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   Gadzhiyevo/Yagelnaya Naval Base
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Polyarnyy
   Pala Bay Submarine Repair Facility
   Polyarninskiy Shipyard
Severomorsk
  Safonovo Ship Repair Facility SRZ-82
   Severomorsk Naval Base
   Site 49
Sevmorput Naval Shipyard No. 35 (Rosta)
Vidyayevo
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Arkhangelsk Oblast Facilities
Severodvinsk
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Northern Fleet General Developments
Northern Fleet Decommissioning Issues
Northern Fleet Radioactive Waste Developments
See Also:
Nuclear Submarine Table
+Foreign Assistance
SSBN Force
General Naval Developments


Russia: Naval Reactors: Fleets: Northern Fleet: Developments Russia: Northern Fleet General Developments

For information on SLBM test launches, START-accountable launchers and warheads, and other SSBN-related developments, please see the SSBN Force subsection of the Russian Nuclear Weapons section.
 
10/9/2003: GERMANY ALLOCATES €300 MILLION FOR DISMANTLEMENT AND REACTOR STORAGE ASSISTANCE
On 9 October 2003, Minatom and the German Ministry of Economics and Labor signed an agreement in Yekaterinburg on the provision of assistance for the safe disposal of nuclear-powered submarines in Northwest Russia. For more information, see the 10/9/2003 entry in the Naval Foreign Assistance Developments section.

10/8/2003: NERPA CONTRACT WITH GERMANY DRAWN UP FOR STORAGE SITE
On 8 October 2003, Nerpa Shipyard Deputy Director for International and Commercial Affairs Oleg Yerin reported that a group of German specialists investigating a possible contract between Germany and the Nerpa Shipyard for the construction at Sayda Bay of a regional storage site for reactors removed from decommissioned nuclear submarines had completed their on-site work. Negotiations had been underway for seven months and, as planned, the October 8 meeting resulted in the text of the contract--which has not yet been finalized--being drawn up.

["Germaniya pomozhet obespechit radiatsionnuyu bezopasnost na Kolskom poluostrove," Interfax, 8 October 2003.] {Entered 11/10/2003 SLK} 

8/30/2003: SSN K-159 SINKS IN BARENTS SEA
On 30 August 2003, the Project 627A nuclear attack submarine K-159 sank in the Barents Sea. The decommissioned nuclear submarine, in service from 1963 to 1988, was being towed from the Gremikha Naval Base to Nerpa Shipyard, in Snezhnogorsk.  For details on this incident, please see the 8/30/2003 entry in the Gremikha file.

8/28/2003: ATOMFLOT OFFICIAL ARRESTED FOR NUCLEAR MATERIALS TRAFFICKING
Russian authorities have arrested Alexander Tyulyakov, Atomflot deputy director for administrative issues, for attempting to sell radioactive materials.  The arrest was first made public on 28 August 2003 by the Murmansk newspaper Nord-Vest Kuryer, and announced internationally four days later by the Norwegian environmental organization Bellona Foundation. For details, please see the 8/28/2003 entry in the Atomflot file.

6/10/2003: ATOMFLOT TEMPORARY SPENT FUEL STORAGE SITE BUILT
Construction of a temporary spent fuel storage facility at Atomflot was reported completed in June 2003. The site will not be commissioned until September 2003, however, after a final inspection has been undertaken by a government commission.  For more information, see the 6/10/2003 entry in the Atomflot file.

4/28/2003: ZVEZDOCHKA RECEIVES EXPORT LICENSE
On 28 April 2003, the Head of the Committee for Cooperation on Defense Technology with Foreign Countries, Mikhail Dmitriyev, announced that Zvezdochka Shipyard and three other Russian defense sector enterprises had been granted permission independently to service and export spare parts for previously delivered military equipment. Previously, any defense technology export had to go through Rosoboroneksport, the state export agency. Earlier, the Rubin Design Bureau was given the same privileges. On 16 September 2002, President Vladimir Putin issued the directive granting the Commission the right to administer such export licenses. [For more information, see the Export Control Developments section.]
["'Zvezdochka' poluchila pravo na eksport zapchastey," Arkhangelskiye novosti, 30 April 2003; in Integrum Techno, http://www.integrum.ru] {Entered 7/25/2003 RS}

4/19/2003: NEW CONSULTATIVE COUNCIL TO INCLUDE SHIPYARD DIRECTORS
The mayor of Severodvinsk has introduced a new council of chairmen, which is composed of the directors of the Sevmash, Zvezdochka, Arktika, and Polyarnaya Zvezda Shipyards as well as the commander of the Belomorsk Naval Base along with a number of other enterprise directors. The council is purely consultative.[1,2] 
Sources:
[1] Yelena Boyko, "Sovet direktorov - v pomoshch meru," Pravda Severa, 19 April 2003; in Integrum Techno, http://www.integrum.ru.
[2] "Arkhangelskaya oblast: Glava administratsii Severodvinska sozdayet sovet direktorov predpriyatiy goroda," IA Regnum, 14 April 2003; in Integrum Techno, http://www.integrum.ru. {Entered 6/19/2003 RS}

4/12/2003: ROBBERY OF SUBMARINERS' WAGES AVERTED
On 12 April 2003, Pravda Severa reported that the robbery of 800,000 rubles (about $25,500 as of 12 April 2003) was averted when submariners came to the aid of an officer who was carrying the collective wages of the SSBN Bryansk's crew. The officer was being attacked by a 35-year-old man from Severodvinsk. According to Pravda Severa, this was just the latest of numerous criminal incidents in this city.
[Yelena Boyko, "Podvodniki chut ne ostalis bez zarplaty," Pravda Severa, 12 April 2003; in Integrum Techno, http://www.integrum.ru] {Entered 6/19/2003 RS}

3/21/2003: TAX PENALTIES WAIVED FOR SEVERODVINSK SHIPYARDS
Penalties for overdue tax payments have been waived for the companies associated with the Russian State Center for Atomic Shipbuilding (GRTsAS), which include the Sevmash and Zvezdochka Shipyards. These companies have been unable to pay taxes as the Russian government had not made payments or paid late for shipyard orders. The accumulated tax penalties totalled approximately 300-370 million rubles (about $9.6-11.8 million as of 21 March 2003). [1,2,3]
Sources:
[1] Mikhail Boyev, "Peni i shtrafy," Korabel, 4 March 2003; in Nord Media Kompani, 21 March 2003;in Integrum Techno, http://www.integrum.ru.
[2] "GRTsAS," Severnyy rabochiy, 13 February; in Nord Media Kompani, 21 March 2003; in Integrum Techno, http://www.integrum.ru.
[3] "Deputaty prostili dolgi Severodvinsku," VolgaInform, 12 February 2003; in Nord Media Kompani, 14 Febuary 2003; in Integrum Techno, http://www.integrum.ru. {Entered 6/23/2003 RS}

3/19/2003: SEVERODVINSK COURT CONVICTS 11 FOR 2001 NUCLEAR SUBMARINE RUDDER BLADE THEFT
On 19 March 2003 the Severodvinsk city court convicted 11 members of a criminal group of stealing a nuclear submarine rudder blade from the Sevmashpredpriyatiya military wharf on 16 July 2001. For more information, see the 3/19/2003 entry in the Severodvinsk file.

3/7/2003: SPONSORSHIP ASSISTANCE RECEIVED IN SEVERODVINSK
On 7 March 2003, Moskovskaya pravda reported that the Moscow city government has provided assistance to Sevmash on several occasions. For more information on this assistance, see the 3/7/2003 entry in the Zvezdochka file.

3/5/2003: PSKOV NUCLEAR SUBMARINE DAMAGED IN FIRE
A fire broke out on the afternoon of 5 March 2003 at the Safonovo ship repair facility, damaging the outer hydroacoustic rubber layer of the Sierra I-class attack submarine K-336, or Pskov.  For more information, see the 3/5/2003 entry in the Severomorsk file.

2/11/2003: TESTING OF ONSHORE FACILITY FOR UNLOADING SPENT SUBMARINE FUEL SUCCESSFULLY COMPLETED IN SEVERODVINSK
According to an 11 February 2003 Interfax report, the testing of an onshore facility at Zvezdochka Shipyard to unload spent nuclear fuel from submarines has been successfully completed. For more information, see the 2/11/2003 entry in the Zvezdochka file.

1/16/2003: REPAIRS ON YEKATERINBURG COMPLETED
Interfax reported on 16 January 2003 that repairs to the Delfin-class [NATO name 'Delta-IV'] ballistic missile nuclear submarine (SSBN) Yekaterinburg, undertaken at the Zvezdochka shipyard over the past four years, have been completed. For more information, see the 1/16/2003 entry in the SSBN Developments file.

11/12/2002: NUCLEAR FUEL FROM KOLA PENINSULA DECOMMISSIONED SUBMARINES TO BE UNLOADED BY 2007
On 12 November 2002, Interfax reported that current plans call for all decommissioned submarines stored on the Kola Peninsula to be defueled by 2007, at a rate of 20 submarines every year.
[Interfax, 12 November 2002; in Agenstvo Voyennykh Novostey; in "Russia: Fuel From All Decommissioned Nuclear Subs In Kola To Be Unloaded By 07," FBIS Document CEP20021112000308.] {Entered 4/9/2003 AV}

10/21/2002: SEVEROMORSK MAY LOSE HEAT AND HOT WATER
On 21 October 2002, MurmanNews.Ru reported that Severomorsk naval base might have its heat shut off. In order to save fuel, the city administration ordered the temperature in apartment buildings lowered. Severomorsk Mayor Vitaliy Voloshin was unable to answer a question regarding how much fuel was left in the city heat and power station. However, he said that the city expects a new shipment of fuel soon. According to city authorities, the heating crisis was caused by "monopolist" power producers who had raised prices for oil from 2,000 to 4,000 rubles (from about $63 to $126 as of 21 October 2002) per ton. As a result, the main Northern Fleet base might be left without heat and hot water. A similar situation occurred in the early 1990s when the entire Severomorsk region was almost "frozen out" due to fuel shortages at the city heat and power station.
["Murmanskaya oblast. Glavnaya baza Severnogo flota Severomorsk mozhet ostatsya bez tepla i goryachey vody," MurmanNews.Ru, 21 October 2002; in Integrum Techno, http://www.integrum.ru] {Entered 2/24/2003 AV}

4/26/2002: KURSK ARRIVES AT NERPA FOR DISMANTLEMENT
On 26 April 2002, the Kursk submarine arrived at the Nerpa Shipyard, where it is expected to be dismantled in the fall of 2002. Before scrapping begins, the seven P-700 Granit [NATO name SS-N-19 'Shipwreck'] cruise missiles remaining on board will be removed from the Kursk's damaged launch tubes. Then the submarine will be defueled and the vessel's hull will be scrapped.[1] It is unclear how this work will be financed as the Nerpa Shipyard has not yet received any money for the dismantlement. In addition, according to the Murmansk Oblast legislative assembly, the Russian Ministry of Defense still owes the shipyard in Roslyakovo about 150 million rubles (about $4.8 million as of 26 April 2002) for prior clean-up work done on the Kursk.[2]
Sources:
[1] Radio Rossii, 26 April 2002; in "Russian Nuclear Submarine Kursk Arrives at Nerpa Repair Yard," FBIS Document CEP20020426000292.
[2] Interfax, 26 April 2002; in "Defense Ministry Owes R150 Million to Roslyakovo Plant for Kursk Work," FBIS Document CEP20020426000309. {Entered 4/30/2002 EF}
 
3/22/2002: KURSK COMPONENTS MAY BE INSTALLED ON OTHER SUBMARINES
On 22 March 2002, Sevmash Deputy Director Vladimir Chuvakin said that the Rubin Design Bureau had proposed that the Kursk nuclear submarine, currently docked at Roslyakovo, not be completely dismantled. Certain components, such as the rollers and various other gears located at the stern of the ship, are fit to be used to repair other submarines. In addition, the navy has not ruled out returning 15 of the 22 Granit cruise missiles removed from the Kursk to active duty on another ship.
[Konstantin Getmansky and Dmitriy Safonov, "Components of the Kursk Submarine to be Installed on Other Submarines," Izvestiya, 22 March 2002; in Defense and Security, http://news.mosinfo.ru.] {Entered on 6/18/2002 TM}
 
3/19/2002: NIZHNIY NOVGOROD NUCLEAR ATTACK SUBMARINE TO RETURN TO ACTIVE SERVICE IN THE NORTHERN FLEET
On 19 March 2002, the press service of the Nizhniy Novgorod Oblast administration announced that according to Admiral Gennadiy Suchkov, commander of the Northern Fleet, the Kondor-class [NATO name 'Sierra II'] SSN Nizhniy Novgorod would not be dismantled and would return to the Northern Fleet. Since December 2000, when the submarine arrived at the Nerpa Shipyard, the navy has been considering dismantling the submarine. Suchkov also said that repair of the Nizhniy Novgorod had begun.
[Agenstvo voyennykh novostey, 19 March 2002; in "Northern Fleet to Get Back Nizhny Novgorod Nuclear Submarine," FBIS Document CEP20020319000129.] {Entered 4/30/2002 EF}
 
3/15/2002: YURIY DOLGORUKIY NEARS COMPLETION
On 15 March 2002, Northern Fleet Commander Gennadiy Suchkov said that the strategic nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine Yuriy Dolgorukiy will join the Northern Fleet upon its completion at Severodvinsk, scheduled for 2002.[1] The submarine is nearing completion with the aid of the city of Moscow, which has extended credit to assist in the final construction.[2] The Yuriy Dolgorukiy is the first of the Borey series, Russia's fifth generation of nuclear-powered submarines. This class will be slower than the Typhoon class, but the power of its missile armaments will be considerably greater. The Borey series is also favored because of its low noise output, and it is intended to be the mainstay of the Russian Navy in the 21st century. Naval Commander-in-Chief Vladimir Kuroyedov claims that the Russian Navy requires 12-15 strategic nuclear submarines and 50 general purpose nuclear submarines. There are currently four nuclear-powered submarines under construction at Severodvinsk.[1,3] For more information on Russian SSBN construction developments, see the SSBN Developments file in the Russian Weapons section.
[1]"Russian Fifth-Generation Nuclear Submarine Nearing Completion," ITAR-TASS, 15 March 2002.
[2]Mikhail Zubov, "Moskva i Moskvichi. U khoroshego khozyaina i steni zarabativaut, uveren perviy zamestitel mera v pravitelstve Moskvi Oleg Tolkachev," Trud, 27 February 2002; in "Universal Database of Central Newspapers," www.eastview.com.
[3]"Severnoye Mashinostroitelnoye Predpriyatiye," Regions.ru, 2 February 2002. {Entered on 6/18/2002 TM}
 
2/28/2002: NORTHERN FLEET SHIPYARDS NOT PAYING EMPLOYEES
On 28 February 2002, the Russian TV station NTV Mir reported that workers at Northern Fleet shipyards in Murmansk, Polyarnyy, and Roslyakovo had not received their wages since October 2001. The Sevmorput Shipyard in Murmansk is in a particularly difficult situation: the facility owes workers about 40 million rubles (about $1.3 million as of 28 February 2002). Management of the Roslyakovo shipyard, whose employees have not received pay for work on the Kursk submarine, had to take out a bank loan to pay workers one month's salary.[1] On the same day, Russian Navy spokesman Igor Dygalo said that the requisite funds had been sent to Northern Fleet shipyards, including 10 million rubles for Roslyakovo (almost $323,000 as of 28 February 2002).[2]
Sources:
[1] NTV Mir, 28 February 2002; in "Northern Fleet Shipyard Workers Poised to Strike over Wage Arrears," FBIS Document CEP20020228000121.
[2] RIA-Novosti, 28 February 2002; in "Russian Navy Spokesman Denies Shortage of Funds at Northern Shipyards," FBIS Document CEP20020228000392. {Entered 3/14/2002 EF}
 
10/23/2001: KURSK AWAITS INSPECTION TEAMS
On 23 October 2001, Russian Prosecutor-General Vladimir Ustinov announced the completion of the operation to raise the sunken Kursk submarine.[1] The Kursk was lifted from the bottom of the Barents Sea on 8 October 2001,[2] and on 10 October 2001, the submarine arrived at the Safonovo Ship Repair Facility (SRZ-82) nera Severomorsk.[3] On 21 October 2001, the submarine was positioned in the PD-50 floating dock.[4] After drying out, the submarine will be inspected by several investigation teams of the Main Military Prosecutor's Office. Twenty-two P-700 Granit [NATO name SS-N-19 'Shipwreck'] cruise missiles will be unloaded from the submarine in Roslyakovo. Later, the submarine will be transferred to the PD-42 floating dock and towed to the Nerpa Shipyard in Snezhnogorsk, where it will be defueled and dismantled.[5]
Sources:
[1] Ivan Yesyutin, "V Murmanske obyavleno o zavershenii operatsii po podyemu APL 'Kursk'," APL Kursk Web Site, http://kursk.strana.ru/print/1003849392.html.
[2] Lyudmila Averina, "'Kursk' podnimut. Chto dalshe?" Argumenty i fakty, 10 October 2001; in Universal Database of Russian Newspapers, http://www.eastview.com.
[3] Roman Fomishenko, Vladimir Gundarov, "Submarina vernulas iz poslednego pokhoda," Krasnaya zvezda, 11 October 2001, p. 1; in Universal Database of Russian Newspapers, http://www.eastview.com.
[4] Vyacheslav Gudkov, "'Kursk' vstal v dok," Kommersant-Daily, 22 October 2001, p. 3; in Universal Database of Russian Newspapers, http://www.eastview.com
[5] Vyacheslav Gudkov, "Operatsiya. V poslednem pokhode," Kommersant-Vlast, 16 October 2001, p. 22; in Universal Database of Russian Newspapers, http://www.eastview.com. {Entered 10/30/2001 EF}
 
10/18/2001: SEVERSTAL SUBMARINE SUCCESSFULLY LAUNCHES SLBMs
On 18 October 2001, the Northern Fleet Akula-class [NATO name 'Typhoon'] SSBN Severstal, commanded by Captain Aleksandr Bogachev, conducted a test launch of two SLBMs in the White Sea. According to Russian Navy spokesperson Igor Dygalo, the missiles' warheads arrived at the Kura testing range on the Kamchatka Peninsula according to plan.
["Dve boyegolovki uchebnykh ballisticheskikh raket, zapushchenykh s podlodki VMF RF v Belom more, dostigli tseley na Kamchatke," Interfax, 18 October 2001.] {Entered 10/22/2001 EF}
 
9/28/2001: TYPHOON SUBMARINE ON PATROL IN BARENTS SEA
On 28 September 2001, Interfax reported that according to an unidentified source in the Northern Fleet, the Severstal, an Akula [NATO name 'Typhoon'] class SSBN, left Zapadnaya Litsa Naval Base for a combat patrol mission in the Barents Sea.
["Raketnyy podvodnyy kreyser 'Severstal' vyshel na boyevoye dezhurstvo v Barentsevo more," Interfax, 28 September 2001.] {Entered 10/3/2001 EF}
 
8/6/2001: NORTHERN FLEET GAINS A NEW SPONSOR
On 6 July 2001, the web site Press-tsentr.ru reported that the Northern Fleet command had agreed to accept Ulyanovsk Oblast Governor Vladimir Shamanov's offer to sponsor a Northern Fleet SSBN. The oblast will provide social benefits for the crew and help repair the submarine. The submarine will be called the Simbirsk (Ulyanovsk's former name).
["Na Severnom flote budet submarina 'Simbirsk'," Press-tsentr.ru, 6 July 2001; in Integrum Techno, http://www.integrum.ru.] {Entered 9/7/2001 EF}
 
6/26/2001: ATTEMPTED SALE OF PALLADIUM OXYGEN-GENERATING CARTRIDGES PREVENTED
On 26 June 2001, Agentstvo Zhurnalistskikh Rassledovaniy reported that an unemployed person had been arrested in Murmansk for attempting to sell two oxygen-generating cartridges containing 125g of palladium each. According to an agreement between the seller, named Litvin, and an unidentified buyer, the cartridges would be sold for $200 each.[1] Litvin is a resident of Roslyakovo, a town near Severomorsk, just north of the Safonovo Ship Repair Facility (SRZ-82). Investigators believe that the cartridges might have been stolen from the ship repair facility.[2]
Sources:
[1] Maksim Leonov, "V Murmanske zaderzhan bezrabotnyy, pytavshyysya prodat dve kassety regeneratsii vozdukha," Agenstvo Zhurnalistskikh Rassledovaniy, 26 June 2001; in Integrum Techno, http://www.integrum.ru.
[2] "V Murmanske pri popytke sbyta palladiya zaderzhan bezrabotnyy," Interfax, 27 June 2001. {Entered 9/14/2001 EF}
 
6/20/2001: LIQUID RADIOACTIVE WASTE PROCESSING FACILITY OPERATIONAL
On 20 June 2001, a liquid radioactive waste processing facility at Atomflot began test operations. The facility has the capacity to process all of the liquid radioactive waste that has accumulated in Murmansk Oblast nuclear facilities as a result of nuclear submarine dismantlement.[1] It is expected to process 5,000m3 of liquid radioactive waste annually. The project, called the Murmansk Initiative, started in December 1994 and cost $4.5 million.[2] It was completed jointly by the US Environmental Protection Agency, Brookhaven National Laboratory, the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy, additional Russian agencies, and scientists from all three countries. The facility was granted permission for one year of experimental operation.[1] (For information on a similar facility at Zvezdochka, see the 10/19/2000 entry in the Zvezdochka section.)
Sources: 
[1] Rozaliya Zykhovskaya, "Unikalnaya ustanovka dlya pererabotki zhidkikh radioaktivnykh otkhodov voshla v stroy," Polyarnaya zvezda, 21 June 2001;  in Integrum Techno, http://www.integrum.ru.

[2] "Modernized Nuclear Waste Disposal Installation Presented in Murmansk," Interfax, 20 June 2001. {Entered 6/28/2001 EF}
 
6/2001: MILITARY COURT SENTENCES OFFICERS FOR THEFT OF PALLADIUM OXYGEN-GENERATING CARTRIDGES
In June 2001, the Severomorsk garrison court convicted three Ostrovnoy Garrison officers for stealing and selling FK-P oxygen-generating filter cartridges, which contain about 130g-140g of palladium each. The group included garrison commander Captain Aleksandr Kupchenko, UFSB senior representative Captain Aleksandr Okladnikov, and seaman Vladimir Nani. Between spring 1999 and March 2000 the group stole 135 canisters worth about 10.8 million rubles (over $370,000 as of 29 June 2001). The canisters were sold in Murmansk for $400 each. The thieves received prison sentences of three-and-a-half to four-and-a-half years. For more information, see the 4/17/2000 entry in the Gremikha section.
[Andrey Riskin, "Ordena i pogony ne spasli ot tyurmy," Nezavisimaya gazeta - regiony, 19 June 2001; in Integrum Techno, http://www.integrum.ru.] {Entered 6/29/2001 EF}
 
5/15/2001: THIEVES DISMANTLE NUCLEAR-POWERED LIGHTHOUSE RADIATION PROTECTION SYSTEMS
On 15 May 2001 during a check of local lighthouses, three radiation sources emitting about 200 roentgens per hour were discovered near the town of Kandalaksha, Murmansk Oblast. An investigation revealed that in late April four unemployed men searching for nonferrous metals disassembled the radiation protection systems of three Northern Fleet lighthouse generators at Kandalakshskiy Bay. They discarded the radioactive generators in several locations and then sold the lead generator covers at a local shop for 5,000 rubles (about $170 as of 15 May 2001).[1] All of them received high doses of radiation and two were hospitalized in the intensive care section of a local hospital. Northern Fleet and Kola NPP radiology experts announced that there was no immediate radiation danger to Kandalaksha residents; the radiation sources posed health risks only in the immediate vicinity of the lighthouses.[1,2] A television report noted that an area extending several kilometers around each lighthouse was cordoned off due to radiation levels reaching 30,000 times ambient levels.[3] On 10 June 2001, one nuclear generator was put in a special container and sent to Mayak for dismantlement. The removal of the radiation source had to be done manually, thus exposing volunteer Northern Fleet officers to high radiation levels; the whole operation had to be precisely timed to prevent any one officer from receiving too much radiation. All of the officers have been nominated for governmental awards to recognize their courage.[4]  
Source:
[1] Maksim Leonov, "V Murmanskoy oblasti iz-za vorovstva tsvetnykh metallov s mayakov rezko ukhudshilas radiatsionnaya obstanovka," Agenstvo zhurnalistskikh rassledovaniy, 5 May 2001; in Integrum Techno, http://www.integrum.ru.
[2] "Pokhititeli priborov s mayakov v Murmanskoy oblasti popali v bolnitsu," NTV-Novosti, 24 May 2001; in Integrum Techno, http://www.integrum.ru.
[3] Elena Izvarina and Oleg Nugayev, "Novosti," ORT; in TsRPI: Monitoring teleefira 24 May 2001;  in Integrum Techno, http://www.integrum.ru.
[4] Elena Izvarina and Andrey Terentyev, "Novosti," ORT; in TsRPI: Monitoring teleefira,  10 June 2001;  in Integrum Techno, http://www.integrum.ru. {Entered 6/1/2001 EF}
 
5/7/2001: NORTHERN FLEET SSN IN ACCIDENT
On 23 April 2001, the Russian newspaper Versiya reported that on 14 April 2001 a Shchuka [NATO name 'Victor III'] nuclear submarine had a mishap in the Barents Sea. The submarine was forced to surface and was later towed to a harbor by the Russian Navy.[1] On 24 April Igor Dygalo, head of the Northern Fleet press service, refuted the Versiya report saying that the submarine was towed temporarily to port as part of a military rescue exercise and that the submarine was again at sea.[2] Also on 24 April, Norwegian TV2 showed the submarine drifting at sea. Jan Espen Lien, spokesperson for the North Norway Defense Command, confirmed that steam and exhaust fumes surrounded the Shchuka and that it was later towed to shore.[3] On 7 May 2001, Versiya reported that Igor Dygalo later admitted that the submarine had experienced problems in its turbine compartment, which had forced it to the surface and had caused it to drift for several hours.[4]
Sources:
[1] Vadim Saranov, "Operatsiya prikrytiya," Versiya, 23 April 2001; in Integrum Techno, http://www.integrum.ru.
[2] "VMF oprovergayet soobshcheniya ob avarii podlodki," Lenta.ru, 24 April 2001; in Integrum Techno, http://www.integrum.ru.
[3] "Atomdrevet ubaat i noed i Barentshavet," Aftenposten online edition, http://www.aftenposten.no, 25 April 2001.
[4] Vadim Saranov, "Faktor vnezapnosti," Versiya,7 May 2001; in Integrum Techno, http://www.integrum.ru. {Entered 5/7/2001 EF}
 
5/7/2001: GROUP HACKS INTO NORTHERN FLEET SECRET COMMUNICATION LINES
On 7 May 2001, the Moscow newspaper Versiya reported that during summer 2000 Northern Fleet headquarters received instructions over secret communication lines from Moscow headquarters ordering the preparation of all animal-drawn transport for inspection. The Northern Fleet attempted to make preparations but the inspection never came. It turned out that the instructions were sent by a group of hackers, who had deciphered the Northern Fleet communications code. According to experts cited by Versiya, deciphering the code is not a very difficult task because the encrypted information is transmitted over unprotected communication lines and breaking the code itself presents a technical problem that can be solved within a week.
[Vadim Saranov, "Operatsiya 'Vyzov ucheniy'," Versiya, 7 May 2001; in Integrum Techno, http://www.integrum.ru. {Entered 7/9/2001 EF}
 
5/4/2001: MORDOVIYA SPONSORING CRUISER ADMIRAL USHAKOV
On 4 May 2001, Regions.ru reported that in late April 2001 a delegation from Mordoviya, a Russian republic approximately 500km east of Moscow, participated in the 20th anniversary celebration of the nuclear-powered battle cruiser Admiral Ushakov in Severodvinsk. The ship is awaiting repairs at Zvezdochka, but the government is unable to provide the necessary funding. Mordoviya is unofficially sponsoring the cruiser; 38 Mordovian conscripts are serving on the ship. During the visit, the crew received a minivan and gifts worth 100,000 rubles (almost $3,500 as of 4 May 2001).
[Olga Panova, "Respublika Mordoviya. Respublika okazyvayet pomoshch ekipazhu tyazhelogo atomnogo raketnogo kreysera 'Admiral Ushakov'," Regions.ru, 4 May 2001; in Integrum Techno, http://www.integrum.ru.] {Entered 7/20/2001 EF}
 
4/7/2001: FEDERAL DEBTS TO THE NORTHERN FLEET RISE
According to the Murmansk Oblast press service, as of 7 April 2001 the federal government owed the Northern Fleet 1.3 billion rubles (over $45 million as of 7 April 2001) in salaries and other payments to personnel, a 260% increase over the previous month. The debt increase has been caused by insufficient federal funding, changes in the payment system, and court decisions regarding previous salary nonpayments.
["Sankt-Peterburg: Gosudarstvo zadolzhalo Severnomu flotu 1,3 mlrd rub.," RosBiznesKonsalting, 28 April 2001; in Integrum Techno, http://www.integrum.ru.] {Entered 8/20/2001 EF}
 
4/4/2001: OFFICIALS PLAN TO IMPROVE RADIATION SAFETY IN MURMANSK OBLAST
On 4 April 2001, Krasnaya zvezda reported that Northern Fleet Commander Vyacheslav Popov, Murmansk Oblast Governor Yuriy Yevdokimov, Deputy Minister of Atomic Energy Valeriy Lebedev, and directors of the Kola Scientific Center of the Russian Academy of Sciences and enterprises dealing with nuclear materials signed an agreement on cooperation for nuclear and radiation safety. The agreement is aimed at creating infrastructure for dealing with radioactive waste and spent fuel, such as construction of a permanent storage facility for radioactive waste and reactor compartments from nuclear submarines. A coordination committee, created as a result of the agreement, will also work to set up an automatic radiation control system to monitor the territory of Murmansk Oblast.
[Roman Fomishenko, "Strategiya kontrolya," Krasnya zvezda, No. 61, 4 April 2001.] {Entered 7/12/2001 EF}
 
3/23/2001: PROBLEM OF KOLA SOLID RADIOACTIVE WASTE ADDRESSED
For more information, please see the 3/23/2001 entry in the Naval Radioactive Waste Developments file.
 
3/22/2001:  POLYARNINSKIY SHIPYARD TO RECEIVE NEW RADIATION MONITORING SYSTEM
For more information, please see the 3/22/2001 entry in the Foreign Assistance Developments file.
 
3/2/2001: SUBMARINE DEFUELING SPEEDS UP
On 3 March 2001, the Murmansk administration informed Interfax that 14 decommissioned submarines had been defueled during 2000 under the federal program "Nuclear and Radiation Security in Russia for 2000-2006." According to the local authorities, four submarines were defueled in 1998, six in 1999.  Plans call for defueling 16 in 2001. Existing plans call for eventually defueling about 20 submarines a year; at this rate all submarines could be defueled by 2007.
["Spent Nuclear Fuel Removed from 14 Submarines in Murmansk Region in 2000," Interfax, 3 March 2000; in Russian Environmental Digest, Vol. 3, No. 9, 26 February-4 March 2001.] {Entered 7/11/2001 EF}
 
2/5/2001: RUSSIA MAY TRANSPORT MOX FUEL FOR JAPAN
On 5 February 2001, Aleksandr Ushakov, deputy chief of the Transportation Ministry's Northern Seaway Department, said that Russia might start transporting MOX fuel produced from Japanese spent fuel by the United Kingdom and France to Japan over the Arctic route. He also noted that for these plans to become reality, a Russian-Japanese accord that would allow Russia to handle Japanese reprocessed plutonium would be required.
[Alexei Filatov, "Russian Fleet Ready to Ship Japan Radioactive Material," ITAR-TASS, 5 February 2001; in Integrum Techno, http://www.integrum.ru.] {Entered 7/3/2001 EF}
 
12/4/2000: MORE FUEL THEFTS HIT THE NORTHERN FLEET
On  4 December 2000, Lenta.ru reported that the Northern Fleet Prosecutor's office had solved a case involving the theft of one million rubles (almost $35,000 as of 4 December 2000) worth of fuel. Sergey Panasyuk, head of the Northern Fleet prosecutor's investigation department, said that a group consisting of six persons stole 590t of fuel. Among the group members was one warrant officer who received 5,000 rubles (about $180 as of 4 December 2000) for his assistance in stealing the fuel. According to Panasyuk, during the last two and a half years over 6,000t of Northern Fleet fuel has been stolen. He also said that because of mafia influence on the courts only three of the 24 people who stood trial during the last three years on charges of stealing the fleet's fuel received adequate sentences.
["Michman Severnogo flota ukral topliva na million, a poluchil za eto 5 tysyach rubley," Lenta.ru, 4 December 2001; in Integrum Techno, http://www.integrum.ru.] {Entered 7/10/2001 EF}
 
11/11/2000: NORTHERN FLEET IN DEBT FOR HEAT
According to the Severomorsk city administration, the Northern Fleet owes the city 60 million rubles (over $2.1 million as of 11 November 2000) for heat.
["Zadolzhennost Severnogo flota RF za teplo pered mestnym byudzhetom sostavlyayet 60 mln. rubley," Interfax, 11 November 2000.] {Entered 7/6/2001 EF}
 
10/12/2000: STATE OWES NORTHERN FLEET $13 MILLION
According to the Murmansk Oblast administration press office, as of 12 October 2000 federal authorities owed the Northern Fleet 359 million rubles (almost $13 million as of 12 October 2000). Almost half of that debt, 180 million rubles (almost $6.5 million as of 12 October 2000), has been owed since 1999. The rest of the debt consists of unpaid salaries to the fleet's military staff and civilian enterprises. At the same time, the Northern Fleet owes the city of Severomorsk 60 million rubles (over $2.1 million as of 15 November 2000) for heat alone (see the 11/11/2000 entry in this section).
["Zadolzhennost po finansirovaniyu Severnogo flota RF iz federalnogo byudzheta sostavlyayet 359 mln. rubley," Interfax, 15 November 2001.] {Entered 7/10/2001 EF}
 
10/2/2000: PM-12 NUCLEAR FUEL TRANSFER SHIP SECURITY SYSTEM MODERNIZED
On 2 October 2000, the US Department of Energy (DOE) announced that modernization of security systems on the PM-12 service ship, based at Nerpa Shipyard, had been completed. The ship conducts refueling for nuclear submarines and icebreakers. The upgrade improved protection against theft or diversion of nuclear materials aboard the ship.[1,2] In 1999, a similar modernization was completed on PM-63, based in Severodvinsk. One more service ship is scheduled for security enhancement. The work is being done as part of cooperation between the DOE and the Russian Federation.[1]
Sources:
[1] "SShA okazali sodeystviye Rossii v uluchshenii na odnom iz voyennykh korabley Severnogo flota sistemy smeny yadernogo topliva dlya podvodnykh lodok," ITAR-TASS, 3 October 2000; in Integrum Techno, http://www.integrum.ru.
[2] "US Energy Department and Russian Navy Complete Security Upgrades of Submarine Service Ship," Department of Energy Press Release, 2 October 2000. {Entered 5/23/2001 EF}
 
7/19/2000: EU CONSIDERING NORTHERN FLEET RADWASTE STORAGE PROJECT 
For more information, please see the 7/19/2000 entry in the Foreign Assistance Developments section.
 
4/17/2000: FORMER OSTROVNOY MILITARY INTELLIGENCE HEAD CHARGED WITH THEFT OF AIR FILTER CARTRIDGES
For more information, please see the 4/17/2000 entry in the Gremikha file.
 
12/16/99: SAFONOVO SHIP REPAIR FACILITY WORKERS ON STRIKE
For more information, please see the 12/16/99 entry in the Severomorsk file.
 
12/99: VICTOR II  NUCLEAR SUBMARINE  DEFUELED AT NERPA SHIPYARD BY IMANDRA
For more information, please see the 12/1999 entry in the Northern Fleet: Facilities: Atomflot file.
{Entered 5/24/2000, GD}
 
9/99: CAPTAIN STEALS PALLADIUM FROM AIR FILTER CARTRIDGES ON THE PANTERA
For details, please see the 9/99 entry in the Developments section of the Gadzhiyevo Naval Base file.
{Entered 11/8/99 JET}  
 
8/8/99: PROSECUTOR'S REPORT REVEALS EXTENSIVE CRIMINAL ACTIVITY IN NORTHERN FLEET
Following the events of 6 August 1999 when five seamen were killed and two were wounded at the Gremikha Naval Base (please see the 8/6/99 entry), prosecutors conducted an investigation in the Northern Fleet and discovered multiple crimes, including racketeering and theft of military equipment.  The report further reveals that since the beginning of 1999, approximately 20 crimes were committed on the aircraft carrier Admiral Kuznetsov alone.  The racketeering has involved senior sailors collecting fines from the newer sailors for the "nonfulfillment" of impossible tasks.   In turn, the newer sailors have resorted to stealing navy property, military hardware, and even weapons.  In other cases, well-organized groups, including officers, senior sailors, and conscripts, have stolen components of the silver and zinc batteries in stored combat torpedoes at Gadzhiyevo Naval Base.  According to Center TV, former Northern Fleet Commander-in-Chief Admiral Oleg Yerofeyev covered up crimes such as this one to maintain good statistics.  (Please see the 1/26/99 entry below for details on the theft of precious metals from a Northern Fleet submarine reactor at Vidyayevo.  For details concerning the theft of californium-252 and mercury at the Atomflot facility, please see the 7/13/99 entry in that file.)
[Anna Averina, Center TV, 8 August 1999; in "Northern Fleet Sailors Investigated for 'Racketeering,'" FBIS Document FTS19990808000349.]  {Entered 10/19/99 JET}  
 
8/6/99: TWO SAILORS GO ON SHOOTING SPREE AT GREMIKHA
For details, please see the 8/6/99 entry in the Developments section of the Gremikha Naval Base file.
{Entered 10/18/99 JET}  
 
6/5/99:  PROSECUTOR RELEASES MORE DETAILS ON 1998 SUB SHOOTING
The Northern Fleet military prosecutor's office declassified the criminal case against Aleksandr Kuzminykh, the 19 year-old sailor who, on 11 September 1998, shot and killed eight seamen in an incident aboard an Akula-class SSN docked at the Gadzhiyevo Naval Base.  (See also the 9/11/98 entry.)  Kuzminykh's submarine, the Vepr, was docked at Gadzhiyevo next to another Akula-class SSN, the Leopard, where one person should have been guarding each submarine.  However, due to personnel shortages, the naval command decided to post only one guard at a time on the dock between the submarines.  In the incident, Kuzminykh struck the guard on the head, scuffled with an officer, obtained the guard's assault rifle, shot the guard, and shot at but missed the officer. Once aboard the Vepr, Kuzminykh shot five sailors in the second compartment and two more in the first compartment, where the torpedoes are located.  He turned on the fire extinguishing system, which released Freon into the third compartment, where 30 sailors were located.  An alarm signaled the sailors to evacuate.  Because Freon is poisonous, no one could pass through and reach Kuzminykh in the torpedo compartment.  Kuzminykh then threatened to blow up the Vepr's ammunition.  He piled all the available flammable material (paper, wooden boxes, oily rags, etc.) beneath the torpedo warheads.  Kuzminykh died while attempting to dismantle an oxygen-generating respirator canister, which exploded and inflicted a fatal head wound.  Ironically, this event occurred one day after a special operations group from the Murmansk Oblast FSB arrived in Gadzhiyevo to conduct exercises in neutralizing terrorists who had seized a nuclear-powered submarine.  Experts agree that a fire beneath the torpedoes would have led to the explosion of all the submarine's ammunition, which would have destroyed the Vepr, neighboring submarines, and naval barracks at the base, as well as the town of Gadzhiyevo itself, not to mention the greater consequences of destroying the nuclear reactors.  Although the small-arms arsenal in any motorized rifle company is constantly guarded and protected by alarms, Navy Shipboard Regulations adopted in 1978, Navy Commander-in-Chief orders, and Ministry of Defense rules do not stipulate constant guard of submarine torpedo compartments.  Since the incident, Gadzhiyevo regulations require that guards work in pairs.
[Vyacheslav Gudkov, "Vklyuchite muziku i prigotovtes k smerti," Kommersant online edition, http://win.www.online.ru/.../13138421.DOC.html, 5 June 1999.]  {Entered 7/28/99 JET}  
 
6/99: NORTHERN FLEET DECLARES Y2K READINESS DESPITE LINGERING OBSTACLES
According to an article by the Bellona Foundation, the Northern Fleet has stated that it is fully prepared to face the year 2000.  After the Russian government issued a special  resolution concerning the Y2K issue in May 1998, the Northern Fleet began checking its systems and reportedly established a working group at its Severomorsk headquarters.  The Northern Fleet has not received any funding to resolve Y2K problems and awaits Moscow's approval of a proposal to obtain funds by selling the valuable metals in its obsolete computer hardware.  No estimate of the total costs to resolve the Y2K issue is available.  However, some Navy officials maintain that $500,000 and five to six months of work are needed just to ensure Y2K compliance on the Fleet's local computer network.  According to the Northern Fleet's automated command systems expert, Vladimir Kiselev, the combat control system, which is integrated into the Russian strategic forces global network, is not linked to calendar dates and requires human input for launch.  However, efforts to test and verify the supposed built-in redundancy of the system are limited by the lack of funds.  Combat operation systems aboard vessels also require human input, whereas satellite navigation systems are the most vulnerable to Y2K problems.  Northern Fleet officials expect that 30 percent of all satellite navigation systems on warships will stop functioning after 31 December 1999.  According to the Bellona Foundation, the strained relations between the US and Russia have limited joint projects to address the Y2K issue.  US defense officials indicate that although the Russian military is not as dependent on computer command and control systems and Russian systems have built-in redundancy, Russia still does not seem fully cognizant of the scope of its Y2K problems.
[Igor Kudrik, "Y2K bugs Russian Navy," Bellona Foundation website, http://www.bellona.no/e, 3 June 1999.]  {Entered 11/12/99 JET}
 
4/23/99: TEN ARRESTED FOR STEALING TORPEDO PARTS
For details, please see the 4/23/99 entry in the Gadzhiyevo Naval Base section.
{Entered 11/2/99 JET}
 
4/99: THEFTS OF MILITARY PROPERTY INCREASING
According to the Northern Fleet prosecutor, every seventh property crime in 1997 involved the theft of military property, and in 1998, the frequency increased to every fifth crime.  Losses totaled more than 50 million rubles (approximately $2 million as of 23 April 1999), and 377 individuals were prosecuted.  The crimes, especially those targeting non-ferrous metals and electronic equipment, inflict large costs to the Northern Fleet and negatively affect fleet combat readiness.  In January 1999, a sailor at the Vidyayevo Naval Base was arrested for stealing instruments containing palladium from the control console of the auxiliary nuclear reactor aboard a decommissioned submarine.  (Please see the 1/26/99 entry below for details.)  In 1995, the Severomorsk military court sentenced Lieutenant Captain Kurochkin and Warrant Officer Timoshenko to imprisonment for stealing radioelectronic devices from combat consoles, which caused malfunctions in additional ship systems including the weapons guidance system.
[Roman Fomishenko, "Na Severnom flote 'atomnaya' trevoga," Krasnaya zvezda, No. 91, 23 April 1999.]  {Entered 12/17/99 JET}
 
1/26/99: SAILOR SELLS NUCLEAR SUBMARINE'S REACTOR PARTS
At the Vidyayevo Naval Base in Murmansk Oblast, on 26 January 1999, a sailor serving on a nuclear attack submarine stole 24 rings of palladium-vanadium wire that form an integral part of the control system for the submarine's auxiliary reactor. For more information, see the 1/26/99 entry in the Vidyayevo section.{Entered 5/2/2000 CC}  
 
1/20/99: YELTSIN APPOINTS NEW COMMANDER OF NORTHERN FLEET
On 20 January 1999, in accordance with a presidential decree, Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Navy Vladimir Kuroyedov presented Vice-Admiral Popov as the new Northern Fleet commander.[1,2,3]  A large part of Vice-Admiral Popov's career has been connected with the Northern Fleet.[3]  Beginning in 1993, he was the commander of a flotilla of nuclear submarines in the Northern Fleet, and in December 1996, Popov became the director of Northern Fleet headquarters after a stint as deputy commander of the Baltic Fleet.[1]
Sources:
[1] "Novyy komanduyushchiy severnym flotom - vitse-admiral Popov," Na strazhe Zapolyarya, 30 January 1999, p. 1; in "Kto yest kto," WPS Oborona i Bezopasnost, 19 February 1999, p. 1.
[2]  "Novosti," Rossiyskoye radio,  29 January 1999; in "Novym komanduyushchim severnogo flota naznachen vitse-admiral Vyacheslav Popov," WPS Oborona i Bezopasnost, 29 January 1999.
[3]  Polyarnaya pravda, 30 January 1999; in "Highlights from Murmansk Press: 12 January-2 February 1999," FBIS Document FTS19990301001502.  {Entered 4/8/99  HA}
 
12/13/98:  KRAVCHENKO SPEAKS ON "NORTHERN STRATEGIC BASTION"
In December 1998, Admiral Viktor Kravchenko, chief of staff of the Russian Navy, discussed with Interfax details of the role of the "Northern Strategic Bastion," which consists of the Northern Fleet's strategic nuclear submarines (SSBNs) and the conventional military forces of the Northern Fleet and the Leningrad military district.  Kravchenko said that although President Yeltsin first voiced the idea in summer 1998 during a period of naval exercises, the Russian Navy's Main Staff drafted the concept of a strategic bastion long ago.  In essence, the "bastion" provides for the concentration of nuclear strategic submarines and supporting forces in the Arctic seas. (See the 8/27/98 entry and the 5/7/98 entry for further information.) The transfer of the most modern ships, including the Petr Velikiy missile cruiser and the Admiral Chabanenko anti-submarine ship, to the Northern Fleet is targeted at implementing the "bastion" plan.  Kravchenko, however, refuted reports indicating that strategic submarines from the Pacific Fleet had been transferred to the Northern Fleet.  He said that it is necessary for Russia to maintain forces everywhere in order to defend its widespread interests but that "an inter-theater maneuver of forces" is also envisaged in the event of a threat to Russia's security.
["Nachshtaba VMF Rossii Kravchenko zayavlyayet o sozdanii v Rossii 'Severnogo strategicheskogo bastiona'," Interfax, 13 December 1998.]  {Entered 4/7/99 HA}
 
11/11/98:  CONDITION CRITICAL FOR NORTHERN FLEET SHIPYARDS
A Russian Duma commission developing proposals for Russian shipyards in Murmansk and Arkhangelsk regions noted in recent years a marked increase in the number of outmoded vessels and combat equipment in the Russian Navy that are in need of repair and modernization.  After examining the situation, the commission concluded that a "critical situation" has developed at the naval ship repair yards in the north as a result of funding problems.  Workers have not been paid for a long time, and no money for the shipyards has gone into the budget.  As a result, social tension is on the rise.  The report also noted that further financial degradation, which committee members attributed to the IMF, might further complicate problems with START II ratification.  Members of the commission have decided to send their report to the Russian government in the hopes that their proposals will influence the state defense order and the 1999 federal budget.
[Kseniya Kolpakova, ITAR-TASS, 11 November 1998; in "Russia's Northern Ship-Repair Yards in Critical State," FBIS-UMA-98-316.]  {Entered 5/25/99 HA}
 
9/98:  NORTHERN FLEET SUBMARINE TRANSFERS TO PACIFIC FLEET
The multipurpose submarine Tomsk, an Oscar II-class SSGN, has been transferred from the Northern Fleet to the Pacific Fleet, where it will join a group of ground, air, and sea forces that are stationed on the Kamchatka peninsula.[1]  During testing, the Tomsk completed an Arctic tour that covered 3500 miles in ice-covered waters.  The Tomsk was transferred to strengthen the Pacific Fleet; over the past eight years, approximately one third of the military ships in the Pacific Fleet have fallen into disrepair.[2]  The Tomsk has the capability of monitoring the entire eastern coastline of Russia.[3]
Sources:
[1] Interfax, 16 September 1998; in "Russian Northern Fleet Submarine Joins Pacific Fleet," FBIS-UMA-98-259.
[2] "Na Kamchatku prishla noveyshaya atomnaya podvodnaya lodka 'Tomsk'," Obshchestvennoye Rossiyskoye Televideniye, Novosti newscast, 30 September 1998.
[3] Novosti newscast, Russian Public Television First Channel Network, 1 October 1998; in "Video Selection List: MOS 98-5661," FBIS-SOV-98-274.
 
9/11/98: SAILOR KILLS EIGHT, COMMITS SUICIDE ON NUCLEAR SUBMARINE
On 11 September 1998, a young Russian sailor serving on a Bars (NATO designation Akula-class) nuclear attack submarine commandeered a rifle and killed eight crew members [1,2,3,4] before turning the weapon on himself.[2,3] Aleksandr Kuzminykh, a 19 year-old conscript from St. Petersburg, obtained the rifle after murdering a sentry posted on the submarine.[4,5] Kuzminykh then shot and killed seven more crew members [1,2,3,4] before barricading himself in the torpedo room, where he threatened to blow up the submarine.[7] After failed negotiations, the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) stormed the torpedo room and discovered the body of Kuzminykh, who had apparently committed suicide.[2,3] The submarine, part of the Russian Navy's Northern Fleet, was docked at a facility in Skalisty (also known as Gadzhiyevo), located near Murmansk and Severomorsk.[3,4] The nuclear reactor on the submarine was not in operation at the time of the incident.[4] Although the submarine is capable of carrying torpedoes equipped with nuclear warheads, none were aboard at the time of the incident.[8] Kuzminykh's motive remained unclear, although some sources pointed to a history of psychiatric problems.[1,5]
Sources:
[1] Mikhail Osokin, Segodnya newscast, NTV, 11 September 1998; in "Television Program Summary," FBIS Document FTS19980913000320.
[2] Interfax, 12 September 1998; in "Defense Ministry Reports Suicide of Submarine Sailor," FBIS Document FTS19980912000053.
[3] ITAR-TASS, 12 September 1998; in "Northern Fleet Confirms Sailor Committed Suicide," FBIS Document FTS19980912000290.
[4] "Russian Conscript Kills 8 on Atom Sub," New York Times, 12 September 1998, p. 6; from UMI's ProQuest Direct  http://proquest.umi.com.
[5] ITAR-TASS, 11 September 1998; in "FSB Group Preparing to Seize Russian Submarine Sailor," FBIS Document FTS19980911000505.
[6] Aleksandr Konovalov, RIA Novosti, 11 September 1998; in "Shooting Incident on Russian Nuclear Submarine," FBIS Document FTS19980911000228.
[7] Interfax, 11 September 1998; in "Russian Sailor Threatens to Blow up Submarine," FBIS Document FTS19980911000688.
[8] Aleksandr Konovalov, RIA Novosti, 11 September 1998; in "No Nuclear Weapons on Submarine Involved in Incident," FBIS-UMA-98-254. {Entered 9/14/98 SP}  
 
8/27/98:  KUROYEDOV DETAILS "NORTHERN STRATEGIC BASTION" PLAN
At a press conference in Moscow on 27 August 1998, Russian Navy Commander-in-Chief Admiral Vladimir Kuroyedov discussed details of the "Northern Strategic Bastion," designed to guarantee Russia's security in the north and northeast.  According to Kuroyedov, the Navy has developed a warning system, based on decades of hydrographic and hydrologic research on the Northern seas.  Kuroyedov denied reports that the strategic submarines of the Pacific Fleet would be transferred to the Northern Fleet and asserted that Russia will continue to maintain two strategic submarine forces in the Arctic and the Pacific.  (See the 5/7/98 entry for more information.)
["Na baze Severnogo flota budet sozdan 'Severniy strategucheskiy bastion,'" Interfax, 28 August 1998.]  {Entered 7/27/99 JET}
 
6/25-27/98:  NAVAL COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF ASSESSES NORTHERN FLEET DURING VISIT
On a three-day visit to the Northern Fleet, Russian Navy Commander-in-Chief Admiral Vladimir Kuroyedov evaluated the combat readiness of its troops and vessels and met with representatives from ship repair yards.[1,2]  Wage arrears at shipyards have created a tense social situation.  The total federal debt to Russian military ship repair yards has reached 62 million rubles (approximately $10 million).  Moreover, the Navy received less than 50 percent of its allocated funds during the first half of 1998, which has gone towards debt repayment, as opposed to new service orders for the shipyards.  As a result of the financial situation, the shipyards have managed to complete only nine percent of the Northern Fleet's necessary repairs.  Kuroyedov assured workers that the Navy would honor payments for all repairs on the ships Admiral Kuznetsov and Petr Velikiy.[1]
Sources:
[1] ITAR-TASS, 27 June 1998; in "Russian Naval Chief Comments on Condition of Northern Fleet," FBIS-SOV-98-178.
[2] Vladimir Kalinin, Russkiy Telegraf, 26 June 1998; in "Decrepit Hulks Will Serve Again. Navy Conducts Experiment," FBIS-UMA-98-181.  {Entered 7/27/99 JET}
 
5/7/98:  "NORTHERN STRATEGIC BASTION" BLUEPRINTS NORTHERN FLEET'S FUTURE
Navy Commander-in-Chief Admiral Vladimir Kuroyedov directed Northern Fleet exercises in April 1998 as part of the "Northern Strategic Bastion" program, which provides a blueprint for Russian geostrategic security and stability in the post-Cold War era and recogizes the importance of the Kola Peninsula region in Russia's strategic security.  A total of 15 surface ships, 12 submarines, and 14 auxiliary ships participated in the exercises.  Noting that the Northern Fleet must provide strategic nuclear deterrence and defend Russia's interests throughout the world's oceans, Andrey Kokoshin's original idea for the "Northern Strategic Bastion" received full support from the General Staff and sailors in 1993.  Financial difficulties facing all of Russia's armed forces will likely affect the ability to implement completely the "Northern Strategic Bastion" plan.  Despite the funding problems, between 1994 and 1997, the Navy commissioned five to six multipurpose Bars (Akula-class) and Antey (Oscar II-class) nuclear submarines.  These submarines, along with the nuclear cruiser Petr Velikiy, which increases the Northern Fleet's combat effectiveness by 17 percent, and the aircraft carrier Admiral Kuznetsov, are responsible primarily for defending the security of Russia's SSBNs.
[Viktor Chugunov, "'Strategicheskiy bastion' na severe," Nesavisimaya gazeta, 7 May 1998.] {Entered 9/16/98 JET}  
 
5/6/98: MINATOM AND MINISTRY OF DEFENSE OFFICIALS VISIT NORTHERN FLEET NUCLEAR SITES
In early May 1998, First Deputy Minister of Defense Nikolay Mikhaylov and Minister of Atomic Energy Yevgeniy Adamov, along with 13 Russian Duma deputies, seven members of the Russian Academy of Sciences, six general constructors, shipbuilders, and representatives of the leadership of the Russian Navy, toured several Northern Fleet nuclear sites, including Murmansk Oblast's Gremikha and Andreyeva Bay, and Sevmash and Zvezdochka in Severodvinsk.  After seeing the deplorable conditions in Severodvinsk, Mikhaylov thanked Arkhangelsk Governor Anatoliy Yefremov for paying particular attention to the hardships the military-industrial complex is enduring and marveled at the success Severodvinsk has had in preserving its key positions and modern shipbuilding technology, despite these difficulties and budget limitations. Chair of the Duma Defense Committee Aleksey Arbatov added that Russia can only preserve those enterprises that provide the maximum return for the defense of the country.  During the trip, the officials also discussed the federal programs for spent nuclear fuel storage and nuclear submarine dismantlement, which lack financing and fall under the responsibility of many government agencies, making coordination difficult.  The Ministry of Defense (MOD) is considering transferring these duties to the Ministry of Atomic Energy (Minatom), which would free the MOD from a responsibility that is absolutely unrelated to its usual functions, according to Mikhaylov.  Citing the precedent of Minatom and MOD coordination on the front end of the naval fuel cycle, Adamov added that MOD funds need to be liberated for purposes other than keeping decommissioned submarines afloat.  Adamov proposed using Russian technology, specialists, and financing to construct interim dry spent fuel storage containers that will be capable of storing the fuel safely for 50-60 years until it is reprocessed.  According to Adamov, Russia's closed fuel cyle allows Russia to reuse isotopes in fuel for fast breeder reactors.  Mihaylov also noted that this visit to the Northern Fleet facilities has strengthened the arguments for ratifying START II, and Arbatov said that the Duma will likely vote on START II in June 1998.  (For more information on the START II ratification debate, please see the START II ratification developments file.)
[Nadezhda Breshkovskaya, "Minatom dogovorilsya s minoboroni snyat s severa yaderniy savan," Pravda severa, 8 May 1998, p. 1.] {Entered 9/10/98 JET}  
 
3/30/98: NORTHERN FLEET REPAIR YARDS FACE DIFFICULT SITUATION
Because the 1998 state budget for the Northern Fleet shipyards has been reduced to a minimum and commercial projects have not produced the expected results, the repair yards for Russia's Northern Fleet are in dire financial straits.  The Nerpa Shipyard and Polyarninskiy Shipyard lost several economic privileges as a result of the Duma's 20 February 1998 amendments to the Law on Special Economic Status for Closed Cities.  In addition, the 1997 dissolution of the Ministry of Defense Industry left the Nerpa Shipyard, Sevmash, and Zvezdochka with little support in Moscow to lobby for the delivery of federal funding obligations.  These three shipyards became subordinate to the Ministry of the Economy, while Sevmorput, Polyarninskiy, and Safonovo remain under the Ministry of Defense.  Moreover, funding and the rate of submarine dismantlement will likely decrease during 1998, as shipyard managers struggle to establish contacts in the incoming government to support dismantlement and radioactive waste disposal funding.
[Igor Kudrik, "Naval repair yards in the north-west of Russia," Bellona Current Status, http://www.bellona.no/e/, 30 March 1998.]  {Entered 8/24/98  HA}
 
9/97: ASSOCIATION OF RUSSIAN REGIONS FOR THE SUPPORT OF THE NORTHERN FLEET FORMED
In the fall of 1997, an Association of Russian Regions for the Support of the Northern Fleet was created.  Oblasts that become members of the association may, for instance, sponsor an individual submarine and its crew.  Vologda Oblast sponsors several Northern Fleet ships, including the Vepr, an Akula-class SSN based in Gadzhiyevo.  Cherepovets, a city in Vologda Oblast, has paid to refurbish the crew's dormitory.  The best draftees from Cherepovets are sent to serve on the Vepr.[1]  Stavropol Kray is also a member of the Association, and sponsors the Krasnoye Znamya Nuclear-powered Submarine Formation, based in Gadzhiyevo. The kray has provided Formation submariners with everything from televisions to musical instruments, as well as trips to Stavropol spas, an automobile, and housing for discharged submariners.  Stavropol Kray sends draftees to submarines based in Gadzhiyevo, and also hosts a regional branch of the All-Russian Movement for the Social Support of the Fleet.[2]  Sverdlovsk Oblast sponsors the Verkhoturye and Yekaterinburg submarines.  Moscow 's Yuzhniy Okrug sponsors the Daniil Moskovskiy, while Minatom sponsors Zapadnaya Litsa submariners.[3]
Sources:
[1] A. Bondarenko, "Troye v lodke, pod vodoy, i vse - Cherepovetskiye," Krasnyy sever, 24 July 1998; in Natsionalnaya sluzhba novostey, http://nel.nns.ru.
[2] V. Lebedev, O. Stadnik, "Shefstvu krepnut," Na strazhe zapolyarya, 10 November 1999; in East View Database, http://news.eastview.com.
[3] "Shefskiye delegatsii u podvodnikov," Na strazhe zapolyarya, 20 March 1999; in East View Database, http://news.eastview.com.{Entered 4/12/2000 CC}
 
6/5/97: OFFICIALS DISCUSS CARGO SUBMARINES
Officials discussed plans to use Typhoon-class SSBNs for transporting cargo along the Northern sea route from the Kola Peninsula to Chukotka at the conference "Conversion and the North" in St. Petersburg, in early May 1997.  According to preliminary estimates, it will take up to five years to recover the costs of re-equipping the submarines, approximately $50 to $60 million.
["Atomniye podlodki vyydut v kommercheskiye reysi," Segodnya, 6 May 1997.] {Entered JET 5/18/98}  
 
10/13/96: GAS CUT OFF TO ZAOZERSK BASE
The Murmansk gas company cut the supply to the Northern Fleet's largest submarine base in Zaozersk. The company swore not to resume gas supply until the base repays the 3 billion-ruble debt.
[Interfax, 13 October 1996.] {Entered 11/18/96}  
 
7/18/96: RUSSIA LAUNCHES NEW TOMSK SSGN
A new nuclear-powered cruise missile submarine (SSGN), the Tomsk, was assembled at the Northern Machine-Building Enterprise (Sevmash) and launched in Severodvinsk.[1,2]  More than 800 Russian facilities participated in building the Tomsk.
Sources:
[1] "So stapeley soshla novaya atomnaya submarina," Krasnaya zvezda, 19 July 1996, p. 1.
[2] Novosti newscast, Russian Public Television First Channel Network, 19 July 1996; in "Video Report on Launch of New Nuclear Submarine," FTS19960719000385. {Updated 3/19/99  HA}  
 
6/1/96: NORTHERN FLEET "PRIMARY" MEANS OF DETERRENCE
Northern Fleet Commander Admiral Oleg Yerofeyev stated that Russia's primary means of deterrence is its SSBN force. In an interview with a correspondent for the Northern Fleet's newspaper, Na strazhe zapolyarya, Yerofeyev said that although the numbers of submarines had decreased, the existing weapons in service enabled the fleet to efficiently carry out its tasks. Consequently, permanent SSBN combat patrols near the shores of other countries had become unnecessary. First Deputy Commander in Chief of the Russian Navy Admiral Igor Kasatonov agreed that the Northern Fleet continued to remain "the pride and reliable shield" of Russian naval power. However, Kasatonov regretted the overall reduction in the Russian Navy's forces and assets, claiming that it undermined the combat potential of operational groupings of strategic, ASW, and strike forces, reported Nezavisimoye voyennoye obozreniye. According to Kasatonov, the six years of "perestroika" (1986-1991) and the following five years of "radical reforms" (1992-1996) together resulted in nearly 50 percent reduction of the fleet in active service and more than a 60 percent reduction in naval aviation forces. The manning level of ship crews dropped to 65-70 percent, and from 22 to 75 percent of the flotillas, squadrons, naval bases, divisions and brigades were disbanded.  The fleet can only afford to keep one or two nuclear submarines on combat duty. The repair services at the fleet's disposal amount to only 6 percent of its needs. Out of 240 ships that need repairs, only 16-17 can be serviced, and repairs take up to 12 months.
Sources:
[1] V. Gundarov, "The Navy as a Sign of Russia's Prestige," Na strazhe zapolyarya, 1 June 1996, pp.1-2; in Former Soviet Union Fifteen Nations: Policy & Security, June 1996, p. 30.
[2] Admiral Igor Kasatonov, "Taking an Ax to the Navy: The Many Years of Efforts for the Builders of the Country's Fighting Fleet May Go Down the Drain," Nezavisimoye voyennoye obozreniye, Supplement to Nezavisimaya gazeta, No. 10, 30 May 1996, p. 5.
[3] "Kasatonov on Past Capabilities, Current Plight of Russian Navy," FBIS-UMA-96-138-S, 30 May 1996. {Entered 8/14/96 KD}  
 
5/7/96: FIRST DEPUTY PM MEETS WITH MURMANSK OFFICIALS
First Deputy Prime Minister Oleg Soskovets announced at the meeting with the Murmansk Oblast administration that in the near future the Russian government will eliminate its debt towards the Northern Fleet. The debt reached a level of 388 billion rubles in the first quarter.
[Interfax, 7 May 1996, p. 5.] {Revised 9/6/96 KVY}  
 
3/26/96: NORTHERN FLEET HOLDS LARGEST EXERCISES SINCE SOVIET COLLAPSE
Izvestiya reported that in March 1996 the Northern Fleet held naval exercises on a scale larger than any since the collapse of the Soviet Union. The exercises reportedly involved 32 surface combatants, including the new aircraft carrier Admiral Kuznetsov, and 22 submarines, including SSBNs. Air support for the exercises included 49 sorties with coordination and control provided by A-50 Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) aircraft. As Izvestiya noted, the show of naval strength was held in the Barents Sea and Norwegian Sea just before President Yeltsin was to visit Norway (to discuss issues including demarcation of the continental shelf in the region), and just after a NATO military exercise in the region.
[Viktor Litovkin, "Severnyy flot pokazal svoyu moshch' pered vizitom B. Yeltsina v Norvegiyu," Izvestiya, 26 March 1996, p. 2.]  
 
2/17/96: NORTHERN FLEET FUNDING TO DROP FURTHER
According to Nikolai Kalistratov, director of the Zvezdochka shipyard, government financing of the nuclear fleet has been reduced by a factor of six since 1990. In 1996, it is expected to decrease by nine times and will constitute 10 percent of the required budget. Such drastic cuts will inevitably lead to maintenance problems with strategic nuclear submarines whose average age will be 17 years in the year 2000. The Typhoon system will suffer the most as it carries 1,200 warheads out of the total 2,500 deployed on SSBNs.
["Restoration Of Ships Is Becoming Increasingly Difficult," Krasnaya zvezda, 17 February 1996, p. 5.]  
 
12/95: NORTHERN FLEET TAKES OVER KOLA POWER GRID
The Administration of the Northern Fleet has taken all the facilities of the Kola energy grid under its temporary control to prevent future energy cut-offs. Earlier in the year, the Kola power authorities cut power to the Northern Fleet due to its 20 billion ruble debt to the energy industry. Four decommissioned nuclear submarines neared a nuclear accident as a result of the power cut-offs. Navy officers evaded the accident "by putting a gun to the head of the person responsible for the power switch."
[Yadernyy kontrol, December 1995, p. 1.]  
 
9/23-24/95: ELECTRICITY SHUTDOWN NEARLY CAUSES ACCIDENT
One of the Northern Fleet submarines came close to an accident when the cooling system shut down due to the cut-off of electricity. The electricity was shut off as a result of the Fleet's debt to the energy industry. Four other decommissioned submarines with operational reactors have had accidents caused by similar situations.
[Jacques Allaman, "Des Factures Impayees Ont Failli Causer Une Catastrophe En Russie," Tribune de geneve, 23-24 September 1995.]  
 
9/21/95: KOLENERGO FORCED TO RETURN POWER TO GADZHIYEVO BASE
The Kola Peninsula power company, Kolenergo, shut off power to the Gadzhiyevo Northern Fleet submarine base due to $4.4 million in unpaid electrical bills. The cut-off caused the reactors of at least one, and maybe as many as four, decommissioned submarine to overheat. Admiral Oleg Yerofeyev, Commander of the Northern Fleet, finally forced the company at gunpoint to restore power to the base, preventing a meltdown of the submarines' reactors. Armed patrols were deployed to the Kola Peninsula and Arkhangelsk regional power substations to avoid any additional cut-offs.
Sources:
[1] Interfax, 25 September 1995; Doug Clarke, "Power Cut-Off Nearly Causes Nuclear Submarine Disaster," OMRI Daily Digest, 22 September 1995, p. 2.
[2] Mark Hibbs, "Power Restored At Gunpoint Averts Russian Sub Core Melt," Nucleonics Week, 28 September 1995, p. 12.
[3] David Hoffman, "Russian Troops Get Electricity By Force," Washington Post, 23 September 1995, p. A22.
[4] Krasnaya zvezda, 23 September 1995, p. 1; in "Power Industry's 'Nuclear Terrorism' Viewed," FBIS-SOV-95-187, 23 September 1995.
[5] "Russia Bars Power Cutoffs To Deadbeat Military Sites," Washington Times, 24 September 1995, p. A9.
[6] "Power Cuts Hit Military Sites," Nuclear Engineering International, December 1995, pp. 6-7.  

Last updated 29 January 2004
Comments or questions? Contact Cristina Chuen at MIIS CNS: Cristina.Chuen@miis.edu

CNSThis material is produced independently for NTI by the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies and does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been independently verified by NTI or its directors, officers, employees, agents. Copyright © 2010 by MIIS.

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