This file is no longer being updated.  For more recent developments, please see the Strategic Forces General Developments file.

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1/27/2003: RUSSIA REMAINS INTERESTED IN COOPERATION ON MISSILE DEFENSE WITH UNITED STATES, EUROPE, AND OTHER PARTNERS
Interfax reported on 27 January 2003 that Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov does not believe that US plans to develop a National Missile Defense (NMD) program should inhibit possible cooperation between the United States and Russia on missile defense. Such cooperation is foreseen in the Joint Declaration on future US-Russia relations signed by Presidents Bush and Putin in May 2002 at the time of the conclusion of the Moscow Treaty. Foreign Minister Ivanov indicated, however, that collaboration on missile defense should proceed gradually as mutual trust builds between the states and said that the US decisions to withdraw from the ABM Treaty and to deploy the first stage of NMD by 2004-2005 undermine efforts to increase trust.[1] These comments echo statements made in January 2003 by President Putin and Defense Minister Sergey Ivanov that reconfirmed Russian interest in engaging in discussions with the United States about missile defense, but only if measures are taken to protect Russian intellectual property rights and ensure access to the products of US research and development.[2,3] Defense Minister Ivanov also emphasized that the US NMD program should not be aimed at limiting Russian capabilities.[3]

These statements closely followed the Russian decision to present the United States with a draft proposal for a new political agreement on missile defense and indications by high-ranking US officials that the United States is prepared to cooperate in earnest with Russia on this matter.[4,5] For example, Alexander Vershbow, the US Ambassador to Russia, identified development of missile attack early warning and missile interceptor systems as well as supplementary components such as radar and tracking systems as possible areas of cooperation. Ambassador Vershbow further emphasized, in response to the Russian military's apparent skepticism regarding US intentions, that the United States is serious about missile defense cooperation with Russia.[5] US Assistant Secretary of State for Arms Control Stephen Rademaker also has indicated that the United States is interested in pursuing together with Russia data exchange and joint research efforts on missile defense, but he has stressed that future cooperation depends to a great extent upon the level of Russian commitment to developing missile defense systems.[6]

In turn, Defense Minister Ivanov has noted that Russian willingness to work together with the United States on missile defense is contingent upon assurances that cooperation will not harm Russia's national security, including economic interests; will not compromise sensitive new cutting-edge technologies; and will not result in missile defense systems that target specific countries.[4,7] Regarding cooperation on non-strategic missile defense, Deputy Foreign Minister Georgiy Mamedov has stated that Russia views the creation of regional theater missile defense (TMD) systems that would be multilateral in nature, open to all interested states, and not aimed at other states as a viable alternative to the US NMD program.[8,9] As a result, while pursuing opportunities for expanded cooperation with the United States, Russia remains open to proposals to develop TMD systems, in Europe in particular.[10,11]

Russia currently supports efforts by a Special Working Group formed under the NATO-Russia Council to explore the future structure of a TMD system that would be in the interest of all European countries, and to develop a framework for the joint use of force against non-strategic ballistic missiles. At the same time, the First Deputy Chief of Staff of the Russian Armed Forces, Yuriy Baluyevskiy, has criticized US proposals to assist Europe in TMD development. He claims that the United States intends to fold European TMD into its own NMD program and thereby force its European partners to shoulder part of the financial burden of developing missile defense while creating technical dependency upon the United States for future activities.[11]

Russia also discussed cooperation on TMD with representatives of Japan and Pakistan during the course of meetings held in Moscow in January 2003.[8,9] The Japanese Minister of State for Defense, Shigeru Ishiba, however, expressed skepticism about the possibilities for cooperation between Japan and Russia on TMD.[12] He also defended Japanese plans to pursue limited TMD with US assistance, despite strong Russian objections that such a bilateral undertaking would further destabilize the already volatile situation in the Asia-Pacific  region.[9,12]

Regardless of missile defense cooperation plans, Russia intends to undertake efforts that will address potential threats that may emerge from the US decision to withdraw from the ABM Treaty, although it is the official Russian position that the decision currently does not threaten Russian security.[7,13] In particular, Russian state military procurement for 2003 devotes attention to service life extension of RS-20 [NATO designation SS-18 'Satan'] and rail-mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) as well as to modernization of the naval component of the Russian nuclear triad.[13]
Sources:
[1] "Glava MID RF vyskazyvayetsya za sotrudnichestvo s SShA v sfere protivoraketnoy oborony," Interfax, 27 January 2003.
[2] "Putin: Rossiya i SShA mogut vmeste sozdavat sistemu PRO," RIA Novosti; in Lenta.Ru Web Site, http://lenta.ru/russia/2003/01/23/putin/, 23 January 2003.
[3] "Moskva mozhet sotrudnichat s SShA v sozdanii strategicheskoy PRO tolko pri uslovii vypolneniya ryada usloviy- ministr oborony RF," Interfax, 15 January 2003.
[4] "Moskva peredala Vashingtonu proyekt novoy politicheskoy dogovorennosti po PRO- MID RF," Interfax, 9 January 2003.
[5] "SShA gotovy sotrudnichat s Rossiyey v sfere PRO vplot do sozdaniya nadnatsionalnoy sistemy protivoraketnoy oborony-Vershbou," Interfax, 8 January 2003.
[6] Yevgeniy Verlin, "Rossii pridetsya reshat, nuzhna yey PRO ili net," Nezavisimoye voyennoye obozreniye online edition, http://nvo.ng.ru/wars/2003-03-21/1_pro.html, No. 10(325), 21 March 2003.
[7] "Rossiya gotova sotrudnichat s SShA v sozdanii strategicheskoy PRO-ministr oborony RF," Interfax, 14 January 2003.
[8] "V khode rossiysko-pakistanskikh konsultatsiy v Moskve zatragivalas tema sozdaniya regionalnykh sistem PRO," Interfax, 16 January 2003.
[9] "Rossiya gotova sotrudnichat s Yaponiyey v oblasti nestrategicheskoy PRO- ministr oborony RF," Interfax, 14 January 2003.
[10] "Rossiya namerena razvivat sistemy nestrategicheskoy PRO i sistemy vozdushno-kosmicheskoy oborony- ministr oborony Ivanov," Interfax, 15 January 2003.
[11] Oleg Falichev, "Kakaya PRO nuzhna Evrope," Krasnaya zvezda online edition, http://www.redstar.ru/2003/03/20_03/1_02.html, 20 March 2003.
[12] Dmitriy Zaks, "AFP:Ishiba, En Route to Moscow, Defends Japan's Right to Missile Shield," FBIS Document JPP20030113000068.
[13] "Rossiya vedet raboty po parirovaniyu ugroz, vyzvannykh vykhodom SShA iz Dogovora po PRO- istochnik v Minoborony RF," Interfax, 5 February 2003. {Entered 3/21/2003 EMC}

9/18/2002: MORE ON POSSIBLE US-RUSSIAN NMD COOPERATION
At a press conference in Shannon, Ireland on 18 September 2002, First Deputy General Staff Chief Colonel Yuriy Baluyevskiy said that Russia was ready to cooperate with the United States in creating strategic ballistic missile defenses. However, it would do so only if the resulting system were not aimed at Russia, cooperation were on a mutually advantageous basis, and the two countries reached an agreement guaranteeing that information exchanged in the process of cooperation were not made available to other parties. Baluyevskiy noted that existing Russian and US legislation hampered such cooperation.  He also drew attention to the importance of protecting intellectual property, and expressed hope that US-Russian cooperation would enable Russia to catch up with the United States in areas where it is lagging behind. Commenting on the US intent to use the National Missile Defense (NMD) system in the interest of the security of the United States and its allies, Baluyevskiy said that the question remained whether Russia would be considered a US ally and be protected by the US strategic defense system.[1] Baluyevskiy also cast doubt on the US ability to create an effective missile defense system before 2015, due to problems in the areas of target discrimination, target interception, and laser technology.[2] Nevertheless, according to Baluyevskiy, Russia is ready to share its technology with the United States in order to accelerate NMD development, provided the United States is willing to sign an agreement on protecting intellectual property.[3]
Sources:
[1] "Russia prepared to cooperate with U.S. in strategic missile defense - Russian military official," Interfax, 18 September 2002.
[2] "Moscow doubts U.S. can build effective strategic missile defense system by 2015," Interfax, 18 September 2002.
[3] ITAR-TASS, 18 September 2002; in "Russia 'ready to use its developments' to help US with missle [sic] defense system," FBIS Document CEP20020918000343. {Entered 10/3/2002 MJ}

6/27/2002: RUSSIA, CHINA INTRODUCE DRAFT SPACE WEAPONS BAN
On 27 June 2002 at the Geneva Conference on Disarmament, Russia and China jointly introduced a draft treaty on banning weapons in space and the use of force against space objects. Co-authors of the draft treaty also included Belarus, Indonesia, Syria, Vietnam, and Zimbabwe. The draft treaty prohibits placing any weapon systems in Earth orbit, on celestial bodies, or in space, and also prohibits the use of force or threats thereof against any space objects. The draft treaty calls on all countries to provide information on their space launches and to establish a treaty implementation organization. Other military uses of space would not be banned by the treaty. During his presentation of the treaty draft, Russian Permanent Representative Leonid Skotnikov noted that such military uses of space as arms control treaty verification have a stabilizing effect. However, Skotnikov also said that space ought not to be used to achieve military supremacy.[1] Commenting on the presented draft, Russian Foreign Ministry Representative Aleksandr Yakovenko said that the new treaty was needed to close loopholes in the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, which only bans weapons of mass destruction in space.[2]
Sources:
[1] "Vystupleniye Postoyannogo predstavitelya Rossii pri Konferentsii po razoruzheniyu posla L.A. Skotnikova na Plenarnom zasedanii Konferentsii po razoruzheniyu Zheneva, 27 iyunya 2002 goda," Russian Federation Ministry of Foreign Affairs Web Site, http://www.mid.ru/, 28 June 2002.
[2] "Rossiya i Kitay predstavyat v Zheneve dogovor o zaprete v kosmose lyubogo oruzhiya," Interfax, 3 July 2002. {Entered 8/26/2002 MJ}

6/24/2002: POSSIBLE RUSSIAN-US NMD COOPERATION DISCUSSED
On 24 June 2002, Major General Vladimir Dvorkin, head of the 4th Central Scientific Research Institute of the SRF, said that Russia ought to welcome the US efforts to reach an agreement with Russia on cooperation on strategic missile defenses. Dvorkin also called for the earliest possible opening of the Joint Data Exchange Center, which will facilitate the exchange of missile launch warning data. The center's inauguration has been delayed by tax and customs issues. According to Dvorkin, the United States and Russia both have considerable capabilities in the area of strategic and non-strategic missile defenses, and Russia would be able to participate as an equal partner with the United States. With Russia's participation, the United States would be able to develop the space component of NMD at a much lower cost through the use of Dnepr space launch vehicles (converted SS-18 ICBMs).[1] According to Colonel General Yuriy Baluyevskiy, first deputy chief of the Russian General Staff, Russia could cooperate with the United States on missile defense as long as it does not impinge on Russian national security. Baluyevskiy said that the United States might be willing to agree to some transparency in the area of missile defenses and may even agree to cooperation with Russia. However, the Bush administration has not yet determined the nature and scope of NMD.[2] Vice President of the Academy of Geopolitical Problems and former head of the Defense Ministry's Main Directorate for International Military Cooperation Colonel General Leonid Ivashov is much more skeptical about prospects for cooperation. At a news conference on 28 June 2002, Ivashov said that the United States would be unlikely to share its secrets with Russia, and that at most some Russian scientific developments might be incorporated into the US system. Ivashov also said that the Russian military considers the planned US missile defenses to be anti-Russian.[3] Ivashov's views are similar to that of an unidentified "top-level" source in the Russian Ministry of Defense, who allegedly said that Russia will avoid participating in US missile defense projects. The source also said that US attempts to involve Russia in some aspects of NMD development are a ploy to convince Russia to change its position toward the United States' withdrawal from the ABM Treaty.[4] The idea of inviting Russia to participate in developing US missile defense systems was raised on a number of other occasions, including 10 January 2002 when an anonymous senior Bush administration official also encouraged Russia to develop its own nation-wide missile defense system.[5]
Sources:
[1] "Sotrudnichestvo SShA i Rossii v oblasti sozdaniya sistem PRO budet vygodnym dlya obeikh stran - voyennyy ekspert," Interfax, 24 June 2002.
[2] ITAR-TASS, 24 May 2002; in "General Says Russia May Cooperate with US in Missile Defense," FBIS Document CEP20020524000360.
[3] Agentstvo voyennykh novostey, 28 June 2002; in "Russia: General says Moscow not to create joint missile defense system with US," FBIS Document CEP20020628000231.
[4] Interfax, 23 May 2002; in "Russia: 'Top-level source' says US anti-missile defense projects to be shunned," FBIS Document CEP20020523000108.
[5] Pavel Vanichkin, "SShA khoteli by sotrudnichat s Rossiyey v proyektakh, svyazannykh s protivoraketnoy oboronoy," ITAR-TASS, 11 January 2002; in Yadernaya Rossiya segodnya, 16 January 2002. {Entered 8/26/2002 MJ}

6/13/2002: UNITED STATES WITHDRAWS FROM ABM TREATY
On 13 June 2002, the Unites States officially withdrew from the ABM Treaty. {Entered 8/26/2002 MJ}

12/17/2001: RUSSIA AND CHINA DISCUSS RESPONSES TO THE US WITHDRAWAL FROM THE ABM TREATY
During a round of strategic stability consultations that began in Moscow on 17 December 2001,[1] Russian and Chinese delegations headed by their deputy ministers of foreign affairs discussed responses to the US withdrawal from the ABM Treaty. Russia and China supported the idea of coordinating their political efforts aimed at preventing global destabilization and continuing the dialogue with the United States.[2] According to an "informed source," both Russia and China anticipated the US withdrawal from the ABM Treaty and coordinated their political positions accordingly. They agreed that the US withdrawal was an error that could have serious consequences both for the United States and other countries including a possible arms race in space and the growth of some countries' strategic arsenals. The two countries also expressed skepticism concerning the stated US motives for withdrawing from the treaty and voiced hope that the US-Russian treaty-based strategic disarmament process will continue.[3]
Sources:
[1] "Rossiysko-kitayskiye konsultatsii po strategicheskoy stabilnosti nachalis v Moskve, soobshchili v MID RF," ITAR-TASS, 17 December 2001; in Integrum Techno, http://www.integrum.com/.
[2] Valeriy Agarkov, "Rossiya i Kitay podcherknuli vazhnoye znacheniye sokhraneniya mezhdunarodnoy sistemy kontrolya nad vooruzheniyami," ITAR-TASS, 17 December 2001; in Integrum Techno, http://www.integrum.com/.
[3] "Resheniye SShA ob odnostoronnem vykhode iz Dogovora po PRO ne bylo neozhidannym dlya RF i KNR, soobshchil informirovannyy istochnik," ITAR-TASS, 28 December 2001; in Integrum Techno, http://www.integrum.com/. {Entered 8/26/2002 MJ}

12/13/2001: UNITED STATES ISSUES FORMAL NOTIFICATION OF INTENTION TO WITHDRAW FROM TREATY IN SIX MONTHS
On 13 December 2001, President Bush formally announced the intention of the United States to withdraw from the ABM Treaty in six months, effective 13 June 2002.  This was done in accordance with Article 15, which requires a party to the treaty to provide a notice six months prior to actual withdrawal from the treaty.  Official notification was given to Russia that same day and also to Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus, which had signed a memorandum of understanding in 1997 recognizing their relation to the treaty as successors to the USSR.  Bush commented that the ABM Treaty hinders the United States' ability to "develop ways to protect our people from future terrorist or rogue-state missile attacks."  Bush also said that he and President Putin had agreed that the treaty withdrawal "will not in any way undermine our new relationship with Russia."[1]  President Putin responded by calling the withdrawal a mistake, while at the same time saying that the withdrawal does not pose a threat to Russian national security and would not affect US-Russian relations. Putin also commented that Russia's position in favor of preserving the treaty was motivated by the desire to preserve the legal base for international agreements concerning disarmament and nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction.  Putin stated, "one cannot allow a legal vacuum to be formed in the sphere of strategic stability."[2]
Sources:
[1] "U.S. Will Withdraw From 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty," Washington File, U.S. Department of State Web Site, http://usinfo.state.gov, 13 December 2001.
[2] "US Withdrawal from ABM Treaty, December 13: Announcement & Reaction," Acronym Institute Web Site, http://www.acronym.org.uk, December 2001. {Entered 4/16/2002 RG}
 
11/13-15/2001: CRAWFORD SUMMIT RESULTS IN REDUCTION DECLARATIONS, BUT NO BREAKTHROUGH ON ABM TREATY
From 13-15 November 2001 US President George W. Bush and Russian President Vladimir Putin held a series of talks in Washington, DC, and Crawford, Texas, to discuss various issues including the ABM Treaty and nuclear offensive arms reductions.  President Bush announced at the summit that the United States would unilaterally reduce its arsenal from 7,000 deployed warheads to 1,700-2,200 over a period of 10 years. Putin responded by declaring that Russia would reduce its arsenal of 6,000 by two-thirds, which would be to a level of approximately 2,000 deployed warheads.[1] The friendly relations between Bush and Putin had raised hopes by some that a breakthrough compromise on the ABM Treaty would also be reached at the Crawford Summit.  Putin had made statements indicating Russia's potential willingness to modify the treaty to allow US missile defense plans.  He also said that Russia recognized "the justified concerns of the United States."[2] No breakthrough was made, however, at the summit.  Neither were there any official statements about talks concerning the treaty at the summit, other than a comment by Bush that there was a "difference of opinion" over the issue of missile defense.  Both White House and Kremlin representatives had warned prior to the summit that no breakthrough agreements were expected to occur.  Instead they emphasized that the meetings were  a step in a process of continuing US-Russian relations.[3,4]  It seemed apparent, though, that after the end of the Crawford Summit neither the United States nor Russia were planning to change their positions in order to save the treaty.
Sources:
[1] "Bush, Putin Agree on Cutting Nuclear Warheads," Washington File, US Department of State Web Site, http://usinfo.state.gov/products/washfile, 13 November 2001.
[2] Susan Glasser, "Putin Sees Chance for Accord on ABM Pact," Washington Post, 11 November 2001, p. A42.
[3] "No Bush-Putin missile agreement," BBC News, 15 November 2001.
[4] Yevgeniy Bay and Georgiy Bovt, "They 'Can Work Constructively'," Izvestiya, 17 November 2001; in "Izvestiya Covers Bush-Putin Crawford Remarks," FBIS Document CEP20011116000274. {Entered 4/15/2002 RG}
 
8/22/2001: RUSSIA, US DENY REPORTS OF ABM TREATY DEADLINE 
A two-day round of ABM Treaty consultations ended in Moscow on 22 August 2001, with no apparent progress. The US delegation in the consultations was headed by the Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security John Bolton, while the Russian Federation was represented by Deputy Foreign Minister Georgiy Mamedov.[1] During the consultations, the Russian delegation reportedly declined US proposals to jointly withdraw from the ABM Treaty, according to an unidentified Interfax source. The same source also stated that the US delegation clearly indicated that the United States would withdraw from the ABM Treaty, unilaterally if necessary, and would do so in October or November 2001. The US delegation reportedly proposed to work on creating a new system of strategic stability, but only following withdrawal from the ABM Treaty.[2] However, other Russian Foreign Ministry sources categorically denied the reports that the US delegation gave a deadline for Russia to agree to US ABM Treaty proposals. Russian experts interviewed by Interfax believe that the US government will not withdraw from the ABM Treaty before completing its national security policy review, which is unlikely to be finished by November 2001.[3] Following the talks, Undersecretary Bolton confirmed that the US government did not present Russia with any deadlines.[4]
Sources:
[1] "Rossiysko-amerikanskiye konsultatsii po voprosam SNV i PRO zavershilis v Moskve," Interfax, 22 August 2001.
[2] "Rossiya ne poydet na sovmestnyy s SShA vykhod iz dogovora po PRO, zayavlyayut v Moskve," Interfax, 22 August 2001.
[3] "V Moskve oprovergayut informatsiyu o yakoby vydvinutykh SShA v khode konsultatsiy po PRO zhestkikh usloviyakh po srokam," Interfax, 22 August 2001.
[4] "SShA ne ustanavlivayut dlya RF nikakikh kraynikh srokov v voprose o PRO," Interfax, 24 August 2001. {Entered 9/4/2001 MJ}
 
8/13/2001: RUMSFELD DISCUSSES ABM TREATY IN MOSCOW
US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld met with Russian Defense Minister Sergey Ivanov in Moscow on 13 August 2001 for consultations on the ABM Treaty. During the discussions, Russia reiterated its support for preserving the ABM Treaty. Speaking with reporters, Lieutenant General Anatoliy Mazurkevich, chief of the Military Cooperation Main Directorate of the Ministry of Defense said that while the Russia understood that the Cold War era was over and was ready to agree with the US position that the currently existing strategic stability system required some changes, these changes could be made only on the condition of preserving the ABM Treaty. During the consultations the Russian delegation introduced a number of new initiatives, including proposals to create a system for preventing the militarization of outer space and a joint global missile and missile technology proliferation prevention system. Russia also proposed that the United States participate in developing the European non-strategic missile defense system proposed by Vladimir Putin.[1] According to an unidentified source interviewed by Interfax, Rumsfeld indicated that the United States would withdraw from the ABM Treaty unilaterally if Russia does not agree to its proposals, and would announce its decision to withdraw in October or November 2001. The same source said that the US delegation did not introduce any new initiatives during this round of consultations.[2] 
Sources:
[1] "Rossiya vydvinula ryad novykh initsiativ po obespecheniyu mezhdunarodnoy bezopasnosti - predstavitel Minoborony," Interfax, 13 August 2001.
[2] "Vashington gotov vyyti iz dogovora po PRO vmeste s Moskvoy ili bez neye - istochnik," Interfax, 13 August 2001. {Entered 9/5/2001 MJ}
 
8/8/2001: STRATEGIC STABILITY CONSULTATIONS IN WASHINGTON, DC
A Russian delegation headed by the deputy chief of the Russian General Staff, Colonel General Yuriy Baluyevskiy, participated in two days of consultations on strategic offensive and defensive weapons in Washington, DC. The US government was represented by Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Douglas Feith. According to Russian military sources, the Russian delegation once again proposed lowering strategic nuclear warhead ceilings to 1,500 within the framework of START III, which would eventually be joined by other nuclear states. Other issues raised during the consultations included Russian proposals to limit anti-submarine activities, eliminate all naval cruise missiles, ban new types of offensive strategic weapons, and lower the heavy bomber ceiling to 50. Russian military sources also stated that the visit was too short to reach a full understanding of US plans to develop ballistic missile defenses.[1] While the future of the ABM Treaty was also on the agenda of the consultations, after the talks Baluyevskiy said that the United States did not explain which specific parts of the ABM Treaty it found lacking.[2]
Sources:
[1] Vladimir Georgiyev, "Russko-amerikanskiye igry vokrug PRO," Nezavisimaya gazeta, 9 August 2001, p. 2; in WPS Oborona i Bezopasnost, 13 August 2001; in Integrum Techno, http://www.integrum.ru/.
[2] "SShA ne znayut, kak narushit dogovor po PRO," Kommersant, 11 August 2001; in Integrum Techno, http://www.integrum.ru/. {Entered 9/5/2001 MJ}
 
7/22/2001: BUSH, PUTIN DISCUSS ABM TREATY DURING GENOA G-8 SUMMIT 
Following discussions on the ABM Treaty during the G-8 summit in Genoa on 22 July 2001, the Russian and US presidents reached an agreement on the need for further deep cuts in strategic offensive weapons, while leaving the exact ceilings to be determined later, in the course of expert consultations. The two presidents also reached an agreement to discuss strategic offensive and defensive arms as one issue. According to Putin, although no breakthrough was made in Genoa, there was nevertheless some progress. Bush and Putin signed a joint statement pledging to commence intensive consultations on strategic offensive and defensive arms in the immediate future. During a press conference in Genoa, Putin said that Russia was not planning any joint actions with other countries to counter US NMD initiatives, but that it might consider MIRVing its ICBMs in response. Replying to reports that the agreement to discuss offensive and defensive weapons as one issue represented a concession, Putin denied Russia made any concessions to the United States and reaffirmed Russia's continued support of the ABM Treaty at a meeting with members of his cabinet held one day after the meeting with Bush. A similar opinion was expressed by Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov, who stated that Putin only obtained Bush's agreement to an old Russian proposal, first introduced by Putin in November 2000. Russian defense analyst Aleksey Podberezkin commented that Putin merely confirmed the old Soviet concept of interdependence of offensive and defensive armaments. 
["Genuezskiye peregovory Putina i Busha po NPRO usilili protivorechiya v rossiyskom obshchestve," WPS Oborona i Bezopasnost, 27 July 2001.] {Entered 9/7/2001 MJ}
 
6/16/2001: PUTIN, BUSH MEET IN LJUBLJANA
On 16 June 2001 US President George W. Bush and Russian President Vladimir Putin conducted a two-hour discussion and subsequently a press conference in Ljubljana, Slovenia. During the press conference, Putin said that although Russia still considers the ABM Treaty to be the cornerstone of the current strategic stability system, there nevertheless are some areas of agreement between Russia and the United States, and the two countries ought to discuss emerging threats and concerns. However, Putin emphasized that any action to address these threats could be taken only after these threats were identified and defined in the course of expert consultations, and noted that he favors relying on existing capabilities to meet new threats.[1] During the meeting Putin also warned Bush against unilateral US withdrawal from the treaty, on the grounds that it could have far-reaching negative consequences, including the collapse of START I and II and the strengthening of Russian capabilities. Nevertheless, although differences remained, Putin called the meeting a success and said that he established a high level of trust with Bush.[2] 
Sources:
[1] "Putin zayavlyayet, chto po probleme PRO 'yest elementy, kotoryye obedinyayut Rossiyu s partnerami v SShA," Interfax, 16 June 2001.
[2] "Putin udovletvoren partnerstvom s Bushem - amerikanskiye SMI," Interfax, 19 June 2001. {Entered 9/6/2001 MJ}
 
5/11/2001: ABM CONSULTATIONS HELD IN MOSCOW
On 11 May 2001 US Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz and Deputy National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley met with Russian First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Vyacheslav Trubnikov, General Staff Chief General Anatoliy Kvashnin, and Advisor to the President on Strategic Stability Issues Igor Sergeyev, to discuss the current US administration's views on ballistic missile defense and strategic offensive weapons.[1] The visit followed a speech given by US President George W. Bush on 1 May 2001 at the National Defense University, which Russian officials interpreted as a sign of US unwillingness to withdraw from the ABM Treaty unilaterally.[2] Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov welcomed Bush's speech and positively commented on Bush's willingness to consult with Russia on issues of international security and to take into consideration Russia's concerns on strategic stability.[3] However, no apparent progress was made during the consultations, and further discussions are expected. Commenting on the meetings, the Russian General Staff Deputy Chief, Colonel General Valeriy Manilov, stated that the Russian officials attempted to persuade their US counterparts that US National Missile Defense (NMD) was an ambitious, expensive, and risky undertaking that threatened to undermine global strategic stability. Manilov also reiterated the long-standing Russian position that the ABM Treaty was the cornerstone of strategic stability and therefore must be preserved unchanged. Scrapping the treaty would have negative consequences and compel Russia to take appropriate asymmetrical measures to guarantee its own security.[1] According to Manilov, Russia's position called for cooperation with the United States, European countries, and other partners in developing a set of measures aimed at preventing possible threats. Manilov also said that NMD would be unreliable and incapable of defending the United States from existing and projected threats.[4] Foreign Ministry Information and Press Department Chief Aleksandr Yakovenko stated that while the discussions were substantive in character, they left more questions than answers. He also said that the US delegation was not able to present convincing arguments in favor of deploying NMD.[5] Igor Sergeyev said that the US delegation did not present compelling evidence that it would be possible to address strategic stability issues without continued reliance on the ABM Treaty, which Sergeyev called the foundation of stability, and without which further strategic weapons cuts would not be possible. Sergeyev also discounted US concerns over the missile threat posed by so-called "rogue states," expressed preference for greater reliance on diplomatic and political measures to defuse emerging threats, and noted that the US government itself did not have a clear idea of what shape the proposed NMD system would take. Nevertheless, Sergeyev expressed satisfaction with the consultations, and noted his particular interest in US proposals for deep cuts in strategic offensive weapons.[6] State Duma Committee on International Affairs Head Dmitriy Rogozin felt Russia scored a minor victory over the United States by compelling it to explain its intentions, and that the visit was a sign that the US administration acknowledges Russia's superpower status.[7]
Sources:
[1]  Vladislav Runov, "Ne narushat strategicheskoy stabilnosti," Krasnaya zvezda, 15 May 2001; in Integrum Techno, http://www.integrum.ru/. 
[2] "V Moskve schitayut, chto vystupleniye Busha ne yavlyayetsya shagom k odnostoronnemu vykhodu SShA iz dogovora po PRO," Interfax, 2 May 2001.
[3] "Rossiya gotova k konsultatsiyam s SShA po problemam strategicheskoy stabilnosti - glava MID RF," Interfax, 2 May 2001.
[4] "Predstavitel rossiyskogo Genshtaba ubezhden v neobkhodimost sokhranit dogovor po PRO," Interfax, 11 May 2001.
[5] "A.Yakovenko: Peregovory s ekspertami SShA po voprosam NPRO vyyavili bolshe voprosov, chem otvetov," UNIAN, 7-13 May 2001.
[6] "Po mneniyu marshala Sergeyeva, SShA yeshche sami ne predstavlyayut oblika budushchey natsionalnoy sistemy PRO," Interfax, 14 May 2001.
[7] "Rogozin vidit v priyezde delegatsii SShA v Moskvu uspekh Rossii po voprosu PRO," Interfax, 11 May 2001. {Entered 5/31/2001 MJ}
 
3/2001: RUSSIAN OFFICIALS DIFFER ON REACTION TO US NMD
Reacting to the new US administration's increased emphasis on a National Missile Defense (NMD), in recent months Russian officials and specialists have issued a number of conflicting recommendations concerning Russia's responses to the possible US withdrawal from the ABM Treaty. During a visit to the Missile Forces Military Institute in Serpukhov, SRF Commander-in-Chief General Vladimir Yakovlev said that existing technologies allow many opportunities for defeating ballistic missile defenses, and that the choice of countermeasures would depend on the level of available financing. Yakovlev added that offense has always been superior to defense, and that it will be impossible to create an absolutely reliable missile defense.[1] During a press conference held in Moscow on 28 February 2001, National Risk Reduction Center Chief Lieutenant General Vyacheslav Romanov announced that in response to unilateral US withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, Russia would reconsider certain provisions of the START I and START II treaties, particularly the ban on MIRVed ICBMs.[2] However, Romanov received a sharp rebuke from Minister of Defense Sergeyev for claiming that in response to US NMD Russia would deploy short- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles, weapons which were banned as a class by the INF Treaty.[3] In a 29 March 2001 interview with Interfax, Russian General Staff experts claimed that Russia could implement a number of passive and active countermeasures to US NMD. Passive measures mentioned included further improvements to the Topol-M [NATO designation SS-27 'Sickle'] ICBM, particularly its ABM penetration ability, emphasis on mobile strategic nuclear forces, increasing the number of warheads per missile, and extending the service lives of "heavy" ICBMs, specifically the R-36M-series [NATO designation SS-18 'Satan'] ICBMs, whose elimination is required by START II. General Staff specialists declined to name active countermeasures being considered.[4] Major General Vladimir Belous, a professor at the Academy of Military Sciences, stated that Russia might retain its rail-mobile 10-warhead RT-23UTTKh [NATO designation SS-24 'Scalpel'] ICBMs, which also must be eliminated under START II.[5] However, other officials suggested that Russia's response would be restrained. Commenting on suggestions that Russia and China cooperate on developing their own ABM system as a response to US NMD, Deputy Prime Minister Ilya Klebanov said on 2 March 2001 that any talk of possible Russian responses was premature, since the United States has not abandoned the treaty. Klebanov added that it would be "senseless" to frighten others, suggesting instead that Russia continue to convince the United States that its plans would undermine the global balance.[6] A similar view was expressed by the Ministry of Defense Main Directorate for International Military Cooperation Chief Colonel General Leonid Ivashov at a press conference on 12 March 2001. Ivashov said that Russia would not engage in saber-rattling, but instead limit itself to political and diplomatic efforts, continuing its attempts to convince the United States to abandon NMD even after it formally withdraws from the ABM Treaty.[7] 
Sources:
[1] "Glavkom RVSN: Tekhnologicheskiye vozmozhnosti dopuskayut proryv luboy sistemy PRO," UNIAN, 19-25 February 2001.
[2] "Rossiya v otvet na narusheniya SShA dogovora po PRO mozhet peresmotret dogovory SNV-1 i SNV-2, zayavlyayet predstavitel Genshtaba," Interfax, 28 February 2001.
[3] "Sergeyev oproverg utverzhdeniya o tom, chto yesli SSha razvernut svoyu sistemu PRO, RF razvernet rakety maloy i sredney dalnosti s yadernymi boyegolovkami," Interfax, 1 March 2001.
[4] "U Rossii yest razlichnyye varianty otveta na sozdaniye amerikantsami natsionalnoy PRO - eksperty Genshtaba," Interfax, 29 March 2001.
[5] "American NMD will compel Russia to reconsider its attitude towards reducing railroad-mobile ICBM systems," Strana.ru Web Site, http://www.strana.ru/, 2 April 2001.
[6] "Vitse-premyer Klebanov predlagayet ne speshit s rossiyskim otvetom na plany razvertyvaniya amerikanskoy PRO," UNIAN, 26 February-4 March 2001.
[7] "Rossiya vspomnit o raketakh lish v kraynem sluchaye," Kommersant, 13 March 2001; in Integrum Techno, http://www.integrum.ru/. {Entered 5/30/2001 MJ}
 
2/20/2001: RUSSIA PRESENTS EXPANDED EUROPEAN MISSILE DEFENSE PROPOSAL
On 20 February 2001, Russian Minister of Defense Igor Sergeyev officially presented to NATO Secretary General George Robertson Russia's proposal for a European non-strategic ballistic missile defense system. This concept was originally proposed by Vladimir Putin, and the latest proposal represents the most comprehensive outline of this concept.[1] Robertson expressed approval of the proposal in guarded terms, adding that it demonstrates Russia's awareness of the danger of uncontrolled proliferation of ballistic missiles and the need for military, as well as political, solutions to this problem.[2] The proposed system would be created in the interests of all European countries, regardless of their membership in NATO or other alliances or international organizations. It would be implemented following the assessment of the missile threat to Europe (which would be accomplished through multilateral consultations) and developing the conceptual framework of the system. According to the Russian proposal, the European missile defense would consist of rapidly deployable mobile missile defense units manned by multi-national crews, and would be deployed in threatened areas.[3] Minister of Defense Igor Sergeyev said that carrying out the threat assessment phase would show whether the project is feasible, and that he reached an understanding with Robertson that NATO countries would study Russian threat assessment proposals. Sergeyev also said that discussion of Russian proposals will facilitate further strategic arms reductions, that Russia was prepared to strengthen its missile technology non-proliferation regime, and that it possessed technologies required for implementing the project.[4] Defense Ministry International Cooperation Main Directorate Chief Colonel General Leonid Ivashov said that the proposal to evaluate missile threats to Europe did not in itself constitute an acknowledgement of the existence of a threat, thus refuting comments, including those by the NATO Secretary General, that the proposal represented a shift in the Russian position. Ivashov added that according to the proposal Russia would be willing to study methods of countering missile threats only after the detailed threat analysis reveals that they in fact exist. Ivashov also emphasized that Russia proposes to counter missile threats using mainly political, rather than military, measures. These would include improving missile technology nonproliferation measures and avoiding giving any country a reason to deploy missile systems capable of striking Europe, areas in which Russia would actively cooperate.[5] Should a missile threat to Europe be identified, and if European states are interested in pursuing the Russian concept, diplomatic sources in Moscow told Interfax that Russia would propose creating mobile anti-missile units, rather than static missile defenses whose location would reveal against whom they are directed. However, the sources also emphasized that the mobile anti-missile units could be created only after a need for a military solution to the missile threat is identified during negotiations, and that Russia continues to adhere to the view that changes in the world situation do not warrant resorting to solely military solutions.[6] Commenting on the proposal, State Duma Defense Committee Deputy Chairman Aleksey Arbatov said that the creation of a European non-strategic missile defense system would result in Russian joining NATO, since it would establish a military-political alliance between Russia and NATO countries, and would also cause Russia to curtail its ties with the so-called "rogue nations," and China. Arbatov also said that Russia could address the technical side of creating missile defense systems, while Western European countries would provide most of the financing.[7]
Sources:
[1] "Ministr oborony RF peredal Gensekretaryu NATO predlozheniya Rossii po sozdaniyu sistemy yevropeyskoy PRO," UNIAN, 19-25 February 2001.
[2] "Dzh. Robertson v ostorozhnykh vyrazheniyakh odobril predlozhennyy Rossiyey plan sozdaniya obshcheyevropeyskoy PRO," UNIAN, 19-25 February 2001.
[3] Zamysel i etapy sozdaniya obshcheyevropeyskoy sistemy protivoraketnoy oborony, Center for Arms Control, Energy and Environmental Studies Web Site, http://www.armscontrol.ru/start/rus/docs/evropro.htm.
[4] "I. Sergeyev: Rossiya imeyet tekhnicheskiye vozmozhnosti obespechit yevropeyskuyu PRO," UNIAN, 19-25 February 2001.
[5] "Rossiyskiye predlozheniya po sozdaniyu yevropeyskoy PRO ne konstatiruyut nalichiye raketnykh ugroz, zayavlyayet general Ivashov," Interfax, 1 March 2001.
[6] "Moskva predlagayet v ramkakh initsiyativy po PRO sformirovat svoyego roda 'protivoraketnyy spetsnaz'," Interfax, 2 March 2001.
[7] "A. Arbatov: Sozdaniya sovmestnoy s NATO sistemy PRO imelo by rezultatom vstupleniye Rossii v alyans," UNIAN, 5-11 March 2001. {Entered 6/1/2001 MJ}
 
2/11/2001:  RUSSIA PARTICIPATES IN JOINT TMD EXERCISE WITH UNITED STATES
Jane's Defence Weekly reported that Russian and US officials concluded a 12-day joint theater missile defense (TMD) exercise on 11 February 2001 at the Joint National Test Facility (JNTF) at Schriever Air Force Base, Colorado.  For more information, see the 2/11/2001 entry in the Strategic C3 Developments section. {Entered 4/16/01 RG}
 
1/18/2001:  RUSSIAN EXPERTS CLAIM THAT UNITED STATES CANNOT CREATE AN EFFECTIVE NMD SYSTEM
On 18 January 2001 unnamed Russian Defense Ministry experts speaking to Interfax correspondents made claims that deployment of the US National Missile Defense (NMD) system would not guarantee complete protection from a ballistic missile attack.  Russian experts expressed readiness to work with US specialists to prove that an effective NMD system is not feasible. Commenting on Secretary of State Colin Powell's statements that the United States intends to deploy NMD, the experts stated that Russia has already developed and tested appropriate countermeasures and was ready to deploy them.  The newest Russian RS-12M1 Topol-M [NATO designation SS-27 'Sickle'] ICBM reportedly already incorporates ABM defense penetration measures. Ministry of Defense sources also reported that they expect the United States to unilaterally broaden the interpretation of the ABM Treaty to permit NMD deployment and thus present Russia with a fait accompli.  Despite this concern, Ministry of Defense sources asserted that Russia will never agree to any proposals to amend the ABM Treaty.
["SShA ne smogut sozdat effectivnuyu sistemu natsionalnoy PRO, schitayut eksperty v rossiyskom voyennom vedomstve," Interfax, 18 January 2001.] {Entered 1/31/01 RG}
 
12/16/2000: ALBRIGHT, IVANOV SIGN PRE-LAUNCH NOTIFICATION AGREEMENT 
On 16 December 2000 US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov signed in Brussels a bilateral Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) establishing procedures for notification of ballistic missile launches. The new MOU expands ballistic missile and space launch vehicle pre- and post-launch notification procedures and complements the MOU on exchanging early warning information signed in June 2000. In a press conference following the signing, Albright and Ivanov stated that the bilateral notification regime provided for by the 16 December 2000 MOU could be converted into a multilateral notification regime.  
Sources:
[1] "Transcript: Albright, Ivanov on Pre-Launch Notification Agreement," U.S. Department of State International Information Programs, Washington File Web Site, http://usinfo.state.gov/products/washfile.htm, 2 January 2001.
[2] "Rossiya i SShA podpisali spetsialnyy memorandum o zablagovremennom preduprezhdenii drug druga pri zapuskakh raket," UNIAN, 11-17 December 2000. {Entered 1/25/2001 MJ}
 
11/28/2000: SERGEYEV CRITICIZES US-JAPANESE THEATER BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE PLANS
During his visit to Tokyo, Russian Minister of Defense Igor Sergeyev criticized US-Japanese plans to create a theater missile defense (TMD) system.  He stated that the system, which would be placed in close proximity to Russia's borders, might be able to intercept Russian intercontinental ballistic missiles. Moreover, according to Sergeyev, its construction could lead to a negative reaction by other states in the region, increase tensions, and even lead to a new arms race and undermine strategic stability. Instead of creating a TMD which would protect only a "narrow circle of states," Sergeyev proposed that, if the situation warrants developing TMD, such systems ought to be developed only after taking the interests of all states in the region.
["Marshal Sergeyev zayavlyayet, chto Rossiya protiv regionalnykh sistem PRO, sozdavayemykh v interesakh uzkogo kruga gosudarstv," Interfax, 28 November 2000.] {Entered 1/25/2001 MJ}
 
11/15/2000:  RUSSIA APPEALS TO UNITED STATES TO STOP TESTING HERA MISSILE, CLAIMS HERA VIOLATES 1987 INF TREATY
Interfax reported on 15 November 2000 that Russia appealed to the United States to discontinue building and testing the Hera missile.[1]  Russia claims that the Hera violates the 1987 Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty, which prohibits building and testing intermediate- or short-range ballistic missiles.[2]  Russian officials argue that it could be deployed as a tactical nuclear missile in the future.  The United States responded that the Hera is a booster system that is allowed to be tested under Paragraph 12, Article 7 of the treaty.[2]  The Hera is used as a target missile for anti-ballistic missile tests.[1]  The Hera is built from the stages of decommissioned Minuteman-2 ICBMs and apparently uses the guidance system from the Pershing-2 IRBM.[2]  Russia has expressed objections to the Hera in the past, but only now has it chosen to make its objections public.  Russia's opposition to the Hera is possibly another expression of Russian unwillingness to modify the ABM treaty.  Nezavisimaya gazeta speculated that Russia's stance against the Hera could signal the start of a diplomatic offensive by Moscow on ABM treaty issues.[2]  
Sources:
[1] "Rossiya potrebovala ot SShA prekratit proizvodstvo i ispytaniya ballisticheskoy rakety-misheni 'Gera'", Interfax, No. 3, 15 November 2000.
[2] Sergey Sokut, "Washington Resuscitating Pershings. Moscow Intends To Accuse United States of Creating Banned Medium-Range Missiles," Nezavisimaya gazeta, 17 November 2000; in "Impending U.S.-Russian Row Over Hera Missile Eyed," FBIS Document CEP20001117000204.{Entered 12/19/00 RG}
 
11/13/2000: YAKOVLEV DOUBTS ABM TREATY CAN BE PRESERVED
In a 13 November 2000 interview with Interfax, Strategic Rocket Forces Commander Army General Vladimir Yakovlev expressed concern that preserving the ABM Treaty will be exceedingly difficult. Yakovlev based this prognosis on the large investments the US government has already made into NMD research and development, as well as on what Yakovlev referred to as US persistence in pursuing its national interests. In light of these factors, Yakovlev considers the likelihood of stopping further US NMD development to be very unlikely, and instead proposed introducing what he referred to as a "common constant strategic armaments indicator" that would account for both strategic offensive and defensive armaments, and using it in future arms control agreements. This would allow states wishing to increase their strategic defensive forces to do so at the expense of reducing strategic offensive forces.[1] Commenting on Yakovlev's remarks, Director of the Foreign Ministry's Department for Security and Disarmament Yuriy Kapralov stated they did not reflect the official position of the Russian government and only represented Yakovlev's personal views on how further cuts in strategic offensive weapons might be achieved.[2]
Sources:
[1] "Glavkom RVSN Rossii schitayet, chto sokhranit na peregovorakh SShA neizmennym Dogovor po PRO budet chrezvychayno slozhno," Interfax, 13 November 2000.
[2] "Confusion Over Russian Missile Chief's Remarks," Disarmament Diplomacy, November 2000, p. 55. {Entered 1/26/2001 MJ} 
 
10/30/2000:  STRATEGIC ROCKET FORCES COMMANDER YAKOVLEV VOICES CONCERN ABOUT VARDO RADAR STATION
Russian Strategic Rocket Forces (SRF) Commander Vladimir Yakovlev commented on 30 October 2000 that although the US-designed Globus-2 radar station under construction in Vardo, Norway, lacks the technical capability to be part of a US National Missile Defense (NMD) system at present, he is concerned that it could be modified in the future to be incorporated into such a system.  Yakovlev also stated that the US position on the ABM Treaty and US rejection of Russia's arguments that the United States is violating certain provisions of START I are indicative of the instability of the existing system of treaties, which reduces the likelihood of START II ever entering into force. Please also see the 4/18/2000 and 6/21/2000 entries in this section.
["Glavkom RVSN RF kommentiruyet sozdaniye amerikanskoy RLS v Verde (Norvegiya)," Interfax, No. 2, 30 October 2000.]{Entered 11/14/2000 RG}
 
10/18/2000: HOLUM AND KAPRALOV DISCUSS START III, ABM TREATY ISSUES 
For more information, please see the 10/18/2000 entry in the START III Developments file. {Entered 11/15/2000 MJ}
 
10/12/2000: RUSSIA DISPUTES US INTERPRETATION OF 2000 PRESIDENTIAL SUMMIT JOINT STATEMENT
Russian Foreign Ministry voiced strong disagreement with the US interpretation of the 4 June 2000 joint statement on strategic stability issued by the US and Russian presidents following their summit meeting in Moscow (for more information please see the 6/4/2000 entry). Foreign Ministry representative Aleksandr Yakovenko objected to wording contained in a document distributed by a US delegation during a disarmament conference in Geneva stating that the joint statement permits amending the ABM Treaty in response to threats posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and related technologies.
["MID RF kategoricheski oprovergayet utverzhdeniya SShA o gotovnosti Rossii rassmotret vopros o vnesenii izmeneniy v Dogovor po PRO," Interfax, 12 October 2000.] {Entered 11/14/2000 MJ}
 
10/3/2000:  RUSSIA AND INDIA SIGN STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP DECLARATION, VOICE SUPPORT FOR ABM TREATY
Russian President Putin and Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee signed a declaration of strategic partnership on 3 October 2000 during Putin's four-day visit to India.[1]  The declaration also contains language supporting the ABM Treaty.[2, 3]  Approximately a week before President Putin's visit to India, Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov and Indian Foreign Minister Jasvant Singh declared joint Russian and Indian support for the unconditional preservation of the ABM Treaty.[4]
Sources: 
[1] "Russian President, Indian PM Sign Strategic Partnership Declaration," Interfax, No. 2, 3 October 2000. 
[2] Yuriy Savenkov, "Khozhdeniye v Indiyu osobuyu pokhodku rossiyskogo prezidenta," Izvestiya online edition, http://www.online.ru/rproducts/.../06-Oct-00/20.rhtml,  6 October 2000. 
[3] "Russia, India Favor Enlargement of U.N. Security Council," Interfax, No. 1, 5 October 2000. 
[4] "Glavy MID RF i Indii podcherkivayut neobkhodimost sokhraneniya Dogovora po PRO," Interfax, No. 1, 22 September 2000.{Entered 11/20/2000 RG}
 
7/23/2000: RUSSIA SEEKS SUPPORT FOR ABM TREATY POSITION DURING G-8 SUMMIT
During the G-8 summit held in Nago, Okinawa on 21-23 July 2000, the Russian delegation headed by President Vladimir Putin actively solicited international support for Russia's position on the ABM Treaty. During a 23 July 2000 meeting with Vladimir Putin, Canadian Prime Minister Jean Chretien stated that Canada has not formulated a position on US NMD plans, and attaches great importance to Russia's position.[1] Doubts about the need for US NMD were expressed by French President Jacques Chirac who cited technical problems with the proposed system. Chirac also noted that the majority of EU members share France's position.[2] Russia also succeeded in including the call for earliest possible signing of START III and preserving the ABM Treaty as "the cornerstone of strategic stability" in the official communique issued upon G-8 summit's conclusion.[3] During the summit, Vladimir Putin presented Bill Clinton with a 28-page Russian START III concept, which includes a provision for preserving the ABM Treaty and reducing both countries' stockpiles to no more than 1500 strategic warheads.[4] Clinton and Putin also issued a joint statement on cooperation on strategic stability, which underscores its importance and creates "a constructive basis for progress in further reductions of nuclear arsenals, preserving and strengthening the ABM Treaty, and counteracting new challenges to international security."  The United States and Russia also affirmed their readiness to continue cooperation on theater ABM defenses.[5] One of the main arguments the Russian delegation used in promoting its position was North Korea's apparent offer to stop missile development programs in return for free satellite launches. This offer was made by North Korean General Secretary Kim Jong Il during Putin's visit to North Korea on the eve of Okinawa summit, and attracted positive comments from other summit participants.[6]   However, this argument may have been undermined by reports emerging after the summit that the offer may have been withdrawn. The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs was quick to issue assurances that, in spite of press reports that the offer was "a joke," this offer was still being treated seriously in Russia.[7] 
Sources:
[1] "Na vstreche s kanadskim premyerom Putin vnov podcherknul vazhnost vzveshennogo podkhoda k voprosu o sozdanii NPRO," Interfax, No. 1, 23 July 2000.
[2] "Shirak zayavlyayet, chto ne odobryayet plany SShA po sozdaniyu natsionalnoy PRO i ne mozhet vmeshatsya v situatsiyu vokrug barka 'Sedov'," Interfax, 21 July 2000.
[3] "V zaklyuchitelnom kommyunike sammita na Okinave soderzhitsya prizyv k skoreyshemu podpisaniyu dogovora SNV-3 na osnove dogovora po PRO," Interfax, 23 July 2000.
[4] "Putin peredal Klintonu rossiyskuyu kontseptsiyu dogovora SNV-3," Interfax, 21 July 2000.
[5] "Putin i Klinton vystupili s sovmestnym zayavleniyem o sotrudnichestve v oblasti strategicheskoy stabilnosti," Interfax, 21 July 2000.
[6] "Po slovam glavy MID RF, uchastniki sammita "vosmerki" proyavili interes k pozitsii KNDR, zayavlennoy v khode vizita Putina v Pkhenyan," Interfax, 22 July 2000.
[7] "Predstavitel MID RF kommentiruyet resheniye Pkhenyana otkazatsya ot sobstvennykh raket v obmen na bezvozmezdnyye zapuski svoikh sputnikov," Interfax, 15 August 2000.{Entered 11/13/2000 MJ}
 
7/21/2000:  RUSSIAN MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS WARNS NORWAY ABOUT NEGATIVE CONSEQUENCES OF PARTICIPATION IN US NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE PLANS
On 21 July 2000 a Russian Foreign Ministry spokesman expressed Russia's surprise and concern regarding an announcement by the Norwegian military's chief of staff that they intend to examine the possibility of participating in US plans for a national missile defense (NMD).  The Foreign Ministry commented that the new announcement casts doubt on Norway's earlier assurances that the Vardo radar station currently under construction would not be used as part of the planned US NMD and contradicts earlier Norwegian statements of support for the ABM Treaty. The Foreign Ministry's statement also warned that actions connected with implementing the NMD would undermine the ABM Treaty, could threaten regional and global stability, and would hinder mutual cooperation in Northern Europe.
["MID RF preduprezhdayet Norvegiyu o negativnykh posledstviyakh v svyazi s namereniyami Oslo prisoyedinitsya k planam SShA v sfere PRO," Interfax, No. 4, 21 July 2000.]{Entered 11/15/2000 RG}
 
7/18/2000: RUSSO-CHINESE JOINT STATEMENT SUPPORTS ABM TREATY, CRITICIZES US NMD PLANS
The joint statement signed on 18 July 2000 by Russia's President Vladimir Putin and China's Chairman Jiang Zemin during the former's visit to China criticizes US plans to develop a national missile defenses. The statement affirms both countries' support of the ABM Treaty as the cornerstone of global strategic stability and international security, and the foundation of key international agreements on strategic offensive weapon reductions and non-proliferation. Warning that undermining the ABM Treaty could spark off a new round of the arms race, Russia and China express concern that the United States is unilaterally attempting to achieve military supremacy, which could only have negative consequences for the security of all concerned states. The statement also disputes US claims of missile threat posed by so-called "rogue states" and cautions against non-strategic anti-ballistic missile defenses which, while not forbidden by the ABM Treaty, may undermine security interests of some countries. 
["Sovmestnoye zayavleniye Prezidenta RF V.V. Putina i Predsedatelya KNR Tzyan Tzeminya po voprosam protivoraketnoy oborony," Rossiyskaya gazeta, 19 July 2000, p. 7; in WPS Oborona i Bezopasnost, No. 84, 21 July 2000.] {Entered 11/15/2000 MJ} 
 
6/29/2000: JOINT US-RUSSIAN TMD EXERCISE TO BE HELD AT FORT BLISS
On 29 June 2000, US Defense Department spokesman Ken Bacon announced that a group of Russian officers will participate in a computer-simulated TMD exercise to be held at Fort Bliss in November or December 2000.[1] The exercise, which will be conducted by Fort Bliss's 32nd Anti-Air and Anti-Missile Defense Command (AAMDC), will include simulated launches of hostile short- and medium-range ballistic missiles. Similar, though less complex, exercises were held in Moscow in 1996 and in Colorado Springs in 1998.[2,3] US officials are viewing the planned exercise as a step toward resuming cooperation in the area of theater missile defense, cooperation which was suspended as a result of NATO's war against Yugoslavia.[3]
Sources:
[1] "Russia, U.S. Planning Joint Theater Missile Exercises," Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 30 June 2000.
[2] Sergey Gulyy, "Yanki nam pokazhut nebo v koreyskikh raketakh," Novyye izvestiya, 30 June 2000, p. 2; in WPS Oborona i Bezopasnost, No.76, 3 July 2000.
[3] Michael R. Gordon, "Joint Exercise On Missiles Seen For U.S. And Russia," New York Times online edition, http://www.nytimes.com, 29 June 2000.{Added 7/10/2000 MJ} 
 
6/21/00: IVANOV PROPOSES JOINT OPERATION OF VARDO RADAR, EXPRESSES CONCERN OVER THULE RADAR
During a meeting with Norwegian Foreign Minister Thorbjorn Jagland in Bergen, Norway, Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov expressed hope that the issue of the Globus-2 radar station in Vardo will not damage Russo-Norwegian relations. Ivanov also said that he received assurances from Norway that “the radar station’s construction and operation will remain fully under Norwegian control and that it will not be used in the interests of US plans to create a national ABM system.”  Jagland stated that Norway has no plans to create a bilateral expert consultative commission with Russia to discuss the radar station, since it considers it obvious that the radar cannot be used as a component of a US ABM system, and that Russia has accepted Norwegian arguments.[1] In a later statement, Ivanov proposed that Norway allow Russian specialists to participate in operating the Globus-2 radar station, but characterized this initiative as “thinking out loud,” rather than an official proposal.  Ivanov added that he does not expect an immediate response from the Norwegians on his proposal and that he hopes Norway will present its own proposals on cooperation.[2,3] This turn of events may represent a softening of the Russian position on the Norwegian radar station in comparison to earlier statements in April and May 2000.  While in Bergen, Ivanov also voiced concerns about the modernization of a US early warning radar located in Thule, Greenland, during a meeting with Danish Foreign Minister Niels Helveg Petersen.  After the meeting, Ivanov told journalists that Russia considers the radar station a component of the planned US national ballistic missile defense.  If the United States proceeds with missile defense deployment and the Greenland radar is incorporated into the system, Denmark would bear part of the responsibility for destroying the ABM Treaty, said Ivanov.[4]
Sources:
[1] “Glava MID nadeyetsa, chto otnosheniya s Norvegiey ne budut omracheny stroitelstvom RLS SShA bliz granitsy RF,” Interfax, No.4, 21 June 2000.
[2] “Glava MID predlagayet Norvegii sotrudnichestvo v ekspluatatsii RLS v Varde,” Interfax, No.1, 22 June 2000.
[3] “Moskva ne zhdet ot Oslo nemedlennogo otveta na initsiativu po RLS v Varde,” Interfax, No.2, 22 June 2000.
[4] “Glava MID vyrazhayet ozabochennost v svyazi so stroitelstvom radiolokatsionnoy stantsii na Grenlandii,” Interfax, No.4, 21 June 2000.{Entered 6/21/00 MJ}
 
6/16/2000: PUTIN, SCHROEDER DISCUSS EUROPEAN MISSILE DEFENSE
Vladimir Putin discussed his European ballistic missile defense proposal with German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder during his visit to Germany.[1]  Additional talks were conducted by the Russian and German defense ministers, Igor Sergeyev and Rudolf Scharping.[2] Prior to leaving on his foreign tour, Putin said that Europe’s position on the proposed US national missile defense is of great importance to Russia.  Putin expressed hope that European governments would speak out in favor of preserving the ABM Treaty and strengthening strategic stability. Putin said that the Russian proposal would guarantee the security of all European states while preserving the strategic balance.  The US initiatives, on the other hand, would only result in increasing the danger to the United States, Russia, and other countries.  According to Putin, if the United States gives official notification of withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, Russia would be forced to consider withdrawing from the START and INF treaties. Putin emphasized that no ballistic missile threat is likely to emerge from the so-called “rogue states” in the Middle East and Asia in the foreseeable future. In his view, a more responsible and sensible approach to addressing this potential threat would include political cooperation, continuing strategic disarmament efforts, and strengthening non-proliferation regimes through the joint development of a global monitoring system.[3] Commenting on the talks, Schroeder spoke in favor of preserving the ABM Treaty, adding that Russia and the United States “bear the responsibility for averting an arms race.”[1]
Sources:
[1] “Putin vysoko otsenil itogo rossiysko-germanskikh peregovorov i zayavil, chto Germaniya yavlayetsa vedushchim partnerom Rossii v Yevrope i mire,” Interfax, No.3, 16 June 2000.
[2] “Ministry oborony RF i FRG obsudili voprosy sokhraneniya Dogovora po PRO i problemy razoruzheniya,” Interfax, No.3, 16 June 2000.
[3] “Putin planiruyet obsudit v Germanii svoyu ititsiativu po sozdaniyu dlya Yevropy obshchey sistemy protivoraketnoy bezopasnosti,” Interfax, No.1, 11 June 2000. {Entered 6/20/2000 MJ}
 
6/13/2000: COHEN AND SERGEYEV AGREE ON COOPERATION, DISAGREE ON BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE
On 13 June 2000, US Secretary of Defense William Cohen met with Russian officials in Moscow to discuss Russian proposals to create a European ballistic missile defense system and to exchange views "on the provisions of the joint statement made by the two countries' presidents at the Moscow summit." In the course of the discussions, Russian Defense Minister Igor Sergeyev challenged the US position that North Korea poses an imminent ballistic missile threat to the United States.  In the view of Russian experts, North Korea will lack the necessary resources to design, test, and deploy intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) in the foreseeable future. In the event of North Korea developing such systems, US military superiority is sufficient to deter any North Korean threat. Sergeyev also noted that North Korea's security interests are regional in character, and its government has recently launched a number of positive initiatives in regard to its neighbors.[1]  Sergeyev spoke out against "modernizing" the ABM Treaty, saying that such a "modernization" would be impossible without violating its provisions.  Instead of the of the proposed US national missile defense, Sergeyev suggested creating a "political umbrella" with the goal of preventing the emergence of ballistic missile threats.  In Sergeyev’s view, such an approach would serve the security interests of many countries, cost less than the proposed US national missile defense, preserve strategic stability, and pose a smaller danger of infringing on other countries' interests.  The "political umbrella" would be created on the basis of mutual agreements between countries, with some provisions for verification.[2] Commenting on the meetings, Strategic Rocket Forces Commander General Yakovlev announced that no progress was made on the issue of US national ballistic missile defense. He called US plans to deploy a such a defense an invitation to established and "threshold" nuclear powers to increase their nuclear arsenals and enhance their capabilities to penetrate ABM defenses.  While conceding that Russia would not be able to afford an ABM system of its own, Yakovlev believes that a European ballistic missile defense could be implemented within eight to 10 years following the decision to proceed.[3] The chief of the Ministry of Defense's Main Directorate for International Military Cooperation, Colonel General Leonid Ivashov, reiterated the official Russian position that Russia is "ready to work on START III provided that the ABM Treaty is preserved," and commented that disagreements between the United States and Russia continue to exist.  However, the two countries will continue to discuss Russian initiatives concerning a non-strategic European ballistic missile defense in the future.[4] In an interview following his meeting with Vladimir Putin, Cohen stated that while the United States is prepared to "study and analyze" the possibility of cooperation in the area of theater ballistic missile defense, such a system, while applicable to Russia and Europe, would not adequately satisfy US security requirements.[5] The possibility of conducting a joint non-strategic ballistic missile defense exercise on Russian territory was also discussed during the meetings.[1]
Sources:
[1] Igor Korotchenko, "Sergeyev i Koen podpisali programmu sotrudnichestva," Nezavisimaya gazeta, 14 June 2000, p.2.
[2] "Ministr oborony Rossii predlagayet vmesto amerikanskoy PRO sozdat 'politicheskiy zontik'," Interfax, No. 2, 13 June 2000.
[3] “Po dannym Glavkoma RVSN, na peregovorakh Koena v Moskve progress po PRO dostignut ne byl," Interfax, No. 1, 14 June 2000.
[4] "Ministry oborony Rossii i SShA obsudyat v Moskve problemy protivoraketnoy oborony," Interfax, No. 1, 12 June 2000.
[5] "Ministr oborony SShA rasskazyvayet o soderzhanii svoyey besedy s Putinym," Interfax, No. 2, 13 June 2000. {Entered 6/19/2000 MJ}
 
6/5/2000: PRESIDENT PUTIN PROPOSES EUROPEAN BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE
On 5 June 2000, during a two-hour meeting in Rome with Italian Prime Minister Giuliano Amato, Russian President Vladimir Putin proposed the creation of a joint Russian-European ballistic missile defense system, with US participation.  In Putin's opinion, this approach would preserve the strategic balance while ensuring the security of European countries.[1] The proposal elicited positive reactions from European governments.  According to a statement issued by the deputy press secretary of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, France "shares Russia's doubts" concerning US plans to develop a national ballistic missile defense, but "intends to consider the consequences of these proposals."[2]  In the opinion of German Ambassador to Russia Ernst-Jorg von Studnitz,  the proposal is "a reflection of Vladimir Putin's search with the West for joint approaches" to solving security problems.[3] Putin's proposal was met with mixed reactions at home.  State Duma Speaker Gennadiy Seleznev believes that creating a joint ballistic missile defense system with the participation of Russia, Europe, and the United States is possible.  At the same time, Seleznev said that the United States would have to confirm it is not withdrawing from the ABM Treaty and that a joint ballistic missile defense system with US participation might not be advisable.[4]  Russian Defense Minister Igor Sergeyev commented that Putin's proposal refers to non-strategic ballistic missile defense, as defined in the ABM demarcation agreements signed in September 1997 in New York.[5]  Since the proposed system would apparently protect only Europe and Russia, the US government is not likely to view it as a viable substitute for a US national ballistic missile defense.
Sources:
[1] "Putin predlozhil italyanskomu premeru sodeystvovat tomu, chtoby Rossiya sovmestno s Yevropoy i NATO sozdala protivoraketnuyu sistemu dlya Yevropy." Interfax, 5 June 2000.
[2] "Frantsiya tshchatelno izuchit predlozheniya Putina o sozdanii sistemy PRO dlya Yevropy." Interfax, 6 June 2000.
[3] "Posol FRG v RF pozitivno otsenivayet initsiativu Putina o sozdanii yevropeyskoy PRO." Interfax, 6 June 2000.
[4] "Glava Gosdumy schitayet vozmozhnym sozdaniye sistemy PRO s uchastiyem Rossii, Yevropy i SShA." Interfax, 6 June 2000.
[5] "Ministr oborony RF Sergeyev predstavil svoim kollegam po NATO konkretnye predlozheniya po sozdaniyu nestrategicheskoy PRO v Yevrope," Interfax, No. 2, 9 June 2000. {Entered 8/8/2000 MJ}
 
6/4/00: JOINT DATA EXCHANGE CENTER TO FACILITATE INFORMATION SHARING ON MISSILE LAUNCHES
On 4 June 2000, US President Bill Clinton and his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) establishing a Joint Data Exchange Center, with the goal of "near real-time" exchange of data produced by US and Russian space- and land-based missile launch early warning systems.  The center is to begin its activities in June 2001, "365 days after the entry into force of this Memorandum."  The MoU specifies that the center will be located in Russia and will be manned by 16 US and 16 Russian officers, as well as 60 support personnel. Data exchanged at the center is to include SLBM launch information as well as information on third country ballistic missile launches capable of posing a direct threat to either Russia or the United States or "creating an ambiguous situation, which might lead to incorrect interpretation." The center is also to gather data "on the place and time of preparations for missile launches in any spot of the globe." Information exchanged at the center will be sent to high-level military leaders of both countries approximately one minute after its arrival. The participating countries are to share the cost of creating and operating the center equally, with English and Russian being its working languages. The MoU also specifies that no equipment, software, or other materials being used at the center will be transferred to third countries or other parties without the written permission of the party that provided it.  This limitation also applies to the information which will be exchanged at the center.[1]  According to sources at the Strategic Rocket Forces (RVSN) headquarters, the currently planned location of the center is in Podlipki, on the outskirts of Moscow, although an earlier report suggested that it would be located in Moscow at 16/3 Tayninskaya Street.  A final decision on the Center's location will be made after a thorough study of the MoU.[2]
Sources:
[1] "Rossiysko-amerikanskiy Tsentr obmena dannymi ot sistem rannego preduprezhdeniya nachnet rabotu v Moskve v iyune 2001 goda." Interfax, 4 June 2000.
[2] "Rossiysko-amerikanskiy Tsentr po preduprezhdeniyu o nesanktsionirovannom puske raket razmestitsa v podmoskovnykh Podlipkakh." Interfax, 5 June 2000. {Entered 6/7/00 MJ}
 
6/4/00: JOINT CLINTON-PUTIN STATEMENT ON STRATEGIC STABILITY REAFFIRMS COMMITMENT TO STRENGTHEN ABM TREATY
In a joint statement at the Moscow Summit, Presidents Clinton and Putin reaffirmed their commitment to strengthen the ABM Treaty and recognized its importance as a cornerstone of strategic stability and its contribution to offensive forces reductions.  At the same time, the presidents recognized that the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery poses an emerging threat to international security and noted that the ABM Treaty contains provisions on considering new developments in strategic situation.  Both presidents have directed their cabinet members and experts to prepare a report on concrete measures that would address emerging threats while preserving strategic stability.  The two sides also noted the importance of the consultative process and expressed their desire to continue consultations in the future as a means of promoting the objectives and implementation of the ABM Treaty.  The principles laid out in the joint statement are to serve as the basis for both sides' activities in the area of strategic offensive and defensive arms.[1]  Some analysts view the statement as a major Russian concession and a retreat from their official position on the ABM Treaty, in that it recognizes the emerging threat posed by the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction and missile technologies by "rogue states."[2] Undersecretary of State Strobe Talbott said in an interview, "The Russians have argued their position forcefully, but they have also listened carefully to ours." US officials in Moscow also characterized the statement as a major concession by Putin.[3] Nevertheless, important differences of opinions appear to remain.  Whereas the United States wants the ABM Treaty amended in order to deploy a limited national missile defense capable of stopping intercontinental ballistic missiles, Putin and his advisors seem in favor of anti-missile systems placed near the borders of rogue states, using boost-phase interceptors.  While agreeing that the rogue states pose a potential threat, Russian and US officials also differ on the issue of this threat's imminence.[4]
Sources:
[1] "Text: Joint Clinton-Putin Statement on Strategic Stability," U.S. Department of State International Information Programs, Washington File web site, http://usinfo.state.gov/products/washfile.htm, 4 June 2000.
[2] "Don't Shout, but Russia Caved in on ABM," Reuters, 6 June 2000; in Russia Today, http://www.russiatoday.com.
[3] "U.S. Says Missile Defense Gap with Russia Closes," Reuters, 13 June 2000; in Russia Today, http://www.russiatoday.com.
[4] "Russian Hints on "Boost Phase" Missile Defense Piques U.S. Interest," Agence France Presse, 14 June 2000; in Russia Today, http://www.russiatoday.com. {Entered 6/6/00 MJ}
 
4/18/00: RUSSIA SAYS VARDO RADAR STATION VIOLATES ABM TREATY
On 18 April 2000, Russian Foreign Ministry spokesman Aleksandr Yakovenko issued a statement alleging that the Globus-2 radar station currently under construction in the Norwegian town of Vardo represents a violation of the ABM Treaty. [The treaty prohibits placing ABM radars outside the national boundaries of its signatories.]  Yakovenko rejected US and Norwegian assurances that the radar is intended for tracking space objects, not detecting ballistic missile launches. He said that prior to being located in Norway the radar was used in anti-ballistic missile tests in the United States, making it clear that the radar could be used as part of a US national ballistic missile defense.[1]  On 19 May 2000, the Russian Foreign Ministry issued another warning to Norway about the possible consequences of violating the ABM Treaty by completing the Globus-2 radar station.[1]  The Russian military has also expressed objections to the Norwegian radar station.  On 20 April 2000, Strategic Rocket Forces (SRF) Commander-in-Chief General Vladimir Yakovlev requested that negotiations be held between the United States and Russia on the radar station.  Once installed in Norway, according to Yakovlev, the radar would be able to monitor a large portion of Russian territory, including missile launches from the Plesetsk cosmodrome and SLBM launches from training areas in the Barents Sea.  An article published on 22 April 2000 in the official Russian military newspaper Krasnaya zvezda claimed that the Raytheon-developed radar had its designation changed from “Have Stare” to Globus-2 to hide its military character, and that before it was transferred to Norway it was a key element of the US missile warning network. Krasnaya zvezda also alleged that the radar’s real mission is collecting radar signatures of Russian missiles rather than tracking space objects, and that the radar is to be incorporated into the new US ABM system by 2008.[3,4]
Sources:
[1] “MID RF rastsenivayet kak narusheniye Dogovora po PRO razmeshcheniya v Norvegii amerikanskoy radiolokatsionnoy stantsii,” Interfax, No.3, 18 April 2000.
[2] “Moskva preduprezhdayet Oslo o posledstviyakh uchastiya Norvegii v narushenii Dogovora po PRO,” Interfax, No.3, 19 May 2000.
[3] Ivan Safronov, “Amerikanskiy Globus ne ponravilsya rossiyskim voyennym,” Kommersant-daily, 20 April 2000, p. 3.
[4] Aleksey Lyashchenko, “Pod ‘Pristalnym vzglyadom’,” Krasnaya zvezda, 22 April 2000, p. 3.{Entered 6/28/00 MJ}

 
3/23/00: IVASHOV: RUSSIA READY TO COOPERATE ON TMD SYSTEMS
In an interview with RIA-Novosti on 23 March 2000, Colonel General Leonid Ivashov, the head of the Russian Defense Ministry's International Cooperation Directorate, said that Russia is ready to participate in the joint development of theater missile defense (TMD) systems with the United States, but only if these systems are not destabilizing.  Ivashov said that such a theater missile defense system would be "non-strategic," as defined in the ABM demarcation agreements signed in September 1997 in New York. He pointedly noted, however, that the US Senate has not yet ratified these agreements. Referring to the possibility of deploying a European missile defense system, Ivashov said that Russia is prepared to discuss the development, with Russian participation, of a system that could intercept missiles launched at Europe from other parts of the world.
["Ivashov Outlines Problems With Russia - US Defense System," RIA Novosti, 23 March 2000; in FBIS Document CEP20000323000302.] {Entered 4/4/00 EV}
 
3/1/00: RUSSIAN GENERAL SAYS NMD THREATENS RUSSIA'S SECURITY
First Deputy Chief of the Main Directorate for International Military Cooperation of the Russian Defense Ministry, Lieutenant General Nikolay Zlenko, said in a 1 March 2000 interview that Russia will respond to any violations of the ABM Treaty and will take all necessary measures to ensure its security if the United States deploys a national missile defense system (NMD).  Rejecting US arguments that NMD is designed only to defend against "rogue" states such as North Korea, Iran, and Iraq, Zlenko contended that the planned US NMD system "is directed against the Russian Federation" and seriously limits Russia's ability to deliver counterstrikes against the US territory, undermining Russia's nuclear deterrent.
["Reaction to Threat," Rossiyskaya Gazeta, 1 March 2000; in "Russian General Say NMD Threatens 'Strategic Parity'," FBIS Document CEP20000301000199.] {Entered 3/15/00 EV}
 
2/29/00-3/2/00: RUSSIA REITERATES ABM LINKED TO START
Another round of US-Russian talks on START II, START III and the ABM treaties was held in Geneva on 29 February-2 March 2000.[1]  The three-day talks were led by John Holum, Senior Advisor to the US Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security and Yuriy Kapralov, Acting Director of the Department of Security and Disarmament Issues of the Russian Foreign Ministry.[2] According to a press statement released by the Russian Foreign Ministry, Russia views strategic offensive arms reductions as linked with the preservation of restrictions on strategic defense systems.  The Russian delegation reaffirmed its opposition to amending the ABM Treaty, saying that "the amendments proposed by the United States would render it meaningless and make reductions in strategic offensive arms impossible.  Therefore they cannot be considered a subject for negotiations."
Sources:
[1]"Soobshcheniye No117 ot 03.03.2000: 29 Fevralya - 2 Marta v Zheneve sostoyalsya ocherednoy raund Rossiysko-Amerikanskikh konsultatsiy po dogovoru SNV-3 i dogovoru po PRO v sootvetstvii s Kyolnskoy dogovoryonnostyu prezidentov Rossii i SShA ot 20 iyunya 1999 goda," Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs press release, Ministry of Foreign Affairs website,  http://www.mid.ru.
[2]"Russia and U.S. Arms Officials Finish ABM Talks," Agence France Press, 3 March 2000, in Russia Today, at http:www.russiatoday.com. {Entered 3/8/00 EV}
 
2/28/00: SECURITY COUNCIL SECRETARY: RUSSIA WILL WITHDRAW FROM START IF US ABROGATES ABM
Russian Security Council Secretary Sergey Ivanov told a 25 February 2000 press conference that Russia will automatically withdraw from the START II and START I Treaties if the United States withdraws from the ABM Treaty.  Disagreeing with US arguments that "a slight modernization of the ABM Treaty would not upset strategic stability," Ivanov said that a planned US national missile defense system, with monitoring stations and interceptor missiles based in Alaska, would seriously affect Russia's interests. He also said that during the ongoing US-Russian talks on strategic stability, he has told the United States that the Russian government will do everything in its power to convince the new Duma that the ratification of START II Treaty is in Russia's interests.  Once the Duma ratifies START II, Russia will immediately be ready to begin negotiations on START III, Ivanov added.
["Russia Threatens to Scrap START Accords if U.S. Ditches ABM," Interfax Diplomatic Panorama, 28 February 2000; in FBIS Document CEP20000228000266.] {Entered 3/1/00 EV}
 
2/24/00: RUSSIAN DIPLOMAT REJECTS CHANGES TO ABM TREATY
Speaking at the plenary session of the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva on 24 February 2000, Russian Representative to the United Nations Vasiliy Sidorov stated that Russia is not holding negotiations with the United States on modfying the ABM Treaty.[1] Clarifying Sidorov's statement, anonymous Russian diplomatic sources told ITAR-TASS that Russian-US consultations on START III and ABM Treaties cannot be considered negotiations on amending the ABM Treaty. The sources said that Russia held these talks in order to express its own concerns with US plans for a national missile defense system and to point out that these plans pose a serious threat to overall strategic stability.[2] Calling for the formation of a special committee on preventing an arms race in outer space within the CD framework, Sidorov said that "prevention of [an] arms race both in outer space and on Earth fully and completely depends on the viability of the 1972 ABM Treaty."[1]
Sources:
[1]"Russian Arms Control Envoy Rules Out Changes to ABM," Reuters, 25 February 2000.
[2] Konstantin Pribytkov, ITAR-TASS, 24 February 2000; in "Russia Not Holding Talks with US on ABM Treaty Adaptation," FBIS Document CEP20000224000270.{Entered 2/29/00 EV}
 
2/24/00: RUSSIA CRITICAL OF US-JAPAN MISSILE DEFENSE PLANS
In a press release issued on 24 February 2000, the Russian Foreign Ministry criticized US and Japanese plans to establish a regional anti-ballistic missile system in the Asia-Pacific region. The ministry expressed concern that a regional theatre missile defense (TMD) system near Russian borders could later become a part of a "layered" US national ABM system.  The ministry noted that plans for the creation of such a system in the Asia-Pacific region with a limited number of participants have already sparked a wave of concern in Asia and in other regions, and cautioned that they could undermine regional strategic stability, destroy the regional balance of power, and trigger an arms race.  These concerns could be dispelled by implementing the Russian idea of setting up a global regime of control over the nonproliferation of missiles and missile technologies, which would help prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems, the statement argued.  In conclusion, the ministry expressed support for creating a multilateral security mechanism in the Asia-Pacific Region with equal rights and opportunities for all participants.
["Soobshcheniye No.77 ot 24.02.2000: V Moskve ne ostalis nezamechennymi prodolzhayushchiyesya nastoychivyye popytki SShA  rasshirit voyennyy soyuz s Yaponiyey," Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs press release,  Ministry of Foreign Affairs website, http://www.mid.ru.] {Entered 3/01/00 EV}
 
1/31-2/2/00: ABM DISPUTE UNRESOLVED BY ALBRIGHT VISIT TO MOSCOW
During a three-day working visit to Moscow on 31 January-2 February 2000, US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright met with acting Russian  President Vladimir Putin and Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov.  According to the Washington Post, an anonymous senior US State Department official said that during their meeting, Putin had agreed to continue consultations on amendments to the ABM Treaty that would allow the US to deploy a limited national missile defense (NMD) system. The official noted, however, that Putin insisted on protecting the treaty's "fundamental principles."  After his meeting with Albright, Ivanov told Interfax that Russia continues to view major changes in the ABM Treaty as unnecessary.[1]  Ivanov characterized US proposals to "modernize" the ABM Treaty as a "very serious mistake" that could lead to the collapse of the treaty. Instead, argued Ivanov, Russia and the United States should find other ways to counter missile threats posed by rogue states and to prevent the further proliferation of missile technology.[2]  Other anonymous Russian diplomatic sources told Interfax that Russia continues to oppose revising the ABM Treaty, stressing that the treaty remained a cornerstone of strategic stability and the future of the offensive strategic arms reductions.[3]
Sources:
[1] Sharon LaFraniere, "Albright Hails Putin's Can-Do Style; Diplomat 'Impressed' in Moscow Meeting," Washington Post, 3 February 2000, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, http://web.lexis-nexis.com.
[2] "Glava MID RF Ivanov otvergayet ideyu peresmotra dogovora po PRO i podtverzhdayet namereniye dobivatsya ratifikatsii Dumoy SNV-2," Interfax, 31 January 2000.
[3] "V khode rossiysko-amerikanskikh peregovorov v Moskve ne udalos sblizit pozitsii storon po PRO," Interfax, 2 February 2000. {Entered 2/8/00 EV}
 
1/19-21/00: RUSSIA INSISTS START PROCESS LINKED TO ABM
Another round of US-Russia consultations on ABM and START III issues was held in Geneva on 19-21 January 2000, Interfax reported.[1]  The three-day talks, led by John Holum, Senior Adviser to the US Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security and Yuriy Kapralov, Acting Director of the Department of Security and Disarmament Issues of the Russian Foreign Ministry, were held on the sidelines of the Conference on Disarmament, which opened its annual session on 18 January 2000.[1,2]  Russia continued to insist that the process of offensive strategic arms reductions is closely interrelated with the ABM Treaty regime, Interfax reported.[1]  The session did not produce any apparent progress on resolving outstanding bilaterial disagreements regarding the ABM Treaty.[3]
Sources:
[1] "Rossiya i SShA proveli v Zheneve ocherednoy raund konsultatsiy po dogovoram po PRO i SNV-3," Interfax, 21 January 2000.
[2] "Progress on START II, ABM Sought," AP, 20 January 2000.
[3] "US Tinkering With ABM Treaty Sticks in Russian Craw," Jamestown Monitor, 21 January 2000. {Entered 1/26/00 EV}
 
12/22/99: US-RUSSIA ABM TALKS REMAIN DEADLOCKED
The US-Russian working group on strategic stability met in Moscow during the three-day official visit of US Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott on 21-23 December 1999, Interfax reported.  In a meeting with Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin and Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov, Talbott discussed issues dealing with the ABM Treaty, the ratification of START II, and START III.[1]  According to Colonel-General Leonid Ivashov, the head of the Defense Ministry's international cooperation directorate, the consultations were "routine."  Russia reiterated its position that any attempts to amend the ABM Treaty will destroy the system of strategic stability and bring about dangerous consequences for the entire world, Ivashov said.[2]
Sources:
[1] Interfax, 23 December 1999; in "Diplomatic Panorama for 23 December 1999," FBIS Document FTS19991223001245.
[2] Xinhua News Agency, 23 December 1999; in "Russia, US Remain Divided Over ABM Treaty," FBIS Document FTS19991223001634. {Entered 1/26/00 EV}
 
12/10/99: RUSSIA AND CHINA CRITICIZE US FOR ABM PLANS
After a two-day informal meeting between Russian President Boris Yeltsin and Chinese President Jiang Zemin held in Beijing on 9-10 December 1999, the two sides signed a joint declaration in which they stressed that the 1972 ABM Treaty must remain the conrnerstone of strategic stability.  Without naming the United States, the presidents expressed strong opposition to its plans to deploy a national missile defense, arguing that such a deployment would undermine strategic stability and the disarmament process. In a clear reference to Japan, the two sides also stated that some countries' plans to deploy anti-missile defenses in the Asia-Pacific region will destroy peace and stability in the region.  In this context, the Russian Federation added that it supports China's opposition to bringing Taiwan into such plans.
["Rossiysko-kitayskoye sovmestnoye zayavleniye," Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Press Release, http://www.mid.ru] {Entered 1/20/00 EV}

12/1/99: UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY PASSES RESOLUTION ON PRESERVATION OF ABM TREATY
The UN General Assembly passed a resolution calling for renewed efforts by the parties to the 1972 ABM Treaty--the Russian Federation and the United States--to preserve and strengthen it through full and strict compliance, the UN press service reported on 1 December 1999. The text of the resolution called on the parties to the treaty to limit the deployment of ABM systems and to refrain from deploying them for the defense of their national territory. The vote on the resolution was 80-4, with 68 abstentions.  The United States, Israel, Albania, and Micronesia voted against the resolution.  Most Western European countries abstained, although France voted for the resolution. A draft version of the resolution--co-sponsored by Russia, Belarus, and China--had been approved by the First Main Committee of the General Assembly on 6 November 1999 by a similar vote.
["General Assembly Calls for Strict Compliance with 1972 ABM Treaty, As It Adopts 51 Disarmament, International Security Texts," UN Press Release GA/9675, 1 December 1999, http://www.un.org/] {entered 1/12/00 SDP}
 
11/16/99: RUSSIA PREPARED TO COUNTERACT US ABM SYSTEM
First Deputy Minister of Defense Nikolay Mikhaylov stated in an interview with Krasnaya zvezda that Russia will act decisively to counteract any attempt by any nation to undercut the effectiveness of Russia's nuclear deterrent capability. He said that should the United States deploy an anti-ballistic missile (ABM) system, the Russian government would give its highest priority to modernizing existing systems and designing and creating a new generation of strategic and tactical systems in order to maintain a credible threat and ensure its nuclear deterrent remains viable.[1] However, Ilya Klebanov, the deputy prime minister in charge of the military-industrial complex, has stated that although Russia has the technical means to carry out such a program, there is no funding for it.[2] Mikhaylov said further that the only result of the US deployment of an ABM system would be an increase in instability in the world and a corresponding decrease in national security for everyone, including the United States. He underlined that for the foreseeable future, the Russian Federation would be depending on its nuclear deterrent to ensure its national security.[1] US-Russian arms reduction talks in September and October 1999 both ended in deadlock due to Russia's refusal to approve amendments to the ABM treaty.[3]
Sources:
[1] "Moskva budet zhestko protivostoyat popytkam snizheniya yeye yadernogo potentsiala sderzhivaniya - zamministra oborony RF," Interfax, 16 November 1999.
[2] David Hoffman, "Moscow Warns U.S. On Missile Defense: Russia Says Its Arsenal Could Beat Any System," Washington Post, 26 October 1999; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, http://web.lexis-nexis.com.
[3] "Russia will respond if US breaches ABM treaty," Agence France Presse, 26 October 1999; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, http://web.lexis-nexis.com. {entered 12/17/99 lgm}
 
11/11/99: RUSSIA ALARMED BY INFLUENCE OF US DOMESTIC POLITICS ON ABM TREATY
In an interview with the newspaper Vek, Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov complained that major foreign policy issues, particularly disarmament, have become embroiled in US domestic political struggles.  Ivanov underlined that athough Russia will not interfere in the interparty struggle in the United States, it is concerned that this struggle affects its own security and that of other countries.  Ivanov added that Russia has concluded that political maneuvering prior to the 2000 elections is moving the United States away from the fundamental positions of strategic stability, which the United States and Russia have been working on in the last few years.  Ivanov also stressed the importance of expanding the awareness of international public opinion about issues of strategic stability.  According to Ivanov, the international community has to be aware of all the implications of US withdrawal from the ABM Treaty.
["Ministr Inostrannykh Del RF Igor Ivanov: 'V odnu diplomatiyu nelzya voyti dvazhdy,'" Vek, 12-18 November 1999, p. 9.]  {Entered 12/2/99 EV}
 
11/10/99: US-RUSSIA CONSULTATIONS ON ABM TREATY DELAYED
According to Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Ordzhonikidze, the scheduled 16 November 1999 round of US-Russia consultations on the ABM Treaty has been postponed at the request of the United States. Ordzhonikidze did not say when the consultations would resume.  Commenting on the UN General Assembly First Committee's draft resolution on the ABM Treaty passed on 6 November 1999, Ordzhonikidze said that the fact that some NATO states refrained from voting for the resolution indicates "a split in NATO on the question of ABM Treaty."
["Konsultatsii mezhdu Rossiyey i SShA po PRO otlozheny po prosbe Vashingtona," Interfax, 10 November 1999.] {Entered 11/12/99 EV}
 
11/6/99: UN COMMITTEE PASSES RUSSIAN-SPONSORED RESOLUTION CALLING FOR PRESERVATION OF ABM TREATY
On 6 November 1999 the First Main Committee of the UN General Assembly (Disarmament and International Security) passed a draft resolution calling for the preservation of, and continued compliance with, the ABM Treaty, ITAR-TASS reported.[1] The resolution, which was co-sponsored by Russia, China, and Belarus, was approved by a vote of 54-4, with 73 abstentions. The United States, Israel, Latvia, and Micronesia voted against the resolution, while most of Western Europe abstained.[2] The draft resolution will now go to the full General Assembly for consideration during its ongoing 54th session.  The text of the resolution calls for the parties to the ABM Treaty to preserve and strengthen it through full and strict compliance with its terms. It also calls on the parties to the treaty to refrain from the deployment of missile defense systems that cover their national territory.[2] The text also expresses the view that the violation of the ABM Treaty "will negatively affect the security of not only member states but of the entire international community, will lead to negative consequences for international peace, security, the strategic balance, and the nuclear disarmament process." [1] The United States is currently seeking to modify the ABM Treaty to allow for the deployment of limited national missile defense, which the treaty prohibits. Russia has opposed making such changes in the treaty.  Among Western European countries, France and Ireland were the only ones to vote in favor of the resolution, after the acceptance of an amendment which expressed concern with the widespread proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery.[2]  The United States delegate voted against both this amendment and against the resolution as a whole, arguing that the ABM Treaty is obsolete and does not create international stability, but only the illusion of such stability. The US delegate said that his country could not ignore the emergence of new threats or new technologies that might be used to protect against them, and said the ABM Treaty needed to be modified to reflect current realities.[2]  A number of European countries, led by Germany, abstained in the vote, saying that they could not support a resolution on the ABM Treaty that did not have the support of all state parties to the treaty.[2] The passage of this resolution, which had the support of a number of Asian, African, and Latin American countries, suggests that many states that are not parties to the ABM Treaty are concerned that the deployment of limited missile defenses by the United States and the possible collapse of the ABM Treaty could have negative consequences for international security.
Sources:
[1] ITAR-TASS, 6 November 1999; in "Three-Nation Resolution to Go to General Assembly," Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, http://web.lexis-nexis.com/universe.
[2] M2 Presswire, 8 November 1999; in "UN Draft Resolution Calling for Compliance with 1972 ABM Treaty Approved in Disarmament Committee," Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, http://web.lexis-nexis.com/universe.{entered 11/9/99 SDP} 
 
11/6/99: US STILL HOPES TO PERSUADE RUSSIA ON ABM TREATY AMENDMENTS
Describing US plans for a limited national missile defense system in a speech on 5 November 1999 at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (Johns Hopkins University), US Undersecretary of Defense Walter B. Slocombe argued that "the limited system we have in mind is fully compatible with the basic purpose of the ABM Treaty," which ensures that "each party's strategic deterrent is not threatened by the missile defenses of the other side."  Expressing frustration with Russian refusal to discuss amendments to the 1972 ABM Treaty, Slocombe stressed that if Russia "persists absolutely in that position, then the United States ... will have to face a very difficult question, which is whether to withdraw from the treaty."  In that case, "Russia will not gain anything from the destruction of the arms control framework," and "the consequences will be difficult for Russia," he concluded.[1]  Slocombe contended that "the real threat to the viability of the ABM Treaty in contemporary conditions comes not from efforts to modify it to reflect current reality ... rather, the threat would come from a fixed refusal to modify it."[2]  He reiterated the US position that rogue states such as North Korea, Iran, and Iraq, not Russia, constitute the principal threat to US national security.[3]  In the next 15 years, these rogue nations will be likely to field "intercontinental-range ballistic missiles that could deliver chemical, biological or nuclear weapons against the territory of the United States."[4]  Slocombe also argued that Russia "shares some responsibility for recognizing that rapid technological changes and new political realities require changes in the treaty."[4]  Slocombe expressed the hope that by summer 2000 Russia will agree to modify the treaty to allow the Untied States to deploy a national missile defense system,  as US President Clinton has said he will decide whether or not to deploy such a system at that time.[3]  Slocombe also announced that the US "will not permit any other country to have a veto on actions that may be needed for the defense of our nation."[4]  Commenting on Slocombe's speech, Duma International Affairs Committee Chairman Vladimir Lukin stated that "a revision of the ABM Treaty could mean that Russia would have to spend more on an assymetrical response--upgrading measures to circumvent a missile defense system."[5]  Lukin expressed confidence that Russia would find an inexpensive way to overcome any US missile defense system, "particularly the fragile system the US may build at the initial stage."  Lukin also said that the fate of START II was related to the future of the ABM Treaty.  Commenting on the "cooling" between Russia and the United States as a result of the dispute over the ABM Treaty, Lukin said that this chill in relations probably won't last long, "given that as a result of [the 2000] elections in Russia and America, people with a rational approach to solving serious problems will come to power."[6]
Sources:
[1] Xinhua News Agency, 5 November 1999; in "U.S. Threatens to Withdraw from ABM Treaty," Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, http://web.lexis-nexis.com.
[2] "Russian-U.S. Differences Over ABM Treaty Appear to Deepen," Jamestown Monitor, 11 November 1999.
[3] Robert Burns, "U.S. seeks to reassure Russia on proposed anti-missile system," Associated Press, 5 November 1999; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, http://web.lexis-nexis.com.
[4] Elizabeth Becker, "U.S. Seeks Missile System Despite Treaty Risk,"  New York Times, 6 November 1999, p. 8; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, http://web.lexis-nexis.com.
[5] Nikolay Zimin, "V voprose po PRO Amerikantsy budut iskhodit iskluchitelno iz svoikh natsionalnykh interesov," Segodnya, November 10, 1999, p. 2 ; in WPS Oborona i Bezopasnost, 12 November 1999.
[6] "Lukin--Russia WiMl [sic]  meet US Anti-Missile System," Interfax, 8 November 1999; in FBIS Document FTS19991108001155. {Entered 11/16/99 EV}
 
11/2/99: RUSSIA TESTS INTERCEPTOR MISSILE FOR MOSCOW ABM SYSTEM
Against the background of the ongoing US-Russian dispute over possible amendments to the ABM Treaty, the Russian Strategic Rocket Forces (SRF) on 2 November 1999 launched a 53T6 [NATO name 'Gazelle'] short-range interceptor missile at the Sary-Shagan testing range in Kazakhstan.[1]  According to SRF Commander-in-Chief Colonel General Vladimir Yakovlev, it was the first test launch of its kind since 1993.  The 53T6 missile is used to equip the A-135 anti-ballistic missile system deployed around Moscow.   According to Jane's Intelligence Review, this missile has an effective intercepting range of 80km and is armed with an AA-84 thermonuclear warhead.[3] The Moscow anti-ballistic missile system includes the full complement of 100 interceptor missiles permitted by the ABM Treaty.  The system has a dual defense against ballistic missiles.  According to the Washington Post, "if radars spot incoming missiles, Russia could launch up to 36 longer-range SH-11 Gorgon missiles.  Should any missiles penetrate this layer, the system also has 64 short-range SH-08 Gazelle missiles, which are quick-reaction, high-acceleration interceptors."[2]  The missile tested was withdrawn from combat duty in a silo launcher near Moscow and transferred to Kazakhstan for the test launch.  Yakovlev said that the aim of the test was to extend the missile system's service life, adding that its success confirmed the combat readiness of the interceptor missile, and extend its planned service life by 12.5 years.[1,3]   Interfax reported that this statement suggests that the missiles involved in the test have been deployed for some time.[4,2]   Ivan Safranchuk, an analyst with the PIR Center for Policy Studies in Russia, said that the test served as a reminder that Russia has an operational missile defense system, and that it may decide to modernize it. Yakovlev himself pointed out that the test should be viewed as illustrating a possible symmetrical and asymmetrical response by Russia to US plans to deploy limited national missile defenses.[5]  According to Reuters, an anonymous US State Department Official said that the United States found the test launch "distressing," and that "Russia is raising the specter of an arms competition when what we're trying to do is work cooperatively with them to focus on rogue states."   In his public comments on the Russian test, US Defense Secretary William Cohen said that he was not sure what point Russia was trying to make with its test.  "It only proves they have an Anti-Ballistic Missile system, which we do not, " Cohen said. [6]  The United States briefly deployed an ABM system at Grand Forks, North Dakota, but dismantled it over 20 years ago.
Sources:
[1] Nikolai Novichkov, "Test aimed at extending missile life," Jane's Defense Weekly, 10 November 1999, p. 4.
[2] David Hoffman, "Russia Test-Fires Interceptor Missile; Military Lobs Warning Shot to Counter Talk of U.S. National Defense System," Washington Post, 4 November 1999, p. A25; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, http://web.lexis-nexis.com.
[3] Steven J. Zaloga, "Moscow's ABM shield continues to crumble," Jane's Intelligence Review,  February 1999, p. 12.
[4] "Russian Anti-Missile Rocket Tested in Kazakhstan," Interfax, 3 November 1999.
[5] Vladimir Isachenkov, "Russia highlights its forces amid war of nerves on nuclear treaty," Associated Press,  5 November 1999; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, http://web.lexis-nexis.com.
[6] "Unconfirmed Russian Missile Test Underscores ABM Tensions," Monitor, 5 November 1999. {Entered 11/22/99 EV}
 
11/2/99: YELTSIN WARNS CLINTON ON ABM TREATY
Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin gave President Clinton a letter from his Russian counterpart Boris Yeltsin regarding the 1972 ABM Treaty at their 2 November 1999 Oslo meeting, ITAR-TASS reported.  In his letter, Yeltsin argued that the deployment of an anti-ballistic missile system on US territory would violate the 1972 ABM Treaty and result in extremely dangerous consequences for the entire disarmament process.  Yeltsin's letter also contended that "strict observance of the ABM Treaty and all other agreements in the field of arms limitation and reduction, combined with political and diplomatic efforts at different levels, will make it possible to counteract the threats by which the United States tries to justify its plans for deploying a national ABM system."[1]  Yeltsin also sent messages regarding the ABM Treaty to the UN Secretary-General, the heads of other G-8 states, China, India, the Republic of South Africa, and Sweden.  Yeltsin called the situation "disturbing," noting that the United States' latest steps towards a national missile defense system will create serious negative consequences for international stability and security.  Yeltsin added that although only a small number of states are parties to the ABM Treaty, it affects the security interests of all states.[2]
Sources:
[1] "Yeltsin Warns Clinton Not to Undermine ABM Treaty," ITAR-TASS, 2 November 1999; in "Yeltsin Tells Clinton of ABM Treaty Failure Fears," FBIS Document FTS19991102001631.
[2]  "Soobsheniye ot 03.11.99: O poslaniyakh prezidenta Rossii po voprosu o situatsii, skladyvayusheysya vokrug dogovora po PRO," Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs press release, http://www.ln.mid.ru. {Entered 11/15/99 EV}
 
10/28/99: IVANOV REITERATES RUSSIAN POSITION ON ABM TREATY
Addressing a meeting organized by the Diplomatic Press Association and the Franco-Russian Press Association in Paris on 28 October 1999, Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov said that "there is not and cannot be any bargaining with the Americans" over the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty.[1]   According to RIA Novosti, Ivanov emphasized that "there is no talk of moving aside from the ABM Treaty on the part of Russia."  He underlined the importance of the agreements reached at the Cologne summit by presidents Yeltsin and Clinton.[2]  Expressing apparent frustration at uncertainty about the Clinton administration's  policy toward the ABM Treaty, Ivanov said, "we heard a lot of various contradictory statements on the part of the US administration" and expressed the hope that ongoing consultations with the United States would "clarify the US administration's real approach to the ABM Treaty."[1]
Sources:
[1] ITAR-TASS, 28 October 1999; in "Ivanov: No Bargaining With US Over ABM," FBIS Document FTS19991028000913.
[2] RIA Novosti, 28 October 1999; in "Ivanov: Russia Sticks To Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty," FBIS Document FTS19991028001766. {Entered 11/17/99 EV}
 
10/21/99: US-RUSSIA CONSULTATIONS ON ABM, START III HELD IN MOSCOW
Another round of US-Russia consultations on ABM and START III issues was held on 21 October 1999 in Moscow.  The two-day talks were led by Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Grigoriy Berdennikov and US Deputy Secretary of State John Holum.[1]  Commenting on the results of these consultations, anonymous Russian diplomatic sources told Interfax that no progress was made on US proposals to amend the terms of the ABM Treaty to permit limited national missile defense.  Russia continues to regard all US proposals to amend the ABM Treaty as fundamentally altering it. According to the diplomats, Russia refuses to accept the revision of the ABM Treaty's provisions since it "does not want to be an accomplice to the erosion of strategic stability in the world," the sources added. Russian diplomats have warned that any US deployment of national missile defenses may trigger a renewed nuclear arms race. The anonymous Russian diplomats also complained that the United States is not giving any guarantees that the ABM system will not be enhanced in the future. Russian officials have argued that the US could use the components of a limited national ballistic missile defense system as the basis for an expanded system in the future, in effect making a limited system indistinguishable from a full-scale defensive system. The diplomats also stressed that if the US unilaterally deploys an ABM system, Russia will consider the limitations imposed by START I, START II, and the INF treaties no longer valid. According to Interfax, Russia will only continue to cooperate with the United States on ABM issues if the Treaty is preserved.[2]
Sources:
[1] "V Moskve nachalis rossiysko-amerikanskye konsultatsii po SNV i PRO," Interfax, 21 October 1999.
[2] "Nikakikh podvizhek mezhdu RF i SShA po voprosu 'Adaptatsii Dogovora po PRO net i bit ne mozhet,'" Interfax, 22 October 1999. {entered 11/1/99 EV}
 
10/20/99: MILITARY OFFICIALS SAY RUSSIA PREPARED FOR US ABROGATION OF ABM TREATY
Colonel General Vladimir Yakovlev, commander of the Strategic Rocket Forces (RSVN), told Interfax on 20 October 1999 that Russia is prepared to take "countermeasures" if the United States decides to unilaterally abrogate the ABM Treaty and deploy a limited national missile defense system (NMD). Although the United States argues that its limited NMD would not be directed against Russia, Yakovlev said that the Russian military was considering about 20 possible countermeasures "that could be put into effect without significantly increasing expenditures." Among these he mentioned reinstituting patrols by rail-mobile SS-24 ICBMs, which have been suspended since 1991, and increasing the patrol areas used by road-mobile SS-25 missiles, which are currently limited by the START I treaty. The removal of these restrictions would greatly improve the ability of these systems to overcome any US missile defense system, Yakovlev added. Yakovlev concluded that "the history of arms development provides reason to conclude that "the shield is always weaker than the sword." Anonymous Russian military sources told Interfax that they expect the United States will decide to deploy NMD, whether or not Russia agrees to amend the ABM Treaty to permit it.  They contended that "it is only a matter of time" until such a decision is made publicly. [Officially, the Clinton administration has said it will not decide whether to deploy a limited NMD until June 2000.] Nevertheless, Interfax reported that many Russian military leaders do not believe that the deployment of limited NMD by the United States will decrease the effectiveness of Russia's nuclear deterrent. The believe that the same measures that were devised a decade ago to counter the Reagan administration's "Star Wars" initiative will prove equally effective against the planned limited NMD system. Many Russian military planners also do not believe that the United States will be able to develop and deploy an NMD that could protect against a large-scale nuclear attack, such as Russia is capable of launching. The main impact of US withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, Russian military sources told Interfax, will be on the entire system of limitations on strategic offensive nuclear weapons. Yakovlev pointedly noted that any US violation of the ABM Treaty would threaten START I, START II, and the proposed START III agreements. Yakovlev cautioned that if these agreements were to collapse, it would cause a major decrease in military transparency between the United States and Russia, as inspections of nuclear weapons facilities would cease. Instead of amending the ABM Treaty, Russian military officials suggest intensified collaborative efforts with the United States to improve monitoring of missile developments and launches in third countries, such as the establishment of joint monitoring centers.[1] The same day, Colonel General Valeriy Manilov, first deputy chief of the Russian General Staff, said that Moscow "will not compromise" on the provisions of the ABM Treaty. Ivashov reitereated the official Russian view that the ABM Treaty, START I, START II and START III are part of a single package, and "can only be implemented together." He concluded that Moscow views "as a threat" efforts to "destroy the existing system of arms control treaties," making a slightly veiled reference to US efforts to amend the ABM Treaty.[2]  These reports suggest that some Russian officials may be exaggerating the threat presented by the possible US deployment of NMD for domestic political purposes or to secure additional concessions from the United States.
Sources:
[1]"Moskva gotova k 'assimetrichnomu otvetu' na vykhod SShA iz dogovora po PRO," Interfax, 20 October 1999.
[2] "Rossiya ne poydet na kompromiss s SShA po voprosu peresmotra dogovora po PRO--general Manilov," Interfax, 20 October 1999. {entered 10/22/99 sdp}
 
10/20/99: FOREIGN MINISTRY BLASTS US PROPOSALS TO CHANGE ABM TREATY
The United States should abandon its plans to deploy a national missile defense and cease trying to negotiate changes to the ABM Treaty that would allow such a deployment, sources at the Russian Foreign Ministry told Interfax on 20 October 1999.  Foreign Ministry spokesman Vladimir Rakhmanin categorically stated the same day that "Russia will not conduct any trading with respect to the ABM Treaty," suggesting that Russia will not exchange agreement to changes in the ABM Treaty for concessions on other related arms control issues. Anonymous diplomatic sources told the agency that Moscow regards "any changes in the key provisions of the treaty as unacceptable, and the Russian side does not intend to change its position." Since Article 1 of the ABM Treaty forbids the deployment of missile defense systems which cover the entire territory of the signatories, this position would appear to preclude Russian acceptance of any amendments which would permit limited national missile defense. The foreign ministry sources emphasized that the United States should give up its attempts to modify the ABM Treaty "if it cares about preserving the [international] nonproliferation regime and continuing the process of strategic arms reductions." Rakhmanin noted that Moscow views a START III agreement as possible only if the ABM Treaty remains essentially unchanged. Russian officials have repeatedly warned that if the US unilaterally withdraws from the ABM Treaty, it would force Russia to reconsider its adherence to START I and START II, and could trigger a renewed arms race. The foreign ministry sources also noted that to date, expert talks on ABM Treaty issues between the United States and Russia had not succeeded in resolving the wide gap that separates their positions. They added that the United States wants the proposed START III agreement, on which Russia wants to open formal talks as soon as possible, to be discussed as part of a "package" which includes changes to the ABM Treaty.[1] Some US officials believe that the harsh Russian position may be a bargaining ploy, designed to obtain additional concessions from the United States. Russian officials, however, say they are simply being blunt, and argue that the Clinton administration has understated the political and military risks of its missile defense plans.[2]  A further round of bilateral talks on ABM and START III was scheduled to begin in Moscow on 21 October 1999.
Sources:
[1] "SShA dolzhny otkazatsya ot planov sozdaniya natsionalnoy sistemy PRO i popytok peresmotra polozheniy dogovora po PRO--MID RF," Interfax, 20 October 1999.
[2] Michael R. Gordon, "Russians Firmly Reject US Plan to Reopen ABM Treaty, New York Times, 21 October 1999, p. 3.{entered 10/21/99 SDP}
 
10/19/99: FOREIGN MINISTRY DENIES REPORTED RADAR ASSISTANCE OFFER
The Press and Information Department of the Russian Foreign Ministry told Interfax on 19 October 1999 that "there is no basis" for press reports that the United States has offered to assist Russia with the construction of a radar site near Irkutsk in return for agreement on changes to the ABM Treaty. The Washington Post and other major US newspapers had published detailed reports about such an offer on 17 October 1999. The foreign ministry noted that it was conducting strategic stability talks with the United States, which include discussions of the ABM Treaty, and pointed out that it "coordinates the work of other Russian agencies in this area," implying that it would be aware of any proposals like that described in those newspaper reports. The United States is seeking changes in the ABM Treaty that would allow the deployment of limited national missile defenses, which are prohibited by Article 1 of the treaty. Interfax noted that the United States argues such a system is necessary to defend against the possible threat from "unstable" regimes, such as Iran and North Korea, but added that "US intelligence agencies" have also claimed that Russia poses a nuclear threat to the United States, suggesting that a limited missile defense could also be employed against Russia. The foreign ministry told Interfax that the Russian position on amending the ABM Treaty remains "unchanged," and that "the Russian side opposes re-examining this treaty, regarding it as the cornerstone of global strategic stability." The foreign ministry also contended that US policy aimed at altering the ABM treaty is a "continuation of the same hard line aimed at creating a unipolar world that was demonstrated by the refusal of the US Senate to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty." Russian officials often use the term "unipolar world" to criticize US policies that they view as aimed at establishing US hegemony.
["MID RF oprovergayet soobshcheniya o tom, chto SShA yakoby predlozhil RF pomoshch v obmen na soglasiye vnesti korrektivy v dogovor PRO," Interfax, 19 October 1999] {entered 10/20/99 SDP}
 
10/17/99: US OFFERS TO TRADE RADAR ASSISTANCE FOR ABM TREATY CHANGES
The Clinton administration has offered to help Russia complete a key early-warning radar site in Siberia in return for renegotiation of the 1972 ABM Treaty, the Washington Post reported on 17 October 1999.  According to the report, sometime in September 1999, [perhaps at the 17 September 1999 Talbott-Mamedov meeting on strategic stability] US officials offered to assist Russia in completing the radar at Mishelevka, Irutsk Oblast, in return for Russia's agreement to modify the ABM Treaty.  The report said that the proposal to help complete the radar was just one of several potential forms of cooperation that US officials have suggested might go forward if agreement was reached on modifying the ABM Treaty to allow limited missile defense. Other possible cooperative measures suggested by the US include: joint computer simulations of antimissile systems; expanded intelligence sharing on threats from rogue states; collaboration in developing missile launch early warning satellites; a joint presence at one US and one Russian radar site; and joint exercises in battlefield missile defense. US officials have also suggested sharing US radar data with Russia, and have even discussed the possibility of US mediation with Azerbaijan to help Russia regain the use of a former Soviet early warning radar site at Lyaki, Azerbaijan, which would cover the Middle East. By suggesting these collaborative measures, US negotiators are trying to convince their Russian interlocutors that Russia and the US have a common interest in guarding against rogue states that may soon be able to deploy intercontinental ballistic missile capable of reaching targets in Russia and the United States.  "We've told the Russians we're prepared to be pretty far-reaching in cooperation," said one US official, while another emphasized that the US desire to field a limited national ballistic missile defense is not directed against Russia, but rather designed to address a threat that Washington feels should concern Moscow as well.  Russian officials, however, while willing to listen to US proposals, have so far shown no willingness to seriously consider modifying the ABM Treaty.  "We're not at the point where we have substantial feedback from the Russians that any of these proposals might bear fruit," a US official admitted.
["US Offers Aid to Russia on Radar Site," Washington Post, 17 October 1999, http://www. washingtonpost.com/]{entered 10/20/99 SDP}
 
10/3/99: RUSSIA CRITICAL OF US ABM INTERCEPTOR TEST
Russian Foreign Ministry spokesman Vladimir Rakhmanin sharply criticized the 3 October 1999 US test of an anti-missile interceptor exoatmospheric kill vehicle (EKV), Reuters reported.[1]  In the test, an EKV launched from the Marshall Islands intercepted and destroyed a modified Minuteman intercontinental ballistic missile fired from California. The launch sites were 4,300 miles apart.  The test was part of a planned series in the US Department of Defense Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO) program to develop a limited national missile defense system.  The BMDO plans to conduct two more EKV tests before President Clinton's decision on deployment of such a system, planned for summer 2000.[2]  Rakhmanin complained that the test not only violated key provisions of the ABM Treaty, but also said it undermined the global arms control system and the nonproliferation regime. Rakhmanin reiterated Russia's insistence on preserving the ABM Treaty, stating that it remains the most important element for securing strategic stability in the world and continuing the process of nuclear disarmament.[1]  Following the test, the commander of the Russian Strategic Rocket Forces, Colonel-General Vladimir Yakovlev, said that the deployment of a national missile defense system in the United States would jeopardize key strategic arms control agreements such as START I, START II, START III, and the Treaty on Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons.  If these agreements collapsed,  he threatened,  Russia would would no longer be bound by their terms. He pointed out that US inspection teams can currently visit Russian nuclear sites under the terms of START I, but would be unable to do so if that treaty collapses.  Also responding to the US interceptor test, Chairman of the Duma Defense Committee Roman Popkovich said that in order to overcome the US national missile defense system and maintain strategic parity with the United States, Russia should create new weapons systems.[3]
Sources:
[1] Gareth Jones, "Russia says US anti-missile test violates ABM deal," Reuters, 5 October 1999; in  Johnson's Russia List, 6 October 1999.
[2] Jonathan S. Landay, "Fallout from US antimissile success Saturday's display of US defense prowness may harm relations with Russia, China," Christian Science Monitor, 4 October 1999; in http://proquest.umi.com/.
[3] Yevgeniy Antonov, "Bokovoy manyevr Rossii: Dogovoritsya po PRO Moskve i Vashingtonu meshayut vybory," Vremya MN, 12 October 1999. {Entered 1/19/00 EV}
 
9/17/99: RUSSIA-US GROUP FOR STRATEGIC STABILITY MEET IN WASHINGTON
The Russia-US group for strategic stability held a meeting in Washington, DC on 17 September 1999. The delegations were led by Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Georgiy Mamedov and US Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott. The discussions at the session addressed the ABM Treaty, strategic arms reduction treaties, and the prospects for further changes in the 1990 Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty. According to ITAR-TASS, the talks made no progress in resolving the ongoing US-Russia dispute over amending the ABM Treaty. The US would like to amend the treaty to allow limited national missile defense, and the Clinton administration has announced that it will decide in the summer of 2000 whether or not to deploy such a system. To date, Russian officials have consistently opposed making changes to the treaty. If the United States decides to withdraw from the ABM Treaty in a year, Russia would reconsider its commitment to the whole range of its disarmament accords with the United States, including START I, START II and the proposed START III, an anonymous member of the Russian delegation told ITAR-TASS.
[Andrey Shitov, ITAR-TASS, 18 September 1999; in "Russia-US Strategic Stability Group Meets 18 Sep," FBIS Document FTS19990918000325.] {Entered 10/4/99 EV}
 
9/13/99: COHEN CONSIDERS AGREEMENT WITH RUSSIA ON ABM POSSIBLE
Russian Defense Minister Igor Sergeyev and his counterpart US Secretary of Defense William Cohen held talks on arms control issues on 13 September 1999 in Moscow.[1]  Cohen said it was the first time he had talked with his Russian counterparts about US plans to amend the ABM Treaty.[2]  In an interview with Ekho Moskvy radio Cohen expressed his belief that the 1972 ABM Treaty could be modified in a way that would "take into account" both Russian and US concerns.[1,2]  Reiterating Russia's reservation on the prospects for amending the treaty, Sergeyev expressed Moscow's desire to improve military relations with the US.  During the same day the two sides signed an agreement on the creation of the Y2K Center for Strategic Stability in Colorado for monitoring the transition to the year 2000.[1]  The head of the Defense Committee in the State Duma, Roman Popkovich, told RFE/RL that in his view the US proposals to modify the treaty were "unacceptable."  However he stressed that some changes could be discussed on the condition that the US makes its proposals for building a new anti-missile system more transparent.[2]
Sources:
[1] "Cohen Says Agreement on ABM Possible ...," Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty News line, 14 September 1999.
[2] Sophie Lambroschini, "Russia: Headway Made With U.S. On ABM Treaty Talks," Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Magazine,15 September 1999. {Entered 9/16/99 EV}
 
9/10/99: ALBRIGHT AND IVANOV DISAGREE OVER ABM ISSUES
US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov held a meeting on 10 September 1999 in Auckland, New Zealand during the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum (APEC). Albright confirmed the US desire to amend the ABM Treaty to permit limited national missile defense, while Ivanov reiterated the Russian viewpoint that the ABM Treaty remains "the core of strategic stability," suggesting that Russia continues to oppose amending it.
["Russia, US Try Again At Arms Control," Associated Press, 10 September 1999.] {Entered 10/6/99 EV}
 
9/8/99: AN ADDITIONAL ROUND OF US-RUSSIA CONSULTATIONS HELD IN MOSCOW
An additional round of informal consultations on strategic stability, including consultations on the ABM and START III treaties, was held 8-9 September 1999 in Moscow under the leadership of US Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott and Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Georgiy Mamedov.[1]  During the first meeting the two sides discussed proposals for a START III Treaty and US plans to modify the ABM Treaty.[3]  Mamedov reiterated the Russian opposition to making any changes in the provisions of the 1972 ABM Treaty.[2]  The US renewed its proposals to make "modest" changes to the ABM Treaty that would permit Russia and the US to deploy limited defenses against rogue states with ballistic missiles.[3]  During the first day of the consultations the two sides reached a deadlock over issues related to the ABM Treaty and adjourned pending consultations with their respective presidents.[4]  On 8 September Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin discussed the ABM impasse and other related issues in a one-hour telephone conversation. However, the presidents did not make any progress toward resolving the impasse.[5] The next round of Russian-US consultations will be held in September in Washington within the framework of the bilateral group for strategic stability.[6]
Sources:
[1] "Russian, US Deputy Foreign Chiefs Discuss ABM Treaty," Interfax, 8 September 1999.
[2] "Ocherednoy raund konsultatsiy RF-SShA po PRO i SNV proydyet v kontse sleduyushchey nedeli v Vashingtone," Interfax, 9 September 1999.
[3] Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 9 September 1999; in "Talbott Resumes Disarmament Talks in Moscow," Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, http://web.lexis-nexis.com.
[4] "Uchastniki konsultatsiy RF-SShA v Moskve po PRO i SNV vsyali taim-aut do telefonnogo razgovora Yeltsina i Klintona," Interfax, 8 September 1999.
[5] David Sands, "U.S. Considers Placing Missiles at Alaska Sites; Defense System Plan Angers Russia," Washington Times, 9 September 1999, p. A17; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, http://web.lexis-nexis.com.
[6] "Russia, U.S. to Discuss START, ABM Next Week in Washington," Interfax, 9 September 1999. {Entered 10/4/99 EV}
 
8/20/99: LUKIN DOES NOT RULE OUT ABM TREATY AMENDMENTS
Duma International Affairs Committee Chairman Vladimir Lukin does not rule out amendments to the ABM Treaty if they do not change its core provisions.  In an interview with Interfax, Lukin said that understanding "the directions in which the Americans intend to adjust the ABM Treaty...would ease the State Duma debate on the START II Treaty ratification."  Until the scope of the changes desired by the United States is clear, said Lukin, there is no reason to ratify START II.  Lukin also stressed his view that START III parameters should be discussed before START II is ratified.  Commenting on the fact that the Clinton administration links opening formal START III negotiations to the ratification of START II, Lukin said that such problems could be resolved at the level of informal consultations.  He concluded, "the work on START III can be formalized after START II ratification."
["Glava komiteta Gosdumy po mezhdunarodnym delam dopuskayet vozmozhnost vneseniya izmeneniy v dogovor po PRO," Interfax, 20 August 1999.] {Entered  10/4/99 EV}
 
 8/17-19/99: US-RUSSIA CONSULTATIONS ON ABM AND START III HELD IN MOSCOW
The first US-Russian consultations on the ABM and START III treaties at the expert level were held in Moscow on 17-19 August 1999.  US Under Secretary of State John Holum and Director of the Russian Foreign Ministry's Security and Disarmament Department Grigory Berdennikov headed the two delegations.[1]  In addition to ABM and START III issues, the experts discussed START II and Y2K problems.[2]  According to the Russian Foreign Ministry's press communique, Russia and the US confirmed that the ABM Treaty remains the cornerstone of strategic stability and expressed their readiness to begin negotiations on START III immediately after the ratification of START II.  During the consultations both sides outlined their approaches to the ABM Treaty and "to further efforts to strengthen it and to enhance its viability and efficiency."[3,4] However, the sides did not discuss any concrete proposals on this matter.[3]  In his press statement after the first round of consultations Berdennikov said that any plans to develop a nationwide missile defense system could upset the current strategic balance and initiate a new arms race.[5]  Berdennikov stated that Russia sees no practical need for modifying the ABM Treaty.  Consequently, US plans to deploy a nationwide ABM system would not only "infringe" upon Russia's interests and "make Russia withdraw from the earlier signed START II Treaty," but would violate the 1972 ABM Treaty, the diplomat said.[6]  However, Bedennikov emphasized that Russia is ready to discuss any proposals aimed at enhancing the treaty's viability.[5] Colonel General Leonid Ivashov, the head of the Defense Ministry's international cooperation directorate, said that the new arms control talks were doomed by the US plan to change the ABM Treaty.[7]  According to Interfax, consultations will be continued in September in Washington by the Russian-US group for strategic stability, which will be headed by Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Georgiy Mamedov and US Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott.[8]
Sources:
[1] "U.S. Hopes for Constructive Arms Limitation Talks," Interfax, 17 August 1999.
[2] "Konsultatsii Rossiya-SShA po PRO i SNV prokhodyat v konstruktivnoy obstanovke-MID," Interfax, 18 August 1999.
[3] "Rossiya i SShA podtverzhdayut, chto dogovor po PRO ostayetsya krayeugolnim kamnem strategicheskoy stabilnosti," Interfax, 19 August 1999.
[4] "US, Russian Negotiators Agree on ABM's Importance," Interfax, 19 August 1991; FBIS Document FTS19990819000610
[5]  "Rossiya ne vidit prichin dlya izmeneniya klyuchevyikh polozheniy dogovora po PRO-MID RF," Interfax, 19 August 1999.
[6]  Oleg Osipov, RIA Novosti, 19 August 1999; in"US ABM System Will 'Infringe' Interests," FBIS Document FTS19990819001345.
[7]  "Russian Official Says U.S. Arms Talks Failed," Reuters, 20 August 1999.
[8] "Vashington nastroyen na konstruktivnuyu rabotu s Moskvoy, zayavlyayet predstavitel SShA pered konsultatsiyami po PRO i SNV-3," Interfax, 17 August 1999. {Entered 9/27/99 EV}
 
7/27/99: STEPASHIN URGES US TO WORK WITH RUSSIA TOWARD A "GLOBAL SECURITY SYSTEM"
During high-level Russia-US talks in Washington on 27 July 1999, Russian Prime Minister Sergey Stepashin reiterated Russia's readiness to begin discussions on START III and the ABM Treaty and announced his intention to raise the question of START II ratification with the Duma in the fall.[1]  In his discussion with President Clinton and Vice President Al Gore, Stepashin spoke of Russia's concern about the emerging threat of missile attacks from "unstable regimes" and said that the two nations should work together toward a "global security system."[2]
Sources:
[1] Konstantin Levin, "Across the Ocean Stepashin Glimpses His Presidential Future,"  Kommersant, 29 July 1999, p. 1; in "Stepashin 'Blunders' Fail to Mar Gore Talks," FBIS Document  FTS19990729000573.
[2] Jonathan Weisman, " U.S., Russia to Develop a Joint Missile Defense: 'Unstable Regimes' Identified as Threat," Baltimore Sun, 1 August 1999.  {Entered 9/17/99 EV}
 
6/20/99: US-RUSSIA COLOGNE AGREEMENT TO HOLD START III, ABM TALKS ON 17-19 AUGUST
A summit meeting between Presidents Bill Clinton and Boris Yeltsin was held on 20 June 1999 in Cologne, Germany on the last day of the annual summit of the Group of Eight nations.  The two presidents agreed to hold preliminary consultations on START III and to begin discussions on "possibly reopening" the 1972 ABM treaty on 17-19 August in Moscow.[1,2]  US Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott will be the head of the US delegation to the talks.  According to Sandy Berger, President Clinton's national security adviser, this is the first time that Russia has agreed to discuss changes to the ABM treaty.[2]  In the Russia-US joint statement released in Cologne the two sides recognized the "fundamental importance" of the treaty and reaffirmed their current obligations under Article XIII: "to consider possible changes in the strategic situation that have a bearing on the ABM Treaty and, as appropriate, possible proposals for further increasing the viability of this Treaty."  The two governments also pledged to "do everything in their power to facilitate the successful completion of the START II ratification processes in both countries."[3,4]  In an interview with Ekho Moskvy radio on 22 June, Kremlin spokesman Dmitriy Yakushkin called the US plans to amend the ABM Treaty "very unwelcome tendencies," and stressed that Moscow continued to view the ABM Treaty as a "cornerstone of political stability."[5]  Despite the agreement to consider possible changes to the ABM Treaty, Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov said that the US plan to deploy the nation-wide ABM system "is dangerous and can destroy the basis of strategic stability and the whole disarmament process" and expressed hope that "Russia and the US will be factors of stability and security."[6]
Sources:
[1]  ITAR-TASS,  30 July 1999, in "Russian-US START-3, ABM Talks Set For 17-19 August," FBIS Document FTS19990730001229.
[2] "U.S., Russia to revisit arms control questions; Clinton, Yeltsin mend rift over Kosovo," Star Tribune, 21 June 1999, p.1A; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, http://web.lexis-nexis.com.
[3] Vladimir Abarinov, "Yeltsin peresmotrit Dogovor po protivoraketnoy oborone," Izvestiya online edition, http://win.www.online.ru/rproducts/izvestia-
izvestia-year/29-Jun-99/16.rhtml, 29 June 1999.
[4]  "Joint Statement Between the United States And The Russian Federation Concerning Strategic Offensive And Defensive Arms And Further Strengthening Of Stability," 20 June 1999, Moscow Institute for Physics and Technology Website, http://www.armscontrol.ru.
[5] "Russia still sees ABM changes as dangerous," United Communications Group, Periscope Daily Defense Capsules, 23 June 1999; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, http://web.lexis-nexis.com.
[6]  ITAR-TASS, 22 June 1999; in "START II Russia's Top Priority," FBIS Document FTS 19990622001030. {entered 9/13/99 EV}
 
3/22/99: MASLYUKOV SAYS RUSSIA SHOULD NOT RECONSIDER ABM TREATY
First Deputy Prime Minister Yuriy Maslyukov believes that the arguments put forward by the United States to justify the revision of the ABM Treaty to allow the deployment of limited national missile defenses (NMD), are "insufficiently considered," ITAR-TASS reported on 22 March 1999.  Maslyukov's press spokesman, Anton Surikov, said the first deputy prime minister also does not agree with proposals that Russia should cooperate with the United States to build a missile defense system to defend against possible threats from the Middle East and North Africa. A US congressional delegation visiting Moscow on 16 March 1999 made a proposal along these lines. According to Surikov, Maslyukov thinks that financial constraints make it impossible for Russia to consider working on the joint development of NMD. Any funds spent on NMD by Russia would have to be diverted from other "top priorities," such as "the Topol-M (SS-27) missile complex, liason and guidance systems, [early] warning equipment, information support, and crucially important types of conventional weapons," noted Surikov.  In any event, argued Surikov, "the nuclear missile-threat to Russia from 'third world' nations is being greatly overblown." As an alternative to NMD, Surikov said that Maslyukov supports efforts "to boost the international non-proliferation of nuclear arms and toughen control over the export of technologies that can be used for the production of weapons of mass destruction. Maslyukov emphasized that Russia is prepared for broad international cooperation in this area, which he termed "more preferable than binding the country into a race of strategic armaments," implying that development of NMD systems could trigger an offensive arms race among the nuclear powers.
["Russia's Attitude Toward ABM Treaty is Unchanged--First Deputy Premier Maslyukov," ITAR-TASS, 22 March 1999; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, http://www.lexis-nexis.com]{entered 3/23/99 SDP}
 
3/20/99: DEFENSE MINISTER SLAMS US MISSILE DEFENSE PLANS
Russian Defense Minister Igor Sergeyev, on a visit to India, harshly criticized US plans to deploy a national missile defense (NMD) system, Interfax reported on 20 March 1999. Sergeyev said that the 17 March 1999 decision by the US Senate, endorsing deployment of a limited NMD system, undermines "the principles of strategic stability in the world."   He added, "We are extremely concerned by this issue. It can potentially destroy the entire system of treaties on reducing strategic offensive weapons." Sergeyev also pointed out that Russia is not the only country concerned with the US plans for NMD. "We fully share China's negative reaction to the decision of the US Senate.  India cannot help being concerned by it," he concluded. Russian analysts have argued that a US NMD deployment could catalyze an offensive nuclear arms race among the other nuclear powers.
["Russian Defense Minister: United States Withdrawal from ABM Treaty Bad for Relations," Interfax, 20 March 1999.]{entered 3/23/99 SDP}
 
3/18/99: FOREIGN MINISTRY CRITICIZES US SENATE VOTE ON MISSILE DEFENSE
The Russian Foreign Ministry issued a statement on 18 March 1999 criticizing the approval by the US Senate of the National Missile Defense Act of 1999.  The statement assessed the legislation as leading "to the destruction of the 1972 ABM Treaty and together with it the entire structure of agreements on the reduction of strategic offensive weapons."[1] On 17 March 1999, the Senate voted 97-3 to pass the bill, which declares: "It is the policy of the United States to deploy as soon as is technologically possible an effective National Missile Defense system capable of defending the territory of the United States against limited ballistic missile attack (whether accidental, unauthorized, or deliberate)."[2] Similar legislation passed the US House of Representatives on 18 March 1999 by a vote of 317-105. [3] A House-Senate conference committe will hammer out an agreed text for the final version of the bill, which President Clinton, who had previously threatened to veto similar legislation, has indicated he will sign.[4] The Russian Foreign Ministry statement emphasized that the deployment of a national missile defense system is a violation of the ABM Treaty, and said that the assertions of the Clinton adminstration that a decision on whether or not to deploy such a system would not be made until 2000 did not substantially soften the negative impact of the proposed legislation on "the stability of the strategic situation." Reiterating a long-standing Russian position, the statement said that the ABM Treaty and the START I and START II treaties are "like two component parts of one whole," and noted that when Russia signed START I it had explicitly stated that it would withdraw from the treaty if the United States withdrew from the ABM Treaty.[1] Since economic constraints severely limit Russian strategic nuclear forces, regardless of treaty limits, the implicit threat contained in the statement may not have any significant impact on the US debate over national missile defenses.
Sources:
[1] "Prinyatiye senatom SShA zakonoproyekta o razvertyvanii natsionalnoy PRO--eto liniya na razrusheniye vsey struktury soglasheniy o sokrashenii SNV--MID RF," Interfax, 18 March 1999.
[2] S. 257,  Missile Defense Act of 1999 (Engrossed in Senate), 17 March 1999; in Thomas: Legislative Information on the Internet, http://www.thomas.loc.gov.
[3]  H.R. 4, "To declare it to be the policy of the United States to deploy a national missile defense (Engrossed in House), 18 March 1999; in Thomas, Legislative Information on the Internet, http://www.thomas.loc.gov.
[4 ] Sean Scully, "House Democrats Follow Senate on Defense," Washington Times, 19 March 1999.{entered 3/19/99 SDP}
 
3/16/99: US CONGRESSIONAL SUPPORTERS OF MISSILE DEFENSE RECEIVE COLD RESPONSE IN MOSCOW
A US Congressional delegation that traveled to Moscow on 16 March to discuss US plans for national missile defenses with Russian parliamentarians received a cold reception in Moscow, according to Russian and Western media reports. A member of the delegation, Rep. Curt Weldon (R-PA), told Interfax that the trip was intended to explain pending legislation in the US Congress which would declare that it is the policy of the United States to deploy a national ballistic missile defense (NMD) system. Weldon admitted that the deployment of such a system would probably require "certain changes in the ABM Treaty." Weldon and his delegation told their Russian colleagues that the missile defense system the United States was considering deploying would be aimed at protecting the country against "nuclear strikes from pariah states," such as Iran, Iraq, and  North Korea. He pointed out that any such system would take at least five years to deploy, and especially emphasized to his Russian interlocutors that the upcoming congressional vote on the missile defense would not be "directed against Russia." He added that the delegation had proposed to the Russian parliamentarians that the United States and Russia jointly develop missile defenses against "pariah states."[1] After the meeting, Weldon admitted to AP that "I would not say the reception was overwhelmingly positive," although he insisted that "I would not say it was overwhelmingly negative, either." He did concede, however, that although the delegation had invited all 450 members of the Russian Duma to attend the session, only 10 had actually shown up.[2] Reflecting the opinion of many Russian analysts and politicians, Pavel Felgengauer, defense correspondent for the Moscow daily Segodnya, described the arguments used by Weldon to justify US deployment of a limited NMD as "laughable." He ridiculed the idea that countries like North Korea, Iran, or Iraq will be able to covertly develop ICBMs capable of reaching the United States within five to ten years. Felgengauer predicted that Russia will respond to a possible US NMD deployment by sharing missile technology that "could easily penetrate any NMD" with China and other Asian states.[3]
Sources:
[1]"V chetverg palata predstaviteley kongressa SShA rassmotrit tselesoobraznost razvertyvaniya v SShA ogranichennoy protivoraketnoy oborony," Interfax, 16 March 1999.
[2] Mitchell Landsberg, "US Delegation Warns Russias About Talk of New Missile Defense System," AP, 16 March 1999; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, http://www.lexis-nexis.com.
[3] Pavel Felgengauer, "Smirking at ICBM Threats," Moscow Times, 18 March 1999; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, http://www.lexis-nexis.com.{entered 3/19/99 SDP}
 
2/23/99: PRIMAKOV REASSERTS REJECTION OF REVISIONS TO ABM TREATY
At a meeting with US Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott on 23 February 1999, Russian Prime Minister Yevgeniy Primakov reiterated the Russian rejection of possible amendments to the ABM Treaty that would allow the United States to deploy a limited national missile defense (NMD) system. According to his press secretary, Tatyana Aristarkhova, Primakov "particularly underlined the fundamental importance of the stability of the ABM Treaty, which remains the cornerstone of strategic stability." Since US Secretary of Defense William Cohen announced on 20 January 1999 that the United States would seek to negotiate changes to the ABM treaty that would permit limited NMD, Russian officials have uniformly insisted that Russia will not agree to such changes in the treaty.
["Na vstreche s Talbottom Primakov obsudil situatsiyu v Kosovo i vokrug Iraka, ukazal na absolutnuyu nepriyemlemost lyubogo primeneniya sily v obkhod ustavnykh prerogativ SB OON," Interfax, 23 February 1999]{entered 3/11/99 SDP}
 
2/3/99: DEFENSE MINISTRY WARNS AGAINST US WITHDRAWAL FROM ABM TREATY
Colonel General Igor Valynkin, head of the 12th Main Directorate of the Russian Defense Ministry, told a Moscow press conference on 3 February that Russia "will take measures adequate to the international situation" if the United States decides to unilaterally withdraw from the 1972 ABM Treaty, Interfax reported.  US Secretary of Defense William Cohen suggested on 20 January 1999 that Washington might decide to withdraw from the treaty if it is unable to negotiate changes to the treaty that would permit the deployment of a limited national missile defense (NMD) system. Although other Clinton administration officials have been more circumspect in their comments, supporters of NMD in the US Congress argue that the ABM Treaty is already legally invalid as a result of the collapse of the Soviet Union, concluding that the United States is not bound by its restrictions and should deploy missile defenses as soon as possible. In this situation, Cohen's comments have apparently been taken very seriously by Russian officials. Valynkin said that "a revision of the ABM Treaty will upset stability and we will undoubtedly respond to this." While he did not specify what measures such a response might include, he noted that Russia has developed systems that can easily overcome air-defense barriers, presumably a reference to countermeasures against missile defenses which Russia could deploy in response to any US NMD system.
["If U.S. Withdraws from ABM Treaty Russia Will Take Adequate Measures," Interfax, 3 February 1999.]{entered 2/18/99 SDP}
 
1/23/99: MASLYUKOV REJECTS REVISION OF ABM TREATY
According his press spokesman Anton Surikov, Russian First Deputy Prime Minister Yuriy Maslyukov "fully shares" the doubts raised by Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov about the possibility of amending the 1972 ABM Treaty, Interfax reported on 23 January 1999. US officials have said they would like to modify the treaty to allow deployment of limited national missile defenses (NMD). Surikov told journalists that Masluykov believes "US experts have failed to pay sufficient attention to a possible reaction from so-called third nuclear powers to changes" in the ABM Treaty. Surikov cautioned that countries like Britain, France, and China could feel that their small nuclear deterrent forces were undermined by a possible US deployment of limited NMD, and as a result, some of these countries could build up their strategic offensive weapons as the "cheapest form of response." Surikov also argued that the United States "exaggerates and excessively dramatizes" the potential threat from states such as Iran, Iraq, Libya, and China, which US officials cite as justifying the development of national ballistic missile defenses. Instead of building missile defenses, said Surikov, the potential threat from such countries should be addressed by "stepping up control of the export of nuclear arms and technologies and the means of their delivery," adding that the United States and Russia should both "adhere to this principle."
[Interfax, 23 January 1999; in "Maslyukov Warns Against Revision of ABM Treaty," FBIS Document FTS19990123000299.]{entered 2/18/99 SDP}
 
1/22/99: FOREIGN MINISTRY REJECTS AMENDING ABM TREATY
Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov told a Moscow press conference on 22 January 1999 that Russia rejects "the introduction of any changes to the ABM treaty as impossible in principle," Interfax reported.[1] According to Reuters, when asked if Russia would accept a US proposal to consider amending the treaty to permit a limited national missile defense (NMD) system, Ivanov replied curtly, "No. I'll say that straight away."[2] Ivanov stressed, however, that despite the announcement on 20 January 1999 by US Secretary of Defense William Cohen that the United States is budgeting funds for a possible limited NMD deployment, he still believed the Clinton administration remained committed to the ABM Treaty. Ivanov said that the United States "officially continues to support the ABM Treaty, recognizing its fundamental role in the ongoing process of reductions in strategic offensive weapons." Nevertheless, he admitted having "concern" about "some actions of the American Congress and Pentagon, which might undermine the ABM Treaty." He said Moscow had "questions" about some American missile defense programs and their funding. Ivanov said he planned to discuss these concerns with US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright during her scheduled 25-26 January 1999 visit to Moscow, saying they were linked with the issue of START II ratification.[1] Russian presidential spokesman Dmitriy Yakushkin was more guarded than Ivanov, saying only that President Yeltsin, who is hospitalized with a stomach ulcer, was studying the issue.[3]
Sources:
[1] "Rossiya schitayet v printsipe nevozmozhnym vneseniye kakykh-libo izmeneniy v dogovor po PRO--Ivanov," Interfax, 22 January 1999.
[2] "Russia Opposes Reworking ABM Treaty," Reuters, 22 January 1999; in Russia Today, http://www.russiatoday.com.
[3] "Yeltsin in Satisfactory Condition, Eyes ABM Treaty," Reuters, 22 January 1999; in Russia Today, http://www.russiatoday.com.{entered 1/26/99 SDP}
 
1/21/99: DEFENSE MINISTRY SLAMS US STATEMENT ON POSSIBLE NMD DEPLOYMENT
Colonel General Leonid Ivashov, head of the Main Department for International Cooperation of the Russian Ministry of Defense, reacted harshly on 21 January 1999 to the announcement the previous day by US Secretary of Defense William Cohen that Washington would like to negotiate changes to the 1972 ABM Treaty which would permit the deployment of a national ballistic missile defense (NMD), Interfax reported.[1] On 20 January 1999, Cohen told a Pentagon news conference that the Clinton administration plans to add $6.6 billion to the US defense budget over the next several years "to support possible deployment of a limited NMD system."[2] Article I of the ABM Treaty specifically states that each of the signatories agrees "not to deploy ABM systems for a defense of the territory of its country," meaning that even a limited NMD system could not be deployed without violating the treaty.[3] As a result, at his press conference, Cohen admitted that "our deployment might require modifications to the [ABM] treaty and the Administration is working to determine the nature and scope of these modifications." He added that "we will seek to amend the treaty if necessary, and will work in good faith to do so." However, Cohen also noted that the treaty "provides, of course, for right of withdrawal with six months notice," effectively threatening that the United States will unilaterally withdraw from the treaty if Russia does not agree to the amendments the United States wants. Cohen did not specify the exact modifications that the United States would want, saying the parameters of the proposed NMD system were not yet clear. He noted that despite the increase in funding, the decision to deploy such a system would not be made until 2000, and actual deployment would not begin until 2005.  Anticipating Russian objections, Cohen argued that the envisioned limited NMD system "is focused primarily on countering rogue nation threats and will not be capable of countering Russia's nuclear deterrent."[2] Ivashov, however, rejected Cohen's arguments as he had done with US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright's hints on the same subject a few days earlier (see related item from 1/18/99 below). Ivashov reiterated the Russian view that "attempts to bypass the ABM Treaty will upset strategic stability," adding that the US plans for NMD could also undermine offensive strategic arms control by threatening START I and START II.[1] Russian parliamentarians have frequently said that ratification of START II is contingent on continued US adherence to the ABM treaty, and according to media reports, the draft law on ratification that the Duma currently has under consideration explicitly states that Russia reserves the right to withdraw from START II if the United States violates the ABM treaty (see entries for 11/19/98 and 11/14/98 in the START II Ratification Developments Section).
Sources:
[1] Interfax, 21 January 1999; in "US Statements on ABM Treaty 'Threat' to Russia," FBIS Document FTS19990121001253.
[2] DoD News Briefing, 20 January 1999; available at the Federation of American Scientists, Space Policy Project, Special Weapons Monitor, http://www.fas.org/spp/starwars/.../index.html#jan
[3] Treaty Between the United States of American and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, available on the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency web site, http://www.acda.gov/treaties/abm2.htm.{entered 1/22/99 SDP}
 
1/18/99: DEFENSE MINISTRY REJECTS POSSIBLE CHANGES TO ABM TREATY
Colonel General Leonid Ivashov, head of the Main Department for International Cooperation of the Russian Ministry of Defense, told Interfax on 18 January 1999 that Russia will regard any attempts to "circumvent" the 1972 ABM Treaty as "upsetting strategic stability."[1] Ivashov was responding to comments made by US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright in a 17 January 1999 interview with the Los Angeles Times. In that interview, Albright, in an apparent shift in Clinton administration policy, said that the United States "must at least consider developing and deploying a ballistic missile defense system," citing the "very dangerous situation" caused by the spread of weapons of mass destruction to "rogue states such as Iraq and North Korea and transnational terrorist organizations." Albright admitted that "the major challenge is to find a way to fit a missile defense system into existing arms control treaties," adding that "it is time to consider ways to overcome the diplomatic impediments to developing such a system," implicitly calling for modification of the ABM Treaty, which prohibits the development of national missile defenses.[2]  Ivashov bluntly dismissed Albright's arguments that a ballistic missile defense against countries like North Korea and Iraq is necessary, saying that "any military expert understands that these countries do not have and will hardly acquire guaranteed means of delivery reaching US territory." As a result, he said that "the Russian Defense Ministry sees US statements about the cancellation of the ABM Treaty or a revision of its clauses as being aimed against Russia's security interests." Ivashov also reiterated that Russia views the ABM Treaty as tightly linked with the START I and START II treaties. Ivashov's comments probably reflect calculations by the Russian military that even a limited US national missile defense could undermine the deterrent capabilties of  Russian strategic nuclear forces, since economic constraints and obsolescence of existing systems will probably reduce those forces to very low levels within the next decade.
Sources:
[1]Interfax, 18 January 1999; in "Defense Ministry Rejects Attempts to Circumvent ABM Treaty," FBIS Document FTS19990118000686.
[2]Tyler Marshall and Norman Kempster, "Albright Envisions New Global Approach to Advance Democracy," Los Angeles Times, 17 January 1999, p. A4; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, http://web.lexis-nexis.com.{entered 1/22/99 SDP}
 
10/13/98: ADDITIONAL AGREEMENTS ON DEMARCATION SIGNED
Representatives of the United States, the Russian Federation, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine signed an agreement in Geneva on 13 October 1998 that finalizes some details of the TBM demaraction agreements concluded in September 1998 (see entry below for 9/26/97). A US official said that the new agreement will facilitate the implementation of the agreement on confidence building measures, which provides for the five states to exchange information and technical data on certain types of tactical missile defense systems.  The new agreement will make it possible to implement the September 1998 agreements as soon as they are ratified by all five parties and enter into force, the official added. The Clinton administration has not yet submitted the TMD demarcation agreements to the US Senate for ratification, where they are likely to face stiff opposition from critics who believe they impose excessively strict limitations on missile defenses. Russian President Boris Yeltsin submitted the agreements to the Duma for ratification in April 1998 as part of a package which includes the amended START II treaty (see related entry for 4/13/98 in the START II Developments File), but the Duma has not acted on them yet.
[Wendy Lubertkin, "Final Set of ABM-Treaty Related Documents Signed in Geneva," USIS Geneva Daily Bulletin, 14 October 1998.]{entered 10/15/98 SDP}
 
9/26/97: TMD DEMARCATION AGREEMENTS, SUCCESSION MEMORANDUM SIGNED
Officials from Russia, the United States, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus signed a set of agreements related to the 1972 ABM treaty in New York on 26 September 1997. The five countries signed two agreed statements which outline criteria that distinguish theatre missile defense (TMD) systems from strategic ballistic missile defense systems.  TMD systems are not regulated by the ABM treaty, while strategic missile defenses are strictly constrained. The first agreed statement, dealing with lower-velocity TMD systems, states that systems with interceptor velocities of 3 km/second or lower will be considered compliant with the ABM treaty as long as they are not tested against targets with velocities over 5 km/second or ranges that exceed 3,500 miles. Under these terms, the United States will be able to deploy a new advanced version of the Patriot surface-to-air missile (PAC-3), as well as the US Army's planned Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system and the US Navy's Area Defense System without raising the question of whether it might be violating the ABM treaty. Washington had earlier declared unilaterally that it viewed these systems as compliant with the ABM treaty. The second agreed statement covers higher velocity TMD systems with interceptor velocities above 3 km/second. It prohibits the testing of such systems against targets with velocities over 5 km/second or ranges over 3,500 miles, and also bans the deployment of space-based interceptors as part of such a TMD system. In a separate agreement on confidence-building measures related to the ABM treaty, the five states agreed to annually exchange data on their plans for TMD development in order to assuage concerns that TMD systems might be used to circumvent the ABM treaty. In a related joint statement, each of the states agreed to notify the others if it has any plans to test an interceptor system with velocities over 3 km/second or to develop land-based or air-based TMD systems with interceptor velocities over 5.5 km/second or sea-based TMD systems with velocities over 4.5 km/second. At the same time, all five states issued identical statements indicating they had no plans to test or develop such TMD systems before April 1999.  A separate memorandum of understanding (MOU) on sucession to the ABM treaty, also signed by all five states, designates Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus as the successors to the USSR for purposes of implementing the treaty. According to the MOU, the four former Soviet republics will collectively "assume the obligations of the former USSR under the treaty and its associated documents." Russia wanted the MOU to provide it with the right to station portions of its treaty-limited strategic ABM system (early-warning radars and test ranges) outside its national territory, while the non-Russian successor states viewed treaty membership as an important symbol of their independent status.  The agreements are designed to assuage Russian fears that the United States would circumvent the ABM treaty by developing advanced TMD systems with the capability to intercept strategic ballistic missiles.  Russian officials and parliamentarians have repeatedly indicated that Russia will not implement START II unless an acceptable TMD demarcation agreement is concluded.  However, the package of agreements may not resolve all the issues related to the ABM treaty.  US and Russian officials seem to have different views of the package, with Russian Foreign Minister Yevgeniy Primakov saying  the package does "not end the work to prevent the circumvention of the ABM treaty," while an American official insisted that "this agreement settles the issue of protecting our right to proceed with the TMD systems that we are now pursuing." In addition, the agreements must be ratified by each of the five signatories.  Proponents of missile defense in the US Senate are certain to put up a fight against ratification of the demarcation agreements, which they view as weakening US missile defense programs.[1] Some Russian and American critics, on the other hand, view the agreements as so permissive as to "virtually destroy" the ABM treaty.[2]
Sources:
[1] Craig Cerniello, "SCC Parties Sign Agreements On Multilateralization, TMD Systems," Arms Control Today, September 1997, pp. 26, 32.
[2] Anatoliy Dyakov, George Lewis, Pavel Podvig, and Theodore Postol, "ABM Treaty Still Seen as Foundation of Strategic Stability. But Agreements Signed in New York Virtually Destroy It," Nezavisimoye voennoye obozreniye, 3-10 October 1997, pp. 1, 6; in "ABM Treaty's 'Key Provisions' Seen Devalued," FBIS-TAC-97-281. [entered 12/16/97 SDP}
 
8/31/97:  TMD DEMARCATION AGREEMENT TO BE SIGNED IN SEPTEMBER 1997
Reuters reported that US officials were planning on signing TMD demarcation agreements and the memorandum on successor states to the ABM Treaty, "on or around" 25 September 1997 during the UN's general assembly meeting in New York.
[Patrick Worsnip, "Missile pact signing set for September," Reuter Online, http://www.nando.net/nt/nation/, 31 August 1997] {Entered 9/1/97 jl}
 
8/21/97: AGREEMENT REACHED ON TMD DEMARCATION AT SCC
On 21 August 1997, Russian and US representatives to the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) reached an agreement on the demarcation of high and low velocity TMD systems and confidence-building measures for these systems. The agreement is based on the understanding reached at the Helsinki summit. Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine also participated in the SCC talks. The participant states also agreed on the "texts of a Memorandum of Understanding providing for succession to the treaty" by four states of the former USSR, as well as new SCC operating regulations.
[US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Press Release, 21 August 1997.] {Entered 8/28/97 SA}
 
5/15/97:  PRESIDENT CLINTON AGREES TO SUBMIT ABM SUCCESSION MEMORANDUM TO CONGRESS
In a press release, US President Bill Clinton welcomed congressional ratification of the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) flank document, but objected to the clause added in the resolution requiring the administration to submit the memorandum on succession to the ABM Treaty to Congress for approval.  Clinton noted that "It is clearly within the President's authorities [sic] to determine the successor States to a treaty when the original Party dissolves...."  However, while disputing Congress' constitutional right to approve the memorandum, Clinton noted that "in view of my commitment to agree to seek Senate approval of the Demarcation Agreements associated with the ABM Treaty...I will submit an agreemeent concluded on ABM Treaty succession to the Senate for advice and consent."
[White House Press Release Online, http://library.whitehouse.gov/.../Demarcationl, 15 May 1997. This document is also available in the NIS Nuclear Profiles full text annex.]{Entered 9/1/97 jl}
 
3/25/97: TMD AGREEMENT REQUIRES SENATE ADVICE AND CONSENT
In a letter dated 25 March 1997, Samuel R. Berger, assistant to the president for national security affairs, informed US Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott (R-MS) that the White House will seek Senate advice and consent to the lower velocity (Part I) Agreed Statement on Demarcation (ASD) after it is signed in the SCC. Berger also stated that a higher velocity demarcation agreement based on the Helsinki statements, being negotiated in Geneva, will also be submitted to the Senate for advice and consent. However, Berger stated that the succession to the ABM Treaty by the four former Soviet states of Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine "does not require the advice and consent of the Senate, or any other from of congressional approval, to enter into force."
[The White House. Letter from Samuel R. Berger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, to Senator Trent Lott (R-MS), 25 March 1997, as reported in the BMDList, http://www.fas.org/spp/starwars/world/bmd970403b.htm] {Entered 8/26/97 SA}
 
3/21/97: CLINTON AND YELTSIN SIGN TMD DEMARCATION STATEMENT AT HELSINKI
On 21 March 1997, Russian Federation President Boris Yeltsin and US President Bill Clinton signed a four-point TMD demarcation statement at the Helsinki Summit. For more information on the Helsinki Summit and the TMD statement, please see the NIS Nuclear Profiles Overview, "The Helsinki Summit and US-Russian Arms Control," by Scott Parrish. {Entered 8/25/97 SA}
 
3/19/97: REPORT ON TMD COMMAND POST EXERCISES
On 19 March 1997, US Air Force Brigadier General Curt Emery, Director for Theater Air and Missile Defenses (TMD), in the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO), US Department of Defense (DOD), testified before the Subcommittees on Military Procurement and Research and Development on the importance of international cooperation in DOD's BMD programs. He stated that "the first US-Russian TMD command post exercise (CPX)" was successfully completed " in June 1996 at the Joint National Test Facility in Colorado Springs." Emery added that the second TMD CPX will be held in Russia in early 1998. He also informed Congress that the BMDO is involved in a number of large and small technology cooperation projects with Russia.
[ Statement of Brigadier General Curt Emery, USAF: Hearing before the Committee on National Security, Subcommittees on Military Procurement and Military Research and Development. 108th Congress, 1st session, 19 March 1997.] {Entered 8/21/97 SA}
 
12/11/96: CONGRESS THREATENS TO CUT OFF FUNDS FOR SCC ACTIVITIES
In accordance with an amendment to the 1997 State Department appropriations bill, Congress cut funding to the US-Russian missile defense demarcation talks at the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) in Geneva, claiming that the White House report on the issue did not fully explain whether the missile defense agreement would require Senate approval. Congress notified President Clinton of the funding cutoff in a letter written by Rep. Robert L. Livingston, Chairman of the House Appropriations Committee, Rep. Benjamin A. Gilman, Chairman of the House International Relations Committee, and Rep. Floyd Spence, Chairman of the House National Security Committee. According to a senior Clinton administration official, the White House report submitted to Congress "fully meets the terms of the Livingston amendment" by stating that the demarcation agreement would be a substantive change to the ABM treaty and could have to be approved either through Senate action or by legislation passed by both houses.
[Bill Gertz, "3 GOP Lawmakers halt funds for missile-defense talks," The Washington Times, 12/13/96, p. A3.] {Entered 2/11/97, SA} {Cleared 4/1/4/97 jl}
 
12/10/96: NO PROGRESS ON TMD DEMARCATION AT PRIMAKOV AND CHRISTOPHER MEETING
US Secretary of State Warren Christopher and Russian Federation Foreign Minister Yevgeniy Primakov failed to make progress in resolving their disagreement over the theater missile defense (TMD) demarcation issue during negotiations in Brussels. The two foreign ministers did, however, agree to have expert negotiators work on the problem. State Department spokesman Nicholas Burns did not give any details on when and where the experts would meet.
["U.S., Russia Fail to Agree on Missile Dispute," RUSSIA TODAY, 12/11/96, http://www.russiatoday.com/rtoday/news/96121103.html.] {Entered 2/11/97, SA} {Cleared 4/14/97 jl}
 
10/31/96: FORMAL AGREEMENT ON MULTILATERALIZATION OF ABM TREATY POSTPONED
The Russian-US disagreement over low-velocity TMD systems also resulted in the cancellation of the signing ceremony for an agreement to multilateralize the ABM Treaty. The agreement provides for Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine to all become successor states to the USSR under the terms of the treaty, and thus all four states will participate in the work of the Standing Consultative Committee (SCC). (See also the entry in Belarus: Nuclear Weapons Status, for Belarusian reaction to the cancellation.)
["U.S., Russia Near Agreement on Lower-Velocity TMD Systems," ARMS CONTROL TODAY, 6/1996, p. 19, 27; ITAR-TASS, 11/2/96, in "Belarus 'Disappointed' Over Blocking of Missile Defense," FBIS-SOV-96-214] {Entered 11/17/96 JL}
 
10/31/96: SIGNING OF LOW-VELOCITY TMD AGREEMENT CANCELED
In an abrupt change of plans, the scheduled signing of an agreement on low-velocity TMD systems was called off due to Russian attempts to link the agreement to a future agreement on high-velocity systems. According to State Department Spokesman Nicholas Burns, the Standing Consultative Committee of the ABM Treaty had since 7 October 1996 been meeting in Geneva in order to "conform" the agreement, check translations, and begin discussions on high-velocity systems. The finalized agreement was sent to Moscow and Washington for confirmation. According to Burns, however, the Russian Foreign Ministry then requested a series of modifications that would make the entry into force of the low-velocity agreement (referred to as Part I) conditional upon an agreement on higher-velocity systems (Part II). (A report in The Washington Times indicated that the Russian requests were given to the United States on 25 October 1996.) Burns termed the proposed changes "unacceptable to the United States," and said they were "inconsistent with the agreement reached by Secretary Christopher and Foreign Minister Primakov." As a result, the United States decided not to send Undersecretary of State Lynn Davis to the signing ceremony. Nevertheless, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Georgiy Mamedov, and the deputy foreign ministers of the other CIS participants in the talks, did travel to Geneva. Negotiations between the United States and the other delegations to the SCC continued, but no agreement on the outstanding issues was reached and the talks were recessed on 2 November 1996. Russian Foreign Ministry statements carried by ITAR-TASS and Interfax both indicated that the blame for the collapse of the ceremony and talks rested with the US. Mikhail Demurin, a spokesman for the Russian Foreign Ministry, expressed "amazement and regret" that the US did not attend the signing ceremony. According to ITAR-TASS, Demurin stated that "the Russian side is ready to sign all the relevant documents if they are fully and properly prepared." Reuters reported that an unidentified US official termed the Russian comments "absurd." Demurin's comments to Interfax also suggested that the Russian Foreign Ministry was at least implicitly linking an agreement on Part II to the ratification of the START II treaty.
[U.S. Department of State, Daily Press Briefing, 10/30/96, http://www.state.gov/www/briefings/9610/961030.html; Bill Gertz, "Russia backs out of pact at 11th hour," THE WASHINGTON TIMES, 10/30/96, p. 1; ITAR-TASS, 11/31/96, in "Foreign Ministry Criticises U.S. Non-Attendance in Geneva," FBIS-SOV-96-213; INTERFAX, 11/2/96, in "Foreign Ministry Blames U.S. for Failure to Sign ABM Treaty," FBIS-SOV-96-214; Reuters, 11/1/96.]
 
10/31/96: RUSSIAN COVERAGE OF ABM TREATY TMD AGREEMENT
Russian press coverage of the TMD debacle was mixed. According to Izvestiya, the Russian decision to link the Part I and Part II agreements was in part due to a toughening Russian position on strategic weapons issues caused by plans for NATO enlargement. Izvestiya also noted, however, that the move might have been a bargaining tactic, noting that "the present demarche seems to have been meant for outbidding the other party and for continuing the bargaining in more favorable psychological conditions." On the other hand, Pavel Felgengauer, defense correspondent for the newspaper Segodnya, reported that a Russian General Staff representative to the talks believed the United States was attempting to get an agreement on Part I that would legalize US programs, and it would then put off agreements on Part II. The unnamed General Staff source said that Russia had from the beginning made it clear that an agreement on Part I would only enter into force together with Part II. The source stated that the changes proposed by the Russian side were largely editorial and did not affect the basic principles of the agreement, but rather emphasized the close linkage between the two parts of the negotiations. Felgengauer, who has close ties to the Russian Ministry of Defense, went on to note concerns that the United States was using the negotiations to legitimize low-velocity systems, such as Patriot PAC-3, but that it would withdraw from the ABM treaty if in the future it failed to meet US interests. In conclusion, Felgengauer noted that Russia would not agree to any clarifications of the ABM Treaty unless the United States agreed not to deploy high-velocity TMD systems,. If the United States did not agree to observe the ABM treaty and limit high-velocity systems, there would be no chance for START II ratification by the Russian State Duma. Concerns similar to those of Felgengauer and his General Staff source were expressed by Major General (retired) Vladimir Belous, a Russian arms control analyst, in comments reported by ITAR-TASS and Nezavisimaya gazeta.
["Moscow Is Learning How To Outbid Its Partner by Holding Up ABM Treaty Talks With the United States," IZVESTIYA, 11/1/96, p. 3, in "ABM Accords Seen 'Frozen,' Not Wrecked," FBIS-SOV-96-215; Pavel Felgengauer, "Kholodnyy mir: Razgranicheniye sistem protivoraketnoy oborony otlozheno SShA i Rossiya obvinyayut drug druga v kovarstve," SEGODNYA, 11/1/96, p. 1; Aleksandr Reutov, "Dokumenty o razgranichenii PRO ne podpisany," NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA, 11/2/96, p. 1; ITAR-TASS, 10/31/96, in "Expert--U.S. Trying to 'Liberalize' ABM Treaty," FBIS-SOV-96-213.] {Entered 11/17/96 JL}
 
9/23/96: US AND RUSSIAN CONFIRM AGREEMENT ON TMD TESTING
US Secretary of State Warren Christopher and Russian Foreign Minister Yevgeniy Primakov announced at a press conference that the US and Russia confirmed the preliminary agreement reached in 6/96 on low-velocity TMD systems. The second stage of negotiations will include higher-velocity TMD systems and once concluded will represent an agreement on demarcation of theater and strategic ABM systems. The two sides agreed that documents formalizing the agreement would be signed in Geneva in late October 1996.
[Steven Erlanger, "U.S. and Russia Report Gains in Talks on Anti-Missile Accord," NEW YORK TIMES, 9/24/96, p. A7; Joint Statement of The United States of America and the Russian Federation on Demarcation of Strategic and Theater Missile Defenses, http://www.state.gov/www/regions/nis/9-26nis.html] {ENTERED 9/24/96 KVY}
 
9/5/96: UKRAINE OPPOSES S-300 ABM TEXT STIPULATION
During ABM Treaty amendment negotiations held in Geneva during June 1996, Ukraine opposed a US and Russian backed text stipulating that each party to the ABM Treaty would report annually to other parties on deployment locations of nonstrategic anti-missile defense systems. The amendment would require Ukraine to report annually on the deployment of S-300 (SA-10 Grumble) SAM systems, which are the foundation of Ukraine's Air Defense Forces. Ukraine adopted its position on the recommendation of its Ministry of Defense. In August 1996, the US notified the ambassador of Ukraine in Washington that it would take Ukraine's stance on this issue into account.
[Serhiy Zhurets, "Only Kiev Will Know Where the S-300s Are?" NARODNA ARMIYA, 9/5/96, p. 2, in "Military Paper Views Strategic/Nonstrategic ABM Systems," FBIS-UMA-96-216-S, 9/5/96.] {Entered 2/7/96, SA} {Cleared 4/14/97 JL}
 
6-7/96: US, RUSSIA REACH PRELIMINARY AGREEMENT ON TMD
During negotiations in Geneva, Russia and the US reportedly reached preliminary agreement on the demarcation of strategic and tactical ABM systems. (The parties also reached an understanding on multilateralization of the ABM treaty, providing for accession to the treaty by Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine.) The agreed text is expected to be attached to the 1972 ABM Treaty in the form of a "joint statement." This joint statement deals only with low-velocity TMD systems, leaving out provisions for high-velocity TMD systems. The agreed text allows for the deployment of TMD systems as long as the velocity of the interceptor is no greater than 3 kilometers per second and it is not tested against targets launched from a range of greater than 3,500 kilometers. In July the Washington Times published a letter reportedly written by Russian Foreign Minister Yevgeniy Primakov to the US Secretary of State, wherein the former outlined Russian conditions for the second-phase agreement, expected to be concluded by 10/96. These conditions included limits on: spaced-based tracking and guidance sensors, defenses based on other physical principles (such as lasers), and tests against multiple-warhead targets. In addition, the letter called for no ban on TMD interceptors equipped with nuclear warheads, and limits on the deployment of air-launched, high-velocity TMD systems, as well as limits on the number and geographic deployment of high-velocity TMD systems.
[Jack Mendelson, "Kilometers Apart on Missile Defense," and Craig Corniello "U.S., Russia Near Agreement On Lower-Velocity TMD Systems," ARMS CONTROL TODAY, 7/96, pp. 2, 19, 27; "U dogovora PRO ot 1972 goda mozhet poyavitsya prilozhenie," KOMMERSANT-DAILY, 7/2/96, p. 4.] {Entered, revised 9/9/96 KVY}
 
2/10/96: PRIMAKOV, CHRISTOPHER DISCUSS ABM TREATY
Russian Foreign Minister Yevgenii Primakov discussed the ABM Treaty with US Secretary of State Warren Christopher in Helsinki. Primakov said that the two sides had agreed to search for a mutually acceptable resolution of the ongoing talks. Primakov also stated, however, that he agrees with those Duma deputies who argue that START II should be ratified only if the United States continues to adhere to the ABM Treaty.
[Scott Parrish and Doug Clarke, "Talks On ABM Treaty To Continue," OMRI DAILY DIGEST, no.30, pt. I, 2/12/96, p.2.]
 
11/28/95: RUSSIA, US AGREE ON ACCEPTABLE ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILES
Western sources reported that the United States and Russia agreed that only systems capable of intercepting ballistic missiles traveling faster than 5 km/second or with a range greater than 3,500 km would violate the ABM Treaty. Systems capable of intercepting missiles with a velocity of up to 3 km/second would be Treaty-compliant. The issue of how to treat proposed US systems with velocities between 3 and 5 km/second, however, remained unresolved.
[Scott Parrish, "Russia And U.S. Compromise On Missile Defenses," OMRI DAILY DIGEST, 11/29/95.]
 
9/11/95: CLINTON INVITES RUSSIAN LEGISLATORS TO US
It was reported that the Clinton administration is inviting Russian legislators to the United States to support continued compliance with the 1972 ABM Treaty. Those invited include legislators from the Duma's Committees on Defense; International Affairs; Law and Juridical Reform; Budget, Tax, Banks, and Finance; and Security.
[Bill Gertz, "Russian Legislators Invited To U.S. To Boost ABM Pact," WASHINGTON TIMES, 9/11/95, p. A3.]
 
9/6/95: SENATE APPROVES NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEM
The US Senate voted to approve a plan for developing, but not deploying, a national missile defense system. The plan requires the United States to negotiate with Russia on adjusting the ABM Treaty to allow for the deployment of a multiple site missile defense network, and that if talks are not successful, for the United States to withdraw from the ABM Treaty.
[Bill Gertz, "Senate Votes For Missile Defenses," WASHINGTON TIMES, 9/7/95, p. A4.]
 
9/1/95: RUSSIA CRITICAL OF US NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEM
It was reported that Foreign Ministry spokesperson Mikhail Demurin stated that US pursuit of a missile defense program, as proposed by the Senate, would abrogate its ABM Treaty obligations, and could force Russia to back out of START I and refuse to ratify START II. Demurin said that Russia views the ABM Treaty as the cornerstone to all other arms control agreements.
[POST-SOVIET NUCLEAR & DEFENSE MONITOR, 9/1/95, p. 15.]
 
8/17/95: RUSSIA WARNS US BILL COULD VIOLATE ABM TREATY
Russian Foreign Ministry spokesman Mikhail Demurin told ITAR-TASS that the bill on ballistic missile defense under consideration in the US Senate could lead to the "actual liquidation" of the ABM Treaty, and that any US move to violate the ABM Treaty could cause Russia to reject START II ratification and to withdraw from START I.
[Scott Parrish, "Foreign Ministry Expresses Concern Over ABM Treaty," OMRI DAILY DIGEST, 11/18/95.]
 
7/95: RUSSIA REJECTS US PROPOSALS
Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Mamedov reportedly rejected new US proposals on TMD limits, stating in a note to US Deputy Secretary of State Talbott, that the proposals "could lead to irreconcilable differences with the ABM Treaty as a result of differing interpretations...and could lead to the possibility of actual circumvention of the treaty."
["Duma Wary Of START II As Congress Nears ABM Crossroads And US And Russian Negotiators Struggle On," NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION NEWS, 8/7/95, p. 5.]  

Page last updated 17 June 2004. This page is no longer being updated.  Please see the Strategic Forces General Developments file for more recent developments.

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This material is produced independently for NTI by the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies and does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been independently verified by NTI or its directors, officers, employees, agents. Copyright © 2010 by MIIS.

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