START II Overview Treaty Summary Treaty Text and Documents Archived Russian Analysis and Commentary Archived Ratification Developments
For more recent developments, please see the General Nuclear Weapons Developments file.
To return to the main Nuclear Disarmament Treaties and Agreements entry, see the Arms Control Treaties and Agreements file

Status

START II Treaty  
Signed: 3 January 1993
Ratified by US Senate: 26 September 1997
Ratified by the Russian State Duma: 14 April 2000
Ratified by the Russian Federation Council: 19 April 2000

Extension Protocol 
Signed:  26 September 1997
Ratified by the Russian State Duma: 14 April 2000
Ratified by the Russian Federation Council: 19 April 2000

US Letter on Early Deactivation: 26 September 1997
Russian Letter on Early Deactivation: 26 September 1997

Russian Announcement on the Legal Status of START II: 14 June 2002

The US Senate Ratification Resolution includes a provision requiring the president to seek Senate approval of any strategic arms cuts that would reduce the US strategic arsenal to below START I ceilings before START II enters into force. Russian State Duma START II Ratification Law requires the US Senate to ratify the Extension Protocol and the 1997 ABM Agreements for ratification instruments to be exchanged and for the treaty to enter into force. The US Senate has not taken up the START II Extension Protocol or the ABM Agreements for consideration, and following the United States' withdrawal from the ABM Treaty on 13 June 2002, the Russian Federation declared on 14 June 2002 that it no longer considered itself bound by the provisions of the treaty. 

Treaty Summary

The START II treaty complements, rather than replaces, the earlier START I treaty, in that the earlier treaty's provisions remain unchanged unless specifically modified by START II. It is to remain in force for the duration of START I.

START II establishes a limit on strategic weapons for each party, with reductions to be implemented in two phases. By the end of Phase I, the United States and Russia are to reduce their total deployed strategic nuclear warheads to 3,800-4,250, including no more than 2,160 warheads deployed on SLBMs, no more than 650 on heavy ICBMs, and no more than 1700-1750 on SLBMs. By the end of Phase II, each party's total number of deployed strategic nuclear warheads may not exceed 3,000-3,500. Of this number, no more than 1,700-1,750 may be deployed on SLBMs. Phase II requires the elimination of all heavy ICBMs and all MIRVed ICBMs (although some of the latter may be downloaded to one warhead). The MIRV ban does not apply to SLBMs.

Initially, Phase I was to be fully implemented within seven years of the entry into force of START I, and Phase II was to be fully implemented by 1 January 2003. However, these timeframes were extended to 31 December 2004 and 31 December 2007, respectively, by a Protocol to the Treaty signed by US and Russian representatives on 27 September 1997. In spite of this delay, both sides pledged themselves to deactivate all weapons to be eliminated under START II by 31 December 2003. The fixed implementation deadline of START II makes it unusual among arms control treaties, and the delays in ratifying it by both the United States and the Russian Federation, as well as the unexpectedly early entry into force of START I on 5 December 1994, required an extension to these deadlines. 

START II modifies START I missile "downloading" rules governing which MIRVed missiles may be converted to a single-warhead configuration. START II allows each side to download two existing types of missile by up to four warheads per missile, with no limit on the total number of missiles or warheads affected. Each side may also download 105 ICBMs by up to five warheads per missile. In practice these conditions mean Russia may download 105 of its UR-100Ns [NATO designation SS-19 'Stiletto,' START designation RS-18], the only Russian in-service ICBM that qualifies for downloading, and must deactivate all of its 10-warhead RT-23UTTKh [NATO designation SS-24 'Scalpel," START designation RS-22] ICBMs.

START II missile system elimination rules are generally similar to those of START I in that they require that the missile's silo be eliminated or converted to carry a treaty-permitted missile type. The sole exception to this rule are the R-36M [NATO designation SS-18 'Satan', START designation RS-20] ICBMs, which must be destroyed along with their silos. START II allows 90 R-36M silos to be converted for use by single-warhead missiles, however, which means that Russian elimination quota is 64 out of 154 R-36M silos. 

In contrast to START I, START II counts nuclear warheads attributed to heavy bombers using the number of warheads each heavy bomber is actually capable of carrying. Additionally, START II allows each side to convert up to 100 heavy bombers to conventional roles. Such bombers will not be counted against the START II warhead limit provided they have observable differences from nuclear-capable bombers of the same type and are not based at the same locations as nuclear-capable bombers. Each side may convert such bombers to a nuclear role following a three-month notification but may not subsequently reconvert them to a conventional role. 

Like those of its predecessor, START II's provisions will be verified by on-site inspections, including observation of observable differences on heavy bombers converted to conventional roles and missile and silo elimination or conversion. Silo conversions are also subject to inspection.

Treaty Documents

START II Treaty: English and Russian text

START II Heavy ICBM Elimination Protocol: English text

START II Memorandum of Understanding: English text

Extension Protocol: English text

Joint Agreed Statement of 26 September 1997

US Letter on Early Deactivation

Russian Letter on Early Deactivation

Russian START II Ratification Law: English and Russian text

Vladimir Putin's Statement on START II Ratification: English and Russian text

Russian Statement on the Legal Status of START II: Russian text

{Entered 4/17/2001 MJ} {Updated 6/20/2002 MJ}

Page last updated 4 December 2002
For more recent developments, see the General Nuclear Weapons Developments file.

Comments or questions? E-mail Nikolai Sokov:  nsokovATmiis.edu.

This material is produced independently for NTI by the Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies and does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been independently verified by NTI or its directors, officers, employees, agents. Copyright © 2002 by MIIS.

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