Spent Fuel and
Radioactive Waste
Legislation
Archived Waste Developments
Radon Special Combines
Spent Naval Fuel and Radioactive Waste
Archived Naval Waste Developments
For major recent developments, see the
Nuclear
Fuel Cycle Developments file.
For much of the last
decade, the Ministry of Atomic Energy (Minatom,
now the Federal Atomic Energy Agency)
has promoted the idea of importing, temporarily storing, reprocessing, and
repatriating spent nuclear fuel (material that has been withdrawn from a nuclear
reactor following irradiation, or SNF) as a means for generating revenue.
However, Article 50 of the Russian Environmental Protection Law of 1991[1]
prohibited the "import for storing or burying of radioactive waste and materials
from abroad...." Although Russian law allowed the import of such materials for
reprocessing, presidential decree No. 773 of 29 July 1995 obligated Minatom to
send back the radioactive waste resulting from the reprocessing of SNF to its
country of origin within thirty days.[2] The only exception was the fulfillment
of contracts that predated the environmental protection law for the repatriation
of SNF from nuclear power plants (NPPs) that the Soviet Union helped construct,
in countries such as
Ukraine, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Finland, Bulgaria,
Armenia, and
Kazakhstan. Most of these
contracts expired in the mid-1990s. Minatom continued to push for amendments to
legislation and promoted its spent fuel import plan, while environmentalists in
particular fought against any legal changes. Spent fuel imports were finally
legalized in July 2001.
On 10 July 2001, President Putin signed a
package of laws that would
allow the import of irradiated spent fuel into Russia for "technical storage"
and "reprocessing." Article 50 (Section 3) of the Environment Protection Law was
amended so as to differentiate between SNF and radioactive waste.[3] Minatom had
argued that spent fuel is a valuable energy resource.[4] It also cited the Joint
Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of
Radioactive Waste Management, passed in Vienna in September 1998 and signed by
the Russian Federation on 27 January 1999, which distinguishes between "spent
nuclear fuel" and "radioactive waste."[5]
This legal change was much fought over, and may still be amended. Large
demonstrations have been held protesting against SNF imports, most recently in
November 2002.[6] In 2000, some 200 organizations gathered signatures to force a
referendum on the issue. Although 2,561,000 signatures were submitted to
regional election commissions on 25 October 2000, the Russian courts found that
800,000 were invalid (2 million signatures are required), many for
technicalities such as "incorrect" street abbreviations.[7,8] The Yabloko
political party in particular has made subsequent efforts to gather signatures
and hold a referendum, but to date no referendum has been held. In addition,
Yabloko deputy Sergey Mitrokhin has pushed for an investigation into the
feasibility study Minatom presented to the
Duma when it was considering the
laws. According to Mitrokhin, reprocessing costs were understated and returns
wildly overstated.[9] Yuriy Vishnevskiy, chairman of Russia’s
Federal Inspectorate for Nuclear and Radiation
Safety (Gosatomnadzor), has pointed out other oversights in Minatom’s
analysis, including "incorrect" assessments of transport problems, the
failure of transport containers to meet international standards, and the unsuitability
of Mayak for imported SNF
storage.[10]
Some Russian papers have also suggested that the current National Security
Concept, adopted in January 2000, might lead to alterations in the laws on SNF
imports, since it identifies the main environmental danger to Russia as "a trend
toward the use of Russian territory as a place for reprocessing and burying
environmentally dangerous materials and substances." However, there is no
indication at present that a new edition of the security concept will expand
upon this statement or that the Russian government intends to stop Minatom’s SNF
import plans for security reasons.[11]
In its argument to the Duma in support of the legal change, Minatom laid out six
benefits:
First, Minatom emphasized profits, maintaining that Russia has the capacity to
import up to 20,000t of SNF before 2020,[3] and could earn up to $1 billion a
year for spent nuclear fuel reprocessing.[12] The ministry argued that it needed
these funds for several important activities, including environmental
remediation. Indeed, the law On Special Environmental Programs for the
Rehabilitation of Radiation-Contaminated Regions of the Territory,[13]
adopted as part of the package of laws allowing SNF imports, was based on a
financial assessment that predicted Russia would earn over $20 billion during
2000-2010 from SNF management services.[14] In addition to spending $7 billion
on environmental programs, supporters proposed that SNF profits could be
distributed to the federal budget ($3.5 billion), renovation of nuclear
enterprises ($2.5 billion), and investment in new storage and reprocessing
technologies ($7 billion).[15]
Minatom also argued it needed the profits to fund reprocessing of domestic SNF.
Reprocessing results in new fissionable material which could be used in a
nuclear reactor (or weapon) and large quantities of radioactive waste. While US
industry has found reprocessing to be uneconomical, and nonproliferation experts
see reprocessing as a proliferation hazard, Minatom has argued against any plan
to permanently get rid of SNF (through vitrification, burial, etc.), arguing
that technology may improve in the future, making the "closed fuel cycle" (where
spent fuel is reprocessed and reused) profitable. Russia has approximately
15,000t of spent fuel, much of it in temporary storage at NPPs.[16,17] By 2025,
this amount is expected to grow to 35,000t.[18] At present there are two
reprocessing facilities in Russia: the aged RT-1 plant (at Mayak) in Chelyabinsk
and the incomplete RT-2 in
Zheleznogorsk. Completion of RT-2 would cost some $1.5-2 billion (some sources
say as much as $6 billion).[5,16] With RT-2, Russia's reprocessing capacity
would be boosted to 1,940 tons a year.[19] Earnings from the storage and
reprocessing of foreign SNF could fund the reprocessing of Russia’s own SNF, as
well as Russia's fast reactor program.[5,39,52] Minatom intends to require
100-percent prepayment for storage services, and store the SNF for 40 to 60
years before reprocessing it.[12,20] This intermediate storage would facilitate
reprocessing because the greater portion of the hazardous radioactive elements
will decay over a period of 50 years.[20]
Third, the ministry maintains that the SNF import project will help the ministry
deal with environmental problems, by funding the development of environmentally
friendly technologies, as well as funding environmental remediation.[12]
Fourth, Minatom argues that the reprocessing of SNF will be necessary in the
future to create a new nuclear fuel source. The ministry estimates that supplies
of natural uranium will be largely used up in the next 100 years, and predicts
that the reprocessing of spent fuel will be the most important source of fuel
for NPPs.[16]
Fifth, Russia’s other nuclear exports,
according to the ministry, hinge on importing SNF. According to
Kurchatov Institute president
Yevgeniy Velikhov, Russia will get profitable orders for the construction of
NPPs abroad (especially in China,
India and Pakistan) if it is
willing to import spent fuel, because clients are interested in sending their
SNF back to Russia.[21]
Finally, Minatom argued that concentrating SNF reprocessing and storage in one
country would decrease proliferation risks.[12] In 1999, then Minister of Atomic
Energy Adamov said that Minatom was ready to store and reprocess SNF under
international control.[22] In September 2002, Russian participants at the annual
Irradiated
Nuclear Fuel Management conference promoted the idea of an international SNF
storage facility in Russia.[23]
The political party Yabloko, environmentalists, and others opposed to spent fuel
imports have voiced the following concerns:
Russia has already accumulated its own spent fuel in huge quantities, and lacks
storage facilities to safely house its own waste.[24] There is not enough space
to store domestic SNF at Mayak’s RT-1 plant, even with the completion of current
plans to increase the capacity of the spent fuel storage facility at RT-1 from
6,000t to 9,000t by the end of 2004.[25] Indeed, because it has continued to
dump radioactive waste, RT-1’s license, which expired on 31 December 2002, had
yet to be renewed as of 10 February 2003 [negotiations over a renewal are
ongoing]. RT-2, in Zheleznogorsk, can store up to 6,000t of SNF, or 12,000 spent
fuel assemblies,[26,27] but is already half full.[28] According to First Deputy
Minister of Atomic Energy Valentin Ivanov, RT-2 could be expanded to store up to
9,000t, or 18,000 spent fuel assemblies.[27,29] However, RT-2 is a wet storage
facility (the fuel rods are stored in large water filled pools). A dry storage
facility (where the SNF is housed in specialized containers), which US officials
argue is both more proliferation-resistant and avoids much of the fuel
degradation that occurs in a wet environment, is expected to be put into
operation at Zheleznogorsk by 2005, but it has already been designated the site
where 6,100t of SNF from the Leningrad,
Kursk and
Smolensk NPPs will be stored. Environmentalists worry that the storage of
additional nuclear fuel will increase the risk of an environmental disaster in
an area where the environmental situation is already alarming.[28] The United
States is pushing Russia instead to develop a geologic repository, like the US
Yucca Mountain facility, for long-term storage. The US Department of Energy
(DOE) defines a geologic repository as a "system for disposing of radioactive
waste in excavated geologic media, including surface and subsurface areas of
operation, and the adjacent part of the geologic setting that provides isolation
of the radioactive waste in the controlled area."[56] The DOE has assisted
Russia in locating a site for such a facility. However, housing imported spent
fuel in a geologic repository conflicts with Minatom’s reprocessing plans and
the argument that the imported spent fuel is only going to be stored in Russia
temporarily.
Minatom will face difficulties reprocessing the waste. The capacity of Russia’s
single reprocessing plant, Mayak, is limited, and the facility uses obsolete
technology. Besides, Mayak can not reprocess foreign SNF, only spent fuel from
Russian VVER-440, BN-350, BN-600,
research, and naval propulsion
reactors.[30,31,32] It will take an estimated 25 years to introduce any new
technology.[33] In addition, reprocessing SNF would create large volumes of
radioactive waste, and Russia will have to build facilities to handle that
waste. That, however, will prove politically difficult, as local populations and
environmentalists are sure to object to the siting of new storage facilities.
The SNF may end up stored in Russia indefinitely, despite Minatom’s statements
regarding reprocessing and repatriation. According to current legislation, the
owner of the SNF continues to hold the title for the radioactive waste obtained
after reprocessing, and has the right to repatriate this waste. The ownership of
SNF as well as nuclear materials obtained from reprocessing is to be determined
by international agreement and valid contracts.[34] The law does not explicitly
prohibit the unlimited storage and burial of the SNF in Russia, however, and on
7 October 1999, Adamov actually said that the waste from reprocessing should
stay in Russia.[35]
Safety concerns are high on the list of arguments against the import of SNF.
Minatom has proven unable to ensure the safety of its own personnel employed in
SNF reprocessing. In addition, the poor condition of Russian railways increases
the danger of transporting large quantities of SNF.[17] Although Minatom argues
that it already transports large amounts of radioactive materials, there have
been incidents in the past, such as inadequate packaging of SNF and a dangerous
railroad accident during SNF transit from Bulgaria.[6] Experts concerned that
nuclear materials might be terrorist targets point out that such materials are
most vulnerable when in transit.
Minatom would not be
able to earn enough from SNF imports to ensure environmental safety. Indeed,
some Russian politicians question both Minatom’s numbers and whether SNF
earnings will actually be spent the way Minatom has promised. Yabloko’s
Grigoriy Yavlinskiy, for instance, said that "The money will be stolen, and
no one will know where it ends up, but the nuclear waste will remain" (Äåíüãè
áóäóò ðàçâîðîâàíû, îíè èñ÷åçíóò â íåèçâåñòíîì íàïðàâëåíèè, à ÿäåðíûå îòõîäû
îñòàíóòñÿ.)[36]
Opinion polls indicate that the majority of the Russian population oppose SNF
imports.[24]
Other countries involved in reprocessing repatriate the reprocessed waste.
If Minatom begins importing SNF it increases the market incentives for Russia to
develop a closed fuel cycle, and create more of the nuclear materials the
destruction of which SNF imports are supposed to fund. Some experts are
concerned that SNF imports will open the door to an uncontrollable trade in
fissile materials. Besides, it will be difficult accurately to account for
fissile materials once they are traded, moved, or altered, increasing the
likelihood that some will end up in the hands of potential or real proliferators.[37]
Although Minatom has yet to begin importing spent fuel from NPPs it did not help
construct, it has been negotiating with potential customers for some time. On 17
September 1998, Minatom subsidiary
Tekhsnabeksport signed its first letter of intent, with Internexco (a
Tekhsnabeksport subsidiary, in Germany)[38] and the Swiss company Suisse
Utilities, on the import of over 2,000 tons of SNF for reprocessing and
subsequent repatriation between 2000 and 2030.[37] The following year contacts
were made with the nuclear industries of Switzerland, Germany, Spain, South
Korea, Taiwan, and Japan.[39] On 21 May 1999, Segodnya reported that the
authorities of Krasnoyarsk Kray, the management of the
Mining and Chemical Combine
at Zheleznogorsk, and the Russian government had prepared contracts for
deliveries of the first consignment of SNF from these three Asian countries.[40]
At the time, the Taiwan Central News Agency reported that the state-run Taiwan
Power Company (Taipower) would start exporting its nuclear waste (both spent
fuel and radioactive waste) to Russia in 2002. The Taiwanese had reportedly
received assurances from Russia that it was willing to import the SNF after
Russian legislation is amended.[41] Continued reports in Taiwan regarding other
radioactive wastes suggest that some in Russia may push for further legal
changes with regard to that material as well.
However, like much of the non-Russian origin nuclear fuel in the world, 75
percent of Taiwanese fuel is of US origin, and as such remains under US
control.[42] Other countries cannot send US-origin SNF for storage or
reprocessing to third nations without US consent, and under the US Atomic Energy
Act, the United States must negotiate a Section 123 agreement for nuclear
cooperation in order to give such permission. Minatom is very aware of this
issue, as the United States controls about 80 percent of the world’s SNF, and
has been trying to persuade the US Department of Energy to begin such
negotiations. On 23 December 1998, Adamov sent a letter to then US Energy
Secretary Bill Richardson proposing a joint study of options for the temporary
storage and subsequent reprocessing of US spent nuclear fuel in Russia, both
with and without its eventual repatriation to the United States.[43,44] Although
Richardson declined this initial proposal, he did say that the United States was
looking forward to further discussions.[43]
Despite the interest of some US companies, such as a 1999 Kurchatov Institute
and US Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC) proposal that an
international "monitored retrievable spent fuel storage facility" be established
at Zheleznogorsk to store foreign spent fuel,[45] the US government has yet to
agree to the Russian SNF import plan, objecting to Minatom’s reprocessing plans
due to plutonium proliferation concerns as well as to Russian nuclear
cooperation with Iran. In April 2000, Minatom reportedly suggested that a
20-year long moratorium on reprocessing of nuclear spent fuel should be
established in exchange for US assistance in the construction of a dry storage
facility.[46] In any event, Minatom has no plans to begin reprocessing for the
first 40-60 years, as noted above.
However, Russia has continued to construct nuclear power reactors in
Iran, despite US objections, and
is even considering bidding for a contract to construct additional reactors
after the completion of Bushehr.[47] In October 2002, Undersecretary of State
John Bolton said that the US had proposed a deal in which "if the Russians end
their sensitive cooperation with Iran…we would be prepared to favorably
consider" transfers to Russia of US-origin spent fuel held in third countries
for long-term storage.[48] In "Securing
Nuclear Weapons and Materials: Seven Steps for Immediate Action," Matthew
Bunn, John Holdren and Anthony Wier point out that the United States should not
use all of its considerable leverage on the Iran issue. They suggest insisting
that a portion of the revenues be spent on securing and destroying WMD
stockpiles. In addition, they argue that effective arrangements (including
independent regulation) of the entire operation, the elimination of excess
plutonium stockpiles, and a democratic process whereby those most affected by
the project might have their concerns effectively addressed, should also be
criteria for determining if the project contributes to international security
and deserves support.[49]
Tom Cochran, a physicist at the
Natural Resources Defense Council in Washington, D.C., developed the idea of
establishing a non-profit trust located outside of Russia that would control the
spent fuel profits, assist in the creation of a safe geologic repository for SNF
in Russia, and make sure that all additional profits are spent on securing
fissile material, environmental remediation, and the provision of alternative
jobs for nuclear workers as well as support for pensioners and orphans, while no
funds would be spent on reprocessing plants.[42] A trust, named the
Nonproliferation Trust (NPT) Inc., was then established by a group of the US and
German companies,[50] and on 5 May 1999 Minatom and NPT signed a memorandum of
mutual consultations (Draft I) on the construction of a 6,000t dry storage
facility to house spent nuclear fuel "from a number of other countries" for a
period of 30 to 40 years.[42] This amount was later increased to 10,000t.[51]
According to the memorandum, NPT would hold title to the fuel in storage. The
Russians, however, argued that the project should include reprocessing to make
it "more profitable."[52] On 26 August 1999, Adamov announced that Russia would
not import spent fuel for storage only, but would “insist on a full range of
fuel services, that is, reprocessing and re-export of the fuel.”[53]
However, these demands were not met, and on 25 October 1999, Minatom and an NPT
subsidiary (NPT II) signed an agreement, "Long-Term Fissile Materials Safeguards
and Security Project" (Draft II), according to which NPT II would lease a dry
cask storage facility from Minatom to store up to 10,000t of spent nuclear
reactor fuel for 40 years. The agreement also mentions the receipt and disposal
of radioactive wastes. After 40 years, the spent fuel could be removed to
another "duly authorized location" or transferred to Minatom for ultimate
disposition, at NPT II’s sole discretion. According to the agreement, the spent
fuel would never be converted for weapons use or be reprocessed, even were its
ownership transferred to Minatom. The spent fuel would be stored in accordance
with Russian and IAEA safety requirements and the storage facility under
Gosatomnadzor review.[54] Three agreements (the framework agreement, a storage
facility lease agreement, and a plutonium safeguards and security agreement)
were to be finalized within three months after the amendments to the Law on
Environmental Protection were passed.[42] In addition, these agreements had to
be approved by the US Department of State in consultation with the US Department
of Energy and the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and submitted along with a
Nuclear Proliferation Statement to the US Congress, in order to enter into
force.[50]
In October 2001, NPT signed an agreement with the Association for
Non-Proliferation and Ecological Improvement, a Minatom-supported group that is
promoting the NPT project in Russia. However, some nuclear industry sources have
reportedly questioned who will accept liability for the operations and how the
money will be raised up-front. Foreign utilities, they argued, would be unlikely
to commit large sums of money unless they could send their fuel for permanent
disposal. At a conference in September 2002, Kurchatov Institute Deputy Director
Nikolay Ponomarev-Stepnoy voiced his opposition to the project because at the
end of the project the long-term interim cask storage facility would remain the
property of the trust, the foreign SNF would remain in Russia, and the project
would not have paid for construction of a final repository, he said. Reportedly
USEC, Inc., the managers of the
US-Russian "Megawatts to Megatons" program, also known as the HEU-LEU deal,
have also indicated their interest in involvement in SNF imports, which might be
modeled after the HEU deal.[55] Others have questioned whether Russia would
agree to have all profits devoted to the purposes NPT proposed, and Russian
environmentalists and the Duma Environmental Committee have worried about the plan to hold the funds earned in
accounts outside Russia, and thus outside the control of both Minatom and the
Russian government.[44] Environmentalists often argue that the import plan could be a Western plot
to dump its waste in Russia and leave it there, and that the Russian government
would have little recourse. While this objection should be dealt with, the
project offers the transparency and clarity of purpose (and ability to audit
funds) that the United States has the leverage to insist upon.
If Russia can come to an
accommodation with the United States regarding Russia’s nuclear reactor projects
in Iran, the United States has suggested it would conclude a nuclear cooperation
agreement with Russia and authorize the export of US-origin SNF to Russia.
Although Minatom statements regarding the possible profits resulting from SNF
import plans far exceed the revenues from constructing reactors in Iran
(particularly since the construction projects are all funded from cheap loans
offered by Russia itself), Russia has yet to indicate that it might consider
dropping its Iran projects.
The SNF import project has been touted as a possible source of funding for
plutonium disposition and safer storage of Russian SNF. However, Minatom never
agreed to use these funds for plutonium disposition, and instead expects
international assistance to turn plutonium into MOX fuel. Otherwise, Minatom
plans to maintain its surplus plutonium stocks.
Additionally, the SNF import plans create a market for spent fuel and
radioactive waste. Kazakhstan has already proposed its own SNF import plans,
while Minatom is likely to argue for the import of radioactive wastes if the
level of SNF imports is less than expected. In addition, the plan promotes a
closed fuel cycle market and the attendant increase in materials of
proliferation concern. Finally, the United States is putting itself at political
risk by allowing the import of US-origin fuel, even if it is able to control
much of the earnings (through an arrangement such as the Non-Proliferation
Trust) and assists in the construction of safe storage facilities and helps
insure the safety of SNF transport. The United States has the leverage to insist
that where US-origin fuel is involved, the process be opened up to local and
national politicians, and there is oversight by Gosatomnadzor and Russian
citizens.
Prepared by Cristina Chuen, CNS Senior Research Associate
Created: February
2003
Page last updated: 13 February 2003
For major recent developments, see the
Nuclear
Fuel Cycle Developments file.
Comments or questions? E-mail Cristina Chuen at MIIS
CNS: Cristina.ChuenATmiis.edu
This material is produced independently for NTI
by the Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the
Monterey Institute of International Studies and
does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has
not been independently verified by NTI or its directors, officers,
employees, agents. Copyright © 2002 by MIIS.
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