1/6/99: ARGUMENTS AGAINST START II RATIFICATION
REAPPEAR AFTER US-BRITISH AIRSTRIKES AGAINST IRAQ In an article published by Krasnaya zvezda
on 6 January 1999, Duma Committee on Defense Deputy Chairman Mikhail Musatov
(Liberal Democratic Party of Russia) argued against ratification of the
START II treaty. While Musatov conceded that "the need for another START
treaty is in no doubt," he added that many of the provisions of START II
are unacceptable today. In particular, Musatov criticized the treaty as
hastily drafted on the basis of US proposals, and said it would eliminate
"the one reliable means of deterrence left, namely, the [Russian] strategic
nuclear forces." Musatov also noted that in the six years since
START II was drafted in 1993, the "post-Soviet area has changed appreciably."
Greater military cooperation between Ukraine, which now owns former Soviet
missile production facilities, and Russia has yet to occur. This limits
Russian ability to produce ICBMs. He refuted statements from START II's
supporters, who claim that the treaty promotes strategic equality.
Musatov cautioned that "whether we ratify START II or not, the consequences
will be the same"--US strategic forces will outnumber Russian forces. Despite
the September 1997 protocols signed by US Secretary of State Madeleine
Albright and Russian Foreign Minister Yevgeniy Primakov that extended implementation
of START II, Musatov asked rhetorically "what [strategic nuclear forces]
will Russia be left with by 2005-2008?" Even though First Deputy Prime
Minister Yuriy Maslyukov has predicted that by 2000 Russia will commission
about 40 Topol-M missiles annually, Musatov argued that with the retirement
of older missile systems "Russia will only be able to dream about the quantitative
ceiling established by the START II Treaty for ICBMs."
[Mikhail Musatov, "Smozhet li Rossiya
oboytis bez yadernogo shchita?" Krasnaya zvezda, 6 January 1999,
p. 3.] {entered 1/19/99 SS}
1/1/99: SPRING DUMA SESSION MAY BE LAST CHANCE
FOR START II According to an analysis published in the January
1999 edition of Voprosy bezopasnosti, published by the PIR Center,
the spring 1999 session of Duma may be the last chance to ratify
START II. If the treaty is not ratified by the end of the spring
session, the attention of Duma members will shift to the scheduled December
1999 parliamentary elections, making ratification impossible, the journal
argued. Drawing on the lessons of the failed attempt to secure ratification
in December 1998, the article contends that the two main preconditions
for ratification are energetic efforts by the Russian government on the
treaty's behalf, and the absence of international events (especially actions
by the United States) that injure Russian interests. The new draft
law on START II ratification, which was ready for approval in December
1998, having the approval of all the main Duma factions, has resolved the
domestic political and military-technical obstacles to ratification.
However, international political obstacles remain, including continued
resentment in Russia of NATO expansion, and Russian-US disagreements over
regional issues such as Iraq and Kosovo. The article argues that
although the treaty is currently scheduled to be considered by the Duma
in March, late February is probably the most likely time for a successful
push by the government for ratification. By that time the government
should have secured approval of the 1999 budget, creating a favorable political
climate of "trust" in the government. Waiting too long after this
window, suggests the article, could be problematic, because NATO is scheduled
to hold its 50th anniversary summit in April, at which it will formally
accept Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary as new members, possibly
triggering renewed debate in Russia about relations with NATO and the United
States. Waiting until later in the session, closer to June, would
raise the risk that electoral distractions would prevent the treaty from
passing. In the final analysis, concludes the article, the success
of ratification will depend on the skill and timing of the government's
lobbying efforts.
["Perspektivy ratifikatsii SNV-2 na
vesenney sessii gosdumy,"
Voprosy bezopasnosti, No. 1, January 1999.]{entered
2/23/99 SDP}
12/3/98: COMMUNIST SUPPORT INCREASES CHANCES FOR START II RATIFICATION According to an article appearing on 3 December 1998 in Proliferation
Brief, the appointment of several former Communist Duma deputies into
the cabinet of Prime Minister Yevgeniy Primakov has increased the likelihood
that START II will be ratified. During closed door sessions held in November
(see the START II Ratification Developments
entry for 11/10/98), Primakov and First Deputy Prime Minister Yuriy
Maslyukov appealed to the Duma, in which the Communist Party holds a working
majority of seats, for the treaty's ratification. Communist deputies
"agreed to accelerate the process considerably" and are currently preparing
a draft resolution with a working group consisting of "representatives
from both houses of Parliament, the office of the government and the presidential
administration." The new draft will replace the previous START II ratification
bill, which President Yeltsin submitted to the Duma in April 1998, and
which failed to gain Communist support. After the working group draft is
finalized, the President will officially withdraw the April bill and submit
the revised draft resolution. According to the article, "such an
approach will provide the Duma with the opportunity to consider the agreed
bill from the very beginning--with much greater chances of its rapid approval."
Concerns remain over the language of the new resolution. For example, there
is still debate about whether START II missile deactivation by Russia should
begin only upon the conclusion with the United States of a START III agreement
or if pledges from Washington to negotiate the terms of START III will
suffice. The article also pointed out that ratification of START II is
not necessarily assured, despite recent developments. Hard-line Communist
and nationalist deputies have so vehemently expressed opposition to the
treaty in the past, that it may prove difficult for them to reverse their
positions now. Furthermore, Maslyukov's recent attempts to link START II
ratification and additional loans from the International Monetary Fund
(IMF) may provoke opposition deputies to reject START II "because this
would be the most efficient way to liberate Russia from the IMF," which
many blame for Russia's ongoing economic crisis. Many deputies also
doubt the wisdom of ratifying START II in the light of calls by some US
legislators for the development of a national missile defense system and
the abrogation of the 1972 ABM Treaty, which Russia views as a crucial
component of strategic stability.
[Alexander Pikayev, "START II: Better Late than Never," Proliferation
Brief, Vol. 1. No. 16, 3 December 1998, p. 1.] {entered 12/14/98 SS}
8/7/98: EXPERTS CAUTION THAT START II RATIFICATION CANNOT AFFORD
DELAY On 7 August 1998, Nezavisimoye voyennoye obozreniye published an
article written by Mikhail Vinogradov and Leonid Ryabikhin from the Committee
for Global Security's Center of Scientific Investigation, who argued that
continued delay in the ratification of START II by the Russian Duma may
lead to the collapse of the 1972 ABM Treaty. Vinogradov and Ryabikhin contended
that further delay by the Duma may lend support to the arguments of some
Republican members of the US Senate, who believe that the United States
should reexamine the ABM treaty of 1972. In particular, Vinogradov
and Ryabikhin expressed concern that as a result of the Duma's hesitation,
the US Senate may refuse to ratify the ABM demarcation agreements signed
by the US and Russia on 26 September 1997 (see
the ABM Treaty developments section). Vinogradov and Ryabikhin conclude
that by contrast, speedy Duma ratification of START II would demonstrate
the crucial role in strategic stability played by the ABM treaty, and thus
undermine the arguments of US Republican legislators that the ABM treaty
compromises US national security.
[Mikhail Vinogradov and Leonid Ryabikhin,"Ratifikatsiya SNV-2
ne priyemlet promedleniya," Nezavisimoye voyennoye obozreniye, No.
29, 7-13 August 1998, p. 1.]{Entered 11/18/98 SS}
6/9/98: MILITARY PAPER REITERATES SUPPORT FOR START II RATIFICATION An article published in the 9 June 1998 edition of the official military
newspaper Krasnaya zvezda argued in favor of ratifying START II.
While the newspaper conceded that the 1993 signing of the treaty was "somewhat
hasty," it added that "it would have been an unforgivable mistake to fail
to make the most of the favorable political situation" of 1993. The newspaper
noted that differences in the structure of US and Russian nuclear forces
have caused many Duma deputies to regard START II as more advantageous
for the United States. However, the paper argued that "Russia has managed
to act on many of the Duma deputies' criticisms." Citing the package of
documents signed in New York in September 1997 (for details see START
II ratification development from 9/26/97 and the
corresponding entry in the ABM Treaty Developments section), the article
argued that if Russia refuses to ratify START II, and "stays within the
framework of the START I agreement, then the ratio of the sides' nuclear
potential will be 15:1 in the United States' favor." If START II were approved,
it contended, then the ratio would fall to 3.5:1. The report cited
Russia's economic situation as an equally compelling reason for START II
ratification, arguing that "obsolete hardware will have to be scrapped
anyway and new software developed." The paper further emphasized that supporters
of START II ratification include "the leadership of the Russian Ministry
of Defense and the Strategic Rocket Forces command."
[Vladimir Maryukha, Krasnaya zvezda, 9 June 1998,
p. 3; in "Army Paper Urges 'Good Sense' on START," FBIS-TAC-98-161.] {entered
11/09/98 SS}
9/97: COMMUNIST ARMS EXPERTS
RECOMMEND REJECTING START II, RESTARTING SS-18 PRODUCTION Writing in a September issue of the extremist weekly
Zavtra,
Communist Duma Deputy Aleksey Podberezkin and conservative defense analyst
Anton Surikov strongly urged the Russian Federal Assembly to "find within
itself the wherewithal" to reject the START II treaty. Both Surikov and
Podberezkin have long criticized the treaty, although Podberezkin, a foreign
policy advisor to Communist leader Gennadiy Zyuganov, had previously suggested
that he might support the treaty with certain amendments and reservations
(see entry below "Communists Release Book on START II Ratification"). The
authors contended that the package of agreements signed in September 1997
in New York (see related item in START
II Ratification Developments for more details) do not make START II
more acceptable to Russia, but in fact would worsen Russia's strategic
position if they were accepted. In particular, Surikov and Podberezkin
argued that the ABM demarcation agreements signed in New York (see related
items in ABM Treaty Developments)
would allow the United States to develop the elements of a national ballistic
missile defense, and to deploy sea-based ABM systems that threaten the
realiatory capability of Russia's force of strategic nuclear missile submarines.
The authors argued that once the United States develops these ABM capabilities,
Russia will be vulnerable to "nuclear blackmail" by Washington if it accepts
START II. Under the terms of the treaty, they asserted, Russia's
strategic nuclear forces will be primarily based on nuclear submarines,
which can be neutralized by sea-based ABM systems, while the single-warhead
Topol-M ICBM on which the land-based leg of the Russian forces will be
based under the terms of START II lacks the throw-weight to carry countermeasures
necessary to penetrate the national ABM system the United States could
begin deploying by 2003. If Russia ratifies START II, Podberezkin
and Surikov said, it would facilitate American plans to achieve "decisive
superiority in the sphere of strategic nuclear arms." In light of what
they view as a coordinated American plan to isolate, encircle, weaken,
and even dismember Russia, the authors said that "we must realize in this
regard that the preservation of strategic nuclear parity with the United
States is the main condition for the preservation of the independence and
territorial integrity of Russia in the 21st century." The authors then
contended that the best means to maintain strategic nuclear parity and
thwart US plans to use ABM systems to neutralize Russian retaliatory capability
is to retain the R-36M2 heavy ICBM (NATO designation SS-18), which is banned
under the terms of START II. Only the SS-18, they asserted, has sufficient
throw-weight to carry the countermeasures necessary to penetrate planned
US ABM systems. The authors claimed that Russia could put domestic facilities
for production of the SS-18--which was previously produced in Ukraine--into
operation by 2004-2005. Podberezkin and Surikov suggested that once production
was begun, 50-75 of the new SS-18s could then be deployed each year in
existing silos. They asserted that the cost of reviving SS-18 production
in Russia would be only about $150-200 million per year over the next several
years, an amount they said could easily be managed within the limits of
current defense budgets. After rejecting START II, the authors concluded
that Russia should declare a five to ten-year moratorium on the negotiation
of a new START III treaty with the United States. The article, which also
features long passages on US efforts to weaken Russia by means of NATO
expansion and various machinations in the Caucasas and Central Asia, reflects
the thinking of the more conservative elements of the foreign policy elite
in Moscow, who are convinced that the United States is deliberately trying
to reduce Russia to the status of a third-rate power in order to eliminate
it in the long run as an international competitor.
[Aleksey Podberezkin and Anton Surikov,"
"Illusions of Peace: Russia's Military Policy Requires a Selection of Priorities,"
Zavtra
no. 38, September 1997, p. 6; in "Podberezkin on START II," FBIS-SOV-97-276.]{entered
2/17/98 sdp}
9/18/97: USA & CANADA INSTITUTE DIRECTOR URGES
RATIFICATION OF START II. Writing in Nezavismaya gazeta on 18 September
1997, Sergey Rogov, director of the USA and Canada Institute of the Russian
Academy of Sciences, urged the Russian parliament to ratify START II with
only minor amendments. Rogov's article appeared just two days after
Defense Minister Igor Sergeyev and Foreign Minister Yevgeniy Primakov met
with Duma deputies to persuade them to ratify the 1993 arms control agreement.
(See related item in START II Ratification
Developments section for details.) In the article, Rogov concluded
that "Russia's national security interests require the ratification of
the START II treaty," provided that the Russian parliament amends the agreement
so that its implementation is linked to continued American adherence to
the 1972 ABM Treaty. Rogov argued that START II was beneficial for
Russia because "mutual restrictions are always more advantageous to the
one who speaks from a position of weakness," pointing out that US GDP is
12 times larger than that of Russia and that the US military budget is
$265 billion while Russia's totals only $40 billion, even if the more generous
purchasing power parity standard is used for comparison rather than the
commercial exchange rate. According to Rogov, under this "extremely unfavorable
correlation of forces," only an agreement like START II can make it possible
for Russia to maintain "approximate equality" with the United States in
strategic nuclear weapons. Rogov rejected the arguments of the treaty's
opponents, who object to provisions which require Russia to destroy its
"heavy" land-based multiple-warhead missiles (MIRVed ICBMs), and worry
that under the agreement the United States will retain the capability to
rapidly augment its nuclear forces. The treaty's opponents ignore its substantial
advantages for Russia, asserted Rogov. He contended that the treaty
will reduce the "most modern" American weapons systems, which present the
greatest threat to Russian nuclear forces, eliminating the highly accurate
MX ICBM, and reducing the number of Trident D-5 submarine launched ballistic
missiles (SLBMs) by 50%. He also noted that the more stringent "counting
rules" for strategic bombers under START II would restrict American bomber
deployments, and said that the treaty would require the US to reduce its
deployed strategic nuclear forces by 5,000 warheads, while Russia would
have to reduce only 3,000 warheads. While admitting that implementing
the reductions in the treaty would impose heavy short-term costs on Russia,
he argued that these would be ameliorated by the extension of the implementation
deadline to 2007 agreed to at the March 1997 Helsinki Summit. He added
that these expenses would be more than offset by the reductions in operations
and maintenance costs over the next 25 years which the treaty would make
possible. Rogov described START II as only the first step in creating a
new stable strategic relationship between Russia and the United States
in the 21st century, and said the Federal Assembly should also link ratification
of START II with the opening of talks on a START III agreement. Rogov also
suggested that it might be possible to reach agreement with Washington
on warhead ceilings in START III lower than the 2,000-2,500 outlined in
the framework agreement concluded by Yeltsin and Clinton at the Helsinki
Summit.
[Sergey Rogov, "Russia's Interests
and the START II Treaty," Nezavisimaya gazeta, 18 September 1997;
in "START II Permits 'Approximate Equality,'" FBIS-TAC-97-261.]{Entered
9/25/97 SP}
1996: IMEMO YEARBOOK ON START II PROBLEMS, SOLUTIONS The 1996 IMEMO yearbook (Rossiya v poiskakh strategii bezopasnosti) estimates
the cost of implementing START II reductions as 90-95 billion rubles (in
1992 prices, or $6-8 billion using the 1992 exchange rate), of which 75-80
billion rubles would be subsumed by START I implementation. Savings are
estimated at 15 billion rubles over 10 years. Since large expenses are
unavoidable in any event (a significant number of missiles and submarines
are slated for elimination with or without START II), overall savings could
reach 135 billion rubles over ten years (1992 prices). The book asserts
that the main difficulty in implementing START II is the choice between
the options of increasing the share of sea- and air-based nuclear warheads
or deploying 1,200-1,500 single-warhead ICBMs. The latter option could
include deploying approximately 300-400 silo-based ICBMs. The second option
is preferable if Russia could use all the SS-18 silos it currently has
(204) to house the new ICBMs. However, the START II treaty limits the number
of SS-18 silos that can be converted to launch smaller ICBMs to ninety,
which would reduce the savings by half. Russia cannot use silos of other
ICBMs because only SS-18 silos are sufficiently hardened. The authors suggest
that chances for ratification of START II could increase if the following
amendments were made: (1) allow all SS-19 and SS-24 ICBMs to be downloaded
to one warhead and retained in the force, an increase from the current
limit of 105 SS-19s; (2) allow Russia to convert all SS-18 silos for use
by single-warhead ICBMs. In addition, the authors suggest that the United
States should unilaterally remove all of the highly accuarate, counterforce
capable W-87 and W-88 warheads from their launchers. From the point of
view of the authors, "it would be more rational for the United States to
defend a treaty that is less advantageous but is being implemented instead
of continuing to insist on a big strategic victory under START II, which
remains on paper."
[Aleksey Arbatov, "Problemy osushchestvleniya Dogovorov
SNV-1 I SNV-2," in Aleksey Arbatov, ed., Rossiya: v poiskakh strategii
bezopasnosti, (Moscow: Nauka, 1996), pp. 13-25]
8/9/96: COMMUNISTS RELEASE BOOK ON START II RATIFICATION At a press conference held to publicize a new book on the START-II treaty,
Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF) leader Gennadiy Zyuganov
stated that the CPRF had not taken a definite position on the question
of ratification of the treaty. Zyuganov noted that further examination
and discussion of the treaty was necessary, and warned that while the CPRF
was "for" arms cuts, it was also concerned about Russia's national defense
and security. The book, Ratification of the START-II Treaty: Solutions,
Problems, Prospects, was issued by the "Spiritual Heritage" movement
and RAU-Corporation, and edited by Aleksey Podberezkin, who heads these
organizations. Twenty-two prominent experts wrote the book, the majority
of them retired military. One of the authors, General Yuriy Lebedev, suggested
at the press conference that the treaty should be ratified, but only after
some "shortcomings" were removed. Lebedev proposed delaying the target
date for implementation from 2003 to an unspecified later date. Lebedev
also noted as potential problems US adherence to the ABM treaty and NATO
enlargement.(Lebedev is a former First Deputy Chief of the Treaty
and Legal Directorate of the Russian General Staff and a past participant
in strategic arms control negotiations.) The authors of the book propose
a number of prerequisites for ratification. First, they call for consultations
with the United States on the following issues: strict implementation of
the ABM Treaty, no NATO enlargement, extension of START II implementation
deadlines, and reduction or limitation of the US ability to stockpile and
potentially reload warheads onto downloaded missiles. Second, they call
for the treaty to be amended so as to extend the implementation date by
an unspecified number of years. Third, they call for provisions stating
that: (a) in the case the United States withdraws from the ABM Treaty,
Russia would withdraw from START II; if the United States begins to deploy
an ABM system without formal withdrawal , then the issue would be raised
in the Russian Federal Assembly; (b) in the event of NATO enlargement,
discuss the implications in the Federal Assembly; (c) START II entry into
force be conditioned on a joint statement regarding further reductions
of strategic weapons to the level of 1,000-2,000 warheads.
[Ratifikatsiya Dogovora SNV-2: resheniya, problemy,
perspektivy (Moscow: Spiritual Heritage, RAU Corporation, 1996); Aleksandr
Reutov, "Duma Shall Have to Decide the Future of START II in the Fall,"
NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA, 8/9/96, p. 2, in "Russia: START II to be One of the
Main Subjects of Duma Session," FBIS-SOV-96-115; Yuriy Lebedev and Aleksey
Podberezkin, "Three Years of Waiting and Disputes: Will the State Duma
of the Russian Federation Ratify the Russian-American Treaty START-2?"
NEZAVISIMOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE, Supplement to NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA, 2/96,
No. 3, pp. 1, 4; in "Russia: Ratification of START-2 Seen Unlikely," FBIS-UMA-96-050-S,
3/13/96.] {Entered, revised 9/04/96 KD, revised 5/97 NS}
8/96: NEW INFORMATION ON TOPOL CAPABILITIES, MIRVING OPTIONS In an article published in the Russian journal Yadernyy Kontrol,
Anton Surikov, a researcher with the Russian Institute of Defense Studies,
presents unusually detailed arguments against the ratification of the START
II treaty. A conservative analyst who has critiqued the START II treaty
on previous occasions (see below), Surikov reveals important information
about Russian alternative force deployments if START II is not ratified.
Surikov argues that the US is conducting ABM research and development with
the intention of withdrawing from the ABM treaty in 2003 and starting deployment
of a strategic ABM system on US territory, to be completed within 3-5 years.
If Russia ratifies and implements START II by 2003, it would be unable
to redeploy heavy MIRVed SS-18 ICBMs to match the US nuclear capability
and penetrate the ABM defenses. Furthermore, the US is retaining a strategic
stockpile of warheads and could "breakout" of the START II treaty by replacing
MIRV warheads on Trident and Minuteman missiles. To hedge against US ABM
deployment, Surikov calls for additional R&D to develop MIRVed warheads
of a special lightweight design for the new variant of the SS-25/RS-12M
Topol-M missile now undergoing flight tests. According to Surikov, the
Topol-M will have a throwweight of 2 tons, making it capable of carrying
up to 7 warheads (or penetration aids). A problem with this approach, however,
is the absence of sufficient (1000) light warheads for such a deployment.
Surikov's preferred solution is for Russia not to ratify START II and to
retain a MIRVed ICBM force. According to Surikov, such a force could be
maintained by deploying SS-N-20 SLBMs with 10 light warheads per missile
in the silos of decommissioned MIRVed ICBMs. Alternatively, Surikov claims
that a new 80-120-ton liquid fueled ICBM with 10 warheads could be developed
in 3-5 years, and that in the 5 years after development up to 300 could
be deployed in existing silos. Then, if the US denounces the ABM treaty,
Russia could withdraw from START I and continue deployment of these new
ICBMs at a rate of 50-70 per year. Surikov estimates the cost of new Russian
MIRVed ICBM deployment at nearly half the cost necessary to deploy 500
mobile Topol-M missiles in the same period of time. Since Surikov is convinced
that the US will not cooperate with Russia on the "breakout" issue and
will not guarantee adherence to the ABM Treaty, he urges that Russia start
research and development on a new generation of MIRVed ICBMs. See also
the overview of Topol-M developments in the Nuclear Forces Status section.
[Anton Surikov, "SNV-2: Protivorechia ostayutsa," YADERNYY
KONTROL, no. 18-19 (Summer 1996), online version at: http://win.www.online.ru/sp/pir/ryak/18-19/pol-2/rhtml;
For an earlier, less detailed, argument along these lines see: Anton Surikov,
"START II: Ratification Is Inadvisable. Russia Needs New Missiles Instead
of Treaty," SEGODNYA, 04/05/96, p. 5; FBIS-SOV-96-068, 04/05/96.] {Updated
9/06/96 KD}
7/14/96:SRF MAJ. GEN. DVORKIN: NATO EXPANSION THREATENS START
II In a significant article published in Nezavisimaya gazeta, Major
General Vladimir Dvorkin, Chief of the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense
Fourth Central Research Institute, assessed the implications for START
II ratification of NATO enlargement. (The Institute carries out research,
analysis, and modeling of strategic forces for the Russian MoD. See the
file Russia: Nuclear Weapons-Related Facilities for more information.)
According to Dvorkin, NATO enlargement would incorporate up to 285 airfields
located in the former Warsaw Pact allies into NATO, giving NATO's tactical
aviation the ability to carry out conventional strikes against Russian
targets up to the Smolensk-Bryansk-Kursk line, and to the Grozny-Saratov-Kotlas-Murmansk
line. Air strikes could also be delivered against SSBN bases (Severomorsk
area) and heavy bomber bases (Mozdok, Engels). The proportion of Russian
strategic targets within NATO's reach would increase by 70-80 percent,
including a 60 percent increase in the ability to reach Russian strategic
nuclear missile launchers. Thus, NATO enlargement would directly influence
the strategic nuclear balance and raise questions concerning the entire
system of US--Russian strategic arms agreements, especially START II. While
Dvorkin does not explicitly call for rejection of the START II treaty,
he does implicitly support a conditional ratification that would tie nuclear
reductions to a halt on NATO expansion. (Dvorkin's article is particularly
noteworthy as the Russian military leadership has generally endorsed the
START II treaty. While not necessarily indicating a split within the military
on this issue, article does suggest that military support for the treaty
is not unconditional.)
[Vladimir Dvorkin, "Upsetting the Strategic Balance:
The West Is Presenting Opponents of Ratification of the START II Treaty
in the State Duma With a valuable Gift," NEZAVISIMOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE,
Supplement to NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA, 7/19/96,;
"NATO Expansion Shifts Strategic Balance," FBIS-SOV-96-140-S, 7/19/96.]
{Entered 8/15/96 KD, Revised 8/29/96 JWRL}
4/3/96:ARZAMAS-16 EXPERT CRITICIZES START II Arzamas-16 staffer Sergey Brezkun argued in an article published in Komsomolskaya
pravda that implementation of START II would lead to a US advantage
in nuclear weapons. START II requires both sides to eliminate their land-based
MIRVed ICBMs, while MIRVed SLBMs are allowed. Russian strategic forces
have traditionally emphasized MIRVed ICBMs, while the US has emphasized
submarine-based (SSBN) systems. START II, therefore, allows the US to retain
its powerful SSBN fleet, while Russia is forced to destroy its effective
silo-based strategic missiles. To replace the MIRVed ICBMs Russia would
have to build approximately 500 SS-25 Topol systems which cannot be upgraded
to carry more warheads. Conversely, the US is replacing the obsolete MK-78
warheads on silo-based Minuteman III ICBMs with 500 MK-87 warheads from
destroyed MX ICBMs. The Minuteman III ICBM can be upgraded to carry 1,500
warheads. (Brezkun therefore implies that the US could "breakout" of the
treaty more rapidly than Russia, and gain a strategic advantage. This argument
ignores, however, the fact that under START-II Russia is allowed to maintain
SS-19 missiles which have been "downloaded" from six warheads to one warhead.)
Brezkun concluded by noting that these features of the agreement do not
guarantee a tranquil nuclear future.
[Sergey Brezkun, "START II: Will Russia Return With Its
Shield or on Its Shield?", KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA, 04/03/96, p. 5; "START
II Seen As Harming Russian Interests," FBIS-TAC-96-006, 4/3/96.] {Entered,
KD, JL 8/29/96}
2/96:GENERAL LEBEDEV ON START II In an article published in Nezavisimaya gazeta's special supplement
Voyennoye
obozreniye, Yuriy Lebedev, a former First Deputy Chief of the Treaty
and Legal Directorate of the Russian General Staff and a past participant
in strategic arms control negotiations, and Aleksey Podberezkin, Deputy
Chairman of the State Duma Committee for International Affairs, argued
that START II ratification should be delayed to allow time for further
analysis. While the authors note that START II is in both Russian and US
security interests and is aimed at strengthening international stability,
they also cite negative arguments similar to those of Brezkun, Surikov
and Dvorkin ( See the corresponding entries in this section) implying that
the treaty would destabilize the nuclear balance by providing the US with
a redeployment or "breakout" advantage. According to Lebedev and Podberezkin,
Russia's choices are between ratifying the treaty with its disadvantages
for Russia, and reducing arms on a bilateral basis, or not ratifying and
disarming unilaterally while maintaining the necessary nuclear deterrent.
Since START II contains provisions disadvantageous only for Russia, Lebedev
and Podberezkin favor the choice of eventual unilateral disarmament, delay
of START II ratification, and pursuit of weapons research and experimental
design.
[Lebedev and Podberezkin, "Three years of Waiting and
Disputes: Will the State Duma of the Russian Federation Ratify the Russian-American
Treaty START-2?" NEZAVISIMOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE, Supplement to NEZAVISIMAYA
GAZETA, 2/96, No. 3, pp. 1, 4; in "Russia: Ratification of START-2 Seen
Unlikely," FBIS-UMA-96-050-S, 3/13/96.] {Entered 9/04/96 KD}
2/18/96:"EMOTIONAL," "PRAGMATIC" REASONS HINDER START II Russian political scientists have cited "pragmatic" and "emotional" reasons
thwarting START II ratification. The first group of reasons includes: deterioration
of the START II premise of a universal disarmament solution, need for colossal
funds for modernization in order to meet the shift to the sea-based leg
of the triad, possible deployment of ABM systems by the US, emergence of
two additional blocks - China and a unified Europe, and a return to the
notion of nuclear weapons as the only credible strategic deterrent. On
the "emotional" side arguments include: Russia's opinion is being disregarded,
promises of substantial financial assistance are not being kept by the
West, and a number of additional arguments not directly related to nuclear
weapons cuts.
["START II: The Unrequited Love of the US Congress,"
MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI, 2/18-2/25/96, p. 13.]
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