Russia

From the late 1950s through the end of 1994, the Soviet Union, and later Russia, built a total of 245 nuclear submarines, more than all other nations combined. These included 91 missile-carrying SSBNs (Submarine, Ballistic Missile, Nuclear).[1] In addition to nuclear submarines, the Russian nuclear fleet includes four Kirov-class guided-missile cruisers, a small number of nuclear-powered scientific research, support, and space-tracking vessels; and seven civilian nuclear-powered icebreakers. Russia's changing strategic and financial situation after the break-up of the Soviet Union in 1991 disrupted these deployments by stripping the Russian Navy of important bases and other facilities in the Black and the Baltic Seas. The remaining Russian naval bases could not handle such a large number of operational vessels, particularly when combined with additional Soviet-era diesel submarines and surface ships. Moreover, the Russian defense budget could no longer afford to keep them in service. As a result, by 1996, only 109 Russian nuclear submarines, including SSBNs, SSGNs (cruise missile-carrying submarines), and SSNs (nuclear attack submarines), remained on the lists of in-service vessels, with about two-thirds deployed at Northern Fleet bases and about one-third in the Pacific Fleet.[2] By October 0f 2006, this number had dropped to 48. However, only about 37 are actually in service: 16 SSBNs (of which three Akula (NATO name Typhoon) class SSBNs do not have missiles on board that can be fired), five SSGNs, and 16 SSNs. [For more information, please see the Russia: Current Capabilities section of the Submarine Proliferation database.] While much smaller than prior deployments, the Russian nuclear fleet still represents the world's second largest nuclear submarine force after that of the United States and, moreover, must face the administrative and decommissioning challenges of the post-Cold War environment.

DEVELOPMENT OF NUCLEAR-POWERED VESSELS

The Soviet Union followed the United States in developing nuclear-powered submarines in the 1950s. Stimulated by the US development of the Nautilus nuclear submarine (deployed in 1954), Soviet work on nuclear propulsion reactors began in the early 1950s at the Institute of Physics and Power Engineering (Obninsk) under Anatoliy P. Alexandrov, later to become head of the Kurchatov Institute. In 1956, the first Soviet propulsion reactor designed by his team began operational testing. (For more information on naval nuclear reactors, please see the Naval Reactor Technology Overview.) Meanwhile, a design team under Vladimir N. Peregudov worked on the vessel that would house the reactor. After overcoming many obstacles, including steam generation problems, radiation leaks, and other difficulties, the first nuclear submarine based on these combined efforts (the Leninskiy Komsomol) entered service in the Soviet Navy in 1958. Regular line production of nuclear attack submarines began in 1959.[2]

Nuclear submarines offered significant advantages to the Soviet Navy. Unlike diesel submarines, which require large amounts of heavy liquid fuel and have severe range limitations due to the need to resurface and refuel every few weeks, nuclear submarines can stay submerged for several months at a time. This provided significant advantages in secrecy. In addition, their large power plants increased speeds up to 16 to 20 knots. For their crews, the new designs allowed much better living conditions than the diesel boats, including fresh water, laundry facilities, showers, and better air quality.[2]

Since the 1950s, four generations of nuclear-powered submarines and several nuclear-powered experimental submarines have been built. From 1955 to 1964, 55-first generation nuclear submarines were constructed. At the height of the Cold War, approximately five to ten nuclear submarines were being commissioned from each of the four Soviet submarine yards (Sevmash in Severodvinsk, Admiralteyskiye Verfi in St. Petersburg, Krasnoye Sormovo in Nizhniy Novgorod, and Amurskiy Zavod in Komsomolsk-na-Amure).[4] Beginning in the 1980s, the Soviet Union launched several titanium-hulled submarines, including the ill-fated Komsomolets, which sank with 42 crew members aboard in 1989.[2] The production of titanium-hulled nuclear submarines has halted. Current submarines in production include: third generation Akula-class attack submarines and Oscar-class cruise missile submarines, fourth generation Severodvinsk-class attack submarines (which will carry anti-ship cruise missiles as well as torpedoes), and fifth generation Borey-class SSBNs. However, severe funding problems have slowed the pace of completion and commissioning of these submarines to no more than one to two per year.[3]

The Soviet Union launched its first nuclear-powered icebreaker, Lenin, in 1957,[2] and has since constructed two additional icebreaker classes, the Arktika and Taymyr classes,[5] and, in 1993, Russia developed the Ural, a communications vessel powered by two icebreaker reactors.[6] Other nuclear-powered vessels include Kirov-class cruisers and scientific and space navigational vessels. The four Kirov-class cruisers are the Admiral Ushakov, Admiral Lazarev, Admiral Nakhimov, and the newest ship, Petr Velikiy (Peter the Great).[2] In addition, Russian authorities plan to use a fleet of floating reactors, consisting of active duty military vessels currently not at sea, special purpose vessels, and barge-mounted reactors, to provide power to remote regions. (For more information, please see the sections on Icebreakers and Floating Reactors.)

STRATEGIC ROLE OF THE NUCLEAR NAVY

Despite the decline in active vessels, the Russian nuclear navy is slated to assume a more prominent role in Russia's strategic nuclear triad. The START II treaty, if implemented, will cut Russian nuclear warheads from 8,500 to between 3,000 and 3,500 by 2003. These reductions will drastically alter the Russian triad from one relying heavily on land-based ICBM deployments to one with over half of its forces deployed on nuclear submarines.[7]

In July 1998, President Boris Yeltsin ordered that 50% of Russia's nuclear warheads and delivery vehicles should be held by the Russian Navy. Vladimir Kuroyedov, Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Navy, said that the percentage of the nuclear triad represented by the navy should increase from 30% to 50%, replacing the Strategic Rocket Forces as the largest part of the triad.[8,9] He said that the number of nuclear submarines would not change; rather the navy will increase its strength by modernizing the submarine fleet and missiles. Kuroyedov also said that improvement and maintenance of the naval nuclear forces will require tremendous resources, and that the funds they are receiving are two or three times lower than the minimum necessary to do so. Kuroyedov gave his assurances that despite the small number of SSBNs on active duty, there are still enough to fulfill the Navy's main goals.[10]

ADMINISTRATION OF THE FLEET

The shifting regulatory environment of post-Soviet Russia provides added complications to the oversight of naval nuclear reactors, their fuel, and waste. During the construction stage, oversight of nuclear submarines falls under the control of the Russian Shipbuilding Agency. This agency, created by Presidential Edict No. 651 on 25 May 1999, assumed responsibility for military shipyards from the Ministry of Economy, which had taken over from the former State Committee for the Defense Industry in 1997.[11,12] After commissioning, the vessels are placed under the auspices of the Ministry of Defense (MOD). [11] Until spring 1998, the MOD also oversaw the decommissioning and dismantlement process as well. However, in mid-March 1998, Russian Minister of Defense Igor Sergeyev began a bid to rid his ministry of this responsibility, which he feels never should have fallen under his ministry in the first place. Sergeyev suggested the creation of a special federal agency to handle submarine decommissioning and dismantlement as well as chemical weapons destruction.[13] Ultimately, in May 1998, the Ministry of Atomic Energy (Minatom) assumed responsibility for coordinating submarine dismantlement and related nuclear material storage programs.[14]

In the case of the nuclear icebreaker fleet , the shipyards producing these vessels are joint stock companies, with most of the stock state-owned. Once the icebreakers are operational, the Atomflot organization controls them under licenses granted by the Department of Transportation.

Since the break-up of the Soviet Union, fuel fabrication for naval propulsion reactors has taken place only at the Elektrostal plant near Moscow.[11] Fuel for nuclear submarines falls under the control of the Russian Ministry for Atomic Energy, which also supervises the entire naval fuel cycle, from the delivery of fresh fuel to naval bases to the reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel. Spent fuel from nuclear submarines, however, is held initially at Ministry of Defense storage sites, of which some 20 exist nationwide.[15] Rail transportation of new and spent fuel is carried out by the Russian Ministry of Transportation.

The Ministry of the Environment, the Ministry of Public Health, the Federal Service for Environmental, Technological, and Nuclear Oversight (Rostekhnadzor), the State Committee for Monitoring Public Health, and the Ministry of Defense coordinate nuclear safety regulation on naval ships and at radioactive waste storage and processing facilities. However, the internal regulating authority of the Ministry of Defense is responsible for guaranteeing adherence to regulations. The Ministry for Emergency Situations is entrusted with disaster prevention and response.[4]

THE CHALLENGES OF DECOMMISSIONING AND DISMANTLEMENT

Russia's nuclear submarine force faces another serious problem: the decommissioning and dismantlement of retired submarines. Difficulties in this area relate to several factors: lack of planning, changes in Russian environmental policy, lack of dismantlement equipment, lack of storage facilities, and lack of financing. Due to Russia's 1993 pledge to adhere to the new protocols of the London Dumping Convention, it can no longer dispose of liquid radioactive waste from shut-down reactors at sea (as had previously been the practice). Moreover, two dismantlement facilities in the Russian Far East, Zvezda (Bolshoy Kamen) and the Kamchatka Shipyard (Vilyuchinsk), can only handle a few boats a year. Existing plans for the dismantlement of nuclear-powered submarines cannot keep up with the rate at which submarines come out of service (as a result of the high construction rates of the Cold War arms race).[4,16] As of 1 October 2006, 197 submarines had been decommissioned.[20] The net result of the slow dismantlement rate and the lack of adequate storage facilities for solid and nuclear wastes is that most of the decommissioned boats will be put into holding docks. Submarines that were decommissioned before the end of their service lives could, at least in principle, be reactivated for Russian use or for sale to interested third parties, and may even be vulnerable to terrorist attack or seizure.[17] Experts disagree on the likelihood of these scenarios,[18,19] but for these reasons, the decommissioning of Russia's nuclear submarines may pose greater proliferation and safety risks than their prior construction and deployment.[4,16] (For more information please see the Decommissioning and Dismantlement section.)

CONCLUSION

Russia's changing political and economic environment since the collapse of the Soviet Union has not left Russia's fleet of nuclear-powered vessels untouched. While the Russian Navy faces the challenges of military reform, which include, but are not limited to, increased responsibility in Russia's strategic nuclear triad and declining resources for handling this added responsibility, changes in the already fragmented naval nuclear fuel cycle regulatory process and safety problems associated with decommissioning and dismantling the aging fleet complicate the situation. As such, naval nuclear-powered vessels warrant particular attention in the analysis of Russia's post-Cold War nuclear legacy.
Sources:
[1] Oleg Bukharin and Joshua Handler, "Russian Nuclear-Powered Submarine Decommissioning," Science and Global Security, vol. 5, 1995, p. 246.
[2] Georgiy Kostev, Nuclear Safety Challenges in the Operation and Dismantlement of Russian Nuclear Submarines, Committee for Critical Technologies and Non-Proliferation, Moscow 1997, p. 9, 16, 17, 18-19, 34-35, 46.
[3] Joshua Handler, "Russia seeks to refloat a decaying fleet: The future of the Northern Fleet's submarines," Jane's International Defense Review, vol. 30, no. 1, 1997, pp. 43-47.
[4] Thomas Nilsen, Igor Kudrik, and Aleksandr Nikitin, "The Russian Northern Fleet Sources of Radioactive Contamination," The Bellona Foundation, 28 August 1996, pp. 8, 19, 22, 25.
[5] Nuclear Wastes in the Arctic: An Analysis of Arctic and Other Regional Impacts From Soviet Nuclear Contamination, " OTA-ENV-623, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, September 1995, p. 135.
[6] "New Icebreaker May Become Nuclear Power Plant," Nuclear Chronicle from Russia, The Bellona Foundation, December 1997, p. 8.
[7] "Worldwide Submarine Challenges," Office of Naval Intelligence, February 1997, p. 11.
[8] Moscow Interfax, 6 July 1998; "Yeltsin Orders Shift of Nuclear Warheads to Navy," FBIS-SOV-98-187.
[9] "MSYaS dolzhny usilitsya," Nezavisimaya voennoye obozreniye, 10-16 July 1998.
[10] Valeriy Aleksin, "Boyevykh korabley vse menshe i menshe," Nezavisimaya gazeta online edition, No. 134, http://www.ipres.ru/news/ng/98/07/data/n134-14.htm, 25 July 1998.
[11] Remarks by Gosatomnadzor official, "Security and Accounting for Bomb Materials in Russia" seminar, Monterey Institute of International Studies, 31 July 1997.
[12] Russian Government Decree No. 878, Voprosy Rossiyskogo agentstva po sudostroyeniyu, 30 July 1999; in The Legislation in Russia, http://law.optima.ru.{Updated 2/10/2000 CC}
[13] ITAR-TASS, 11 March 1998; in "Russian minister: New body required to deal with scrapping subs, weapons," BBC, 11 March 1998.
[14] "Problemoy utilizatsii atomnykh podvodnykh lodok teper budet zanimatsya Minatom RF - postanovleniye pravitelstva," Interfax, 29 May 1998.
[15] Remarks by Russian Scientist, "Security and Accounting for Bomb Materials in Russia" seminar, Monterey Institute of International Studies, 31 July 1997.
[16] Margarita Alenina, Vladimir Gavrilov, Pavel Filatov, and Igor Zhikarevich, "Major Areas of Activity of the International Foundation for the Promotion of Conversion and Ecology," Military Parade, September-October 1997, pp. 122-124. {Updated 2/19/99 HA}
[17] James Clay Moltz and Tamara Robinson, "Dismantling Russia's Nuclear Subs: New Challenges to Non-Proliferation," Arms Control Today, June 1999, pp. 10-15.
[18] NISNP Interview with Russian Nuclear Scientist, 21 September 1999, RUS990921.
[19] NISNP Interview with Russian Naval Expert, 4 November 1999, RUS991104. {Updated 11/19/99 TR}
[20] Russian Federal Atomic Energy Agency presentation, CEG meeting, Munich, Germany. {Updated 1/19/07 CC}

Prepared by Dr. James Clay Moltz, CNS Assistant Director ; Tamara Robinson, CNS Senior Research Associate; Hilary Anderson, CNS Graduate Research Assistant; and Jill Tatko, CNS Graduate Research Assistant

Page last updated 19 January 2007.
For more recent developments, see the other naval nuclear reactor sections.

Comments or questions? Contact Cristina Chuen at MIIS CNS: Cristina.ChuenATmiis.edu

This material is produced independently for NTI by the Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies and does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been independently verified by NTI or its directors, officers, employees, agents. Copyright © 2003 by MIIS.

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