Spent Naval Fuel and Radioactive Waste Overview Disposal Regulatory Bodies Proposals Developments
Northern Fleet Dumping Northern Fleet Storage Sites Northern Fleet Radioactive Waste Developments
Pacific Fleet Dumping Pacific Fleet Storage Sites Pacific Fleet Radioactive Waste Developments

Overview

Prepared by Hilary Anderson, CNS Graduate Research Assistant
Created: April 1998
Updated: April 2001

INTRODUCTION

Economic hardships over the past decade have rendered Russia's radioactive waste handling capabilities inadequate.  A severe shortage of radioactive waste storage space, coupled with a lack of funding allocations for new storage sites, has led to a difficult situation for Russia.  Some of the most significant sources of radioactive waste in the Northern and Far Eastern regions of Russia result from the operation and maintenance of naval nuclear reactors, which are used primarily to power submarines and icebreakers.[1] As a result of treaty obligations and submarines reaching the end of their service lives, a number of submarines have been scheduled for decommissioning and dismantlement.  Dismantlement facilities in the Northern and Pacific fleets are crowded with decommissioned submarines awaiting dismantlement, but the storage facilities for radioactive materials are reaching capacity.[2] At the Annual Pollution Prevention Conference, sponsored by the US National Defense Industry Association and the US Air Force Center for Environmental Excellence, Major General B.N. Alekseyev, head of the Environmental Safety Directorate of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, noted that as of August 1998, the Russian Navy was producing approximately 18,200 cubic meters of liquid radioactive waste and as much as 6,000t of solid radioactive waste every year.[34] (For more information on decommissioning and dismantlement, see the Naval Reactors Decommissioning section.)

Historically, the Soviet Union and Russia have disposed of radioactive waste in three ways:  by dumping it into the Baltic and Arctic Seas as well as into the northern Pacific (primarily the Sea of Japan); by placing it in storage sites on the Kola Peninsula in the Russian North, and on the Shkotovo and Kamchatka Peninsulas in the Russian Far East; and by holding radioactive waste on storage ships servicing the Northern and Pacific fleets. Spent fuel is sent to the Mayak Chemical Combine for reprocessing.[2] These methods of radioactive waste disposal and submarine accidents have resulted in contamination of naval facilities and the surrounding land and water in the Russian North and Far East.  Continued contamination of the Arctic and northern Pacific regions poses a serious threat to the marine environment[3] and could have significant economic and social costs for Russia, Japan, and the Scandinavian countries that maintain fisheries in these areas.[4]

PROTECTION AND HANDLING OF NAVAL FUEL

The vulnerability of naval fuel to diversion presents a problem of particular concern for the Russian Navy.  Materials protection, control, and accounting (MPC&A) of the Russian Navy's nuclear fuel has historically been weak.  The responsibility for naval nuclear fuel once belonged to the State Committee of Defense Industry (Goskomoboronprom), then to the Ministry of Economy, and finally, as of 28 May 1998, jurisdiction was transferred to the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy (Minatom).[29]

In September 1995, the Department of Energy (DOE) began to seek possible cooperation in the area of MPC&A with the Russian Navy, the process of which was facilitated by the Kurchatov Institute.  In May 1996, DOE experts made their first visit to a fresh fuel storage site in the Northern Fleet region, where they helped plan the construction of a physical protection annex for fresh fuel.  The Pacific Fleet sites were added to the DOE MPC&A program in December 1997.[7]  In September 1998, DOE began to upgrade MPC&A technology at a land-based fresh fuel storage facility at Chazhma, Primorskiy Kray.  The enhancements initially included several rapid upgrades.[38] Other measures include a long-term storage facility.[39] Upgrades to two buildings were reported completed in September 2000.[40] 

Spent nuclear fuel accounts for most of the reactor core radioactivity in nuclear powered submarines. The Russian Navy relies on specially equipped service ships to remove spent fuel from submarines. There is no spent fuel storage available for additional reactor cores from decommissioned submarines, as Russian naval policy reserves the limited available shipboard and shore-based storage space for refueling operational submarines. The inadequacies in spent fuel storage space at naval facilities can be attributed to two factors:  the fast pace of Russia's submarine decommissioning and the slow transfer rate of spent submarine fuel to the RT-1 reprocessing facility at Mayak.[5,6] For example, as of 1998, Russia's Pacific Fleet was sending only two rail shipments to Mayak per year.[37]  Due to the large number of submarines awaiting dismantlement, it may take several years before spent fuel is removed from retired submarines. Decommissioned submarines and service ships have become long-term de facto spent fuel storage facilities. 

RADIOACTIVE WASTE DISPOSAL AT SEA

History
The London Dumping Convention of 1972 regulates the disposal of hazardous wastes into the oceans.  The Soviet Union was a member of the London Dumping Convention, and thereby obligated not to dump certain types of highly radioactive waste into the seas.  In the late 1980s, however, Soviet citizens began to voice concern over reports about dumping of low-level radioactive waste and the emergency dumping of nuclear reactors at sea.  Initially, reports focused on the radioactive waste dumped into the sea by the Murmansk Shipping Company, which operates Russia's fleet of nuclear icebreakers.  By 1992, however, attention was shifting to the dumping of radioactive waste by the Russian Navy.  According to one source, the Navy had dumped 12 damaged submarine reactors, five of which still contained fuel, into the Kara Sea and areas near Novaya Zemlya.  In addition, three damaged reactors from an icebreaker and nearly 17,000 containers of radioactive waste had been dumped into the Barents and Kara Seas.[9]

As a result of these reports, there was growing concern among the public about radioactive waste disposal.  People began to demand more information about Russia's history of dumping radioactive waste into the seas.  In response to this increasing pressure for information, Russian President Boris Yeltsin created a government commission to further investigate the reports of radioactive waste dumping at sea.  This government commission was headed by Professor Aleksey Yablokov, Yeltsin's adviser on environment.  The commission focused on Russia's compliance with its international commitments and how dumping of radioactive waste would affect environmental safety in the future.  The outcome of this investigation was a report known as the White Book or Yablokov Report.  In addition to information about deliberate dumping and burial of liquid and solid radioactive waste at sea, this report contains information on submarine accidents.  According to the White Book, the Soviet Union had been dumping radioactive waste into the seas since 1959.[9] The last known incident of dumping at sea by the Russian Navy occurred in 1993, when approximately 900 tons of liquid radioactive waste were dumped into the Sea of Japan.[10]

Dumping in the North
Twelve Northern Fleet facilities on the Kola Peninsula and two shipyards in Severodvinsk were responsible for the majority of the radioactive waste dumped into the Arctic.  In addition, the Murmansk Shipping Company also participated in liquid radioactive waste (LRW) dumping until 1984, after which point they began to send the waste for processing at a land-based facility.[10]

LRW was dumped into five designated areas in the Barents Sea.  By 1992, the total volume of LRW dumped into the Barents Sea at all five sites was 192,700 cubic meters, which had a total radioactivity of 12,171 Ci.  A small amount of LRW disposal may have also taken place in Barents Sea areas other than the designated dumping sites.[10]

Solid radioactive waste (SRW) was dumped into eight areas of the Kara Sea, primarily in shallow bays on the eastern coast of Novaya Zemlya.  The majority of the SRW in the Northern seas is low- and intermediate-level waste generated by nuclear-powered ships and submarines.  Again, the Northern Fleet dumped the majority of the SRW in the Northern seas, but the Murmansk Shipping Company also dumped SRW until 1986.[11]

Dumping in the Far East
Most of the Pacific Fleet naval facilities responsible for radioactive waste dumping are in the Vladivostok and Petropavlovsk regions.  The Russian Navy dumped LRW and SRW into ten designated areas in three bodies of water: the Sea of Japan, the Sea of Okhotsk, and the North Pacific Ocean.  LRW was dumped in nine of the ten designated areas.  As of 1992, the total volume of LRW dumped into the Far Eastern seas amounted to approximately 123,497 cubic meters with a total radioactivity of 12,337 Ci.  SRW was dumped in four of the designated areas.  The SRW consisted of both low- and medium-level radioactive waste.  In contrast to the Northern region, no reactors with spent nuclear fuel were dumped into the Far Eastern seas.[13]

Levels of Contamination
The data regarding the potential threats of LRW in the seas varies.  Theoretically, the radioactive waste should be diluted and dispersed in the water, and therefore be rendered fairly harmless.  However, there is some indication that the waste does not in fact dilute, but rather settles in one area.  If the radioactive waste settles rather than diluting, there is a possibility that it will be ingested or absorbed by marine organisms.[4]

The potential hazards presented by SRW in the seas depend on the type of SRW, its containment, if any, and the protective qualities of the containment and its seals.  The Yablokov Commission determined that the greatest potential threat posed by SRW in the seas results from the reactors with spent fuel that were dumped into the Northern seas.[14] [For information on the radiation dangers of sunken nuclear submarines, see National Geographic's "Radiation Risk" site, at http://crater.nationalgeographic.com/k19/radiation_main.html.]

RADIOACTIVE WASTE ON LAND

Northern Storage Sites
The land-based radioactive waste storage sites in the Northern Fleet include Gadzhiyevo Naval Base, Gremikha Naval Base, Nerpa Shipyard, Polyarninskiy Shipyard, Sevmorput Naval Shipyard No. 35, Ara Bay, and Zapadnaya Litsa Naval Base.

Far Eastern Storage Sites
The land-based radioactive waste storage sites in the Pacific Fleet include Kamchatka Shipyard (Site 49K), Pavlovsk Nuclear Submarine Base, and Site 32.

RADIOACTIVE WASTE ON STORAGE SHIPS

Northern Fleet
The Northern Fleet uses service ships to transport and store radioactive waste and spent fuel.  Some of the ships were used for collecting liquid and solid radioactive waste and dumping it into northern waters.  Most of the service ships are stationed near facilities where submarines are serviced.  Several barges are also used to store spent fuel.  Some of the ships used primarily for the transport of waste can also be used for storage.  Most of the storage and transport tankers are based at the Northern Fleet facilities Zapadnaya Litsa, Gadzhiyevo, Gremikha, and Severodvinsk.  The Northern Fleet also operates several PEk-50 type floating tanks for storage of liquid radioactive waste.[15]

Pacific Fleet
The majority of the service ships operated by the Pacific Fleet are located in the Vladivostok and Shkotovo Peninsula regions.  There are at least two Vala-class tankers in the Vladivostok region, which are used to store and transport solid and liquid radioactive waste.  In addition, at least two PM-class radiological repair ships, which transport fresh fuel to or spent fuel from submarines at Bolshoy Kamen's Zvezda Far Eastern Shipyard, are based in the Vladivostok region.  Finally, there is one Pinega-class submarine support ship in the Vladivostok region that transports liquid radioactive waste.[16]   Several PM-class and Vala-class tankers used in the Shkotovo Peninsula area, however, are all reported to be in poor condition.[17]

ACCIDENTS

Submarine accidents can cause not only numerous casualties, they can also result in the creation of additional radioactive waste.  Radioactive waste resulting from accidents has contaminated both land and water in areas near naval facilities in the North and the Far East and poses an immediate threat to the surrounding environment.[18]

GOVERNMENTAL BODIES RESPONSIBLE FOR REGULATING RADIOACTIVE WASTE

Difficulties in handling spent fuel and radioactive waste may also arise from the fact that so many agencies are involved in the various stages of the naval fuel cycle.  The Navy has oversight of naval fuel from the time fresh fuel arrives at a central storage area until spent fuel is shipped for reprocessing.  The Navy is specifically responsible for fresh fuel storage, refueling and defueling, reactor fuel use, interim storage of spent fuel, and the loading spent fuel into shipping casks to be sent for reprocessing.  A division of the Murmansk Shipping Company, Atomflot, assumes responsibility for the nuclear-powered icebreakers in the Northern Fleet.  Its fuel-management duties are similar to the Navy's.  The Ministry of Railways is partially responsible for the transportation of fresh and spent fuel.[21]

The Department of Shipbuilding operated under the aegis of Goskomoboronprom. (Goskomoboronprom was transformed into the Ministry of Defense Industry in September 1996, which was subsequently dissolved by President Yeltsin in March 1997. Many of Goskomoboronprom's responsibilities were turned over to the Ministry of the Economy, and then, on 25 May 1999, to the Russian Shipbuilding Agency. Please see the Russia: Government Agencies section for more information.)   The Shipbuilding Agency operates all of the major shipyards, while the Navy operates naval bases.  Together, these two bodies are responsible for loading fresh fuel into new submarines and those undergoing major overhaul.  Research institutes and design bureaus integrate reactor systems and fuel management with the technologies and operations of naval vessels.[21]

General regulation of nuclear activities falls under Gosatomnadzor, which has tried to model itself after the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission and is charged with four main tasks: the regulation of nuclear activity, including the development of regulatory guidelines for nuclear and radiation safety, material control and accounting (MC&A), physical protection (PP), radioactive waste management, and industrial safety; inspection activities, involving the verification of facility compliance with set regulations; licensing, which is in reality limited (as of January 1996); and assessment, including the making of recommendations to other agencies and the government.[19]  Officially, the main divisions of Gosatomnadzor involved in the supervision of naval fuel management include the departments of transport reactors, fuel cycle facilities, radiation safety, and material control and accounting.[20]  However, Gosatomnadzor no longer has access to naval facilities subordinate to the Ministry of Defense.

The Ministry of Atomic Energy (Minatom) is also involved in the general oversight of military and civilian related nuclear enterprises and is involved in essentially all stages of the naval fuel cycle.[24]  Minatom was established by presidential decree on 28 January 1992, and replaced the Ministry of Atomic Power and Industry (MAPI), which in turn had replaced the USSR Ministry of Medium Machine-Building in 1989.  Minatom controls 151 nuclear production and research facilities. [23] Minatom is responsible for the production of all nuclear materials and the development, testing, and production of all nuclear weapons.  Some of Minatom's responsibilities include research and design of reactors and fuels, the development of infrastructure to support reactor and fuel operations, the production of naval fuel, the production and use of spent fuel shipping casks, reprocessing of spent fuel, and development of a regulatory framework for fuel management and coordination of regulatory activities with Gosatomnadzor.[21]  In May 1998, Minatom became the main coordinator for nuclear submarine dismantlement and related nuclear material handling and storage activities. (For more information, please see the 5/29/98 entry in the decommissioning developments section.)[22]

SPENT FUEL AND RADIOACTIVE WASTE HANDLING PROPOSALS

As the number of submarines awaiting dismantlement increases, the Russian Navy's spent fuel and radioactive waste problems continue to grow more acute.  The lack of a land-based storage facility for reactor compartments has forced the Navy to take extreme measures, such as storing reactor compartments and partially dismantled submarines afloat at naval facilities.[25] Due to the critical nature of the situation, expedient solutions to the problems of spent fuel and radioactive waste storage and disposal are being sought.  Since 1992, several proposals on increasing the land-based capacity for spent fuel and radioactive waste storage have been put forward.[26]  In July 1994, Minister of Atomic Energy Viktor Mikhailov, Minister of Defense and Army General Pavel Grachev, and Chief Military Inspector and Army General Konstantin Kobets wrote a confidential letter to Russian President Boris Yeltsin conveying a possible solution to the naval nuclear waste problem.  The Central Physical-Technical Institute of the Ministry of Defense and the All-Russian Scientific Research Institute of Experimental Physics (VNIIEF) in Sarov (Arzamas-16) proposed using an underground nuclear explosion technique that would simultaneously vitrify and bury naval spent fuel and radioactive waste in old, excavated tunnels at the Central Atomic Test Site on Novaya Zemlya at a cost of $150 to 350 million, which includes evaluation by international experts, shipment costs, and social programs.  Just three nuclear explosions would alleviate the Northern Fleet's waste problems.  Although the Ministry of Atomic Energy (Minatom) characterized the explosions as "clean" and non-weapons-related, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs opposed the project itself, because it "might undermine fulfillment of the CTBT."[36] One project, involving the St. Petersburg All-Russian Scientific Research and Design Institute of Energy Technology (VNIPIET) and an international consortium of SKB of Sweden, Kvaerner Maritime of Norway, BNFL of the United Kingdom, and SGN of France, is investigating spent fuel storage options at Mayak.  After Minatom voiced problems with the proposal for dry storage at Mayak, the group decided to investigate sites in the Northern Fleet as possible locations for a spent fuel storage facility.[31,32]  In addition, in March 1999, UK Foreign Secretary Robin Cook pledged three million pounds (approximately $4.83 million) to aid in cleaning up radioactive waste from decommissioned nuclear submarines.  Most of these funds are to be specifically earmarked for removing damaged spent fuel rods from the Lepse storage ship and providing casks to house the spent fuel rods.[33] Although the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program includes a naval spent fuel cask development project, in June 1999, the US Department of Defense moved to provide funding for limited naval spent fuel reprocessing at the Mayak Chemical Combine, in the hopes of advancing the stalled dismantlement process.  The lack of storage facilities led to the decision to fund reprocessing of fuel from the submarines under contract for dismantlement in 1999 as part of the CTR project, but the move appears to contradict US government policy on reducing stockpiles of plutonium.[35]

Japan and US companies have worked together to provide a floating LRW processing facility, called the Landysh, to the Far East.  The facility began operating in October 2000.(For more information please see the Landysh facility file.) In the Northern Fleet area, an LRW processing facility at Atomflot began test operations on 20 June 2001.  Part of a joint effort by Norway, the United States, and Russia called the Murmansk Initiative, construction started in December 1994 and cost some $4.5 million.[27] A similar facility at Zvezdochka began operating in October 2000. Construction costs of the latter project, implemented within the framework of the US-Russian Comprehensive Threat Reduction program funded by the US government, totaled $17 million.[28] Proposals regarding the treatment and storage of SRW and reactor compartments are much less definitive.  Suggestions range from storing reactor compartments in tunnels located at naval bases to building a new storage site at Novaya Zemlya.[30]

CONCLUSION

Russia is at a critical stage in the management of its spent fuel and radioactive waste associated with naval activities.  Operation and dismantlement of nuclear-powered submarines must proceed and, therefore, radioactive waste generation will continue.  The popular past method of dumping waste into the seas is no longer an option.  Prioritization of the problem on the part of the Russian government and cooperation with other nations on radioactive waste management concerns is imperative in order to find a solution both for Russia and for other countries facing similar radioactive waste management problems.  Russia's failure to find safe, new options for radioactive waste storage, processing, and disposal will lead to further degradation of the environment, and the economies of neighboring countries relying on a healthy marine environment will risk damage.
Sources:
[1] Don Bradley, Behind the Nuclear Curtain (Columbus: Battelle Press, 1997),  p. 239.
[2] Thomas Cochran, Robert S. Norris, Oleg Bukharin, Making the Russian Bomb: From Stalin to Yeltsin (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995),  p. 217.
[3] Thomas Cochran, Robert S. Norris, Oleg Bukharin, Making the Russian Bomb: From Stalin to Yeltsin (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995),  p.218.
[4] TED Case Studies, "Arctic Sea Dumping,"  http://gurukul.ucc.american.edu/.
[5] Oleg Bukharin and Joshua Handler, "Russian Nuclear-Powered Submarine Decommissioning," Science and Global Security, Vol. 5, 1995, p. 258.
[6] "Nuclear Wastes in the Arctic: An Analysis of Arctic and Other Regional Impacts From Soviet Nuclear Contamination," OTA-ENV-623, Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, September 1995, pp. 117-119, 132.
[7] Nuclear Successor States of the Soviet Union, March 1998, pp. 59-60.
[8] Nuclear Successor States of the Soviet Union, March 1998, p.52.
[9] Thomas Cochran, Robert S. Norris, Oleg Bukharin, Making the Russian Bomb: From Stalin to Yeltsin (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995),  p. 219.
[10] Thomas Cochran, Robert S. Norris, Oleg Bukharin, Making the Russian Bomb: From Stalin to Yeltsin  (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995),  p. 221.
[11] Thomas Cochran, Robert S. Norris, Oleg Bukharin, Making the Russian Bomb: From Stalin to Yeltsin  (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995), p. 223.
[12] Thomas Cochran, Robert S. Norris, Oleg Bukharin, Making the Russian Bomb: From Stalin to Yeltsin  (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995),  p. 228.
[13] Thomas Cochran, Robert S. Norris, Oleg Bukharin, Making the Russian Bomb: From Stalin to Yeltsin  (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995), p. 231.
[14] Thomas Cochran, Robert S. Norris, Oleg Bukharin, Making the Russian Bomb: From Stalin to Yeltsin (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995), p. 234.
[15] Don Bradley, Behind the Nuclear Curtain (Columbus: Battelle Press, 1997),  p. 243.
[16] Don Bradley, Behind the Nuclear Curtain (Columbus: Battelle Press, 1997),  p. 256.
[17] Don Bradley, Behind the Nuclear Curtain (Columbus: Battelle Press, 1997), p. 261.
[18] Georgi Kostev, Nuclear Safety Challenges in the Operation and Dismantlement of Russian Nuclear Submarines,  p. 11.
[19] NISNP Discussions With Russian Nuclear Official, 19 December 1995.
[20] "Nuclear Wastes in the Arctic: An Analysis of Arctic and Other Regional Impacts From Soviet Nuclear Contamination," OTA-ENV-623 (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office), September 1995, p. 139.
[21] "Nuclear Wastes in the Arctic: An Analysis of Arctic and Other Regional Impacts From Soviet Nuclear Contamination," OTA-ENV-623 (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office), September 1995, p. 138.
[22] Olga Antonova, "Minatom monopoliziruyet unichtozheniye starykh podlodok," Vremya MN, 9 June 1998, p. 2.  {Updated 3/18/99  HA}
[23] Oleg Bukharin, "Nuclear Safeguards And Security In The Former Soviet Union," Survival, Winter 1994-1995, p. 58.
[24] Thomas Cochran, Robert S. Norris, Oleg Bukharin, Making the Russian Bomb: From Stalin to Yeltsin (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995),  p. 32.
[25] Thomas Cochran, Robert S. Norris, Oleg Bukharin, Making the Russian Bomb: From Stalin to Yeltsin  (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995),  p. 239.
[26] Thomas Cochran, Robert S. Norris, Oleg Bukharin, Making the Russian Bomb: From Stalin to Yeltsin  (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995),  p. 240.
[27] "Modernized Nuclear Waste Disposal Installation Presented in Murmansk," Interfax, 20 June 2001.
[28] "V Arkhangelskoy oblasti otkryt kompleks po pererabotke radioaktivnykh otkhodov," Interfax, 19 October 2000.
[29] Dmitriy Litovkin, "Russia's Naval Doctrine Does Not Consider Problems of Written-Off Nuclear Powered Submarines," Yadernyy kontrol, 15 December 1999; in "Russia's Nuclear Sub Recycling Problem, " FBIS Document CEP2000032200000230.
[30] Thomas Cochran, Robert S. Norris, Oleg Bukharin, Making the Russian Bomb: From Stalin to Yeltsin  (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995), p. 243.
[31] Igor Kudrik, "Navy not to be held responsible for radwaste handling," Bellona: Nuclear Chronicle from Russia, February 1998, p. 4.
[32] "Problem of the Coming Century," Flag Rodiny, 5 February 1998, p. 3; in "Nuclear Submarine Disposal Difficulties," FBIS-SOV-98-085, 26 March 1998.
[33] David Buchan, "UK Offers Russia Nuclear Waste Aid," Financial Times, 4 March 1999, p. 2; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, http://web.lexis-nexis.com.
[34] "Nearly 20,000 M³ of LLRW Dumped at Sea from Russian Nuclear Subs," Post-Soviet Nuclear & Defense Monitor, 31 August 1998, p. 1.
{Updated 5/5/99  HA}
[35] NISNP Correspondence with Department of Energy Personnel, June 1999, RUS990630.  {Updated 7/29/99 JET}
[36] Viktor Litovkin, "Yadernyy vzriv pod grifom 'sekretno,'" Izvestiya, 6 May 1997, p. 5.  {Updated 8/4/99 JET}
[37] James Clay Moltz, "Trip Report: Vladivostok and Khabarovsk, Russia," 15-22 October 1999, RUS991015. {Updated 11/19/99 TR}
[38] Rear Admiral Nikolay Yurasov et al., "Upgrades to the Russian Navy's Fuel Transfer Ships and Consolidated Storage Locations," Partnership for Nuclear Security: United States/Former Soviet Union Program of Cooperation on Nuclear Material Protection, Control, and Accounting, September 1998.
[39] NISNP Correspondence with MPC&A task force personnel, January 2000, RUS000100.
[40] U.S. General Accounting Office, Nuclear Nonproliferation:  Security of Russia's Nuclear Material Improving; Further Enhancements Needed, GAO-01-312 (Washington, DC:  February 2001), GAO Web Site, http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d01312.pdf.{Updated 8/14/2001 CC}

Page last updated 14 August 2001
For more recent developments, see the General Naval Radioactive Waste Developments file

Comments or questions? Contact Cristina Chuen at MIIS CNS: Cristina.Chuen@miis.edu

This material is produced independently for NTI by the Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies and does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been independently verified by NTI or its directors, officers, employees, agents. Copyright © 2002 by MIIS.

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