5/14/2003: DUMA RATIFIES MOSCOW TREATY
AFTER DELAYS
The State Duma voted during a closed session on 14 May 2003 to ratify the
Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty, signed by Presidents Bush and Putin
in Moscow in May 2002 and ratified by the US
Senate in March 2003.[1] The law on ratification, which required 226 votes to
pass, garnered support from 294 deputies. The majority of the 134
parliamentarians
opposed to ratification came from the Communist Party and the Agro-Industrial
Group.[2] The law on ratification requires that President Putin inform the
Federation Council and State Duma about
development plans for the
strategic nuclear forces within three months of entry into force of the treaty.
It also mandates that the government submit annual reports on implementation of
the Moscow Treaty and START I to the
Federation Council.[1] The vote followed a meeting at the Kremlin on 13 May 2003 during which
President Putin encouraged the leaders of Duma groups and factions to
support ratification.[3] The decision to ratify the Moscow Treaty followed
several delays, most recently due to the war in Iraq,
and coincided with a visit of US Secretary of State Colin Powell to Moscow.
Secretary Powell welcomed the action by the Duma and suggested that it would be
symbolic to exchange the
instruments of ratification in Moscow.[4] In addition to the law ratifying the
treaty, the Duma
also adopted two statements.[5,6,7] The first declared that the
strategic nuclear forces will continue to serve as the primary guarantor of
Russian military security and as such must be maintained at a level necessary to
deter aggression on the part of an individual state or group of states. The Duma
also appealed for state support and priority funding for those companies in the
military industrial complex involved in providing equipment for the strategic
nuclear forces.[5] The second statement adopted by the Duma deputies advocated
strengthening the nuclear nonproliferation regime and called upon the United States and other states to move in this direction by
ratifying the Comprehensive Test Ban
Treaty (CTBT).[6,7] Sources:
[1] Galina Filippova, "Gosduma ratifitsirovala rossiysko-amerikanskiy Dogovor
SNP," RIA Novosti, 14 May 2003; in Integrum Techno,
http://www.integrum.com.
[2] Galina Filippova, "Stalo izvestno kak progolosovali dumskiye fraktsii i
deputatskiye gruppy po Dogovoru o SNP," RIA Novosti, 14 May 2003; in Integrum Techno,
http://www.integrum.com.
[3] Syuzanna Farizova, "Deputaty obsudili s prezidentom dogovor o SNP,"
Kommersant, No. 81, 14 May 2003; in Integrum Techno,
http://www.integrum.com.
[4] "Kolin Pauell predlagayet obmenyatsya ratifikatsionnymi gramotami po
Dogovoru SNP v Rossii," RIA Novosti, 14 May 2003; in Integrum Techno,
http://www.integrum.com.
[5] Pavel Shevtsov, "Gosduma prizyvayet podderzhivat strategicheskiye yadernyye
sily Rossii v boyevoy gotovnosti i razvivat ikh," RIA Novosti, 14 May 2003; in Integrum Techno,
http://www.integrum.com.
[6] "Dogovor SNP: vo imya mira i stabilnosti," Parlamentskaya gazeta, No.
1216 (585), 15 May 2003; in Integrum Techno,
http://www.integrum.com.
[7] Dmitriy Chernov, "Dogovor dorozhe ugovora," Vremya-MN, No. 74, 15 May
2003; in Integrum Techno,
http://www.integrum.com.{Entered
5/15/2003 EMC} 3/18/2003: DUMA DECISION TO POSTPONE CONSIDERATION
OF MOSCOW TREATY CONCERNS FEDERATION COUNCIL AND PRESIDENT PUTIN
ITAR-TASS reported on 18 March 2003 that
the Foreign Affairs Committee of the
State Duma had decided not to recommend ratification of the
Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty
at the 21 March 2003 Duma session.[1] Dmitriy Rogozin, Chairman of the
Foreign Affairs Committee, explained that the decision to postpone
consideration of the treaty until at least early April resulted from concerns that ratification could be misinterpreted as indirect support for the
US war in Iraq.[2,3] His deputy, Sergey Shishkarev, indicated that ratification of the treaty, signed by Presidents Bush and Putin in Moscow in
May 2002 and approved unanimously by the US
Senate on 6 March 2003, should occur in a less volatile
political atmosphere, but he also stressed that the timing of an eventual
decision on ratification would depend upon the degree to which the United States takes into
account the Russian stance on Iraq.[3] Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov told a plenary
session of the Federation Council on 25 March 2003 that he believes that the
treaty should be ratified because it corresponds completely with Russia's
national interests, but not at the current time. He recommended that the Duma
return to ratification of the Moscow Treaty once efforts to resolve the
situation in Iraq resume within the framework of the UN Security Council.[4] State Duma
Chairman Gennadiy Seleznev
added his
support for the delay and
predicted that a decision by the United States to "forego international law" in favor of the
"law of the jungle" in Iraq potentially could cast doubts upon the fate of the treaty.
In this context, Seleznev expressed the belief that Russia needs to retain its
nuclear status in order to further its support for world peace and security.[5] Dmitriy Rogozin
and other Duma members, however, reiterated that, despite the decision to
postpone discussions on ratification, implementation of the treaty remains in
the strategic interests of Russia, and the Duma intends to revisit the issue
once the situation in Iraq normalizes.[6,7] Nevertheless, the Federation Council
strongly criticized the decision reached in the Duma.[8,9]
Federation Council Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Mikhail Margelov accused the Duma
members of placing their own re-election prospects before the interests of the
state.[2] Sergey Mironov, Speaker of the Federation Council, also expressed concern about the delay, arguing that
implementation of the Moscow Treaty, whose signing Russia initiated, will
improve national security and defense capabilities.[6,9] As a result of its
concerns, the Federation Council adopted an appeal to the Duma in which it requested that the lower house
reconsider its stance and proceed with ratification.[6] President Putin also
weighed in on the issue on 5 April 2003. He stated that ratification of the
treaty is in the best interests of the Russian Federation, despite disagreements
over the proper course of action in Iraq, and indicated that the executive
branch will work with the legislative branch to secure ratification.[10] The dispute regarding the
pace of ratification represents only the latest problem encountered by the
treaty as it moves through the Russian legislative system. An initial draft law
on ratification of the treaty submitted to the Duma by President Putin in
December 2002 drew a strong negative reaction from members of the
Duma Defense
Committee, who insisted that the bill attach a set of conditions to
ratification.[11,12] In particular, the deputies sought guarantees that efforts
to maintain and enhance Russia's strategic nuclear forces would receive adequate
funding, pledges that reductions in strategic weapons would affect only those assets
nearing the end of their service lives, and assurances that Russia
could withdraw from the treaty if its national security is threatened.[11,12,13] Other deputies expressed concern about the lack
of a firm definition of terms in the agreement and the existence of significant
possibilities for US uploading of warheads.[11,14] These concerns led to the formation
of a working group consisting of representatives of the Duma, Federation
Council, Presidential Administration,
Ministry of Defense,
Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, Ministry of Atomic Energy, and
Rosaviakosmos tasked with
developing an alternative draft law on ratification.[11,15] This group forwarded its
proposals to President Putin, who then resubmitted to the Duma on 9 March the
modified draft law.[16] The new draft
included provisions for the maintenance of the military
preparedness of strategic nuclear forces regardless of overall strategic
developments as well as reporting requirements for the President and the government on
the implementation of the treaty. This led the Duma Defense and Foreign Affairs
Committees to recommend on 13 and 14 March, respectively, that the entire Duma consider
ratification of the treaty, which likely would have occurred were it not for the beginning of
US military action in Iraq.[16,17,18] Sources:
[1] Lyudmila Aleksandrova, "Mezhdunarodnyy komitet Gosdumy nameren otozvat
predlozheniye po ratifikatsii dogovora s SShA o nastupatelnykh potentsialakh," ITAR-TASS,
18 March 2003; in Integrum Techno,
http://www.integrum.com.
[2] Andrey Lebedev, "Stepen vliyaniya," Izvestiya.Ru, 18 March 2003; in Integrum Techno,
http://www.integrum.com.
[3] "Gosduma rassmotrit vopros o ratifikatsii Dogovora s SShA o strategicheskikh
nastupatelnykh potentsialakh ne raneye nachala aprelya ili yeshche pozzhe,"
ITAR-TASS, 18 March 2003; in Integrum Techno,
http://www.integrum.com.
[4] "Igor Ivanov: Seychas ne samyy podkhodyashchiy moment dlya ratifikatsii
dogovora ob SNP," Grani.Ru, 26 March 2003; in Integrum Techno,
http://www.integrum.com.
[5] Lyudmila Aleksandrova and Igor Shamshin, "Rossii neobkhodimo sokhranit svoy yadernyy
potentsial, zayavil Gennadiy Seleznev," ITAR-TASS, 18 March 2003; in Integrum Techno,
http://www.integrum.com.
[6] "Sovet Federatsii predlozhil Gosdume vernutsya k ratifikatsii Dogovora o
sokrashchenii strategicheskikh nastupatelnykh potentsialov," ITAR-TASS, 25 March
2003; in Integrum Techno,
http://www.integrum.com.
[7] Lyudmila Aleksandrova, Ivan Novikov, and Robert Serebrennikov, "V Gosdume neodnoznachno vosprinimayut obrashcheniye
Soveta Federatsii vernutsya k ratifikatsii Dogovora ob SNP," ITAR-TASS, 25 March
2003; in Integrum Techno, http://www.integrum.com.
[8] "Sovet Federatsii ne vidit osnovaniy dlya priostanovki protsessa
ratifikatsii Dogovora s SShA o strategicheskikh nastupatelnykh potentsialakh,"
ITAR-TASS, 18 March 2003; in Integrum Techno,
http://www.integrum.com.
[9] "Sovet verkhney palaty parlamenta RF nameren obratitsya k sovetu Gosdumy s
predlozheniyem peresmotret resheniye o perenose ratifikatsii dogovora ob SNP," Regions.Ru, 24 March 2003; in Integrum Techno,
http://www.integrum.com.
[10] Veronika Voskoboynikova, "Prezident RF otmetil zainteresovannost Rossii v
ratifikatsii Dogovora o sokrashchenii strategicheskikh nastupatelnykh
potentsialov," ITAR-TASS, 5 April 2003; in Integrum Techno,
http://www.integrum.com.
[11] Petr Titov, "Zakonodateli nedovolny Dogorovom o strategicheskikh
nastupatelnykh potentsialakh," Nezavisimoye voyennoye obozreniye, No. 4
(319), 7 February 2003; in Integrum Techno,
http://www.integrum.com.
[12] Viktor Litovkin, "Ratifikatsiya po-dumski," Vremya-MN, No. 18, 13 February 2003; in Integrum Techno,
http://www.integrum.com.
[13] Dmitriy Litovkin, "Svoim strategicheskim putem," Izvestiya.Ru, 14 March
2003; in Integrum Techno,
http://www.integrum.com.
[14] Vladimir Temnyy, "Zapasnyye puti dlya yadernogo bronepoyezda," Grani.Ru
Web
Site, http://www.grani.ru/War/Arms/Nukes/p.25649.html, 12 March 2003.
[15] "Mezhdunarodnyy komitet Gosdumy nameren vynesti Dogovor ob SNP na
ratifikatsiyu 21 marta," RIA Novosti, 14 March 2003; in Integrum Techno,
http://www.integrum.com.
[16] Lyudmila Aleksandrova, "Komitet Gosdumy po mezhdunarodnym delam
rekomendoval rassmotret vopros o ratifikatsii Dogovora o SNP 21 marta," ITAR-TASS, 14 March 2003; in Integrum Techno,
http://www.integrum.com.
[17] Pavel Shevtsov, "Komitet po oborone Gosdumy rekomendoval ratifitsirovat
Dogovor o sokrashchenii strategicheskikh nastupatelnykh potentsialov," RIA Novosti,
13 March 2003; in Integrum Techno,
http://www.integrum.com.
[18] "V Gosdumu postupil zakonoproyekt o ratifikatsii rossiysko-amerikanskogo
dogovora o SNP," Finmarket novosti, 13 March 2003; in Integrum Techno,
http://www.integrum.com.
{Entered 4/1/2003 EMC} 3/6/2003: SENATE RATIFIES MOSCOW TREATY
On 6 March 2003 the US Senate voted 95-0
to give its advice and consent to ratification of the
Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty signed by President Bush and Russian
President Putin in Moscow in May 2002. The Senate resolution links its advice
and consent to a series of binding conditions, including the following
provisions: annual reports submitted by the President to the Senate Committees on Foreign Relations
and Armed Services on the role of
cooperative threat reduction and nonproliferation assistance programs in
ensuring the security of the Russian nuclear arsenal; on implementation of the
Moscow Treaty, including updated information about the strategic nuclear
weapons force levels in both countries; on progress or lack thereof towards meeting
the strategic offensive reductions foreseen in the treaty; and on the status of
discussions on extending the START I
verification regime beyond December 2009. The resolution also incorporates
non-binding declarations that express the intent of the Senate. One such provision
calls upon the President to consider accelerating strategic offensive reductions
to the lowest possible levels consistent with national security requirements in
light of the reduced threat that Russia poses
to the US. The Senate also
encourages the
President to engage Russia on non-strategic (tactical) nuclear weapons in
order to improve mutual confidence on the accurate accounting and security of
these weapons. [Record of US Senate Advice and Consent to Ratification of
the Treaty Between the United States and the Russian Federation on Strategic
Offensive Reductions; in Thomas: Legislative Information on the Internet Web Site,
http://thomas.loc.gov.] {Entered
3/13/2003 EMC}
9/20/2002: FIRST MEETING OF RUSSIAN-AMERICAN CONSULTATIVE GROUP ON STRATEGIC
STABILITY HELD
On 20 September 2002, the first meeting of the US-Russian strategic stability
consultative group, the agenda
of which includes consultations on implementing the Moscow Treaty, was held in
Washington, DC.[1] The US delegation was headed by the US secretaries of state
and defense; the Russian delegation by the ministers of foreign affairs and defense.[2]
Defense
Minister Sergey Ivanov announced that the Russian Ministry of Defense and the US
Department of Defense had created working groups on Moscow Treaty
implementation and possible cooperation on ballistic missile defense.[1] During
the meeting an understanding was reached on creating expert working groups on
potential strategic offensive reductions and ballistic missile defenses. Russia
proposed conducting the first meetings of these groups in Moscow in late October or
early November 2002. Russia also reiterated its offer to begin a dialogue on the
issue of military activities in space.[3] Sources:
[1] "Nachinayet rabotu rossiysko-amerikanskiy komitet po vypolneniyu Dogovora o
SNP," Interfax, 20 September 2002.
[2] Aleksey Lyashchenko, "Strategicheskiye konsultatsii," Krasnaya zvezda, 18 September 2002;
in Universal Database of Russian Military and Security Periodicals, http://online.eastview.com/.
[3] "Rabochiye gruppy RF-SShA po voprosam SNP i PRO, kak ozhidayetsya,
soberutsya osenyu v Moskve," Interfax, 24 September 2002. {Entered 10/2/2002 MJ}
9/2002: RUSSIAN OFFICIALS ON MOSCOW TREATY RATIFICATION PROCESS Yadernaya Rossiya reported on 3 September 2002 that Dmitriy Rogozin,
chairman of the State Duma Committee on
International Affairs, said that while the Duma would not
hurry to ratify the treaty, he did not see any major obstacles to its
ratification. According to Rogozin, closed ratification hearings were to begin in
October 2002.[1]On 12 September 2002,
Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Georgiy Mamedov said that Russia did not intend to link
the Moscow Treaty
ratification process with a similar process in the United States. Mamedov also
said that during a discussion of the treaty with the State Duma Committee on
International Affairs, representatives of the
Ministry of Defense, the
Foreign Ministry,
and the Duma agreed that Russia ought
to act in its own national interest.[2]Deputy General Staff
Chief Colonel GeneralYuriy Baluyevskiy, who participated in the
discussion, underscored the importance of the Moscow Treaty for Russian national
security and for the development of US-Russia relations.[3] During the 12
September 2002 meeting, Baluyevskiy and Mamedov expressed hope that the treaty
would be ratified by both Russia and the United States by the end of the year.[4]
Further commenting on the Moscow Treaty on 16 September 2002, Baluyevskiy said
that both he and the Ministry of Defense considered its ratification to be
advantageous for Russia, since the treaty increases the Russian military's
flexibility in determining the composition of its strategic forces.[5]
Baluyevskiy also expressed confidence that Russia would not experience any
difficulties in implementing the treaty. While acknowledging some disagreements
on the issue of US plans to store its strategic warheads, Baluyevskiy said
that he hoped Russian concerns would be alleviated.[6] On 24 September 2002,
State Duma Defense Committee Chairman Andrey Nikolayev said that treaty
ratification ought not to be linked to US policies concerning Iraq. Although Nikolayev described the treaty as containing significant flaws, he supported its
ratification, referring to the treaty as a transitional one that will create
the conditions for a future treaty.[7] Sources:
[1] "Dogovor SNP budet ratifitsirovan, utverzhdayut rossiyskiye politiki,"
Yadernaya Rossiya segodnya, 3 September 2002.
[2] "Moskva ne stanet uvyazyvat sroki ratifikatsii Dogovora po SNP s podobnoy
protseduroy v SShA," Interfax, 12 September 2002.
[3] "V blizhaysheye vremya v Gosdumu postupit paket dokumentov po ratifikatsii
rossiysko-amerikanskogo dogovora o SNP," Interfax, 12 September 2002.
[4] "O khode ratifikatsii v Gosudarstvennoy Dume Dogovora mezhdu Rossiyey i SShA
o sokrashchenii strategicheskikh nastupatelnykh potentsialov," Ministry of
Foreign Affairs Department of Information and Press Web Site,
http://www.mid.ru/, 12
September 2002.
[5] "Odin iz rukovoditeley rossiyskogo Genshtaba - za ratifikatsiyu Gosdumoy
Dogovora o sokrashchenii SNP," Interfax, 16 September 2002.
[6] "Zamestitel NGSh zayavlyayet, chto Rossiya vypolnit vse svoi obyazatelstva
po Dogovoru SNP," Yadernaya Rossiya segodnya, 20 September 2002.
[7] "Deputat Nikolayev predpochitayet ne uvyazyvat ratifikatsiyu dogovora SNP s
vozmozhnym primeneniyem sily SShA protiv Iraka," Interfax, 24 September 2002.
{Entered 10/2/2002 MJ}
7/28/2002: MOSCOW TREATY SCHEDULE AND REDUCTIONS TO BE NEGOTIATED
Russian Defense Minister Sergey Ivanov announced during a visit to Kaliningrad Oblast on 28 July 2002 that the schedule and rules of reductions
under the Moscow Treaty will be negotiated by Russia and United States within
the framework of a
special consultative group which includes US and Russian foreign and defense
ministers and secretaries.[1] After a meeting with US Secretary of State Colin Powell
in Brunei on 31 July 2002, Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov said that the
first meeting of the consultative group will take place in Washington, D.C. on
20 September 2002. The meeting agenda will include Moscow Treaty implementation,
missile defense issues, and nonproliferation regimes.[2] Sources:
[1] ITAR-TASS, 28 July 2002; in "Russian Defense Minister: Strategic Arms
Reduction Schedule to be Negotiated," FBIS Document CEP20020728000087.
[2] ITAR-TASS, 31 July 2002; in "Russia, US preparing for commission meeting on
nuclear missile issues," FBIS Document CEP20020731000094. {Entered 8/26/2002 MJ}
6/21/2002: MOSCOW TREATY RATIFICATION
PROCESS STARTED
The
Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced on 21 June 2002 that preparations
for the ratification of the Moscow Treaty have started. On the same day
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs sent the treaty to relevant Duma and Federation
Council committees.[1] The head of the Duma Defense Committee, Andrey Nikolayev, said
that he believes the Duma will ratify the treaty during the autumn 2002 session.
In addition to the Defense Committee, the Foreign Affairs Committee will be
involved in the preparation of the treaty for Duma debate. Nikolayev identified a
number of weaknesses in the treaty, including the lack of reduction schedules
and verification measures.[2] Sources:
[1] "O podgotovke k ratifikatsii Dogovora o sokrashchenii strategicheskikh
nastupatelnykh potentsialov," Russian Federation Ministry of Foreign Affairs Web
Site, http://www.mid.ru, 21 June 2002.
[2] "Duma ratifitsiruyet dogovor SNP osenyu, schitayet glava komiteta po oborone,"
Interfax, 27 June 2002. {Entered 8/26/2002 MJ}
5/24/2002: MOSCOW TREATY SIGNED On 24 May 2002 US President
George W. Bush and Russian President Vladimir Putin
signed the
Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty
(also known as the Moscow Treaty) in Moscow, which codifies the reduction
commitments made during the Crawford Summit. {Entered
8/23/2002 MJ}
3/1/2002: RUSSIA MAY KEEP MIRVED ICBMS IF
NO REDUCTION AGREEMENT IS REACHED At a press briefing on 1 March 2002, First Deputy
Chief of the General Staff Colonel General Yuriy Baluyevskiy stated that
Russian leaders will consider it possible and realistic to keep MIRVed ICBMs
in their nuclear arsenal if no legally binding agreement between Russia and the United
States on arms reductions is reached. The agreement, which is still
in the negotiation process, is expected to commit Russia and the United States
to reduce their deployed warhead levels to 2,200-1,700. There are disagreements,
however, over the
nature of the reductions. Baluyevskiy criticized current US reduction
plans, saying that the United States intends to store its reduced warheads rather than
eliminate them. The US government has emphasized transparency and reduction of
deployed warheads over dismantlement. According to Baluyevskiy's
statements, Russia proposes that the agreement be a legally binding document
ensuring that the reductions are monitored, verified, and made irreversible. Russia
has emphasized following START I guidelines for control, verification, and
transparency.
[RIA-Novosti, 1 March 2002; in
"Russia may keep missiles with multiple warheads if talks with US fail," FBIS
Document CEP20020301000301.] {Entered 3/29/2002 RG}
11/13-15/2001: CRAWFORD SUMMIT
RESULTS IN REDUCTION DECLARATIONS During the Crawford Summit
held between 13 and 15 November 2001, US President George W. Bush made a
commitment to reduce deployed US strategic nuclear warheads to 1,700-2,200 over
a period of 10 years. A similar commitment was made by Russian President
Vladimir Putin.
For more information, please see the
11/13-15/2001 entry
in the ABM Treaty Developments
section. {Entered
8/23/2002 MJ}
8/8/2001: STRATEGIC STABILITY CONSULTATIONS IN
WASHINGTON, DC For more information please see the 8/8/2001
entry in the ABM Treaty Developments section. {Entered
9/5/2001 MJ}
11/13/2000: PUTIN OUTLINES START III PROPOSAL On 13 November 2000 Russian President Vladimir Putin
made a statement outlining elements of the Russian START III proposal in order
to lay the groundwork for opening negotiations with the United
States. In addition to reiterating the 1,500-warhead ceiling and linking
further strategic arms reductions to retaining the ABM
Treaty, Putin's
proposal suggested that START III become a set of amendments to the START I and II
treaties, rather than a stand-alone treaty of its own.[1,2] Commenting on
Putin's statement, the director of the
Foreign Ministry's Department for Security and Disarmament, Yuriy Kapralov,
suggested counting US non-strategic nuclear weapons based in Europe against
the 1,500 strategic warhead limit.[2] In a press conference on the same day,
SRF Commander Vladimir Yakovlev suggested introducing what he
referred to as a "common constant strategic armaments indicator"
that would establish a common ceiling for strategic offensive and defensive
weapons. This would allow states wishing to
increase their strategic defensive capabilities (such as the US NMD program) to do so at the expense of reducing
strategic offensive forces.[3] However, Kapralov said Yakovlev's statement did not reflect the official position of the Russian government
and only represented his personal views on how further cuts in
strategic offensive weapons might be achieved.[4] For additional information
on Yakovlev's remarks see the 11/13/2000 entry
in the Russia: ABM Treaty Developments section. Sources: [1] Nikolai Sokov, "Putin sets out arms
control agenda," Jane's Defence Weekly, 29 November 2000, p.
23. [2] Oleg Odnokolenko, "V Belom dome predpochitayut vysokiye potolki.
Kreml vystupil s uprezhdayushchey mirnoy initsyativoy," Segodnya
online edition, http://news.mosinfo.ru/news/.../data/54-2v_b.htm,
14 November 2000. [3] "Glavkom RVSN Rossii schitayet, chto sokhranit na peregovorakh SShA
neizmennym Dogovor po PRO budet chrezvychayno slozhno," Interfax, 13
November 2000. [4] "Confusion Over Russian Missile Chief's Remarks," Disarmament
Diplomacy, November 2000, p. 55. {Entered 5/30/2001 MJ}
10/18/2000: HOLUM AND KAPRALOV DISCUSS START
III, ABM
TREATY ISSUES The United States and Russia held another round
of talks concerning the START and ABM treaties in Moscow on 16-18 October 2000.
The Russian delegation was led by
Head of the Russian Foreign Ministry's Department of Arms Control
and Security Yuriy Kapralov, while the US
delegation was headed by Deputy Secretary of State John Holum, who also
met with Deputy Foreign Minister Georgiy Mamedov. During the discussions,
the Russian delegation reiterated its proposal to reduce each country's strategic
offensive forces to 1,500 warheads. Russia also expressed its
readiness to begin official START III talks and called on the United States to
do the same, noting that a joint statement from 2 September 1998 issued by
Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin stated that START III negotiations ought to
commence "immediately after Russia ratifies START II." Russia also
reaffirmed its opposition to amending the ABM Treaty, stating that further
strategic offensive arms reductions will not be possible without strict
adherence to the ABM Treaty. The Foreign Ministry's press statement placed the
blame for delays in beginning these talks squarely on the United States' desire to link
commencing START III talks with "adapting" the ABM Treaty to allow a
US National Missile Defense.[1,2]
Sources: [1] "16-18 Oktyabrya v Moskve sostoyalsya ocherednoy raund
rossiysko-amerikanskikh konsultatsiy po problematike SNV/PRO," Ministry
of Foreign Affairs Web Site, http://www.ln.mid.ru/. [2] "18 Oktyabrya zamestitel Ministra inostrannykh del Rossiyskoy
Federatsii G.E. Mamedov prinyal zamestitelya Gosudarstvennogo Sekretarya SShA
Dzh. Kholuma, nakhodyashchegosya v Moskve dlya provedeniya konsultatsiy po
problematike SNV i PRO," Ministry of Foreign Affairs Web Site, http://www.ln.mid.ru/. {Entered
11/15/2000 MJ}
4/21/2000: US-RUSSIA START III TALKS HELD IN GENEVA US and Russian arms control delegations, headed by
the US Senior Adviser for Arms Control and International Security John
Holum, and head of the Russian Foreign Ministry's Department of Arms Control
and Security Yuriy Kapralov, completed two days of talks on further cuts
in strategic nuclear arsenals. No statements were issued.[1] The US negotiating
team was seeking a reduction to a level of 2,000-2,500 nuclear warheads,
in accordance with its earlier proposals.[2] The Russian side continued
to advocate much deeper cuts. In a statement issued following State
Duma ratification of the START II treaty, Vladimir Putin declared Russia's
readiness to reduce its strategic arsenal to 1,500 warheads, a level suggested
during US-Russian expert level talks in Moscow
on 17-19 August 1999.[3] According to Russian diplomatic sources,
the proposed reductions, as well as Russia's adherence to the START II
treaty, are contingent "on the preservation of the ABM Treaty of 1972,
which bans the deployment of a national anti-missile system."[4]
Sources: [1] "U.S., Russia End Nuclear Arms
Control Talks in Geneva," Russia Today Web Site, http://www.russiatoday.com/, 19 April
2000. [2] "U.S. Details With Russians START
III Arms Reductions," Russia Today Web Site, http://www.russiatoday.com/, 21 April
2000. [3] "Russia Ready to Cut Strategic
Arsenals to 1,500 Warheads--Putin," Interfax, 14 April 2000. [4] "Moscow Offers Larger Cuts in Warheads
Under START III," Interfax, 13 April 2000. {Entered 6/8/00 MJ}
10/21/99: US-RUSSIA CONSULTATIONS ON START III,
ABM HELD IN MOSCOW Another round of US-Russia consultations on ABM and
START III issues was held on 21 October 1999 in Moscow. The two-day
talks were lead by Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Grigoriy Berdennikov
and US Senior Adviser for Arms Control and International Security John
Holum.[1] Commenting on the results of these consultations, anonymous
Russian diplomatic sources told Interfax that significant differences over
START III persist. In particular, Russia will not agree to the adoption
of START III if the ABM Treaty were to be modified,
these sources said. In addition, Russia insists on more drastic cuts
in strategic offensive weapons under START III than the United States wants.
Russia also considers it necessary to include in START III restrictions
on long-range sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs) and anti-submarine warfare.
The US Navy, however, opposes the restriction of SLCMs under START III,
arguing that they are not strategic weapons. For its part, the United States
insists that the treaty cover not only delivery systems, but the warheads
themselves, including those in storage. Significant disagreements
persist on the issue of tactical nuclear weapons (TNW). In particular,
while the United States insists that Russia has a comparative advantage
in tactical nuclear weapons, potentially threatening to US allies in Europe,
Russia argues that its TNW cannot reach US territory, while US TNW stationed
in Europe can reach Russia.[2]
Sources: [1] "V Moskve nachalis rossiysko-amerikanskiye
konsultatsii po SNV i PRO," Interfax, 21 October 1999. [2] "Nikakikh podvizhek mezhdu RF i
SShA po voprosu 'Adaptatsii dogovora po PRO net i byt ne mozhet,'" Interfax,
22 October 1999.{Entered 11/1/99EV}
8/20/99: RUSSIA
PROPOSES NEW CEILING FOR START III, US DISAGREES During US-Russian expert level talks on the ABM and
START III treaties, held in Moscow on 17-19 August 1999, Russia proposed
lowering the START III ceiling to 1,000 to 1,500 strategic warheads. The
US delegation advocated maintaining the 2,000-2,500 level, as agreed at
the March 1997 Helsinki Summit. [1,2,3] In an interview with Interfax,
Duma International Affairs Committee Chairman Vladimir Lukin stressed that
START III parameters should be discussed ahead of START
II ratification. Commenting on the instistence of the Clinton
Administration that START III negotiations begin only after the ratification
of START II by the Duma, Lukin suggested that the outline of START III
could be agreed upon during informal consultations. In Lukin's view,
"the work on START III can be formalized after START II ratification."
Lukin also reiterated his view that the new level of strategic warheads
for START III should not exceed 1,500 warheads for each side.[4]
These reports suggest that the US and Russia remain divided over the framework
of the proposed START III Treaty.
Sources: [1] Peter Graff, "Moscow bitter on
U.S. missile system plans," Reuters, 20 August 1999. [2] "Dogovor po PRO ostayetsya osnovoy
strategicheskoy stabilnosti," Segodnya, 20 August 1999, p. 2; in
WPS Oborona i Bezopasnost, 23 August 1999. [3] "An Impasse on Nuclear Arms Control,"
Jamestown
Monitor, 23 August 1999. [4] "Glava komiteta Gosdumy po mezhdunarodnym
delam dopuskayet vozmozhnost vneseniya izmeneniy v dogovor po PRO," Interfax,
20 August 1999. {Entered 10/7/99 EV} 8/17-19/99: US-RUSSIA CONSULTATIONS ON ABM AND
START III HELD IN MOSCOW The first US-Russian consultations on the ABM and
START III treaties at the expert level were held in Moscow on 17-19 August
1999. US Under Secretary of State John Holum and Director of the
Russian Foreign Ministry's Security and Disarmament Department Grigory
Berdennikov headed the two delegations.[1] In addition to ABM and
START III issues, the experts discussed START II and Y2K problems.[2]
According to the Russian Foreign Ministry's press communique, Russia and
the US confirmed that the ABM Treaty remains the cornerstone of strategic
stability and expressed their readiness to begin negotiations on START
III immediately after the ratification of START II. During the consultations
both sides outlined their approaches to the ABM Treaty and "to further
efforts to strengthen it and to enhance its viability and efficiency."[3,4]
However, the sides did not discuss any concrete proposals on this matter.[3]
In his press statement after the first round of consultations Berdennikov
said that any plans to develop a nationwide missile defense system could
upset the current strategic balance and initiate a new arms race.[5]
Berdennikov stated that Russia sees no practical need for modifying the
ABM Treaty. Consequently, US plans to deploy a nationwide ABM system
would not only "infringe" upon Russia's interests and "make Russia withdraw
from the earlier signed START II Treaty," but would violate the 1972 ABM
Treaty, the diplomat said.[6] However, Bedennikov emphasized that
Russia is ready to discuss any proposals aimed at enhancing the treaty's
viability.[5] Colonel General Leonid Ivashov, the head of the Defense Ministry's
international cooperation directorate, said that the new arms control talks
were doomed by the US plan to change the ABM Treaty.[7] According
to Interfax, consultations will be continued in September in Washington
by the Russian-US group for strategic stability, which will be headed by
Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Georgiy Mamedov and US Deputy Secretary
of State Strobe Talbott.[8]
Sources: [1] "U.S. Hopes for Constructive Arms
Limitation Talks," Interfax, 17 August 1999. [2] "Konsultatsii Rossiya-SShA po PRO
i SNV prokhodyat v konstruktivnoy obstanovke-MID," Interfax, 18 August
1999. [3] "Rossiya i SShA podtverzhdayut,
chto dogovor po PRO ostayetsya krayeugolnim kamnem strategicheskoy stabilnosti,"
Interfax, 19 August 1999. [4] "US, Russian Negotiators Agree
on ABM's Importance," Interfax, 19 August 1991; FBIS Document FTS19990819000610 [5] "Rossiya ne vidit prichin
dlya izmeneniya klyuchevyikh polozheniy dogovora po PRO-MID RF," Interfax,
19 August 1999. [6] Oleg Osipov, RIA Novosti,
19 August 1999; in"US ABM System Will 'Infringe' Interests," FBIS Document
FTS19990819001345. [7] "Russian Official Says U.S.
Arms Talks Failed," Reuters, 20 August 1999. [8] "Vashington nastroyen na konstruktivnuyu
rabotu s Moskvoy, zayavlyayet predstavitel SShA pered konsultatsiyami po
PRO i SNV-3," Interfax, 17 August 1999. {Entered 9/27/99 EV} 6/20/99: US-RUSSIA COLOGNE AGREEMENT TO HOLD START
III, ABM TALKS ON 17-19 AUGUST A summit meeting between Presidents Bill Clinton
and Boris Yeltsin was held on 20 June 1999 in Cologne, Germany on the last
day of the annual summit of the Group of Eight nations. The two presidents
agreed to hold preliminary consultations on START III and to begin discussions
on "possibly reopening" the 1972 ABM treaty on 17-19 August in Moscow.[1,2]
US Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott will be the head of the US
delegation to the talks. According to Sandy Berger, President Clinton's
national security adviser, this is the first time that Russia has agreed
to discuss changes to the ABM treaty.[2] In the Russia-US joint
statement released in Cologne the two sides recognized the "fundamental
importance" of the treaty and reaffirmed their current obligations under
Article XIII: "to consider possible changes in the strategic situation
that have a bearing on the ABM Treaty and, as appropriate, possible proposals
for further increasing the viability of this Treaty." The two governments
also pledged to "do everything in their power to facilitate the successful
completion of the START II ratification processes in both countries."[3,4]
In an interview with Ekho Moskvy radio on 22 June, Kremlin spokesman Dmitriy
Yakushkin called the US plans to amend the ABM Treaty "very unwelcome tendencies,"
and stressed that Moscow continued to view the ABM Treaty as a "cornerstone
of political stability."[5] Despite the agreement to consider possible
changes to the ABM Treaty, Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov said that
the US plan to deploy the nation-wide ABM system "is dangerous and can
destroy the basis of strategic stability and the whole disarmament process"
and expressed hope that "Russia and the US will be factors of stability
and security."[6]
Sources: [1] ITAR-TASS, 30 July
1999, in "Russian-US START-3, ABM Talks Set For 17-19 August," FBIS Document
FTS19990730001229. [2] "U.S., Russia to revisit arms control
questions; Clinton, Yeltsin mend rift over Kosovo," Star Tribune,
21 June 1999, p.1A; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, http://web.lexis-nexis.com. [3] Vladimir Abarinov, "Yeltsin peresmotrit
Dogovor po protivoraketnoy oborone," Izvestiya online edition, http://win.www.online.ru/rproducts/izvestia- izvestia-year/29-Jun-99/16.rhtml,
29 June 1999. [4] "Joint Statement Between
the United States And The Russian Federation Concerning Strategic Offensive
And Defensive Arms And Further Strengthening Of Stability," 20 June 1999,
Moscow Institute for Physics and Technology Website, http://www.armscontrol.ru. [5] "Russia still sees ABM changes
as dangerous," United Communications Group, Periscope Daily Defense
Capsules, 23 June 1999; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, http://web.lexis-nexis.com. [6] ITAR-TASS, 22 June 1999;
in "START II Russia's Top Priority," FBIS Document FTS 19990622001030.
{entered 9/13/99 EV}
2/1/99: ARTICLE ANALYZES "EXPERT TALKS" ON START
III An article in the February 1999 issue of Voprosy
bezopasnosti analyzes the Russian position in the ongoing "expert talks"
on the proposed START III treaty. Although at the insistence of the Clinton
administration, official negotiations on the treaty will not begin until
after the Russian Federal Assembly ratifies START II, working-level consultations
between arms control experts from both countries have now been going on
for nearly two years. As a result of ongoing economic difficulties, the
overall warhead ceiling for START III set by Presidents Yeltsin and Clinton
at the Helsinki Summit in March 1997 (2,000-2,500), is not much better
for Russia than the START II ceiling of 3,500, according to the article.
Within the next 10 years, even under the most optimistic scenario, Russia
will not be able to field more than 1,500 strategic nuclear warheads, it
argues, and may be able to afford only about 1,000. This situation
means that Russia will probably seek lower warhead ceilings than those
discussed at Helsinki. While the details of the START III consultations
have not been publicly released, the article says that the United States
has proposed including tactical nuclear weapons in START III. Tactical
nuclear weapons were not covered by either START I or START II. Including
them in a new treaty would create a unified ceiling for all nuclear weapons.
However, judging by the comments of Russian military officers, Moscow has
not accepted this US proposal for two reasons. Russian military officers
apparently fear that the overall parity in nuclear weapons required by
such an agreement would mean that the US would have an advantage in strategic
nuclear weapons systems, since Russia would need to maintain more tactical
nuclear weapons than the United States. Second, Moscow is concerned
that establishing the necessary technical and political parameters for
including tactical nuclear weapons in START III--such as exhanging basic
data on tactical nuclear weapons stockpiles and establishing counting rules
for all nuclear-capable delivery systems--would greatly delay the conclusion
of START III. Russia wants to conclude START III as soon as possible
in order to address what Moscow views as "shortcomings" in START II.
Russia has proposed that START III include sea-launched cruise missiles,
which were not directly addressed in START I and II, and has pressed the
United States to accept limits on the number of warheads deployed on SLBMs.
The details of the talks on these topics remain secret, but it is clear
that a Russian proposal to completely eliminate sea-launched cruise missiles
was not accepted by the United States. Russia has also reportedly proposed
banning the development of new air-launched cruise missiles and limiting
the number of nuclear-capable heavy bombers to 50. Russian negotiators
are also probably trying to solve the problem of "upload potential," which
has been the basis of some Russian criticism of START II. The issue emerged
as a result of provisions in START II that allow SLBMs to be deployed with
fewer than their maximum number of warheads. These provisions give the
United States the theoretical capability to redeploy a large number of
warheads removed from SLBMs, if Washington were to decide to violate the
treaty in a crisis. Initially Russian experts hoped to address this issue
by having stricter control over warheads in START III than in START II,
which applies to delivery systems, not warheads. Russia apparently has
proposed that not only the delivery systems slated for reduction under
the new treaty, but also the warheads associated with them, be subject
to verifiable dismantling. Similar rules were used in the 1987 INF Treaty,
but many details remain to be worked out. The two sides have reportedly
agreed on a number of measures that will increase the transparency of their
warhead stockpiles. The increased transparency measures will reportedly
not include actual monitoring of the destruction of warheads or of the
storage of the nuclear materials they contain. The article says that the
Russian Defense Ministry and the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy (Minatom)
disagree on this issue, with Minatom objecting to increased transparency.
Despite the change of focus to reducing warheads rather than delivery systems,
the article says that Russia expects START III to be an extention of START
I and START II. More sweeping changes, such as including all nuclear
weapons in arms control agreements and extending the nuclear arms control
process to include the other nuclear powers, are supported by Russia in
principle, but seen as tasks for the future, after the conclusion of START
III.
["Rossiyskaya pozitsiya na budushchikh
peregovorakh po SNV-3: prognoz," Voprosy bezopasnosti, No. 4, February
1999, pp. 6-9]{entered 3/11/99 SDP}
8/18/98: RUSSIA PUSHES FOR START III DISCUSSIONS DURING SEPTEMBER 1998
SUMMIT According to ITAR-TASS reports from 18 August 1998, President Boris Yeltsin
seeks to initiate further discussion on strategic armament reductions during
his scheduled September 1998 summit with his US counterpart Bill Clinton.
According to Sergey Prikhodko, assistant to the president for foreign policy,
the Russian government is doing "everything necessary" to ensure that START
II will soon be ratified. Prikhodko added that "Russia thinks it expedient
to reach agreement on considerable intensification of the current consultations
on parameters of the future START III." The Clinton administration insists
that it will conduct only informal expert consultations on START III until
Russia ratifies START II.
[Pavel Kuznetsov, ITAR-TASS, 18 August 1998; in "Russia Hopes
to Discuss Arms Issues at US Summit," FBIS-TAC-98-230.] {entered 12/2/98
SS}
12/5/97: TALBOTT, MAMEDOV DISCUSS START III US Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott and Russian
Deputy Foreign Minister Georgiy Mamedov held "fruitful and constructive"
consultations on the proposed START III treaty during a 5 December meeting
in Washington, according to Russian diplomatic sources. US officials confirmed
that the talks had addressed arms control issues, but stressed that only
preliminary discussions of START III are possible until after Russia ratifies
START II.
[ITAR-TASS, 5 December 1997; in "Russian,
US Envoys Discuss START III Prospects," FBIS-TAC-97-339.]{entered 12/10/97
SDP}
12/2/97: YELTSIN SAYS RUSSIA WILL CUT NUCLEAR
WARHEADS "BY ONE-THIRD," AIDES BACKTRACK Speaking at a press conference in Stockholm during
an official visit to Sweden, President Boris Yeltsin declared, "I am here
making public for the first time that we, in a unilateral manner, are reducing
by another third the number of nuclear warheads." Yeltsin added that Russia
would aim at "convincing Great Britain, France, and China to join a convention
on destroying nuclear warheads," concluding that "it is necessary to carry
the matter to a conclusion and completely destroy these weapons on both
sides."[1] Initially, some viewed Yeltsin's remarks as a pledge to immediately
insitute a unilateral cut in deployed Russian nuclear warheads, but as
has happened on numerous previous occasions, Yeltsin's aides stepped in
quickly to "clarify" his remarks, substantially reducing their impact.
Presidential Press Secretary Sergey Yastrzhembsky said Yeltsin was not
discussing a new initiative, but merely publicly voicing a Russian proposal
for the parameters of the proposed START III treaty, which had already
been aired in ongoing discussions between Russian and American experts
on the future treaty. Under certain circumstances, said Yastrzhembsky,
Moscow would be prepared to accept a START III treaty with overall limits
lower than the 2,000-2,500 level agreed to at the March 1997 US-Russian
summit in Helsinki.[2]
Sources: [1] "Boris Yeltsin: Rossiya v odnostoronnem
poryadke na tret sokrashchayet kolichestvo yadernykh boyegolovok," RIA-Novosti,
2 December 1997. [2] Interfax, 2 December 1997; in "Spokesman
on Yeltsin Proposal on Cuts in Nuclear Warheads," FBIS-SOV-97-336.{entered
12/10/97 SDP}
11/18/97: SERGEYEV SAYS START III WILL BE LAST
BILATERAL NUCLEAR ARMS TREATY Speaking during a tour of the Volga Military District,
Defense Minister Igor Sergeyev said that once the United States and Russia
reduce their nuclear arsenals to a certain level, all other nuclear states
should join the nuclear disarmament process. Reflecting a view held
in both the United States and Russia, Sergeyev said "START III will be
the last bilateral document; the subsequent process must be five-sided,
with nonproliferation of nuclear technologies being strictly enforced."
[Interfax, 18 November 1997; in "Russia's
Sergeyev--All Nuclear Powers Must Join Disarmament," FBIS-SOV-97-322.]{entered
12/10/97 SDP} 10/3/97: US, RUSSIAN DIPLOMATS DISCUSS OPENING
EXPERT TALKS ON START III Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Grigoriy Mamedov
and US Ambassdor to Moscow James Collins discussed plans for beginning
expert consultations on START III at a 3 October 1997 meeting. "The pressing
aspects of joint actions in the light of the latest talks between Foreign
Minister Yevgeniy Primakov and the US leadership in New York" were discussed
at the meeting, according to a press release by the Russian Foreign Ministry.
Sources in the Russian Foreign and Defense Ministries told the Interfax
news agency that they expected the talks to begin shortly.
[Interfax, 3 October 1997; in "Russia's
Mamedov Discusses START III with US Ambassador," FBIS-TAC-97-276.]{entered
12/10/97 SDP}
9/26/97: START II PROTOCOL CLEARS PATH FOR "EXPERT
TALKS" ON START III Following the 26 September 1997 signing in New York
of a package of documents related to START II, Russian diplomats said that
"expert talks" on START III would begin shortly. Included in the
package was a protocol
to the START II treaty, extending the deadline for the destruction
of weapons systems slated for elimination under its terms from 2003 to
31 December 2007. Official letters exchanged by Russia
and the United
States at the protocol signing, however, specify that such systems
must still be deactivated by 2003. In a unilateral statement attached
to the letters on deactivation, the Russian government declared that "the
Russian Federation proceeds from the understanding that well in advance
of the above deactivation deadline, the START III Treaty will be achieved
and will enter into force." The United States "took note" of this declaration.[1]
A joint
statement on Minuteman III warhead reduction was also issued (please
see the START II ratification
section for more details). Russian diplomats explained that although
Washington will not begin formal negotiations on START III until START
II is ratified, "we managed to agree with the American side to start work
on START III at least at the level of experts."[2] This arrangement is
designed to convince Russian parliamentary critics of START II to ratify
the treaty, by demonstrating that a more acceptable START III agreement
will follow quickly after START II enters into force.
Sources: [1] USIA, "Fact Sheet on START II Protocol,
Letters on Early Deactivation," 26 September 1997, available at http://www.usia.gov/products/washfile.htm [2] "Foreign, Defense Ministries Ready
to Discuss START III, Interfax, 29 September 1997.{entered 12/10/97 SDP}
9/15/97: YELTSIN SAYS 1,000 WARHEADS COULD "ENSURE"
RUSSIAN SECURITY Speaking with journalists after a 15 September 1997
meeting with Defense Minister Igor Sergeyev, President Boris Yeltsin said
that Russian security could be ensured with "even 1,000 [strategic nuclear]
warheads, not to mention the 2,000-2,500 which are mentioned in the proposed
START III treaty." Yeltsin's remarks suggest that he is sympathetic
to the arguments in favor of "minimal nuclear deterrence" which have
been made by some Russian defense experts, and could signal that Russia
will aim for warhead ceilings lower than 2,000-2,500 in future talks on
START III. Yeltsin also confirmed that talks on START III would begin
only after START II is ratified by the Russian Federal Assembly.
[RIA-Novosti, 15 September 1997; in
"Yeltsin: START II Must Be Ratified Before START III Talks," FBIS-SOV-97-258.]{entered
9/25/97 SDP}
6/3/97: DEFENSE COUNCIL STAFFER URGES DEEPER CUTS IN START III At an April 1997 arms control conference at Sandia National Laboratory
in Alberquerque, New Mexico, Sergey Kortunov, an arms control specialist
on the Russian Defense Council, outlined a proposed START III agreement
that would reduce Russian and American strategic arsenals down to the level
of 1,000-1,500 warheads. That would represent a 50 percent reduction below
the level set in START II, and is considerably fewer warheads than the
2,000-2,500 ceiling for START III which was outlined by Presidents Yeltsin
and Clinton at their March 1997 Helsinki summit. Kortunov also said that
during START III talks, Russia might aim for bans on multiple-warhead SLBMs,
long-range sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs), and heavy bombers or long-range
missiles using stealth technology. Kortunov said that further Russian-American
arms control agreements should be based on the concept of "minimal nuclear
deterrence," with the eventual aim of achieving a "zero alert posture"
in which both countries' strategic nuclear weapons are completely detargeted.
[Paul Mann, "Russians Sketch START 3 Despite Odds Against
It," Aviation Week and Space Technology, 2 June 1997.]{entered 8/18/97
SDP}
4/23/97: SRF COMMANDER SERGEYEV FAVORS START III Army General Igor Sergeyev, commander of the Strategic Rocket Forces (SRF),
said he favors the conclusion of a START III agreement with the United
States as an extension of the still unratified START II accord. Sergeyev
said "there is no alternative" to further reductions of the American and
Russian nuclear arsenals, adding that START III "would allow [us] to reach
a threshold of the strategic stability which Russia is able to maintain
without substantial additional financial spending." Sergeyev warned, however,
that "parity of nuclear forces" would be destroyed if NATO accepts new
members in Eastern Europe, saying that NATO tactical nuclear weapons would
then be able to reach targets inside Russia.
[ITAR-TASS, 23 April 1997, in "Missile Forces Commander
in Favor of START-3," FBIS-UMA-97-113.]{entered 8/18/97 SDP} 3/21/97: YELTSIN, CLINTON AGREE ON START III OUTLINE Following their summit meeting in Helsinki, Finland, Russian President
Boris Yeltsin and his US counterpart Bill Clinton issued a joint statement
pledging that immediately after the Russian parliament ratifies START II,
they would begin negotiating a START III agreement. The statement said
the proposed START III agreement would reduce Russian and American strategic
nuclear forces to a level of 2,000-2,500 warheads by the end of 2007. Clinton
and Yeltsin also said that START III would go beyond previous agreements
and seek to make strategic nuclear reductions irreversible by including
measures providing for the destruction of warheads deactivated under its
provisions while also increasing the transparency of both countries'
stockpiles
of nuclear warheads and fissile materials. The statement added that separate
but related talks would address tactical nuclear weapons and nuclear-armed
long-range sea-launched cruise missiles, issues which Moscow has long wanted
to see included in strategic arms control negotiations. (For more information
on the Helsinki summit meeting please see the NIS Nuclear Profiles Overview,
The
Helsinki Summit and Nuclear Arms Control, by Scott Parrish.)
[The full
text of the Clinton-Yeltsin joint statementon parameters of future
nuclear reductions is available in the Profiles database, obtained from
the US Information Service at http://www.usis.fi/whatshap/summit30.htm]
{Entered 8/18/97 SDP}
2/8/97: OPPOSITION ANALYST WARY OF START III OFFER FROM WASHINGTON Writing in the opposition paper Pravda-5,
defense analyst Anton Surikov argued that while the Clinton administration's
recent proposal to open talks on a START III treaty looks superficially
attractive, Russia should not rush to begin a new round of strategic nuclear
arms reductions. Surikov argued that while the new American START III proposal
appears favorable for Russia, the details that still remain to be worked
out would determine whether or not the new treaty would be acceptable to
Russia. He conceded that the 2,000-warhead ceiling which the US has propsed
matches the level which Russia could maintain at current financing levels.
But Surikov, who has been a harsh critic of the START II agreement, argued
that the lure of such a START III agreement should not tempt Russia to
ratify START II. He cautioned that if Russia were to ratify START II before
START III is signed, Moscow could find itself obligated to implement the
earlier agreement, since there is no guarantee that START III talks will
produce an acceptable treaty. He complained that the new American proposal
did not appear to address important shortcomings of START II, like the
potential for rapid uploading of additional warheads on US submarine-launched
ballistic missiles (SLBMs), or counting rules which require Russia to destroy
the systems which have traditionally been the heart of its nuclear deterrent,
while the United States can simply "download" warheads from the systems
which it relies most heavily upon, but need not destroy the launchers themselves.
He also contended that American plans to deploy a limited National Missile
Defense (NMD) would undermine the credibility of Russia's deterrent, especially
at the lower force levels outlined in the proposed START III agreement.
Surikov concluded that Russia should reject both the START II and proposed
START III treaties, and develop its strategic forces within the constraints
of the 1991 START I treaty. To maintain the force levels permitted by START
I, Surikov said Russia should develop a new generation of "heavy" multiple-warhead
intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs).
[Anton Surikov, "Ne stoit ustupat nazhimu," Pravda-5,
8 February 1997.]{entered 8/19/97 SDP}
1/25/97: TO ACCELERATE RATIFICATION OF START II, WASHINGTON PROPOSES
OUTLINE OF START III The Russian media reported that during his January 1997 visit to Moscow,
US Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott discussed the framework of
a possible START III agreement with a number of high-ranking Russian officials.
Segodnya
said
that Talbott had expressed readiness to begin talks on a START III agreement
that would reduce Russian and American strategic nuclear forces to levels
around 2,000 warheads. Under the US proposal, negotiations on START III
would open only after START II is ratified. (for more information, see
the related item in the "START II: Ratification Developments" section of
the database.) [Vladimir Arbanov, "Vashington gotov k novym sokrashcheniyam
yadernogo oruzhiya," Segodnya, 25 January 1997.]{entered 8/18/97 SDP}
4/14/95:GRACHEV CALLS START III TALKS PREMATURE Russian Defense Minister Grachev stated that discussions of a START III
Treaty during the upcoming summit between Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin
would be premature as long as START II has not been ratified and NATO is
expanding into Eastern Europe. [INTERFAX, 4/14/95; in "Grachev: START III Talks During Clinton
Visit 'Premature'," FBIS-SOV-95-072, 4/14/95.]
9/94: YELTSIN PROPOSES ARSENAL REDUCTIONS In an address to the UN, President Boris Yeltsin proposed that the five
major nuclear weapon states sign a new treaty in which they would decrease
their nuclear arsenals.
["Yeltsin Proposed..." Wall Street Journal, 9/27/94, p. 1.]
Page last updated 17 June 2004. This page is no longer being updated.
Please see the Strategic Forces General Developments
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Comments or questions? Contact Nikolai Sokov (nsokovATmiis.edu) at MIIS
CNS.
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being updated. For more recent developments, please see the
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