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the
Arms Control Treaties and Agreements
file
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file
For further developments, see the
Archived CTBT Developments file
For major recent developments, see the Strategic Forces General Developments
file
See also:
Semipalatinsk Test Site
Novaya Zemlya Test Site
9/24/96: RUSSIA SIGNS CTBT
Russia signed the CTBT in New York. On 9/12/96, the
Russian Foreign Ministry released a statement welcoming
the UN approval of the CTBT.
8/27/96: RUSSIA CRITICAL OF INDIAN REFUSAL TO SIGN
CTBT
Although no agreement was achieved on a comprehensive
nuclear test ban treaty in 8/96 in Geneva, the chief
Russian delegate to the Conference on Disarmament,
Grigoriy Berdennikov, confirmed Russia's support for the
comprehensive test ban, ITAR-TASS reported on 8/22/96.
Berdennikov criticized India's refusal to sign the
treaty. India requested that nuclear powers provide a
timetable for complete disarmament, but the nuclear
powers found such a request impossible to fulfill at this
time.
7/23/96: RUSSIA AND UNITED STATES HOPE COMPLIANCE WITH
CTBT WILL PERSUADE OTHER NATIONS TO SIGN
Russian Foreign Minister Yevgeniy Primakov and US
Secretary of State Warren Christopher announced in
Jakarta that Russia and the United States will sign a
compromise CTBT at the next session of the multilateral
Geneva negotiations. Although the compromise draft,
proposed by Dutch diplomat Jaap Ramaker, does not
entirely satisfy the two sides, both agreed to accept it
in order to persuade other countries, including China and
India, to cooperate and speed up the establishment of the
CTBT regime.
5/21/96: MONITORING CENTER COOPERATES WITH UNITED
STATES
The national monitoring center in Dubna gathers
information from all the national technical means (NTM)
sites around Russia. The experts at the center can
determine the time, location, and nature of nuclear
explosions anywhere in the world in real time. The
long-classified center, established under the auspices of
the Ministry of Defense, now conducts research in the
field of NTM together with the similar center in
Arlington, Virginia.
5/14/96: RUSSIA WOULD WITHDRAW FROM CTBT ONLY IF
INTERESTS AT STAKE
Russia aspires to conclude the CTBT talks no later than
September 1996, said Grigoriy Berdennikov, the head of
the Russian delegation to the Conference on Disarmament
in Geneva, ITAR-TASS reported. Berdennikov also presented
the statement of the Russian President's press secretary
which emphasized that, if the supreme national interests
of Russia are threatened, Russia will use its right to
withdraw from the CTBT in order to conduct all necessary
tests to confirm the safety and reliability of key types
of Russian nuclear weapons.
4/20/96: RUSSIA SUPPORTS CTB AT G-7 SUMMIT
Russian President Boris Yeltsin co-chaired a Nuclear
Safety Summit in Moscow, which was attended by the heads
of state of the G-7 countries. Joint communiqués were
issued calling for the signing of a comprehensive nuclear
test ban (CTB) by September 1996 and pledging to
implement stricter nuclear safety standards. This was the
first time that Russia supported a total test ban. Russia
proposed that nuclear powers base nuclear weapons only on
their own soil. Russia also called for the creation of a
nuclear weapons free zone (NWFZ) in Eastern and Central
Europe.
4/19/96: RUSSIA CONSIDERS CHINESE POSITION ON PEACEFUL
TESTS
The Russian Deputy Minister of Atomic Energy indicated
that Russia could in principle support China's position
on insisting on exclusion of peaceful nuclear explosions
from the CTBT scope if other nuclear weapon states act
likewise.
3/7/96: UNDERGROUND TEST BAN IS ENDORSED
Russia endorsed the global treaty to ban underground
nuclear tests. The endorsement, however, failed to call
for a zero-yield or no-yield test ban which would
prohibit underground explosions with any release of
nuclear energy.
1/96: SPECIALISTS FEAR THAT A TEST BAN COULD HINDER
WEAPONS SAFETY
Although Moscow has not issued any new directives on
conducting nuclear tests at Novaya Zemlya, the likelihood
of such tests is growing. Russian nuclear specialists
fear that without tests the momentum for improvement of
the safety of nuclear weapons, necessary for the
modernization of the nuclear arsenal, could be lost.
Moskovskiye novosti reported that if Russia proceeds
with nuclear testing it could still sign the CTBT treaty.
However, Russia could insist on including an escape
clause in the text of the treaty, which would allow
Russia to resume testing if its national security is
infringed upon. (See also the discussion of an alleged
nuclear test at Novaya Zemlya, in the Russia: Nuclear
Weapons Status file.)
12/95: RUSSIA ACCEPTS US PROPOSAL TO CONDUCT SIX TESTS
OVER A TWO YEAR PERIOD
According to a Ministry of Foreign Affairs official,
Russia accepted the announcement by the United States
regarding six subcritical nuclear tests to be conducted
in the next two years.
11/25-30/95: RUSSIA WILL CONDUCT FINAL TESTS BEFORE
CTBT IS ENACTED
MOSCOW NEWS reported that Russia will probably conduct a
last series of nuclear tests at Novaya Zemlya test site
before completion of a CTBT. The tests will most likely
be about one or two kt yield, according to various
sources. Russian military experts said that the conduct
of these tests will not hinder Russia's signing of the
CTBT.
11/19-26/95: MILITARY AND OFFICIAL POSITIONS DIFFER ON
TEST BANS
There are currently two positions in Russia with regards
to signing the CTBT treaty. Military leaders, including
Valeriy Manilov, Deputy Secretary of the Security
Council, and Yevgeniy Maslin, Chief of the 12th Main
Directorate of the Ministry of Defense, favor a new
series of nuclear tests while the present official
position stands for a comprehensive ban on all nuclear
testing.
11/3/95: PHYSICISTS WANT TO RESUME TESTING
It was reported that Russian nuclear physicists recently
sent a letter to the Russian government arguing for the
resumption of nuclear testing.
11/2/95: RUSSIA TO CARRY ON NECESSARY NUCLEAR TESTS
OVER THE NEXT TWO YEARS
Responding to the question of whether Russia conducts
explosions similar to the six nuclear weapon tests using
"subcritical" materials planned by the United
States over the next two years, a Russian Foreign
Ministry official stated that Russia is conducting
experiments deemed essential to ensure the safety and
security of its arsenal.
10/23/95: YELTSIN ENDORSES "ZERO-YIELD" CTBT
During a meeting with President Clinton in Hyde Park, New
York, President Yeltsin endorsed a "zero-yield"
CTBT, to be completed in 1996.
9/25/95: KOZYREV URGES PASSING CTBT BEFORE 1996
In an address to the United Nations 50th General
Assembly, Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev stated
that it was necessary to conclude the Comprehensive Test
Ban Treaty (CTBT) as early as possible but not later than
1996. In the meantime, he called for a universal and
permanent moratorium on nuclear tests.
9/20/95: DUMA ADOPTS MEASURE AGAINST RESUMING NUCLEAR
TESTING
During the 10th General Assembly of the international
parliamentarian organization GLOBE-International, Russia
and Japan sponsored a Tokyo declaration against
resumption of nuclear testing. The Russian Duma
unanimously adopted the declaration.
9/6/95: MINATOM STATES THAT ALTHOUGH TESTING IS
DESIRABLE, A TOTAL BAN IS MORE ADVANTAGEOUS
Georgiy Kaurov, Head of Minatom's information
directorate, in an interview with Nihon Keizai Shimbun,
stated, "If the definition of what is a nuclear test
is clarified, [Russia] will take the same position as the
United States," i.e., will support a complete ban on
nuclear testing. Kaurov also stated that although "a
total nuclear test ban will be disadvantageous for
Russia, which lags behind the United States in computer
simulation technology," Russian adherence to a total
ban would be "inevitable from the international
cooperation standpoint."
8/15/95: SPOKESMAN SAYS THAT SOME TESTS WILL STILL BE
NECESSARY AFTER CTBT IS ENACTED
Russian Foreign Ministry spokesman Mikhail Demurin stated
during a press conference that Russia is proceeding from
the assumption that when the CTBT enters into force, the
nuclear states would still need to conduct certain
activities to ensure the safety and reliability of their
arsenals.
8/12/95: RUSSIA DESIRES SMALL-SCALE TESTS UNDER THE
CTBT
It was reported that Russia wants to allow nuclear tests
with a yield of ten tons under a CTBT.
2/1/95: RUSSIA PLEASED WITH UNITED STATES' EXTENSION
OF MORATORIUM
Russia praised the United States on extending its
moratorium on nuclear testing until the CTBT enters into
force. According to a Foreign Ministry statement,
"Russia has initiated an indefinite moratorium on
nuclear tests. It intends to firmly keep it as long as
similar moratoria announced by other nuclear powers are
adhered to de-facto or de-jure." The Foreign
Ministry also favors signing the CTBT in 1995.
9/94: RUSSIA IS IN FAVOR OF CTBT CONTINUATION
According to CD Secretary General Vladimir Petrovskiy,
Russia has called for an indefinite and
non-discriminatory CTBT. Russia has agreed to seismic,
hydroacoustic, and atmospheric radiation controls as
verification measures.
5/94: RUSSIA WILL AGREE ON TEST-BAN DECISIONS
Grigoriy Karasin stated that Russia is prepared to favor
agreed-upon decisions concerning the main provisions of a
treaty banning nuclear testing by Spring 1995.
4/26/94: MORATORIUM ON NUCLEAR TESTS WILL CONTINUE
Secretary-General of the Geneva Conference on Disarmament
Vladimir Petrovskiy stated that, "during talks with
the UN secretary-general at the beginning of April,
President Boris Yeltsin had expressed Russia's intention
to continue the moratorium on nuclear tests which was
initially declared by ex-Soviet president
Gorbachev."
Page last updated 17 June 2004. This page is no longer being updated.
Please see the Strategic Forces General Developments
file for more recent developments.
Comments or questions? Contact Nikolai Sokov (nsokovATmiis.edu) at MIIS
CNS.
This material is produced independently for NTI
by the Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the
Monterey Institute of International Studies and
does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has
not been independently verified by NTI or its directors, officers,
employees, agents. Copyright © 2003 by MIIS.
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