This file is no longer being updated. For information on
developments in the nuclear power industry, please see the Nuclear
Power Developments section.
Bilibino, Chukchi
Autonomous Okrug
Address: Bilibinskaya
ATETs, Bilibino, Magadan Oblast, 686510
Telephone: +7 (13) 25028
Rosenergoatom
Director: M. Chudakov
GBWR-12, Model EGP-6 (graphite-moderated
boiling-water reactor for combined heat and power)
Four
Unit 1: initial criticality 12/73 (operational
1/74)
Unit 2: initial criticality 12/73 (operational
1/74)
Unit 3: initial criticality 12/75 (operational
12/75)
Unit 4: initial criticality 12/76 (operational
12/76)
12 MWe and 62 MWt per
operating unit
Enriched to 3.0-3.6 percent
Under the International
Nuclear Safety Program, the US Department of Energy (DOE) has been assisting
with safety improvements at Bilibino, particularly focusing on improving the
safety of day-to-day operations. An analytical simulator project was
initiated in 1996, and was scheduled to be completed in December 1999.
Pilot courses for shift supervisors and instrument and control technicians
began in 1996 as the first phase in transferring the Systematic Approach to
Training methodology and training materials developed at the Balakovo
Training Center to the Bilibino NPP. Maintenance training classes
on protective circuit boards in power reactors have been completed, and as
of 1999, a maintenance training classroom is being developed at the plant.
Plant engineers attended a workshop in Alaska that focused on reactor corrosion
and corrosion control. A plant engineer was trained in using the SCALE
computer code package (criticality, neutronics and heat-transfer codes used
to support licensing submissions), and given preliminary training in the use
of MCNP codes (for criticality and shielding calculations) and Visual Editor
(which provides a visual display of results). In 1996 an improved communication
link was established between Bilibino NPP and the Alaskan Emergency Response
Office. As of 1999, enhanced systems are being provided to improve communications
between the plant and the outside world.
The Bilibino reactors are surrounded by ordinary building
walls, not a containment structure. They may also be prone to reactor
cavity over-pressurization if there is a multiple fuel channel rupture.
Bilibino NPP does not meet current safety standards for Russian reactors.
However, the reactor was conservatively designed, with low temperatures and
a large heat-sink capability, and has not reported any events above INES 1.
Construction of the Bilibino station
was finished in December 1976.
At Bilibino, solid waste is stored
without processing. As of October 1996, the liquid waste storage facility
was 70-85 percent full; the solid waste storage facility was 65-85 percent
full.[1] High-level waste is kept in stainless steel-lined concrete tanks.[2]
Units 5 and 6, 32 MWe graphite-moderated
light water reactors (GLWR), are scheduled to be completed sometime between
2001-2005. Unit 7, also a 32 MWe GLWR, is scheduled to be completed sometime
between 2006-2010.[1,2]
(For more recent developments,
see the Nuclear
Power Developments file):
10/16/99: GOVERNMENT DIRECTIVE PROVIDES
$1 MILLION SUBSIDY TO BILIBINO NPP IN FOURTH QUARTER 2000
On 16 October 1999 Prime Minister
Vladimir Putin signed government directive No. 1651-r, according
to which the 27 million ruble (about $1 million as of 16 October 1999) subsidy
for Chukotkenergo in the fourth quarter of 1999 will instead be used to purchase
nuclear fuel and repair equipment at Bilibino NPP. In addition, the
Federal Energy Commission is directed to expand its electricity tariff subsidies
to aid Chukotka industries in order to further reduce rates on electricity
generated by Bilibino NPP.
8/98: DESPITE DISPUTE OVER BILIBINO
NPP FUNDING, TWO BILIBINO REACTORS TO GO ON LINE FOR THE WINTER
In late August, because the Bilibino
NPP had cut off power production, Chukotka Okrug Governor Aleksandr Nazarov
declared a state of emergency in Bilibino and Chaun regions. He also
suggested that the Russian government form a commission to investigate the
use of federal funds earmarked for safety improvements at the Bilibino NPP.
In an interview with Vremya MN, Rosenergoatom representatives charged
that Chukotka Okrug had misused federal subsidies for electricity producers
by routing the funds into the municipal budget. According to Rosenergoatom,
Bilibino NPP owes it 113 million rubles ($10.3 million as of 1 September 1998)
and owes fuel producers 43 million rubles ($3.9 million as of 1 September
1998), while Chukotenergo, gold mining companies, and local utility companies
owes Bilibino NPP 289 million rubles ($26.3 million as of 1 September 1998).
The refueling of two reactor units at Bilibino NPP had been stalled due to
this lack of funds. Nevertheless, Rosenergoatom reported that hot water
service was restored on 14 August and heating on 20 August. Two reactors
will be on line throughout the winter, and taken off line again in the spring.
8/22/98: ROSENERGOATOM
STOPS TWO BILIBINO REACTOR UNITS, CHUKOTKA OBJECTS
Rosenergoatom ordered two of the Bilibino
NPP's reactor units off-line, cutting off electricity to residential areas,
children's and medical institutions, and production facilities in Bilibino,
Chaunskiy District, and part of neighboring Sakha Republic (Yakutiya).
Chukotka Okrug Governor Aleksandr Nazarov sent a telegram to Prime Minister
Sergey Kiriyenko requesting that Minatom order the NPP to resume production
of electricity at full capacity. Nazarov also asked for an inquiry into
Rosenergoatom's actions.
8/20/98: ROSENERGOATOM THREATENS
TO CLOSE BILIBINO NPP IF GOVERNMENT DOES NOT MAKE CHANGES
Rosenergoatom demanded that the government
change the timetable for the payment of Bilibino NPP debts to the budget and
obtain the assistance of Chukotka Okrug for the NPP. Unless these measures
are taken, Rosenergoatom said it would propose the closure of the NPP for
safety reasons. Bilibino NPP debts to budgets at all levels of government
total 21 million rubles ($3 million as of 20 August 1998), while debts to
nonbudget funds stand at 88 million rubles ($12.8 million as of 20 August
1998). The NPP has not been receiving payment for the electricity it
provides, as the gold mining enterprises that are its main consumers are themselves
not being paid. The NPP has not received funds for 1997 or the first
half of 1998, and is suffering from shortages of spare parts and nuclear fuel.
Rosenergoatom has proposed allowing the NPP the right to sell electricity
directly, and asked that the Chukotka Okrug begin to subsidize the NPP.
10/97: BILIBINO SALARY DEBT REMAINS
HIGH, UNION HEAD THREATENS SELF-IMMOLATION
Salary payments at Bilibino NPP in
October 1997 remain four months late. The total debt for back pay is
over 11 billion rubles ($1.9 million as of 1 October 1997). Rosenergoatom
is paying for nuclear fuel to keep the station running, and sent airplanes
over the summer with supplies for the workers, as well as to take them on
vacation. Nevertheless, Bilibino trade union head K. Apalkov sent a
letter addressed to President Boris Yeltsin, Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin,
Federation Council Chairman Yegor Stroyev, State Duma Speaker Gennadiy Seleznev,
Minister of Atomic Energy Viktor Mikhailov and Rosenergoatom President Erik
Pozdyshev threatening to set himself on fire if NPP salaries were not paid
by 30 December 1997.
6/97: BILIBINO PERSONNEL RECEIVE
SALARY PAYMENTS WITH FIVE-MONTH DELAY
Bilibino NPP workers received their
salaries for January 1997. K. Apalkov, head of the Bilibino NPP trade
union, traveled to Moscow where he met with Minister of Atomic Energy Viktor
Mikhailov and Chukotka Okrug Governor Aleksandr Nazarov. Nazarov promised
to issue the NPP a credit of 5 billion rubles ($867,000 as of 1 June 1997).
In the beginning of June, Rosenergoatom sent the NPP 8 billion rubles ($1.4
million as of 1 June 1997). At the end of April 1997, NPP workers were
owed 12 billion rubles in back pay ($2 million as of 1 May 1997).
11/96: BILIBINO NPP STRIKE OVER
Near the end of November 1996, the strike committee of the
Bilibino plant called an end to the workers' two-month strike after operations
personnel received back wages up to and including September 1996, and other
staff received a promise that they would be paid in early December 1996. The
payments were made according to an agreement signed on 22 October 1996 by
Rosenergoatom and the strike committee. According to this agreement, Bilibino
will begin billing consumers directly, but this step must be approved by First
Deputy Prime Minister Aleksey Bolshakov. A meeting with Bolshakov was scheduled
for 20 November 1996, but did not take place, and has been postponed indefinitely.
10/96: BILIBINO WORKERS REQUESTING RELOCATION
Ogonek reported that striking workers at the Bilibino
NPP demanded not only that their back wages be paid, but that they be evacuated
from the Far North to a less remote location. Approximately 400 workers were
involved in the strike.[1] According to Nuclear Engineering International,
only two units are operating, with two units shut down for repairs; in addition,
the waste storage facility at the plant is full, which could lead to the closure
of the plant, since there are no funds to renovate the facility.[2]
9/19/96: BILIBINO NPP ON STRIKE
On 19 September 1996, Interfax reported that the strike at
the Bilibino NPP was still under way. Plant personnel were doing only the
minimum amount of work necessary to maintain production and were cutting back
on other operations. On 6 September 1996, Segodnya reported that the
workers of Bilibino NPP planned to strike on 9 September 1996, cutting the
connection to YeES Rossii, the electricity distribution monopoly that owes
Russia's nuclear power plants over six trillion rubles.
Last updated 9 June 2000
For more recent developments,
see the Nuclear
Power Developments file.
Comments or questions? Contact Cristina Chuen at MIIS
CNS: Cristina.Chuen@miis.edu
This material is produced independently for NTI
by the Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the
Monterey Institute of International Studies and
does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has
not been independently verified by NTI or its directors, officers,
employees, agents. Copyright © 2002 by MIIS.
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