This file is no longer
being updated. For major recent developments, please see the
Strategic Forces General Developments file.
To return to the main Nuclear Disarmament Treaties and Agreements entry, see
the
Arms Control Treaties and Agreements
file
To return to the main CTBT entry, see the CTBT Overview
file
For earlier developments, see the
Negotiations History file
See also:
Semipalatinsk Test Site
Novaya Zemlya Test Site
10/1/2002:
NIKOLAYEV BELIEVES RESUMPTION OF US TESTS POSSIBLE
On 1 October 2002, chairman of the State Duma Committee on Defense Andrey
Nikolayev said that the United States might resume nuclear
tests at the Nevada test site in the near future. Nikolayev made his statement after meeting with
US Ambassador to Russia Alexander Vershbow, during which the latter allegedly
said the United States did not intend to ratify the CTBT.
9/14/2002: RUSSIA, OTHER COUNTRIES ISSUE JOINT STATEMENT IN SUPPORT OF CTBT
On 14 September 2002, Russia and 17 other countries, including France,
Japan, and Great Britain, issued a joint statement in New York City supporting
the CTBT
and calling for its entry into force.
6/28/2002: NOVAYA
ZEMLYA TEST SITE TO BE MAINTAINED
On 28 June 2002 Russian Defense Minister Sergey Ivanov, during
a visit to the
Novaya Zemlya test site, announced that the Russian government intends to
maintain the site in working condition and further develop it. At the same time, Ivanov said, Russia had no intention to resume nuclear testing.[1] However, it
will continue conducting so-called subcritical experiments intended to
verify the safety and reliability of Russian nuclear weapons, at the rate of
four to six a year.[2] Ivanov also noted the site's importance to Russia's
national security as its only nuclear test site, and discussed the need to
address environmental issues on the island.[1] Ivanov's comments were echoed by
Minister of Atomic Energy Aleksandr Rumyantsev on 30 June 2002, also
on a visit to the island, where he said that the test site was vital to national security
and was a necessary attribute of Russia as a nuclear power. Rumyantsev did not
exclude the possibility of resuming nuclear tests in the future in the event of
significant changes in the political situation.[3]
5/23/2002: RYABEV DENIES PREPARATIONS
FOR NUCLEAR TESTS
On 23 May 2002,
Izvestiya
published an interview with First Deputy Atomic Energy Minister Lev Ryabev
concerning a New York Times article suggesting Russia was preparing to resume
nuclear testing. According to
Ryabev, Russia was only
performing CTBT-permitted subcritical
experiments, at a rate of four to six per year. Ryabev
also noted that some activities performed by Russian specialists before each
subcritical test indeed resemble preparations for a normal nuclear
rest. This is done in order to preserve the test site's infrastructure and the skills of Russian nuclear testing specialists. On
the issue of increasing the transparency of US and Russian test sites, Ryabev
said that although the United States has been trying to persuade Russia to agree
to exchange groups of inspectors, Russia's position is that any such bilateral
arrangements would be inappropriate, particularly since the United States has
not ratified the CTBT,
which provides for site inspections. In addition to conducting subcritical
tests at Novaya Zemlya,
the Russian nuclear stockpile stewardship program includes a detailed check of each
type of nuclear warhead in the Russian inventory, which entails full disassembly and
detailed analysis of selected munitions of each type. Following the component
analysis, a decision is made whether to retain the munition
type in the inventory. When asked about Russia's plans to develop compact nuclear
munitions, Ryabev
responded that Russia had already studied the issue of low-yield nuclear munitions
and would not require additional nuclear tests.
1/8/2002: NUCLEAR POSTURE REVIEW
LEAKS ELICIT RUSSIAN REACTIONS
Strana.ru
reported on 8 January 2002 that Colonel-General Igor Valynkin,
head of the 12th Main Directorate of the Ministry of Defense, said that if a
recognized nuclear weapons state conducts a nuclear test, Russia will
follow suit.[1] Valynkin
was responding to reports that leaked US Nuclear Posture Review documents
indicated the possibility that the United States was moving toward the
resumption of tests.[2] At an earlier interview in October 2001, Valynkin
indicated that the Novaya Zemlya
test site facilities were undergoing renovation in anticipation of a possible US
resumption of testing.[1] Deputy Prime Minister Ilya Klebanov
said that Russia did not intend to end the nuclear testing moratorium and would
monitor the situation. While
Klebanov expressed confidence in
the methods used to maintain the viability and safety of Russian nuclear
weapons, he also said that Russia would act to protect its national security
interests, implying a possible resumption of Russian tests in response to US
tests.[3]
5/25/2001: FOREIGN MINISTRY DENIES ALLEGATIONS OF
CTBT VIOLATIONS
On 25 May 2001 the Russian Foreign Ministry categorically
denied allegations published in the US press that Russia has violated CTBT
provisions. The Foreign Ministry also reaffirmed Russia's support for the treaty,
which it views as a proliferation prevention tool. According to the ministry,
the allegations represent an attempt to divert attention from plans to launch a new round of nuclear weapon modernization by countries
that are not interested in preserving the existing legal framework for strategic
stability.
3/20/2001: MINISTER OF ATOMIC ENERGY ADAMOV
DISCUSSES CTBT WITHDRAWAL
In an interview reported on 20 March 2001, Minister
of Atomic Energy Adamov discussed the possibility of Russia's withdrawal from the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treat (CTBT). Adamov stated that while Russia
is currently able to carry out its nuclear weapons program without
conducting nuclear explosions, the CTBT provides for withdrawal from the treaty if the
president deems its observance to be contrary to Russia's national
security interests.
10/27/2000: RUSSIA COMPLETES PLANNED
SERIES OF SUBCRITICAL NUCLEAR TESTS IN ACCORDANCE WITH CTBT STANDARDS
On 27 October 2000 the Ministry
of Atomic Energy announced that it completed its planned series of
subcritical nuclear tests for
the year 2000.[1] The series consisted of five
subcritical tests, conducted on 28 August, 31 August, 3 September, 20 September,
and 27 October 2000, at the Novaya Zemlya test site.[2]
Minatom emphasized that the tests were conducted in
accordance
with CTBT provisions and were performed to verify continued viability and safety
of Russia's nuclear weapons by testing weapon-grade plutonium of various ages. Funding
shortages have made it more difficult for Russia to regularly replace
plutonium in its warheads. Minatom spokesman
Yuriy Bespalko said approximately 100g of weapons-grade plutonium were
used in each test.[2] For a related report see also the 8/28/97
entry on this page.
5/28/00: PRESIDENT PUTIN SIGNS CTBT FEDERAL LAW
Russian President Vladimir Putin signed the federal
law On Ratifying the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty following its
approval by the State Duma on 21 April 2000 and by the Federation Council
on 17 May 2000. It will enter into force on the date of its publication
in Rossiyskaya gazeta, the official government newspaper.
5/23/00: MINISTER OF ATOMIC ENERGY SEES CTBT AS
A NONPROLIFERATION INSTRUMENT
During a meeting with members of International Physicians
for the Prevention of Nuclear War, Minister of Atomic Energy Yevgeniy Adamov
stated that a nuclear test ban is necessary to stop countries currently
working on acquiring nuclear weapons. Adamov also said, "a nuclear
test ban ought to become a future instrument with which nuclear weapons
will be buried." Adamov noted that while some experts claim that a nuclear
test ban jeopardizes Russian national security, computer simulations are
adequate to the task of ensuring the safety of the Russian nuclear stockpile.
5/17/00: FEDERATION COUNCIL RATIFIES CTBT
The Federation Council "practically unanimously"
ratified the CTBT after a closed discussion session. The head of
the Federation Council's Committee on Security and Defense, Ivan Shabanov,
told journalists "Russia is counting on the United States to take adequate
measures to ratify" the CTBT and added that the ratification shows Russia's
good will in the area of arms control. Shabanov expressed hope that
the issue of the US Senate's ratification of the CTBT would be discussed
during President Clinton's visit to Russia in June 2000.
4/21/00: RUSSIAN STATE DUMA OVERWHELMINGLY RATIFIES
CTBT
The State Duma ratified the CTBT on 21 April 2000,
with 298 deputies voting for the ratification, 74 deputies voting against,
and 3 abstaining. The minimum number of votes required for ratification
was 226. This vote makes Russia the third nuclear state to have ratified
the treaty, after Great Britain and France. In a separate resolution
adopted simultaneously with the ratification, the State Duma expressed
concern over the US Senate's failure to ratify the treaty, which it interpreted
as a possible sign that the United States desires to modernize its nuclear
weapons and to use "nuclear components" in "destabilizing anti-ballistic
missile systems." The resolution called on President Putin to ensure the
financing of federal programs specifically related to development of the
nuclear weapons complex and also called on other countries to sign and/or
ratify the treaty as soon as possible.[1] Russia's Foreign Affairs Minister
Igor Ivanov called the ratification "a very important step," undertaken
in the interests of Russia's security and international stability. According
to Ivanov, the treaty will become "a serious barrier to proliferation of
nuclear weapons on the planet."[2] The Ministry of Foreign Affairs also
issued a statement calling the ratification "a confirmation of our country's
consistent course toward strengthening the nuclear weapons non-proliferation
regime, disarmament, and strengthening the strategic stability in the world"
and inviting countries that have not signed the treaty to do so.[3] The
ratification came only three days before the opening of the Non-Proliferation
Treaty review conference in New York.[4]
11/24/99: YELTSIN SUBMITS BILL ON CTBT RATIFICATION
At the November 1999 summit of the OSCE in Istanbul,
Russian President Boris Yeltsin announced his intention to pursue the ratification
of the CTBT by the Duma as soon as possible.[1] On 24 November 1999
Yeltsin sent a bill on the ratification of the CTBT to the Duma.
Russian Foreign Affairs Minister Igor Ivanov, Defense Minister Igor Sergeyev,
and Atomic Energy Minister Yevgeniy Adamov have been appointed official
representatives of the President at the parliamentary hearings on this
issue. Yeltsin suggested that the Duma assign top priority to CTBT
ratification, which he would like to see completed prior to the parliamentary
elections scheduled for 19 December 1999.[1,3] In a letter addressed
to Duma Speaker Gennadiy Seleznev, Yeltsin underlined that his administration
considers the CTBT the "most important instrument for strengthening the
nonproliferation regime and a major factor preventing the qualitative improvement
of nuclear weapons." Stating that the treaty does not impede Russia's
defense and security capabilities, Yeltsin noted that Russia could exercise
its right to leave the treaty if its national interests were threatened.[3]
According to the Jamestown Monitor, unnamed Russian parliamentarians
said that the bill would first have to be submitted for discussion to four
different subcommittees of the Duma. Due to the fact that the current
parliamentary session ends on 3 December, these parliamentarians concluded
that "consideration of the CTBT will not take place at least until the
first session of the new parliament." Moreover, "Russia's upper house
of parliament, the Federation Council, must also approve the accord."
"According to at least one lawmaker, "the obvious diplomatic benefits of
Russian ratification of the CTBT will not necessarily translate into parliamentary
approval." Vladimir Ryzhkov, the head of the Our Home is Russia faction
in the Duma, said that "as long as the United States sticks to its clearly
unfriendly policy toward Russia, no Duma is ever going to ratify that [test
ban] treaty." Reuters reported a Russian Foreign Ministry spokesman
announcing that Russia has no intention of resuming nuclear tests as long
as "other nuclear nations do the same."[5]
10/14/99: RUSSIA ALARMED BY US SENATE REJECTION
OF CTBT
The Russian Foreign Ministry expressed disappointment
and concern following the US Senate's 13 October 1999 rejection of the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).[1] Foreign Ministry spokesman
Vladimir Rakhmanin said that "this decision is a serious blow to the entire
system of agreements in the field of nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation."
Rakhmanin linked US rejection of the CTBT to other US policies that "are
destabilizing the foundations of international relations," such as US efforts
to develop a national missile defense system and frequent imposition of
unilateral sanctions on companies and countries accused of violating international
export controls.[2,3] Russian Defense Ministry sources indicated
that the Senate vote set "a dangerous precedent with far-reaching consequences"
and that it could undermine the efforts by the Russian government to win
ratification of START II by the Federal Assembly.[4]
10/7/99: RUSSIA PREPARES FOR CTBT RATIFICATION
According to Russian Foreign Ministry spokesman Vladimir
Rakhmanin, the Russian government is currently finalizing a package of
documents to be submitted to the Duma for the ratification of the Comprehensive
Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). Rakhmanin added that a Russian delegation
is attending a conference of states that have ratified the CTBT as an observer.This
conference opened in Vienna on 6 October 1999. He reiterated Russia's
support for making the treaty universal. Several nuclear capable
states, including India, Pakistan, and North Korea, have not yet signed
the CTBT.
10/2/99: UNITED STATES AND RUSSIA HOLD TALKS ON
STRENGTHENING THE CTBT
In the course of a 27 September - 2 October 1999
tour of closed civilian and military nuclear installations, US Secretary
of Energy Bill Richardson met with Russian Minister of Atomic Energy Yevgeniy
Adamov to discuss improving verification of the Comprehensive Test Ban
Treaty. Richardson suggested that the two sides begin new talks to
promote "transparency" at the Russian nuclear test site at Novaya Zemlya.
Richardson proposed that US experts be allowed to visit the Novaya
Zemlya test site to conduct seismic experiments that would help the
US to distinguish nuclear tests from other seismic activities like earthquakes.
He also suggested that Russia give the United States 24 hours advance notice
before conducting "subcritical"
tests at the site. US critics of the CTBT argue that its verficcation
provisions are insufficient to discriminate between subcritical tests,
which the treaty allows, and low-yield nuclear tests, which it prohibits.
In response to Richardson's proposals, Adamov said that he was prepared
to discuss the proposed measures, but stressed that Russia was opposed
to discussing "just one measure in isolation." He insisted that these
measures become part of a package deal that would include granting Russia
access to US supercomputers to conduct nuclear test simulations, which
would assist in ensuring the safety and reliability of the Russian nuclear
stockpile. According to the New York Times, Adamov said that
"conditions should be established so that all nations possessing nuclear
weapons will have the same opportunity to engage in computer simulations."
The United States plans to make extensive use of such computer simulations
to maintain its nuclear stockpile while adhering to the CTBT. Russian
officials have repeatedly complained that during CTBT negotiations, the
United States promised access to US computer technology, but then reneged
on this pledge after the treaty was signed. US officials deny that
any such pledge was made. Adamov noted that Russia fully adheres
to the terms of the CTBT and has sent the treaty to the Federal Assembly
for ratification. Both Richardson and Adamov said the CTBT promotes international
security and therefore should be ratified by both the United States and
Russia.
8/28/97: SUSPECTED NUCLEAR TEST NEAR NOVAYA ZEMLYA
For details of this event, please see the overview,
"The
"Seismic Event" at Novaya Zemlya: Earthquake or Nuclear Test?"
4/97: RUSSIA BUYS US SUPERCOMPUTERS
According to Minatom, Russia purchased a $7 million US supercomputer that
can be used for simulation of nuclear tests from a European middleman.
Russian officials claim that the computer is essential in assuring a safe
and dependable nuclear weapons stockpile. However, US officials are concerned
that the Russians will use the computer to design new nuclear weapons.
In addition to this supercomputer, the United States is currently looking
into the sale of four small supercomputers to Russia by Silicon Graphics
of California. The California computer company stated that they thought
that the computers were being sold to a pollution monitoring laboratory.
11/96: RUSSIA WILL NOT RECEIVE US SUPERCOMPUTERS
The United States Department of Commerce blocked a planned sale to Russia
of IBM and Hewlett-Packard supercomputers that were intended for delivery
to Arzamas-16 and Chelyabinsk-70 nuclear weapons complexes.[1, 2] Due to
Commerce Department regulations the details of the export license requests
are confidential. However, the decision received wide publicity in the
US and Russia and triggered a number of often contradictory press reports.
The first detailed report of the planned sale was published in the RISK
Report in March 1996, which reported that in late 1995 or early 1996 the
Convex Computer Corporation, a subsidiary of Hewlett Packard, requested
permission from the US Commerce Department to sell up to three supercomputers:
two to the Arzamas-16 weapons complex and one to the Chelyabinsk-70 complex.[3]
However, during the summer of 1996, the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy
(Minatom) indicated its interest in buying an even more powerful supercomputer:
the Hewlett Packard Convex SPP-2000 Exemplar X-class computer, even though
no license application had been submitted for the purchase.[4] The SPP-2000
supercomputer is substantially faster than the other computers requested.
In response, US Secretary of Energy Hazel O'Leary on 13 August 1996 sent
a letter to Russian Minister of Atomic Energy Viktor Mikhailov requesting
clarification on the intended use of the supercomputers.[4] In his response
of 9 September 1996, Mikhailov declared Russia's intent to use supercomputers
only for maintaining the safety and reliability of the existing Russian
nuclear weapon stockpile under the conditions of the Comprehensive Test
Ban Treaty (CTBT).[5] This planned use was in itself controversial, since
Russia appeared to be making purchase of the computers a quid pro quo for
ratification of the CTBT, implying that maintaining nuclear stockpile integrity
under the CTBT would be impossible without supercomputers.[6] On the US
side, some officials argued that supercomputers should not be sold to Russia
even in order to assist in maintaining the stockpile or ensuring its safety.[7]
Concerns also emerged that beyond maintaining the Russian stockpile, the
computers could aid in the design of new nuclear weapons.[8] Supercomputers
of the SPP-2000 class are capable of close simulation of the rapidly varying
physical conditions at each stage of a nuclear explosion, and thereby might
allow virtual reality tests of new or modified weapons designs. [7] In
response to these concerns, Congressman Duncan Hunter (R-CA), a member
of the House National Security Committee, requested that the US General
Accounting Office (GAO) study the proposed sale and report to Congress.
According to the 9/30/96 GAO testimony, the SPP-2000 supercomputer, with
a speed of up to 34,500 Million Theoretical Operations per Second (MTOPS)
(equivalent to about 46.1 billion Floating Point Operations per Second
(GFLOPS)), would increase Russia's computing capabilities by as much as
a factor of ten.[9] Current US policy allows the executive branch to deny
an export license if the computer speed exceeds 2,000 MTOPS and the computer
is intended for military use, or if the speed exceeds 7,000 MTOPS and the
computer is intended for civilian purposes.[10] After hearing the GAO testimony
Congressman Hunter warned of "the grave damage to US security" that could
result from the sale if Russia used the computers to maintain or improve
its nuclear weapons.[11] As a result of these concerns the Commerce Department
refused to grant export licenses for all of the computers in question,
evidently including the lower-performance computers. According to Segodnya,
the blocked sales included an IBM supercomputer capable of 780 MTOPS for
Arzamas-16, and an SPP-1200 computer each for Chelyabinsk-70 and the Moscow
Institute of Experimental Physics.[12] It remains unclear whether a formal
request for an export license for an SPP-2000 computer was filed. Subsequent
Russian reports indicate, however, that Minatom is likely to continue to
pursue the purchase of US supercomputers. Kommersant-Daily reported
in December 1996 that the license requests were returned "without decision"
rather than being denied, and that the version of the SPP-2000 to be sold
to Russia is only capable of 4,500 MTOPS.[13] (This rating is more consistent
with that of the former SPP-1200, or Exemplar S-class, than an SPP-2000
X-class computer.[14]) In January 1997, Minatom Minister Mikhailov stated
at a press conference that he was confident that a deal on the supercomputers
would be reached in 1997.[15]
10/26/96: DETAILS OF SOVIET NUCLEAR TESTS SOLD TO THE PENTAGON
The Washington Post reported that the Russian Ministry of Atomic
Energy sold to the US Department of Defense a 2000-page text on the history
of Soviet nuclear tests for $288,501. The DOD Special Weapons Agency (DSWA),
the Pentagon unit assisting the dismantlement of nuclear weapons and nonproliferation
efforts in the CIS, contracted with Alexander Chernyshev, a deputy scientific
director at Arzamas-16, and over 200 Russian scientists, to create the
report between December 1992 and December 1995. The Russian Minister of
Atomic Energy and Scientific Director of Arzamas-16, Viktor Mikhailov,
approved the project. The report details all 715 Soviet and Russian nuclear
tests held since 1949, including the first explosion in 1949, the development
of the Soviet hydrogen bomb in 1953, and the 1954 Tomsk nuclear test involving
ground troops. The data also informed the Pentagon of the manner in which
Soviet nuclear facilities functioned, who the decision-makers were, the
levels of technology throughout Soviet history, environmental analyses
performed, and safety measures taken. The new information will be used
along with data collected during the Cold War in order to better understand
Russian testing procedures and to monitor compliance with the Comprehensive
Test Ban Treaty. The report remains classified by the DSWA at the request
of its Russian authors, who want the information released to cleared government
employees and contractors only. Although no Russian state secrets were
divulged and no information on Soviet weapons design was furnished, Robert
M. Norris, senior analyst with the Natural Resources Defense Council, has
declared the report a possible "intelligence goldmine."
4/23/96: SEISMIC STATIONS PLANNED WITH US DEFENSE DEPARTMENT
TO MONITOR INTERNATIONAL WEAPONS TESTS
Premier Viktor Chernomyrdin signed Russian Federation Directive No. 683,
providing for negotiations between the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense
and the US Defense Department on establishing and operating seismic stations
to monitor nuclear weapons tests and their cessation. Chief of the Russian
Federation Defense Ministry Special Monitoring Service, Major General Yuriy
Cherepanov, said that since the CTBT bans nuclear explosions in all media,
it is planned to establish a comprehensive International Monitoring System.
The plan envisions 170 seismic, 80 radionuclide, 60 subsonic, and 11 hydroacoustic
stations located around the globe. An International Data Center will collate
all the information in Vienna. The center of the System will be located
in a neutral, non-nuclear country, Austria.
1/96: SPECIALISTS FEAR THAT A TEST BAN COULD HINDER WEAPONS SAFETY
Although Moscow has not issued any new directives on conducting nuclear
tests at Novaya Zemlya, the likelihood of such tests is growing. Russian
nuclear specialists fear that without tests the momentum for improvement
of the safety of nuclear weapons, necessary for the modernization of the
nuclear arsenal, could be lost. Moskovskiye novosti reported that
if Russia proceeds with nuclear testing it could still sign the CTBT treaty.
However, Russia could insist on including an escape clause in the text
of the treaty, which would allow Russia to resume testing if its national
security is infringed upon.
Page last updated 17 June 2004. This page is no longer being updated.
Please see the Strategic Forces General Developments
file for major recent developments.
Comments or questions? Contact Nikolai Sokov (nsokov@miis.edu) at MIIS
CNS.
This material is produced independently for NTI
by the Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the
Monterey Institute of International Studies and
does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has
not been independently verified by NTI or its directors, officers,
employees, agents. Copyright © 2003 by MIIS.
HOME | CONTACT US | SITE MAP
Nuclear Disarmament Treaties/Agreements