on leasing the submarines to India took place
during President Putin's visit to that country in December 2002, and India has
already advanced Amur Shipyard $100 million. The entire deal is estimated to be worth
$1.7-1.8 billion.[2] However, Minster of Defense Sergey Ivanov stated that
the media reports are untrue. According to Ivanov, during his visit
to India in the beginning of 2004, no discussion of leasing submarines took
place.[3]
10/19/2004: RADIOACTIVE CARGO FROM
VILYUCHINSK DETAINED AT PETROPAVLOVSK SEAPORT
In mid-October 2004, a truck with radioactive scrap metal was detained at
Petropavlovsk-Kamchatskiy commercial seaport. An alarm went off when the truck
was passing through the port checkpoint, and the port security service notified
the Kamchatka Oblast Chief Directorate for Civil Defense and Emergency
Situations. Radiation readings indicated that the cargo did not pose a
significant safety or security threat. The scrap metal was collected by a
military unit based near the closed city of
Vilyuchinsk on the Kamchatka Peninsula; the name of the unit was not
specified. The cargo was sent back to the military unit so it could check the
cargo content and identify the source of radiation.[1,2] Similar incidents have
taken place at the same seaport in the past. On 2 June 2004, radiation emitted
by the scrap metal loaded on a KamAZ truck activated radiation detection devices
at the port checkpoint. The cargo was emitting radiation two times above
background levels. An investigation established that a local scrap metal dealer
delivered the radioactive cargo to the seaport from a military unit based in the
Zavoyko settlement near Petropavlovsk. The cargo was returned to the military
unit for decontamination.[3,4] On 14 December 2003, Kamchatka Oblast authorities
seized a shipping container holding radioactive metal tubes at the seaport.
Media reports speculated that the tubes may have been stolen from the
naval base at Vilyuchinsk.[5]
9/10/2004: TWO RTGS DROPPED DURING HELICOPTER
TRANSPORT
On 10 September 2005, two radioisotope thermoelectric generators were dropped
during helicopter transport from Novaya Sibir to the Bung polar station. The RTGs were to be stored
at Bung, and eventually dismantled. The
RTGs were dropped from 50 meters and fell onto the tundra. Upon further
investigation, one RTG was badly damaged and leaking a considerable amount of
radiation while the other suffered minor damage and was leaking smaller
amounts of radiation. The investigating commission concluded that the
removal of these RTGs will require special extraction equipment.
Extraction is expected to begin in 2005 during the navigation season.
5/20/2004: TITANIUM STOLEN FROM
RETIRED RUSSIAN SUBMARINES
On 20 May Krasnaya zvezda reported the discovery that large
quantities of titanium had been stolen from reactor compartments stored afloat
in Sayda Bay. The Murmansk Oblast
prosecutor’s office has opened a criminal investigation concerning the thefts.
According to Nikolay Zaytsev, a special cases investigator in the prosecutor’s
office, in late 2003 inspectors discovered that 14.72 metric tons (t) of
external bulkheads had been stolen, and inspections in late April 2004 revealed
that internal bulkheads had also been cut out—resulting in an additional loss of
about 17t of metal. Zaytsev was quoted as saying that the timing of the thefts
could not be determined, as the vessels have been transported to the docks at
Sayda Bay over the past five years.[1] The stolen metal has residual radiation,
but Nerpa Shipyard Assistant Security Director
Vladimir Panev said that radiation does not exceed acceptable radiation
norms.[2] According to
Vecherniy Murmansk, the
investigation has already revealed that the titanium was stolen by thieves who
made multiple trips to the storage area between September and October 2003.[3]
Zaytsev said that the bulkheads were worth 1.117 million rubles (over $38,500 as
of June 2004), and that the investigation would take at least four months.[1]
The price of titanium scrap in bulk weldable form currently averages about
$4.40/pound on Western markets.[4] Thus, 30t are worth about $291,000.
The thieves apparently used a portable welder to remove titanium
from submarine hull girders—the parts of the bulkheads, or interior partitions
between submarine compartments, that stiffen the hull. The pieces of metal are
reportedly as much as 100mm thick.[8] In all, approximately 30t of metal was
stolen. The affected submarines were all located in the so-called "safe zone,"
where reactors that have been defueled were stored. Reactors with nuclear fuel
on board are stored in a "dangerous zone" that is better guarded. Panev noted
that "we were surprised that the thieves got into the 'safe zone'" because the
barriers seemed to be good enough. He noted that the safe zone would now be
provided with a guard post.[1] In order to gain access to the Sayda Bay storage
area, the suspects had to pass through the Gadzhiyevo closed city checkpoint,
while the trucks loaded with metal would have had to go through a border
checkpoint as well as a customs checkpoint on the road to Murmansk. This implies
that the suspects either had documents allowing them to pass with the metal, or
paid off guards at each point.[8] Russian authorities have spoken to Global
Partnership members of the need to equip the site, and the checkpoint in
particular, with engineered features as well as equipment to provide continuous
radiation control and monitoring at Sayda Bay.
As part of its assistance to Russia
under the G8 Global Partnership, Germany has promised to fund the construction
of a land-based reactor storage facility at Sayda, to house some 120 reactors by
2009.[6] The German effort will reportedly include security upgrades.[2]
However, the titanium thefts show that the real security problem resulted from
the human element.
According to the prosecutor’s office, it is investigating
several residents of Snezhnogorsk (home of Nerpa Shipyard, which supervises the
reactor compartments stored in Sayda Bay) and Gadzhiyevo (location of a nuclear
submarine base), both located only a few kilometers from the storage facility in
Sayda Bay. Most of the suspects are former military personnel.[3] However,
Gadzhiyevo police are among the suspects.[9] This is why a case has been opened
by the oblast prosecutor. According to one media source, the prosecutor’s office
said that the activity appeared to involve about 40 individuals, who were not
members of an organized group but were instead acting independently.[10]
Aleksandr Golubev, head of the Murmansk Oblast Prosecutor’s Office Special Cases
Division, was quoted as saying that no less than four groups were involved in
the thefts, with group members assuming specific roles: welding, loading,
transporting, and selling the metal. He said the titanium had been sold for
50-55 rubles per kilogram.[9] As of May 11, only one individual had been
arrested: the purchaser of the stolen titanium.[2]
Since most of the titanium was taken from the upper sections of
the submarine bulkheads, Panev averred that submarine buoyancy had not been
affected.[2] However, Norway’s
Bellona environmental organization quotes former
Murmansk Shipping Company special equipment
technician Yuriy Chernogorov as saying that the bulkheads give the hull its
strength and support the weight of the hull's interior, including the reactor
compartment, which weighs 800-1,100 metric tons.[2] Thus, buoyancy could become
an issue.
4/28/2004: PETR VELIKIY CHIEF
FINANCIAL OFFICER SENTENCED FOR GRAFT
On 28 April 2004, Lieutenant Captain
Denis Dolgachev, the chief financial officer of the nuclear missile cruiser
Petr Velikiy, was sentenced to five years imprisonment by the
Severmorsk garrison court.[1,2] The sentence was handed down after
the court convicted Dolgachev of stealing over 12 million rubles (approximately $418,000
as of April 2004).
In addition to prison time, the court ordered him to pay 9 million rubles
(about $315,500) in fines. In 2003, the financial directorate of the Northern Fleet headquarters
detected the theft of 14 million rubles (almost $500,000 as of December 2003) worth of
money and
property from the ship; an additional 400,000
rubles worth were discovered missing in the first months of 2004.[1,2]
4/22/2004: REPAIRS TO PETR VELIKIY TO BE COMPLETED WITHIN TWO MONTHS
Speaking on 4 April 2004, Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov stated
that the nuclear-powered missile cruiser Petr Velikiy will complete its repairs in less
than two months.[1] On 22 April 2004, the cruiser
arrived at a ship repair yard in Roslyakovo, Murmansk Oblast (probably
Safonovo Shipyard). Repairs will reportedly include cleaning and repainting
the underwater portion of the ship, repairing outboard fittings, and examining the
propellers and the control system.[2] Defense Minister Ivanov said that the
current repairs are routine and denied allegations that the vessel has been
operated by an incompetent crew.[1]
3/26/2004: PETR VELIKIY "COULD BLOW
UP AT ANY MOMENT"
In March 2004, Commander-in-chief of the Russian Navy Admiral Vladimir Kuroyedov
reportedly ordered the nuclear-powered missile cruiser Petr Velikiy into dry
dock for repairs after saying, "The warship is in such a state that it may
blow up at any moment. I mean the state of the nuclear reactor as well."
He later retracted his statement on March 23, saying that he was, in fact,
referring to the living quarters and not the reactor.[1] The shocking statement
contradicts other information about the vessel. Representatives from the
Baltiyskiy Zavod shipyard in St.
Petersburg, where Petr Velikiy was built, note that the cruiser was named
Russia's best-maintained vessel in 2002.[2] The vessel also received
excellent ratings during the strategic command-staff exercise in
January-February 2004. The ship's commander, Vladimir Kasatonov, was later
promoted to rear admiral.[1] Further, specialists note that a nuclear
explosion onboard the cruiser is unlikely, citing the reliability of the
reactors and the fact that there was no leak of radiation or reactor explosion
during the sinking of the Kursk submarine, which suffered a massive
explosion.[1] There has been some speculation that Kuroyedov made his original
statement with the intention of attacking the reputation of the commander of the
Northern Fleet, Rear Admiral Gennady Suchkov. Kuroyedov and Suchkov
have reportedly been at odds over the sinking of the K-159 submarine.[1]
1/23/2003: GRIGORIY PASKO
RELEASED
On 23 January 2003, Interfax reported that
military journalist Grigoriy Pasko had been released from a prison camp in the town of Ussuriysk,
where he had been sent to serve a four-year sentence for espionage. He had spent two years and eight months
in detention. The Ussuriysk
Municipal Court made the decision to release Pasko
on parole.[1]
Pasko continues to protest his innocence and intends to seek total exoneration.[2] His
lawyer, Ivan Pavlov, has filed a supervisory appeal to the chairman of the Russian
Supreme Court, Vyacheslav Lebedev.
The appeal will be considered by 13 Supreme Court judges that are members of the
Presidium.[3] The Presidium could decide to reverse the
verdict and legally clear
Pasko's name. Pasko also
has an appeal pending before the European Court of Human Rights arguing violations of the European Convention on Human Rights.
In January 2003, the Norwegian environmental organization Bellona reported that Pasko
was editor-in-chief of its
Russian-language magazine Ecology and Rights.[2] In March 2003, Pasko
became an aide to Russian State Duma
Deputy Sergey Yushenkov. According to Yushenkov, Pasko will prepare expert
opinions and bills on questions involving the media, environment, military, and
judicial reform.[4] For more information on
the Pasko case, see the 9/18/2002 entry, below.
10/2/2002: STATE DUMA CONSIDERS
LAW CHANGING STATE UNITARY ENTERPRISE OVERSIGHT
On 2 October 2002,
Dumskaya panorama
reported that the State Duma
had
passed the second reading of the law On state and municipal unitary
enterprises. These enterprises are mostly involved in strategic production,
including military and nuclear production. The
property of such enterprises belongs to the state. According to the new law, the
Ministry of Property Relations would gain control
over these enterprises: Alexander Belousov,
a member of the Budget and Tax Committee,
claims that this would contradict existing managerial practices in the defense and transportation
industries that have proven quite effective. He states that as a result of
the implementation of this law, the task of the control over unitary enterprises
would be separated from the task of fulfilling the state armament
program, state defense orders, etc, and slow enterprise reform.[1] On the other
hand, First Deputy Minister of
Property Relations Aleksandr Braverman, argued that it would speed reforms.[2]
Ministers opposed to the law include
Minister of Atomic Energy Aleksandr Rumyantsev,
General Director of the
Aerospace Agency Yuriy
Koptev, General Director of the
Conventional Weapons Agency Aleksandr Nozdrachev, and
General D.
irector of the Shipbuilding
Agency Vladimir Pospelov.[1]
9/18/2002: GRIGORIY PASKO
SENT TO LABOR CAMP
On 18 September 2002, NTV-Novosti reported that former
military journalist Grigoriy Pasko, who had been sentenced to four years in prison,
was transferred from the detention center where he had been kept during his trial in Vladivostok to
a hard labor prison camp in the town of Ussuriysk.[1]
Pasko, an investigative journalist who worked for the Pacific Fleet
newspaper Boyevaya vakhta, was arrested in Vladivostok on 20 November 1997 by Russian Security Police.[2]
The FSB accused Pasko of
treason in the form of espionage for his work with Japanese journalists. He was
found guilty of attending a navy commanders' meeting and taking notes with
the intention of passing them to the Japanese media.[3]
Pasko's publications focused on nuclear safety issues in the
Russian Pacific Fleet. Pasko had worked with Japanese television and newspapers
on reports concerning environmental abuses by the Russian navy, such as
dumping radioactive waste into the Sea of Japan.
Following his 1997 arrest, Pasko spent 20 months in jail. In
July 1999, the Court of the Russian Pacific Fleet in Vladivostok acquitted him
of the treason charges, but sentenced him to three years in prison for exceeding
his authority as a military officer and released him under a general amnesty.[2]
Pasko appealed, but so did the prosecution, insisting that he was a spy. In
November 2000, the Military Collegium of the Russian Supreme Court sent the case back for a re-trial in the Pacific Fleet Court.
After several postponements, the re-trial started on 11 July 2001. It ended on
25 December 2001. Pasko had been charged with collecting and transferring 10
items of "secret" information; he was acquitted
regarding nine items of information, but convicted for having kept at home
the hand-written notes taken at the Pacific Fleet staff meeting.[2] He was convicted to four years of hard labor for treason and taken into
custody.
Both sides appealed the verdict. While the defense demanded a full acquittal,
the prosecution believed the sentence was too lenient and demanded 12 years for Pasko. The hearing of the appeal in the Supreme Court was held on 25 June 2002. The verdict was slightly changed
(the court changed the wording of the verdict, dropping a reference to Pasko's
illegal attendance of a meeting on Pacific Fleet exercises in 1997, as well as a
clause censoring him for maintaining contacts with foreigners), but the four-year sentence remained
the same.[3]
Pasko has already spent 2.5 years in prison and is scheduled to be released from the labor camp on 25 April 2004.
However, he will be eligible for parole in December 2002, which will be
dependent on "good behavior" while inside.[2]
President Putin asserted that he would consider Pasko's request for pardon,
but the journalist intends to seek acquittal on all charges. He stated that
amnesty could only be offered to guilty men, while he is innocent.[4]
Amnesty International adopted Pasko as a prisoner of conscience on 7 January
2002, saying that the prosecution of Pasko appears to be "motivated by political
reprisal for exposing the practice of dumping nuclear waste."[2]
8/26/2002: NEED FOR NAVAL REFORM
DRAWS INCREASED ATTENTION
During a visit
to the Pacific Fleet at the end of August 2002, President Putin reinforced the importance the government attaches
to reforming the Navy by proclaiming that "it is time to recognize the role of
the Navy in defending the country and cease treating it as a stepchild (pasynok)."[1,2]
He identified inadequate allocations from the military budget as
contributing to the serious problems faced by the Navy and
characterized the failure to build new ships as a result of government neglect.[2]
Minister of Industry, Science, and Technology Ilya Klebanov furthermore stated that "the problems of the
Navy [now] are the problems of the government and not only the Ministry of
Defense." This new approach represents a significant change from past military
reform programs, which in one case proposed limiting the role of the Navy to
guarding maritime borders. In contrast, the current reform plans call for the Navy to resurrect its status as an oceanic power, assume a
predominant role in nuclear deterrence in place of the
Strategic Rocket Forces,
and receive at least 20% of the overall military budget.[1] An increase in the current
11-12% of the military budget allocated to the Navy (compared to 23% in 1993
and 9.2% in 1998) would enable the Navy to devote more resources to the
completion, repair, and modernization of existing assets as well as begin to build new ships and
submarines. Admiral Kuroyedov estimates that continuation of the current level
of funding would result in a naval fleet of no more than 60 ships by 2015,
whereas reform plans envision a fleet of 12-15 strategic submarines, 50
multipurpose nuclear submarines, 35 diesel submarines, and approximately 70
surface ships. A fleet of this size is unlikely, however,
given that allocations for shipbuilding in 1999-2001 covered only 3-5% of
required yearly costs, in contrast to the allocation of 25% of costs per year sought by Admiral Kuroyedov.[2] Although renewed interest in naval reform produced an 80% increase in state defense orders for the Navy in 2002,
helped to revitalize dormant projects such as the
Severodvinsk nuclear
submarine and the fifth-generation nuclear-powered submarine
Yuriy Dolgorukiy, and led to the launch of the Dmitriy Donskoy SSBN after
repairs that stretched over 12 years,
limited funding and competing priorities within the defense establishment
suggest that it may be difficult for the Navy to overcome existing realities
and pursue the new goal of a revived Soviet Navy.[1,2]
7/15/2002: RUSSIA LAUNCHES, THEN LOSES, SPACE RECOVERY VEHICLE
On 12 July 2002, Russia successfully
launched a converted Volna booster vehicle equipped with a 150kg Demonstrator-2
reentry and descent space vehicle from the submarine Ryazan in the
Barents Sea. The Demonstrator-2 is designed to recover cargoes from space to
Earth, has the capacity to land on other planets, and is equipped with an
inflatable breaking system, according to navy spokesman Igor Dygalo. The Demonstrator-2 was designed by the G.
N. Babakin Scientific Research Center. The launch was deemed to be a success;
the data collected will be used to design further space vehicles, while the
launch itself provided Russian sailors with a training opportunity.[1,2]
However, the Demonstrator-2, which was
supposed to land at the Kura range on Kamchatka, had not been found as of 15
July 2002.[3]
7/10/2002: THREE TYPHOON
SUBMARINES TO BE DISMANTLED
On 10 July 2002, the Russian Navy
announced that it will dismantle three of its six Akula-class (NATO name 'Typhoon')
submarines. The funding for the dismantlement will come from the U.S.
CTR program. Work on the first submarine began
at Sevmash. The decision to scrap another two Akulas was based upon the
projected cost of modernization and the lack of funding.[1,2]
7/8/2002: COURT SETS PRECEDENT
FOR SHIPYARDS TO PAY GOVERNMENT FOR WORK BEGUN BEFORE PRIVATIZATION
On 8 July 2002, the Arbitration Court
of St. Petersburg and Leningrad Oblast ordered
Severnaya Verf to pay the federal
budget $603 million, nearly the total amount paid to the shipyard for completion
and delivery to China of two 956E destroyers. The rational for the decision was
based upon the fact that work on the destroyers had begun prior to the 1997
agreement between China and the Russian Shipbuilding Agency, and that work had been done at the expense of the Russian government. The
government believed itself entitled to compensation for the work done prior to
the privatization of the enterprise, but the court unexpectedly awarded the
Ministry of Finance almost the entire amount paid to the shipyard. The
decision may
bankrupt the shipyard if it is enforced, and calls into question
future business dealings between the Russian Shipbuilding Agency and civilian
shipyards.
6/12/2002: CHINA TO BUY EIGHT
KILO-CLASS SUBMARINES FROM RUSSIA
Russian sources have said that China
intends to buy eight Vashavyanka-class [NATO name 'Kilo'] submarines from
Russia. The deal is reportedly worth $1.6 billion, and all the boats are to
delivered within five years. Preliminary reports have five of the boats
scheduled to be built at Admiralteyskiye Verfi, two at
Amurskiy Zavod, and one
at Krasnoye Sormovo.
Krasnoye Sormovo has already completed two-thirds of the
hull of the first ship. The purchase of these submarines calls into question the
future of the the Chinese Song-class submarine program.
6/11/2002: TWENTY DECOMMISSIONED NUCLEAR SUBMARINES CURRENTLY
UNDERGOING DISMANTLEMENT
On 11 June 2002, Russian Minister
of Atomic Energy Aleksander Rumyantsev said that 20 decommissioned nuclear
submarines were being dismantled at the time. He
said that the total number of submarines that have been dismantled is 70,
and another 100 are awaiting dismantlement over the course of the next several
years.
5/28/2002: FUNDING
PROBLEMS CONTINUE TO PLAGUE NAVY
On 28 May 2002, Sergey Mironov,
speaker of the Russian Federation Council, promised Sevmash workers
that he would address the issue of Ministry of Defense debts. Workers
at Sevmash have still not been paid for the
construction of the
submarine Gepard.[1] The Defense Ministry owes 20% of the
cost of construction, or 542 million rubles ($17.3 million as of 28 May
2002).[2] The continuing funding problem underscores a larger trend in the navy:
the undertaking of new projects for which the navy has inadequate funds. Yuriy Sivkov, Arkhangelsk Oblast representative to the Federation
Council, claims that the military owes the defense industry in excess of 8
billion rubles (approximately $255 million as of 29 May 2002). According to Sivkov, money to
pay the debt is regularly transferred from the government to the Ministry of
Defense, but then vanishes. Government attempts to take over
Defense Ministry debts have only resulted in a reshuffling of accounting ledgers. The
Defense Ministry's unreliability is putting a strain on the defense industry, as
well as affecting the quality of construction work and ship repairs.[3] Defense
Minister Sergey Ivanov has said that the Russian state will pay the entire
amount that it owes to Sevmash.[4]
3/28/2002: K-19 TO BE
SCRAPPED JUST AS MOVIE ABOUT TRAGEDY SET TO BE RELEASED
On 28 March 2002, the K-19 nuclear
submarine was sent to the Nerpa Shipyard for
dismantlement. The ship was decommissioned and its reactor removed in the
1970s; it has been in Ara Bay since
1990.The ship's history, which earned it the nickname "Hiroshima," includes a
1961 reactor accident that killed eight members of the crew, and a 1972 fire
that killed another 28. Shortly after the second accident the K-19 was
decommissioned from the Northern Fleet. In July 2002, an American movie about the
accident, made by
National
Geographic, will be released, starring Harrison Ford as former Soviet Navy Captain Nikolay Zateyev. [1,2,3]
2/22/2002: INDIAN SUBMARINE
CREW REPORTED TRAINING IN RUSSIA
The Indian newspaper
Hindustan Times
reported on 22 February 2002 that an Indian Navy submarine crew has been
training in Russia for a year. Its training included going to sea aboard an Akula
II-class nuclear attack submarine, which is similar to the submarines that are
reportedly the subject of talks between India and Russia concerning their
possible lease. According to the Indian Navy's commander, Admiral Madhvendra
Singh, the Indian Navy would need two and a half years to acquire skills
necessary to operate nuclear submarines. Although the Indian Navy has already
operated a Russian Charlie-class nuclear-powered cruise missile submarine, the
Indian Navy undertook no measures to preserve those skills and, according to
former naval chief Admiral Vishnu Bhagwat,
the nuclear de-skilling
was a deliberate policy. The policy changed in the late 1990s, with renewed
interest in nuclear propulsion for submarines, and the acquisition of nuclear
propulsion simulators for training in 1998.
2/8/2002: INDIAN SUBMARINE DEAL SUSPENDED
On 8 February 2002, Russian Deputy Prime Minister Ilya Klebanov
and Indian
Defense Minister George Fernandes held a meeting during the course of
which they signed several protocols on military-technical
cooperation and discussed the possible lease by India of four Tu-22M3
long-range bombers and an aircraft carrier, the
Admiral Gorshkov.[1,2] No progress was reported on the possible
lease of two Project 971 Shchuka-B [NATO designation 'Akula'] nuclear submarines. According to
the Moscow Times,
the subject was not even broached at the meeting.[2]
According to the Hindustan Times, given India's low defense budget this year, it
is unlikely that India would finalize the nuclear submarine deal in the near
future, despite its high interest and agreement in principle.
Nevertheless, the article emphasizes that acquisition of
nuclear submarines would provide India with the most reliable nuclear weapon delivery
platform.[3]
The US Department of Energy Weekly Report briefly outlined the Indian plan to
renovate its navy, which was submitted for review to the Indian government by
Commander Admiral Madhevendera Singh. It states that the Russian
government had already asked for about $5 million through the year 2010 for the
purchase of the submarines.[4] For more information on the meeting, see
the 2/8/2002 entry in the
Nuclear Exports to India Developments
file.
1/26/2002: INDIA TO LEASE TWO RUSSIAN NUCLEAR
SUBMARINES
Commander-in-Chief
of the Russian Navy Admiral Vladimir Kuroyedov has
announced that Russia plans to lease nuclear submarines to India. The statement
was made during his visit to the Amurskiy Shipyard in the Russian Far East in late January 2002. The shipyard is
constructing the first submarine India would lease -- the Nerpa, a
Shchuka B-class [NATO name
'Akula
II'] SSN. The second submarine for the lease, the Kuguar, in being
constructed in the Far North at Sevmash
facility in Severodvinsk. India will provide Russia with finances to complete construction of
the two Shchuka B-class SSNs,
while Russia will train four Indian submarine crews and provide India with the
submarines for five years, beginning in 2004. The leased submarines are
expected to be armed with Club-S
missiles [NATO name SS-NX-27 'Alfa'].[1] The Club-S system can be
outfitted with supersonic 3M-54E or subsonic 3M-54EI antiship missiles, 3M-14E
land attack cruise missiles or 91RE1 antisubmarine torpedoes. The 3M-54E and
3M-14E missile can carry a warhead of up to 400kg and have a range of about 300km.[2] UPI quotes
Russia's Rosoboronexport arms sales agency as saying that construction of the
submarines
will resume when India makes the first $100 million payment.[3] According to
Indian External Affairs Minister Jaswant Singh, during the last four years
India and Russia have signed military contracts worth $10 billion.[4] The
submarine lease may open the door to sales of submarines as well as sales of
HEU nuclear fuel for the submarine's OK-650 pressurized water reactors. For
more items on Russian-Indian military cooperation see the following entries:
10/16/2000
in the Rubin Design Bureau
section, 6/8/2000 in the
Zvezdochka Developments section,
10/24/2000
in the Baltic Shipyard
Developments section, Russian assistance in the
Indian ATV program.
http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/NAVY/Klub.html
11/26/2001: RUSSIA BEGINS MODERNIZATION OF ANTEY-CLASS SSGNS
On 26 November 2001, the Pacific Fleet Antey-class
[NATO name Oscar II] SSGN Irkutsk arrived for repairs at
Zvezda.[1] The
decision to repair the submarine at Zvezda and not at
Sevmash in Severodvinsk,
where it was built, was made because the submarine was not able to
travel from Kamchatka to Severodvinsk. The
technical condition of Irkutsk was so poor that its crew had to be replaced by one of the
most skilled Pacific Fleet crews, from the submarine Omsk of the same class, in
order to move the
submarine to Bolshoy Kamen safely.[2] According to Zvezda Director Yuriy Shulgan, the repairs will take
from from three to four months, though timing ultimately depends on financing.[3]
The repair of the Irkutsk marks the beginning of a program to
repair and modernize Antey-class SSGNs. The full-scope
program will start only after the final conclusions on the causes of the Kursk
accident are announced by the state commission.[2]
8/2001: YEKATERINBURG SSBN TO BE SUPPORTED
BY BUSINESSES FROM URALS
The 17 August 2001 issue of Vecherniy Yekaterinburg reported that a foundation consisting of about 40
enterprises from the Urals region has been created to support the Yekaterinburg,
a Delfin-class [NATO name 'Delta IV'] SSBN. The submarine has been under
repair
at the Zvezdochka shipyard since
1998. According to the foundation's director, Petr Boldyrev, the submarine will
receive about 160,000 rubles (over $5,400 as of 17 August 2001) a month from
its sponsors. Among other things, the money will be spent on buying training
simulators for the submarine crew.
7/25/2001: SCIENTIST CHARGED WITH
DISCLOSING STATE SECRETS NOT GUILTY OF ANY CRIME
On 25 July 2001, TV6 reported
that the case against Professor Vladimir Soyfer, accused of disclosing state
secrets, had been dropped. In the summer of 1999, the Primorskiy Kray FSB
confiscated materials from Soyfer's
laboratory and apartment. They later argued the materials could be used by NATO to attack Russian
military targets with high-precision weapons. [1]
Professor Soyfer, who
works in the Pacific Oceanological Institute of the
Far Eastern Branch of the Russian
Academy of Sciences, is a leading specialist
in the area of radiation security. Soyfer
has worked for 25 years in a laboratory studying radioactivity
in the ocean and has studied the effects of the K-314 nuclear submarine accident in Chazhma Bay in 1985.[2]
In February 2000, an official FSB statement noted that the
confiscated documents contained secret hydrological data and a secret map of Chazhma
Bay, where Pacific Fleet nuclear submarines are based.[3] Also,
some xeroxed copies of secret documents from the Radiation, Chemical, and
Biological Defense Service of the Pacific Fleet were found in Soyfer's
laboratory. The materials were copied in violation of regulations on secret
documents.
The territorial procurator's office found that the scientist had committed a
crime by disclosing state secrets and deserved a punishment of up to four years
in jail, ITAR-TASS reported on 18 February 2000. However, taking into account Soyfer's age (70 years), the prosecution
decided not to institute criminal proceedings because an amnesty had been issued
for elderly criminals.[1]
Professor Soyfer appealed, as he disagreed with the verdict, insisting that he
was not guilty. A case was initiated, but was closed due to the "absence of
the commission of a crime."[4]
6/26/2001: KLEBANOV SAYS RUSSIA WILL NOT SELL A
NUCLEAR SUBMARINE TO CHINA
On 26 June 2001, Deputy Prime Minister
Ilya
Klebanov refuted rumors that Russia is going to sell a nuclear submarine
to China. The statement was made in response to the 24 June 2001 New York Times
article "Just
What Game is Putin Playing?", which speculated that Russia might sell an Oscar II SSGN to China and
also assist the Chinese in developing multiple warhead technology as a
response to US plans to deploy a national missile defense. [In February 2001,
Commander-in-Chief
of the Russian Navy Admiral Vladimir Kuroyedov
similarly denied negotiating a lease of a nuclear
submarine to India, but in January 2002, it became known that negotiations over
the lease of a Russian nuclear
submarine to India are under
way.]
4/11/2001: SSNS AT ZAVETY ILYICHA HEAD FOR
DISMANTLEMENT
For more information see the 4/11/2001
entry in the Pacific Fleet General
Developments section.
4/5/2001: REPORT THAT KURSK CARRIED NUCLEAR
WEAPONS UNLIKELY
On 4 April 2001, in an interview on Norway's TV-2, Russian
Duma Deputy Grigoriy Tomchin said that the Kursk was carrying nuclear
weapons.[1] A deputy chair of the Russian Property Committee, Tomchin
has been a member of the Russian government commission investigating the Kursk accident
since 19 December 2000, when nine Duma members were added to the
commission.[2] TV-2 also reported that Harald Ramfjord, a member of
Global Tool Management who has been working on the project to raise the Kursk,
said he has seen secret Russian documents confirming the presence of two
cruise missiles with nuclear warheads on board the vessel.[3] The Russian Navy
immediately denied that there were nuclear weapons on the Kursk.[4]
On 5 April Tomchin denied having stated that there
were nuclear weapons on the Kursk, calling the TV-2 report a
"provocation," and saying that the reporter had misrepresented his
statements.[5] In response, TV-2 made a video of Tomchin's interview available
on its
website. Tomchin clearly states that there were nuclear weapons on the Kursk,
although he added that there is no danger from the weapons, just as there is no danger
from weapons aboard the sunken US submarines Thresher and Scorpion.
In the interview, he declined to answer a question regarding the type of weapons the Kursk
had on board.[1] Sources in the State Duma suggested on 5 April that the
make-up of the Kursk investigative commission might be changed to
eliminate current members who make "irresponsible and untrue" remarks
regarding the Kursk.[7]
The Kursk, a Russian Project 949A Antey-class [NATO
name 'Oscar II']
nuclear-powered guided missile submarine (SSGN), carried 24 P-700 Granit [SS-N-19, NATO name 'Shipwreck'] antiship cruise missiles. The
Granit missile can have either a 750kg high explosive or 500kt nuclear warhead.
Antey-class submarines can also carry nuclear-capable torpedoes and
sea-launched cruise missiles which can be launched from torpedo tubes.
However, all tactical
nuclear weapons were supposed to have been removed from Russian warships in 1992 following a 5
October 1991 declaration by Mikhail Gorbachev. The
Kursk was launched in 1994, and entered into service on 20 January 1995.[8]
It is unlikely that it ever carried nuclear weapons. Reintroduction of
tactical nuclear weapons would be politically risky and difficult to
hide: traffic between tactical nuclear warhead
storage facilities and the naval base would likely be
visible to foreign intelligence services.
3/19/2001: RUSSIA MAINTAINS SUBMARINE PRESENCE AT
SEA
On 19 March 2001, Deputy Chief of the Main Staff of the Russian Navy
Rear Admiral Vladislav Ilin said that depending on the tactical situation, the Northern
and Pacific Fleets keep a combined 10-12 submarines constantly on combat watch or sea patrol.
2/16/2001: RUSSIA MAY BE NEGOTIATING LEASE OF NUCLEAR SUBMARINE
TO INDIA
On 16 February 2001, an official spokesperson of the
Russian naval delegation visiting India said that reports in local
newspapers regarding negotiations with India on the lease of a Russian nuclear submarine
were incorrect.[1] In an interview with RIA Novosti, Commander-in-Chief
of the Russian Navy Admiral Vladimir Kuroyedov said he "did not have information on" the possibility of leasing a Russian
nuclear submarine to India.[2] The Russian delegation was invited by the Indian
Navy to take part in celebration of the fiftieth anniversary of the Republic
of India. [There has, however, been no complete denial that Amurskiy
Zavod has been discussing the lease or sale of a submarine to India.]
10/18/2000 REGIONAL SPONSORSHIP OF SUBS TO CONTINUE FOR 55
YEARS
On 18 October 2000, representatives
of nine Russian cities (Vilyuchinsk, Petropavlovsk-Kamchatskiy, Irkutsk,
Krasnoyarsk, Tomsk, Omsk, Chelyabinsk, Podolsk, and Zelenograd) met in
Petropavlovsk-Kamchatskiy to form a "sponsorship council" to
help maintain the Pacific Fleet nuclear submarine unit based at Rybachiy. The
council will consist of the cities' mayors. The vessels covered by this agreement all
carry the names of the cities. Under the agreement, the cities will assist sailors in solving housing problems and in finding jobs for those leaving the service. They also pledged to send only the best
conscripts from the regions to serve on the submarines. Under the arrangement
between the regional authorities and the fleet command this cooperation will
last for 55 years.[1,2,3] To see the sponsorship agreement (in Russian), please
click here.
4/6/2000: MISSILE-LOADING
CRANES IN POOR CONDITION
According to a 6 April 2000 article in Segodnya,
the special-purpose cranes used to load and unload submarine missiles are
in poor shape, and the 500 million rubles ($17.4 million as of 6 April 2000)
earmarked for cranes in the 2000 budget was spent on a new submarine.
(On 6/16/2000 in Shkotovo
an accident attributed to an obsolete crane resulted in the release of toxic
fuel from an SLBM.) The only manufacturer of the special cranes in the ex-USSR
is Istrian, in Ukraine. The service life of the newest of the cranes
was to expire in 1998, but the manufacturer fixed six cranes, extending their
service period through July 2000. The cranes are needed to unload missiles
for inspection, as well as to load missiles into submarines going on duty.
The Duma Defense Committee is
looking into the matter. In March 2000, Aleksey Moskovskiy, deputy secretary
of the Security Council, sent
a message to Deputy Prime Minister Ilya Klebanov noting the matter, and stating
that the 2000 budget should be strictly observed. According to Segodnya,
Russia cannot make the cranes and does not wish to purchase them from Ukraine.
3/18/2000: REGIONAL SPONSORSHIP
OF SUBMARINES CONTINUES
In an 18 March 2000 interview Nikolay Konorev, Commander
of the Russian Navy's Operational
Directorate, praised the continuing assistance regions are providing individual
submarines. For instance, Yekaterinburg continues to sponsor the
Yekaterinburg,
providing stipends to four top sailors each month.[1] In the past
seven years, Voronezh has given the submariners on the Voronezh
(based at Zapadnaya Litsa) busses
and paid to remodel their dormitory. Other regions aiding submarines
include Orel (the Orel is based at Zapadnaya
Litsa), Nizhniy Novgorod, Krasnodar, Chelyabinsk, Zelenograd, Tambov,
Tomsk, and Omsk (the Tambov, the Tomsk, and the Omsk
are based at Rybachiy).[1,2,3]
The city of Moscow is paying for the construction of 200 apartments for
submariners' families in Murmansk, and in a May 1999 visit to Murmansk
Moscow mayor Yuriy Luzhkov promised to aid in the completion of the Yuriy
Dolgorukiy SSBN, under construction at the Northern
Machine-Building Enterprise (Sevmash). Further, Luzhkov promised Northern
Fleet commanders that the Moscow Central Fuel Company would provide the
fleet with fuel, and that he would consider new proposals they might have
regarding sponsorship of Northern Fleet submarines.[4] For more information
on regional sponsorship of submarines, see the 9/97
entry under Northern Fleet General Developments.
11/18/1999: ADMIRALS ACCUSED OF
SELLING WARSHIPS ILLEGALLY
On 18 November 1999, the Pacific
Fleet Military Procurator's Office charged three high-ranking officers with
"exceeding official powers while causing grave consequences." The indicted
admirals are Admiral Vasiliy Yeremin, chief of the Naval Academy, Rear Admiral
Yuriy Klichugin, chief of the Russian Navy's Auxiliary Fleet, and Vice Admiral
Yevgeniy Serbo, deputy chief of the Academy of Rear Services and Transportation.
The admirals, as well as others yet to be named, stand accused of selling
warships and auxiliary ships from the Russian Navy for personal profit. Most
notably, the group allegedly sold the naval arms transport ship Anadyr
to a Norwegian front company in 1994. The Anadyr was designed to
transport strategic missiles, medium and small combat ships, and nuclear
submarines. The ship was practically new, having been built in 1988. In
addition, the group is charged with the illegal transfer of a number of Pacific
Fleet tankers to Kamchatka's Slavin Company from 1994 to 1998.
10/99: RUSSIAN OFFICIALS OFFER DIVERGENT VIEWS
ON NAVAL NUCLEAR FORCE READINESS
After completing inspection trips of the Northern
and Pacific Fleets, Russian Navy Commander-in-Chief Admiral Vladimir
Kuroyedov reported that naval strategic nuclear forces are at the required
level of readiness. During his tour in October, Kuroyedov evaluated
the Navy's combat readiness, technical readiness and the operation of the
fleet control system.[1] On 28 October 2000, Duma Defense Committee
member Vladimir Volkov gave a very different assessment of the Navy's preparedness.
He said that only four of Russia's approximately 50 nuclear submarines
are combat worthy and that the state urgently needs 750 million rubles
to repair 24 submarines in order to ensure a "minimum level of security."[2]
6/21-26/99: ZAPAD-99 EXERCISE INCLUDES SIMULATED
NUCLEAR STRIKES
For details, please see the 6/21-26/99
entry in the Strategic Forces General
Developments file of the Weapons section.
8/28/98: NAVY TO COMMISSION TWO SUBMARINES
Vladimir Kuroyedov, commander-in-chief of the Russian
Navy, announced that the navy plans to commission two "multipurpose" (attack)
submarines in 1999. Amurskiy Zavod
shipyard in the Far East houses one of the subs, which is 82 percent complete.
The other, located at the Sevmash shipyard in Severodvinsk in northern
Russia, is at approximately the same stage of completion.
5/98: RUSSIAN OFFICIALS ANALYZE MILITARY
REFORM AND THE RUSSIAN NAVY
In an article in Nezavisimoye voyennoye obozreniye,
Duma member Yuriy Pavlovich Kuznetsov analyzed several aspects of the effects
of military reform on the Russian Navy and advocated abandoning the Soviet
approach to naval organizational development. Kuznetsov maintained
that the Russian Navy will need 65 to 75 submarines in the 21st century,
including 12 to 13 SSBNs, 12 to 13 SSNs to protect these SSBNs, and 10
to 12 SSNs each in the Northern and Pacific Fleets to engage in tactical
operations and monitor enemy SSBNs. According to Kuznetsov, the absence
of clear enemies, however, necessitates an "economic" approach to estimating
Russia's naval force requirements in the 21st century, in which the "naval
order of battle is determined by capacities for regular funding in the
form of a certain proportion of GNP." Financial limitations have
already affected the stationing of forces, with most of the SSNs and "general
purpose forces" moving to the Northern Fleet.[1] Russian Navy Commander-in-Chief
Vladimir Kuroyedov noted that the Northern Fleet is successfully implementing
its role in ensuring Russia's security, the most significant part of which
is providing nuclear deterrence. Kuroyedov also referred to financial
problems associated with the Navy in general and stated that because of
them, any new large-scale construction efforts must wait until the 21st
century, and the primary objective until then is "to maintain and technically
support" the naval forces that Russia has inherited from the Soviet Navy.[2]
3/22/98: SUBMARINE FLEET SUFFERS FINANCIAL SHORTAGES
The Russian nuclear submarine fleet is suffering
from extreme financial deficiencies. According to Nikolay Zakharenko, commander
of the Pacific Fleet, there is no money for submarine maintenance work,
which requires the temporary removal of weapons and the transfer of nuclear
fuel. The latter is time consuming and requires money, specialists,
and equipment, all of which are lacking.
7/18/96: RUSSIA LAUNCHES NEW TOMSK SSGN
A new nuclear-powered cruise missile submarine (SSGN),
the Tomsk, was assembled at the Northern Machine-Building Enterprise (Sevmash)
and launched in Severodvinsk.[1,2] More than 800 Russian facilities participated
in building the Tomsk.
2/96: NAVY NOT RECEIVING NECESSARY OPERATING FUNDS
In 1995, the Russian Navy received less than 35 percent of the funds needed
for its operations, and it is now estimated that it will receive even fewer
funds in 1996. If current funding levels remain constant, the transfer
of naval reactor fuel to recycling facilities will take 150 years.
2/1/96: FUTURE EFFECTS OF PRESENT FUNDING
TRENDS FOR NAVY
Given the current level of government financing for
the Russian Navy, by the year 2000 Russia will have between seven and ten
ballistic missile submarines (each of which can carry approximately 16
ballistic missiles), between 15 and 20 nuclear attack submarines, between
ten and twelve diesel-powered submarines, between 112 and 160 ballistic
missile launchers, one aircraft carrier, two or three missile cruisers,
seven to ten torpedo-boat destroyers and the same number of frigates, and
30 to 40 missile boats.
11/7/94: GOSATOMNADZOR REPORT CITES MARITIME
NUCLEAR ACCIDENTS
A secret Gosatomnadzor report from 13 May 1994, leaked
to the press in Moscow, mentions numerous nuclear accidents on ships and
submarines that were never reported. Reportedly, there are 60 decommissioned
submarines that still have their nuclear reactors intact, even though they
were supposed to have been removed; the report compared the situation to
having 60 "floating spent nuclear fuel storage ships."
Links to archived developments files:
Andreyeva Bay Developments
Atomflot Developments
Safonovo
Developments
Severomorsk
Developments
Vidyayevo Developments
Chazhma Developments
Kamchatka Shipyard Developments
Landysh Developments
Pavlovsk Bay Developments
Razboynik Bay Developments
Rybachiy Developments
Site 32 and 86 Developments
Vostok Developments
Zavety Ilyicha Developments
Zvezda Developments
Naval
Research, Design, and Production Facilities Developments
Admiralteyskiye Verfi Shipyard
Developments
Baltic Shipyard Developments
Krasnoye Sormovo Shipyard Developments
Krylov Shipbuilding Research
Institute Developments
Lazurit Central Design Bureau
Developments
Malakhit Central
Marine-Engineering Design Bureau Developments
Rubin Central Design Bureau for
Marine Engineering Developments
Page last updated 1 March 2007
Comments or questions? E-mail Cristina Chuen:
cristina.chuenATmiis.edu.
This material is produced independently for NTI
by the Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the
Monterey Institute of International Studies and
does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has
not been independently verified by NTI or its directors, officers,
employees, agents. Copyright © 2002 by MIIS.
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