archives
Features

This material is produced by the Monterey Institute's Center for Nonproliferation Studies
 
Russia Research, Power, and Waste Power Reactors
Nuclear Power Reactors
Table of Power Reactors
Balakovo
Beloyarsk
Bilibino
Kalinin
Kola
Kursk
Leningrad
Novovoronezh
Smolensk
Rostov-na-Donu
Table of Reactor Incidents
New Power Facilities Under Construction
Far East
Khabarovsk
Kola NPP-2
Kostroma
Northwest Scientific-Industrial Center for Atomic Energy (Leningrad)
Primorskaya
South Urals (Yuzhnouralskaya)
Tatarskaya
Voronezh
General Nuclear Power Developments


Russia: Reactors: Power: Smolensk

Russia: Smolensk NPP

This file is no longer being updated.  For information on developments in the nuclear power industry, please see the Nuclear Power Developments section.

LOCATION: Desnogorsk, Smolensk Oblast, 40km from Roslavl
Address: Smolenskaya AES, Desnogorsk, Smolensk Oblast, 216532
Telephone: (08153) 72350
["Smolenskaya AES," Institute of Physics and Power Engineering Webpage, http://www.ippe.rssi.ru/rnpp/smolensk_win.html.]{entered 10/25/99 CC}
HOMEPAGE: http://www.smolensk.ru/user/desnogorsk/snpp.htm (unofficial)
["Smolenskaya AES," Institute of Physics and Power Engineering Webpage, http://www.ippe.rssi.ru/rnpp/smolensk_win.html.]{entered 10/25/99 CC}
ADMINISTRATION:
Plant Manager:  Sergey Krylov
[Vladimir Korolev, "Smolenskuyu AES budet proveryat vsemirnaya assotsiatsiya organizatsiy, ekspluatiruyushchikh atomnyye elektrostantsii," RIA Novosti, 8 December 1999; in National News Service, http://nel.nns.ru.] {entered 12/10/99 CC}
Chief Engineer: Aleksandr Spirin
[Oleg Artyushin, ITAR-TASS, 3/1/97; in "Nuclear Power Plant Repair Workers Go On Strike," FBIS-SOV-97-041.] {Entered 7/10/97 LBN}
TYPE: RBMK-1000 LWGR
UNITS: Three
Unit 1: initial criticality 9/82 (operational 9/83)
Unit 2: initial criticality 4/85 (operational 5/85)
Unit 3: initial criticality 12/89* (operational 6/90)
*listed as 11/89 in "World Nuclear Industry Handbook 1996"
Sources:
[1]"World Nuclear Industry Handbook 1996," Nuclear Engineering International, p. 29.
[2] Nuclear News, September 1994.
[3] Interfax, 25 June 1996.
POWER: 925 MWe per operating unit
FUEL: Enriched to 2 percent
SAFETY:
The US Department of Energy (DOE) has been assisting with safety improvements at Smolensk, particularly focusing on improving the safety of day-to-day operations and upgrading critical plant safety systems. Smolensk NPP personnel have been trained in the development of  improved operating safety procedures. In addition, emergency operating instructions to improve accident mitigation strategies have been drafted. The transfer of training methodology and materials for safety and maintenance measures developed at the Balakovo Training Center to Smolensk NPP is ongoing. Instructors at Smolensk NPP have been trained in the Balakovo safety and maintenance methodology. A pilot course in laser shaft alignment has been implemented. To support the training courses, Smolensk NPP was fully equipped with basic training equipment including office machines, equipment and supplies. The tools provided to enhance maintenance safety activities consisted of valve-seat resurfacing equipment, a pipe lathe/weld-preparation machine and a vibration monitoring and shaft alignment system. An analysis of the fire hazards at Smolensk NPP began by identifying the equipment necessary for safe shutdown in the case of a fire. To decrease fire hazards, DOE has provided Smolensk NPP with fire hazard training for Russian analysts as well as fire doors, fire detectors, fire protection equipment, penetration sealant material, and a fire brigade communications system. The communications and fire detection system was scheduled for completion in 1999.
[Pacific Northwest Laboratory Website, http://insp.pnl.gov:2080/?profiles/smolensk.]{Entered 5/31/2000 NEB}
SPENT FUEL AND RADIOACTIVE WASTE:
Waste is stored at the site of the Smolensk nuclear power plant. In 1/96, construction of a new storage facility in Desnogorsk, Smolensk Oblast, was completed. The facility is a part of the reactor department of the plant and represents a substantially improved version of spent fuel storage facilities at the Kursk and Leningrad nuclear power plants. The uranium spent fuel will be stored there for 30 years before being sent for reprocessing. Until recently, spent fuel was stored at the power units.[1]  
According to one source, the liquid waste storage facility at Smolensk was 70-85 percent full as of October 1996.[2] However earlier reports indicate that the facility was full as of June 1995.[3] For more information, see the developments section of this file.
Sources:
[1]"To Be On The Safe Side," Rossiyskaya gazeta, 10 January 1996, p. 2; "AES obezapasilas," Rossiyskaya gazeta, 7 February 1996, p. 4.
[2]"Radioaktivnyye otkhody AES," Energiya: ekonomika, tekhnika i ekologiya, October 1996, pp. 32-33.
[3] Yadernyy Kontrol, November 1995, p. 11. {Entered 9/17/1997 EV}
 
SMOLENSK DEVELOPMENTS (For more recent developments, see the Nuclear Power Developments file):
 
A detailed background report on the nuclear industry pay crisis and Smolensk NPP protests is also available.
 
4/16/99: RADIOACTIVE VAPOR RELEASE AT UNIT THREE
On 16 April 1999, a radioactive vapor release occurred at the third unit of the Smolensk NPP. The vapor was ejected into the central hall of the plant, after which the reactor was stopped and cooling operations began. The radioactive substances escaped into the environment through the ventilation system, but did not exceed established acceptable levels. According to Vasiliy Petukhov, head of the Smolensk Center for Hydrometeorology and Environmental Monitoring, from 15 April to 19 April, the gamma background level in the town of Desnogorsk, where Smolensk NPP is located, averaged 15 microroentgen/hour (the maximum acceptable level is 20 microroentgen/hour).[1] The accident was caused by a loss of pressure in a loading machine during the reloading of a fuel channel.[2] A special commission will investigate the accident.[1]
Sources:
[1] NTV newscast, 19 April 1999; in "Radioactive Vapor Released at Smolensk Nuclear Plant," FBIS Document FTS19990419001561.
[2] "Na Smolenskoy AES v Pyatnitsu Proizoshel Vybros Parovodyanoy Smesi," Interfax, No. 1, 19 April 1999. {Entered 7/20/99 VT}
 
3/19/99: OLD EQUIPMENT AND NUCLEAR WASTE STOCKPILES CHALLENGE SAFETY AT SMOLENSK NPP
There were 22 operational disruptions at the Smolensk NPP in 1998, as opposed to 10 in 1997. According to a 19 March 1999 article in Smena, the increased number of incidents is due to aging equipment. In addition, large stockpiles of spent nuclear fuel are increasing safety risks.
[Lina Zernova, "Nad Severo-zapadom navisla ten yadernoy opasnosti," Smena, 5 March 1999, p. 2; in WPS Yadernyye Materialy, No. 11, 19 March 1999] {Entered 11/11/99}
 
4/98: NEW NPP TO BE BUILT IN SMOLENSK OBLAST
A new nuclear power plant (NPP) will be built in Smolensk Oblast. By 1 July 1998, the oblast authorities and the Smolensk NPP directorate are to prepare documents on the construction of Smolensk NPP-2.
[ Viktor Artemenko, "Pod Smolenskom Budet Novaya AES," Pravda-5, online edition, http://www.mosinfo.ru:8080/.../0408-1.html.] {Entered 7/12/99 VT}
 
7/8/97: PROTEST MARCHERS HIT 50-KM MARK
A group of Smolensk NPP workers began a protest march to Moscow on 3 July 1997, and by 8 July 1997, the protesters had covered 50km of the 250km distance between Desnogorsk and Moscow. The number of marchers has grown to 50.[1] Plant workers have volunteered to replace exhausted marchers on their days off.[2] Other workers are holding a hunger strike at the plant.[2] The protesters demand the payment of R27 billion in back wages.[3] Once in Moscow, the protesters will picket the headquarters of Unified Energy System of Russia (YeES Rossii) and the Russian government building.[4] As of 3 July 1997, consumers owed Smolensk NPP R1.55 trillion. Smolensk NPP, in turn, owes R1.523 trillion to suppliers, maintenance firms, and various funds.[2]
Sources:
[1] "Atomshiki priblizhayutsya k stolitse," Izvestiya online edition, 9 July 1997.
[2] Vladimir Vengrzhnovskiy, Radio Rossii, 3 July 1997; in "Nuclear Plant Workers Begin Protest March from Smolensk," FBIS-SOV-97-184.
[3] V. Vengrzhnovskiy, Russian Television Network, 24 June 1997; in "Smolensk Nuclear Station Workers Protest Financial Crisis," FBIS-SOV-97-175.
[4] "Russian Atomic Industry Workers To Stage Protests July 3," Interfax, 2 July 1997. {Entered 7/10/97 LBN}
 
6/11/97: SMOLENSK UNIT 1 SHUT DOWN DUE TO COOLANT SYSTEM MALFUNCTION
On 11 June 1997, the system for controlling the flow of coolant through Smolensk's Unit 1 failed, prompting the shutdown of the unit. The cause of the malfunction was found and repaired.
[Veronika Romanenkova, ITAR-TASS, 13 June 1997; in "Smolensk Power Unit Closed Down After Heat Malfunction," FBIS-SOV-97-164.] {Entered 7/10/97 LBN}
 
3/1/97: SMOLENSK REPAIR WORKERS STRIKE
Workers of a division of Kurskturboatomremont, the company that takes care of repairs at the Smolensk NPP, went on strike on 1 March 1997, demanding that nine months' worth of back wages be paid. The workers of Smolensk NPP, who are not participating in the strike, will make repairs themselves or call in other specialists as necessary. Smolensk Chief Engineer Aleksandr Spirin stated that the situation poses no threat to safety,[1] which the strike committee says is incorrect. According to a statement released by the strike committee, Smolensk NPP management has repeatedly asked the striking workers to make emergency repairs.[2]
Sources:
[1] Oleg Artyushin, ITAR-TASS, 1 March 1997; in "Nuclear Power Plant Repair Workers Go On Strike," FBIS-SOV-97-041.
[2] Radio Rossii, 20 March 1997; in FBIS-TEN-97-004. {Entered 7/10/97 LBN}
 
12/5/96: EQUIPMENT DEFECT FOUND, SMOLENSK-1 SHUT DOWN
A defect in Unit 1's control system was observed by plant personnel, who responded by shutting down the reactor. The reactor will be started up once the equipment has been examined.
[Vesti, Russian Television Network, 5 December 1996, in "Reactor Unit at Smolensk AES Shut Down," FBIS-SOV-96-239.] {Entered 1/2/97 LBN}
 
10/23/96: SMOLENSK STRIKE OVER
Atompressa reported that on 23 October 1996, workers agreed to stop their strike after the Smolensk NPP administration, Minatom, and Rosenergoatom guaranteed that back wages would be paid according to an agreeed-upon schedule. The Smolensk workers will operate the plant at a lower rate, proportional to what they receive for the electricity generated. Should the other side not uphold its end of the agreement, the strike committee reserves the right to reduce the output of the plant to the minimum level necessary to operate the plant and provide necessary services to nearby Desnogorsk.
["Administratsiya I zabastovochnyy komitet dostigli soglasheniya," Atompressa, Novermber 1996, p. 1.] {Entered 7/10/97 LBN}
 
10/21/96: SMOLENSK NPP WORKERS STRIKE
Rossiyskaya gazeta reported that on 21 October 1996, Smolensk NPP workers took to the streets of Smolensk with demands that their back wages be paid.[1] According to Post-Soviet Nuclear and Defense Monitor, the strike lasted for one hour, during which time all operations, except those necessary to maintain safety levels, were suspended. Since Russian law forbids strikes at nuclear power plants, documents relating to the Smolensk strike are being filed at the prosecutor's office.[2] Workers had announced plans in June 1996 to hold a protest on 28 June 1996 and demand full remittance of 40 billion rubles in back wages; the workers also threatened to boycott repairs being made on off-line reactors. In addition, the workers announced they would consider appealing to the Russian Constitutional Court, claiming the law forbidding strikes at NPPs is unconstitutional.[3] Pravda reported that plans to strike on 7 October 1996 were suspended after the strike committee and the plant's administration reached an agreement. However, the strike was reinstated after the plant administration failed to uphold the agreement.[4]
Sources:
[1]Andrey Kirillov, "Vot i yadershchiki stolknulis' s ugrozoy zhizni...," Rossiyskaya gazeta, 23 October 1996, pp. 1, 3.
[2] Post-Soviet Nuclear and Defense Monitor, 28 October 1996, p. 11.
[3] "Energetiki Smolenskoy AES namereny trebovat' pogasheniya dolga po zarplate," Interfax, 25 June 1996.
[4] "Bastuyut na Smolenskoy AES," Pravda, 23 October 1996, p. 1. {Entered 10/30/96, revised 12/1/96 LBN}
 
9/96: SMOLENSK OWED 800 BILLION RUBLES
According to Atompressa, electricity consumers owe Smolensk NPP 800 billion rubles for electricity. The plant owes 700 billion rubles to its suppliers and other organizations, as well as a total of 400 billion rubles in taxes.
["AES ne Buratino," Atompressa, September 1996, pp. 1-2.]{Entered 12/19/96 LBN}
 
7-8/96: SIMULATION EXPOSES WEAKNESSES IN ACCIDENT CLEANUP PLANS
During July-August 1996, the Interdepartmental Commission on the Prevention and Liquidation of Emergency Situations participated in a simulation at the Smolensk NPP to determine what measures would be taken to localize and clean up the aftermath of a serious accident. The simulation showed that the plant lacks the robotics technology necessary to remove the remains of fuel assemblies from the roofs and floors of plant buildings, should an explosion occur. The Commission recommended that simulations be conducted at all Russian NPPs.
["Sosotoyalos' zasedaniye Otraslevoy komissii po chrezvychaynym situatsiyam Minatoma Rossii," Atompressa, September 1996, p. 1.] {Entered 12/18/96 LBN}
 
6/28/96: SMOLENSK WORKERS HOLD MEETING
Workers from the Smolensk NPP held a meeting in the city of Desnogorsk at which they approved an open letter to the president and government of the Russian Federation, urging them to resolve the financial problems the power plant is facing.
["Aktsii protesta na AES," Atompressa, August 1996.] {Entered 12/19/96 LBN}
 
6/96: ACCIDENT DRILL AT SMOLENSK NPP
The group Operative Assistance for Atomic Power Plants (OPAS) held a mock accident at the Smolensk NPP to determine plant personnel's level of preparation and effectiveness in an emergency. OPAS found that during the simulation, all personnel responded quickly and decisively in identifying the seriousness of the incident, notifying the authorities and local population centers, and protecting plant personnel from the effects of radiation.
["BezOPASnaya avariya," Atompressa, No. 27,  August 1996, p. 2.] {Entered 3/6/97 LBN}
 
11/17-23/95: THREE UNITS REPAIRED
According to Yevgeniy Safrygin, manager of the Smolensk nuclear power plant, repair of the three power units has been completed.
[Vladimir Gubarev, "Heat and Light Are Priceless," Vek, No. 44, 1995, p. 6.]
 
11/95: SMOLENSK SPENT FUEL STORAGE FACILITY NEARLY FULL
Gosatomnadzor reported that the storage facility for spent nuclear fuel at the Smolensk NPP is nearly full. There are no plans for any fuel from RBMK or EPG reactors to be transferred or reprocessed in the near future.
[Yadernyy Kontrol, November 1995, p. 11.]
 
6/9/95: SMOLENSK FACILITY 90% FULL
The storage facility at the Smolensk nuclear power plant is 90 percent full, and is expected to reach capacity by June 1996. A new reservoir scheduled to be completed by June 1995 is still under construction because of a lack of funds.
Sources:
[1] Yadernyy Kontrol, November 1995, p. 11.
[2] Viktor Arteminko, Pravda, 9 June 1995, p. 3.
[3] Thomas Cochran, Miriam Bowling, and Elizabeth Powers, "Difficult Legacy: Spent Fuel From Soviet Reactors," Nuclear Weapons Databook, 31 January 1996, p. 21.
 
3/2/95: SCOTTISH NUCLEAR LTD. TO GIVE SMOLENSK EQUIPMENT
It was reported that, as a part of the European Union's TACIS nuclear assistance program, Scottish Nuclear Ltd. will provide the Smolensk facility with nondestructive testing (NDT) equipment and an information management system called "Gomis."
[Pearl Marshall, "With Eye On Privatization, Liability, SNL Creates International Subsidiary," Nucleonics Week, 2 March 1995, pp. 7-8.]
 
1/31/95: FUEL SHORTAGE AT SMOLENSK PLANT
Smolensk is experiencing a great shortage of nuclear fuel; there are only 57 fuel assemblies left. The plant is operating at half of its capacity.
["Deficit At The Nuclear Power Plant," Rossiyskaya gazeta, 31 January 1995, p. 1.]
 
1/30/95: SMOLENSK PLANT IN FINANCIAL CRISIS
During an interview with ITAR-TASS, Rosenergoatom Vice President Yevgeniy Ignatenko said that the Smolensk facility's financial situation is critical. The power plant is owed 367 billion rubles, is currently burning its "emergency fuel reserves," and has no money to pay plant employees or to buy new fuel.
["Smolensk Shutdown Looms As Fuel Supply Dwindles," Nuclear News, March 1995, p. 46.]
 
1/95: SIMULATORS AT SMOLENSK UNITS 1 AND 3
It was reported that there are simulators in operation at Units 1 to 3, with an additional one under construction at Unit 3.
[Janet Wood, "The Simulator Explosion," Nuclear Engineering International, January 1995, p. 52.]
 
12/94: STORAGE PONDS OVERFILLED
By the end of 1994, it had become impossible to perform "emergency core unloading" at two of the reactors due to over-filled cooling and storage ponds. Safety regulations require that sufficient space be left in cooling ponds to allow for the unloading of the reactor core in the event of an emergency.
[Thomas Cochran, Miriam Bowling, and Elizabeth Powers, "Difficult Legacy: Spent Fuel From Soviet Reactors," Nuclear Weapons Databook, 31 January 1996, p. 21.]
 
9/19/94: NO CONTROL RODS AT SMOLENSK UNIT 1
It was reported that Unit 1 has no control rod mechanisms, and Unit 3 is under repair.
[Yuriy Sidorov, ITAR-TASS, 19 September 1994; in "Smolensk Nuclear Power Plant Operating At One-Third Capacity," FBIS-SOV-94-182, 20 September 1994, p. 23.]
 
6/16/94: SMOLENSK NPP TO USE CASCADE PROCESS
Spent fuel from this reactor will be placed into wells using the Cascade process. This will be done under a contract signed by the SGN/Eurisys Network and Rosenergoatom. Smolensk can store 5,000 tons of spent fuel using this process.
["SGN Participates In Russian Fuel Storage," Enerpresse, 16 June 1994.]
 
5/16/93: NEW STORAGE FACILITY PLANNED FOR SMOLENSK
Another RBMK spent fuel storage facility is planned for this nuclear power plant site.
[Leonid Veksler, "'Pokhorony' Radioaktivnykh Otkhoddov Oboidutsya Boleye v 200 Milliardov Rubley," Moscow News, 16 May 1993, p. 12.]
 

Last updated 30 October 2000
For more recent developments, see the Nuclear Power Developments file.

Comments or questions? Contact Cristina Chuen at MIIS CNS: cristina.chuen@miis.edu

CNSThis material is produced independently for NTI by the Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies and does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been independently verified by NTI or its directors, officers, employees, agents. Copyright © 2002 by MIIS.

HOME  |  CONTACT US  |  SITE MAP