12/5/2001: FOREIGN MINISTRY: START I REDUCTION REQUIREMENTS
MET On 5 December 2001 the Russian
Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced that Russia has met its
treaty obligations and reduced the number of deployed strategic delivery
vehicles to 1136 and accountable warheads to 5518.[1] Speaking to reporters on
30 November 2001, General Staff Deputy Chief Colonel General Yuriy Baluyevskiy
said that while the United States should have no complaints about Russia's
fulfillment of its obligations, Russia was dissatisfied with several details
of United States' implementation of the treaty, including the issue of
counting warheads ascribed to delivery vehicles.[2]
Sources: [1] "Zayavleniye ofitsialnogo predstavitelya MID Rossii A.V. Yakovenko v
svyazi s okonchaniyem perioda sokrashcheniy strategicheskikh nastupatelnykh
vooruzheniy po Dogovoru o SNV," Russian Federation Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Department of Information and Press, 5 December 2001. [2] "Rossiya vypolnila usloviya Dogovora SNV-1," Interfax, 30 November
2001.{Entered 5/22/2002 MJ}
1/4/2001: RUSSIA ACCUSES UNITED STATES OF VIOLATING PEACEKEEPER ICBM DISMANTLEMENT PROCEDURES In a press briefing on 4 January 2001,
Russian Defense Ministry representative Aleksandr Yakovenko accused the United States of being in direct violation of
START I procedures for
dismantling the LGM-118A Peacekeeper ICBM.[1] The United States considers
destroying the first stage of the Peacekeeper sufficient for counting it as eliminated as it is the only part accountable under
START I, while Russia claims that the START I
Protocol for Conversion or
Elimination requires that all stages of the missile be destroyed.[2] A
Pentagon spokesman stated on 4 January 2001 that the remaining second and
third stages of the Peacekeeper are used for space launch vehicles. He also
commented that the United States and Russia have had long-standing
disagreements about the procedures for eliminating the Peacekeeper
ICBM.[2,3] A Russian Foreign Ministry press release suggested that the surviving stages
of the Peacekeeper could be used for other purposes such as a reserve for future arms
build-ups or to create a new type of Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM),
which would violate the
Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. Russia has, on earlier occasions, also voiced
similar opposition to the Hera missile as a violation of the INF treaty.[4]
Russian opposition to the Hera missile is linked to its opposition to US
withdrawal from the ABM Treaty and
use of the Hera in testing for a national missile defense (NMD) system.
Discontinuation of testing with the Hera would require the development
of an alternative test missile and would slow US progress on NMD development.
Sources: [1] "MID RF zayavlyayet,
chto SShA
narushayut polozheniye dogovora SNV-1, kasayushcheesya likvidatsii
mezhkontinentalnykh ballisticheskikh raket," Interfax, 6 January
2001. [2] "DoD News Briefing - Mr. Kenneth
H. Bacon, ASD PA," Department of Defense Web Site,
http://www.defenselink.mil, 4 January 2001. [3] "Problemy v realizatsii Dogovora
SNV-1," Yadernaya Rossiya segodnya, 12 January 2001. [4] "O narusheniyakh SShA Dogovora
SNV-1," Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Web Site,
http://www.ln.mid.ru/, 4 January 2001. {Entered 11/21/2001 RG}
11/9/95: START I SLV REVISION SIGNED A revision of the START I treaty was signed in Geneva
which permits the transfer of converted mobile strategic
missiles as space launchers. Under the revision, Russia
can establish space-launch sites anywhere in the world as
long as the converted ICBM launchers remain under Russian
control. Analysts fear that the missiles and technology
may eventually be transferred to rogue states such as
Iran. The Missile Technology Control Regime limits where
the missiles can be moved but has no enforcement
mechanisms. Russia and Ukraine reportedly announced their
intentions to sell SS-25 and SS-24 ICBMs as commercial
boosters for satellites as early as 9/95. ACDA Director
John Holum stated that Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and
Ukraine would have to notify the United States before the
launchers were moved and launched, and allow the
monitoring of any payload radio signals after launch. [1,2]
Sources: [1] Bill Gertz, "White House Denies Any
Concessions To Russia In START Revision," Washington Times, 11/10/95, p. A3. [2] Bill Gertz,
"Russia, Ukraine Have Unlimited Mobility With
Converted ICBMs," Washington Times, 11/17/95, p. A4.
5/11/95: IS RUSSIA'S START SLV SUBJECT TO START I QUOTAS? It is still unclear whether the new Russian space launch
vehicle Start, a modified SS-25, will be termed an ICBM,
thereby becoming subject to START I quotas. Since the SLV
was unsuccessfully tested by Russia in March 1995, the United
States has believed that the Start's trajectory coincides
with that of an ICBM.[1,2]
Sources:
[1] Pavel Felgengauer, "The Agreement
Clarifying The Term 'Tactical ABM' Has Been
Reached," Segodnya, 5/11/95, p. 1. [2] ITAR-TASS, 10/13/95; in "Russia To Supply Boosters
For U.S. Missiles," FBIS-SOV-95-198, 10/13/95.
3/95:US INSPECTORS SATISFIED WITH ICBM BASES According to a Russian Defense Ministry spokesman, US
START I verification inspectors were
"satisfied" with the three ICBM bases that they
inspected. The inspectors examined the Kostroma SS-24
base, the Irkutsk SS-25 base, and the Yasnaya SS-25 base.[1,2]
Sources: [1] "START I Inspections Continue,"
Krasnaya zvezda, 3/4/95, p. 1. [2] Doug Clarke, "First START Inspections Went Well,"
OMRI Daily Digest, No. 47, Part 1, 3/7/95.
12/5/94: START I ENTERS INTO FORCE Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus submitted their
START I instruments of ratification, thereby allowing
START I to enter into force.
["U.S. Officials Arrive In Russia To
Inspect Nuclear Weapons Sites," Post-Soviet Nuclear
& Defense Monitor, 3/14/95, p. 7.]
5/94: JOINT COMMISSION ON INSPECTION AND COMPLIANCE MEETS The Joint Commission on Inspection and Compliance (JCIC),
a body set up to work out the details of implementation
of START I, met in Geneva. Representatives from Belarus,
Kazakhstan, Russia, Ukraine, and the US signed a number of
agreements that will regulate the multilateral
fulfillment of START I.
[Ostankino Television First Channel, 5/6/94; in "Work Of Arms Control Commission
In Geneva Reported," FBIS-SOV-94-088, 5/6/94, p. 8.]
11/26/93: RUSSIA DENOUNCES UKRAINIAN CONDITIONAL
RATIFICATION The Russian government formally denounced the Ukrainian
Rada's conditional ratification of the START I Treaty,
stating that it was not valid under international law.
The status of the agreement that Russia and Ukraine
signed regarding the maintenance of nuclear weapons and
warheads at the Massandra Summit in September is still
uncertain. Apparently neither side has taken steps to
implement the terms of the agreement.
["Russia Cuts Off Maintenance Of
Ukrainian Nuclear Weapons," RFE/RL News Briefs,
11/29/93, Vol. 2, p. 6.]
11/4/92: RUSSIA RATIFIES START I Russia's Supreme Soviet ratified START I. Russia will
not, however, exchange its instruments of ratification
until Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine accede to the NPT
as non-nuclear-weapon states.
5/23/92: FOUR CIS STATES SIGN LISBON PROTOCOL Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine signed the Lisbon
Protocol to START I.
7/31/91: BUSH, GORBACHEV SIGN START I TREATY US President George Bush and Soviet President Mikhail
Gorbachev signed the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty
(START I). START I calls for the US and Soviet Union to
reduce their nuclear arsenals to 1,600 strategic delivery
vehicles and 6,000 accountable warheads. Ballistic
missiles cannot carry more than 4,900 warheads. START I
will reduce the Soviet arsenal by 48 percent and the US
arsenal by 38 percent.[1] START I cuts will occur over the next seven
years in three stages. The Treaty will remain in effect for 15 years,
with an option to extend the Treaty for an additional 5 years.[2]
Sources: [1] Dunbar Lockwood, "START Treaty
Signed; Brings Historic Cuts In Strategic Warheads,"
Arms Control Today, 9/91, pp. 25, 32-33. [2]"USA And Soviets Agree START
Cuts," Jane's Defence Weekly, 7/27/91, p. 131.
3/1/95: OSIA TEAMS ARRIVE IN RUSSIA Three 10-member teams from the On-Site Inspection Agency
arrived in Russia from the US to begin a 120-day baseline
inspection. The teams, which must be allowed onto a base
within 24 hours of giving notice, will inspect 71 weapons
facilities in Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine.
["START I On-Site Inspections Begin
On Schedule," ARMS CONTROL TODAY, 4/95, p. 22.]
Page last updated 17 June 2004. This page is no longer being updated.
Please see the Strategic Forces General Developments
file for more recent developments.
Comments or questions? Contact Nikolai Sokov (nsokovATmiis.edu) at MIIS
CNS.
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