This file contains
developments relating to the closed
cities and nuclear weapons facilities under
Minatom's jurisdiction. (Other nuclear weapons facilities are discussed in
the Nuclear Weapons,
Delivery Vehicle Facilities, and
Naval Reactors sections.) For more information on the Nuclear Cities Initiative, please see the Russia:
Foreign Assistance:
DOE
Programs section of the NIS Nuclear and Missile Database, especially the
Nuclear
Cities Overview.
3/17/2003: ACTIVISTS RAISE
ISSUE OF SUBSTANCE ABUSE AT NUCLEAR FACILITIES On 17 March 2003 activists from
Greenpeace
and other groups such as Ozersk's Planet of Hopes, as well as sociologists from the Institute of Sociology at
the Russian Academy of Sciences, called on the government to pay attention
to drug and alcohol
abuse among employees at nuclear facilities, as well as the lack of action
taken by industry leadership to address the problem. The groups
expressed concern for the increased risk of nuclear accidents and theft as a
result of the abuse. Nadezhda Kutepova,
director of Planet of Hopes, contends that the incidents of drug and alcohol
abuse at nuclear facilities are underreported because managers tend to cover
up for employees under the influence. Minatom
refuted many of these claims, maintaining that substance abuse does not
exist among employees in responsible positions. [Steve Gutterman, "Drinking Problem Seen at Nuke Sites,"
Associated Press; in The Moscow Times, 18 March 2003.] {Entered
5/28/2003 CB}
2/21/2003: MOSCOW PLANS TO AUDIT
CLOSED CITIES On 21 February 2003,
Rossiyskaya gazeta reported that the Administration of the President of
Russia and the Accounts Chamber of the
Russian Federation plan to audit
Minatom closed cities.
A preferential tax regime attracted many companies to register their
businesses in ZATOs (closed administrative territorial formations). As a
result, "hundreds of millions of dollars in taxes" were undercollected.
The Ministry of Taxation stated that "ZATOs turned into
offshore zones, through which the country is losing its
financial resources." Oil companies benefited the most from tax breaks
in closed cities. However, according to Sergey Stepashin, head of the
Accounts Chamber, the audits will not focus on oil companies, but rather on
the tax collection and spending patterns of ZATO administrations. The
newspaper names Snezhinsk in Chelyabinsk
Oblast as the first candidate for the audit. [Ivan Gromov, "ZATO,
oni idut k vam!" Rossiyskaya gazeta, No. 34, 21 February 2003; in Integrum Techno,
http://www.integrum.com/.]
{Entered 3/11/2003 DA}
1/17/2003: FUTURE MINATOM
EMPLOYEES TO BE SCREENED FOR DRUG ADDICTION On 17 January 2003,
Kommersant reported that in accordance with a Russian government
anti-narcotics commission recommendation, individuals applying for a job at
Minatom
enterprises will be required to undergo a medical examination to identify
any drug dependency. This measure was initiated by Mikhail Grishankov, a State Duma deputy from Chelyabinsk oblast. ["Narkomanov
ne pustyat rabotat v atomnoy promyshlennosti," Kommersant, 17
January 2003; in Integrum Techno,
http://www.integrum.com/.]
{Entered 2/21/2003 DA}
10/2/2002: STATE DUMA CONSIDERS
LAW CHANGING STATE UNITARY ENTERPRISE OVERSIGHT
On 2 October 2002,
Dumskaya panorama
reported that the State Duma
had
passed the second reading of the law On state and municipal unitary
enterprises. These enterprises are mostly involved in strategic production,
including military and nuclear production. The
property of such enterprises belongs to the state. According to the new law, the
Ministry of Property Relations would gain control
over these enterprises: Alexander Belousov,
a member of the Budget and Tax Committee,
claims that this would contradict existing managerial practices in the defense and transportation
industries that have proven quite effective. He states that as a result of
the implementation of this law, the task of the control over unitary enterprises
would be separated from the task of fulfilling the state armament
program, state defense orders, etc, and slow enterprise reform.[1] On the other
hand, First Deputy Minister of
Property Relations Aleksandr Braverman, argued that it would speed reforms.[2]
Ministers opposed to the law include
Minister of Atomic Energy Aleksandr Rumyantsev,
General Director of the
Aerospace Agency Yuriy
Koptev, General Director of the
Conventional Weapons Agency Aleksandr Nozdrachev, and
General Director of the Shipbuilding
Agency Vladimir Pospelov.[1]
Sources:
[1] Dumskaya panorama, 2 October 2002; in
Integrum Techno,
http://afnet.integrum.ru.
[2] Aleksandr Braverman: Prinyatiye zakona ob unitarnykh predpriyatiyakh
sdelayet etot sektor ekonomiki bolee upravlyayemym," Regions.ru Web Site, 10
August 2002; in Integrum Techno, http://www.integrum.ru. {Entered on
10/17/2002 MP}
10/23-26/2002: MINATOM
STRENGTHENS
SECURITY REGIME DURING HOSTAGE CRISIS IN MOSCOW On 23 October 2002, a group of armed Chechens took more than 700 people
hostage in Dubrovka Theater in Moscow. In response to this crisis,
Minatom
ordered a security upgrade at its civilian and military nuclear facilities
against
possible terrorist attacks and established a security task force under Deputy Minister Anatoliy Kotelnikov to supervise
its implementation.
Minatom security forces and Interior Ministry troops guarding nuclear
facilities were put on a state of high alert. Access to closed cities was
further restricted.[1] In addition, the Minatom Situation and Crisis Center
screened information from all nuclear facilities 24 hours a day for
subsequent analysis and reporting.[2] The hostage crisis was resolved in the
early morning of 26 October 2002, when Russian special forces stormed the
theater using incapacitating gas.[3] Sources:
[1] "Minatom
usilil okhranu yadernykh obyektov," RIA Novosti,
http://www.rian.ru/, 25
October 2002; in Integrum Techno,
http://www.integrum.com/.
[2] Andrey Vaganov, "Atomshchiki
nacheku," Nezavisimaya gazeta online edition,
http://www.ng.ru/,
28 October 2002.
[3] Margot Buff, "Russia:
Dozens Dead as Troops Storm Theater and End Crisis," Radio Free
Europe/Radio Liberty,
http://www.rferl.org/, 26
October 2002. {Entered 10/30/2002 DA}
10/16/2002: RUMYANTSEV: CLOSED
CITIES WILL BE "OPENED IN THE NEAR FUTURE" On 16 October 2002, Russian
Minister of
Atomic Energy Aleksandr Rumyantsev announced that
Minatom closed cities would be "opened in the near future". However, he
didn't provide any specific time frame. "This cannot happen instantly,
though,"
according to Rumyantsev, because
cities with nuclear facilities such
as Novouralsk,
Snezhinsk,
Angarsk,
Arzamas-16,
Zelenogorsk and others play an important role in Russia's national defense
and thorough prearrangements are required before lifting their
"secret" [sic] status.
The announcement was made at a conference in Novouralsk devoted to the 50th
anniversary of UEKhK.[1,2] Sources:
[1] "Na
zavershivsheysya v Novouralske nauchno-prakticheskoy konferentsii A.
Rumyantsev nazval UEKhK 'zhemchuzhinoy v korone atomnoy promyshlennosti',"
Nuclear.ru Web Site, http://www.nuclear.ru/, 17 October 2002.
[2] Eduard Puzyrev, "'Zakrytyye'
goroda, v kotorykh raspolozheny predpriyatiya Minatoma RF, v nedalekom
budushchem mogut byt rassekrecheny," RIA Novosti,
http://www.rian.ru/, 17
October 2002. {Entered 10/17/2002 DA}
7/1/2002: VIOLATORS OF ZATO
ACCESS REGIME WILL BE FINED On 1 July 2002, the new
Administrative Code of the Russian Federation entered into force. According to
Article 20.17 of the Code, violators of the restricted access regime in closed
cities could be fined an amount ranging from three to five minimum monthly wages.
[The minimum monthly wage is a measure used in Russia to calculate wages,
social benefits and fines. As of 1 January 2002, the minimum monthly wage was
450 rubles ($14.28 as of 1 July 2002).] [Administrative
Code of the Russian Federation, Rossiyskaya gazeta, No. 256, 31
December 2001; in Integrum Techno,
http://www.integrum.com/.]
{Entered 8/14/2002 DA}
5/22-24/2002: CONVERSION
ISSUES DISCUSSED IN SNEZHINSK From 22 May to 24 May 2002,
Snezhinsk hosted a three-day
workshop on nuclear defense conversion. VNIITF specialists
and representatives from Dimitrovgrad, Zheleznogorsk, Lesnoy, Obninsk, Ozersk, Trekhgornyy
and other cities with nuclear infrastructure discussed the outcomes of the
defense industry conversion program for 1998-2001 and outlined plans for
restructuring military nuclear enterprises for 2002-2006. The participants emphasized
the importance of
developing an investment policy for the nuclear cities and maintaining close cooperation with Minatom. ["24 maya v gorode
Snezhinske Chelyabinskoy oblasti zavershilsya seminar rukovoditeley
predpriyatiy Ministerstva RF po atomnoy energii i administratsiy ZATO, na
kotorom obsuzhdalis problemy konversii yadernoy otrasli," Nuclear.ru website,
http://www.nuclear.ru/news/full/960.shtml, 24 May 2002.] {Entered 6/24/02
DA}
5/20/2002: STATE DUMA PLANS TO
INTRODUCE AMENDMENTS TO LAW ON ZATOs On 20 May 2002,
the Russian State Duma held parliamentary hearings dedicated to the
implementation of the 1992 Law on ZATOs.
Ozersk Mayor Vladimir Malkov summarized the results of the hearings at a
press conference on 24 May 2002. He told local journalists that the
meeting in the Duma, initiated by the Association of Closed Cities and its
chairman Nikolay Lubenets, mayor of Trekhgornyy, had been prompted by the
need to streamline relations between ZATOs and federal authorities and
remove the provisions of the 1992 law that contradicted the Tax and Budget codes. The
Association proposed a draft law, amending the
existing law on ZATOs and overruling a draft prepared by the Ministry of
Finance which, if implemented, could have reduced funding for closed cities. The
participants in the hearings also noted that the economic and social situation
in ZATOs under the aegis of the Ministry of Defense is significantly worse
than in Minatom's closed cities. The Duma's committee on local
self-government spoke in favor of transferring some powers and
financial resources from Moscow to ZATO administrations, especially in the social
arena. According to Malkov, Minatom's ZATOs will remain closed, but
their status as "offshore zones" is unlikely to be restored.
[Georgard Tolkachev, "Ozersk
ostayetsya zakrytym. Poka," Ozersk.ru Web Site,
http://www.ozersk.ru/, 31 May 2002.] {Entered
7/15/02
DA}
2/12/2002: DEPUTY PRIME
MINISTER DISCUSSES ISSUES OF CLOSED CITIES WITH CHELYABINSK GOVERNMENT On 12 February 2002, an
interagency meeting initiated by the Chelyabinsk Oblast Administration to
discuss nuclear industry development and regional radiation safety
issues was held in Chelyabinsk. Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Industry,
Science, and Technologies Ilya Klebanov chaired the meeting. Presidential
Envoy to the Urals Federal Okrug Petr Latyshev, Minister of Atomic Energy
Aleksandr Rumyantsev, Chelyabinsk Oblast Governor Petr Sumin,
representatives of the Russian Academy of Sciences, and heads of ZATOs
and nuclear facilities took part in the meeting. The participants discussed
the economic and social development of ZATOs, radiation protection of the
population, and physical protection of nuclear facilities. Klebanov
emphasized at the meeting that the government intends to maintain the special regime
at Minatom ZATOs and
further develop legal regulations defining the status of closed cities.
[Yelena Vyatkina, "Problemy
ostryye - ZATO atomnyye," Ozersk.ru Web Site, http://www.ozersk.ru, 20
February 2002.] {Entered 3/12/2002 DA}
10/12/2001: RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT APPROVES PROGRAM FOR
DEVELOPMENT OF CLOSED CITIES IN 2001-2004 The Russian government approved the "Program for Development of
the Closed Cities in 2001-2004,"
Vek reported on 12 September 2001. The program emphasizes
goal-oriented programs for social and economic development in the closed cities,
funded by annual federal budget allocations. Administrations
of the closed cities and Minatom believe that this approach is most effective and
gives federal agencies the most control over development programs. However, current budget
allocations for development programs in the closed cities are insufficient,
according to Vek. The 2001 budget allocated 613 million
rubles ($20.8 million as of 12 October 2001) to these programs, and the 2002 budget
only allocates 313.3 million rubles ($10.6 million). According to experts, the
closed cities require 3-7 billion rubles ($101.8-$237.5 million) annually in
order to implement these programs. According to
Vek, Minatom could
promote development of the closed cities by funding development of new
technologies, continuing funding of the city infrastructure that supports the operation of
the nuclear facilities, and creation of new employment
opportunities in the closed cities.
[Vladimir Dernovoy, "Demarsh 'sekretnykh' gorodov
ZATO proryvayutsya v rynok," Vek, 12 September 2001; in Minatom
News Digest,
http://www.minatom.ru/presscenter, 12 September 2001.] {Entered 2/21/02 EC}
10/4/2001 LUXOFT AGREES TO RETRAIN RUSSIAN
NUCLEAR WEAPONS SCIENTISTS AND ENGINEERS FOR WORK IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR LUXOFT became the first major Russian information technology company to
join the US DOE Initiatives for Proliferation Program (IPP). LUXOFT
and its US partner, CTG Inc., of Wayne, Pennsylvania, plan to train 500 nuclear
professionals at the Kurchatov Institute in Moscow in a number of computer
technology applications. The project consists of four stages: trainee
selection, external basic training, targeted training at LUXOFT, and
provision of employment. LUXOFT plans to expand training at Kurchatov
before moving on to Russian nuclear weapons facilities.
["Software Firm Enlists In Effort To Retrain Russian
Weapons Scientists", DW, Vol. 22, No. 41, 15 October 2001, pp.1-2]
{Entered 2/18/02 TH}
9/26-28/2001: MINISTER OF
ATOMIC ENERGY VISITS
CLOSED CITIES From 26 to 28 September 2001, Russian Minister of
Atomic Energy Aleksandr Rumyantsev visited Trekhgornyy and
Ozersk in
Chelyabinsk Oblast. On 26 and 27 September, Rumyantsev participated in a
meeting initiated by the Closed Cities Association in Trekhgornyy. The meeting
was attended by heads of
ZATO administrations and nuclear facilities, Minatom representatives, Chelyabinsk Oblast Governor Petr Sumin, Presidential Envoy to the Urals Federal Okrug Petr Latyshev,
State Duma deputies,
and law enforcement officials.[1]
Discussion focused on development
strategy; cooperation between Minatom, the closed cities' authorities and Minatom's
nuclear facilities; coordination of policies regarding employment, funding, and
conversion of nuclear
facilities.[1,2] According to
Mikhail Shubin, head of Minatom's Department on Regional, Personnel and Social
Policy, the Russian Ministry of Finance plans to cut subsidies for ZATOs from
613 million rubles ($20.83 million as of 26 September 2001) in 2001 to 300
million rubles ($10.19 million as of 26 September 2001) in 2002. Shubin believes
that despite higher budget allocations and better social services than elsewhere in
Russia, the
closed cities are not yet adjusted to new economic realities. He recommended ZATO administrations shift investment priorities from social programs to
business development and improvement of city infrastructure.[2] Mayors of the closed cities
submitted their recommendations for a new law on ZATO and a draft agreement
between ZATO administrations and Minatom on development programs for closed cities.[1,2]
Sources: [1] Aleksandr Abrosimov, "Perspektiva v
obyedinenii i rekonstruktsii," Ozersk.ru Web Site,
http://www.ozersk.ru/cgi-bin/article.cgi?news/46. [2] "Obshchiye
tseli, obshchiye zadachi," Atompressa,
No. 39, October 1999, pp. 1-2. {Entered 2/26/2002
DA} {Updated 7/31/2002 DA}
8/9/2001: MINATOM SUMMARIZES ACTIVITIES IN 2000 On 9 August 2001
Minatom published an
Internet report on nuclear activities
in Russia in 2000. The report provides sector-wide statistics for the
year, as well as major achievements in nuclear energy, nuclear fuel
production, nuclear research, exports, and international activities. According
to the report, the financial situation at nuclear-related scientific
institutions stabilized in 2000. Wages for workers in scientific institutions
increased, reaching 3549 rubles per month ($121 as of 9 August 2001) by the
end of 2000. The report also described progress on conversion of facilities
from military to civilian production. Minatom spent 811,748,000 rubles ($27.7
million) on the Conversion of the Nuclear Industry in 1998-2001
Program in 2000.
Civilian products worth 1.08 billion rubles ($36.8 million) were produced at Minatom facilities in 2000, and 2,150 jobs were created in the civilian production
sector. The report described developments in international
cooperation programs in 2000. The United States, Germany, and France continued to be Russia's main partners in MPC&A in 2000. The US
Congress allocated $236.5 million in 2000 to fund these programs. Collaboration
between the United States and Minatom in MPC&A involved
about 20 Russian enterprises. All scheduled deliveries of downblended LEU
under the
HEU-LEU
agreement were completed in 2000, and all shipments of natural uranium feed
were received.
According to Minatom's report, nuclear fuel
deliveries by Minatom
in 2000 increased by 40% in monetary terms over 1999 levels, while all
exports increased by 20%. Accelerator hardware was exported to China and South Korea, and
an agreement was signed to supply hardware to the United States over the next four
years. A major contribution to the increase in exports was collaboration
with Asian states on nuclear power plant construction, particularly at
Tianwan in China,
Bushehr in Iran, and
Koodankulam in India. Addressing
reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel, Minatom reports that in 2000, 11 trainloads
of spent fuel were transferred to
PO
Mayak for reprocessing. The report also outlined a plan to reorganize
Minatom's commercial structures. The plan would combine uranium extraction,
enrichment, and fuel-producing enterprises into a new joint stock company, Rosatomprom, unifying fuel cycle activities.
Rosenergoatom
would manage generation of nuclear power. OAO Rosatomstroy would be formed to
make construction in the nuclear industry more efficient.
["Itogi deyatelnosti atomnoy otrasli v 2000 godu,"
Minatom Press-Center
http://www.minatom.ru/presscenter,
9 August 2001.] {Entered 11/20/01 EC}
4/24/2001: CARNEGIE PUBLISHES REPORT ON NUCLEAR
AND MISSILE SCIENTISTS IN RUSSIA In May 2001, the Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace published a report by Valentin Tikhonov entitled Russia's Nuclear and Missile
Complex: The Human Factor in Proliferation.
The report is based on a 1999 sociological field study of specialists currently working in
Russia's nuclear and missile centers and focused on migration to and from
nuclear cities, potential and actual emigration of weapons specialists out
of Russia, private sector absorption of nuclear and missile experts, and
training of new specialists for nuclear and missile industries. The
study draws on the results of a survey of 500
nuclear scientists in five closed cities: Sarov, Snezhinsk,
Seversk, Zarechnyy, and Trekhgornyy.
The report emphasized that conditions in nuclear cities are rapidly
deteriorating. The qualifications of nuclear specialists have declined
and their salary levels have remained static while the cost of living has
sharply risen. According to the study, more than 62% of these scientists earn less than $50 a month,
58% work other jobs to make ends meet, 89% say that their living
conditions have declined since 1992, 14% would like to work outside of Russia and
6% would move to any place
where they could find gainful employment. However, the number of workers willing to emigrate
to other countries is shrinking. In the past
decade, most of the emigrants moved to Israel, Germany, and the United States. Furthermore,
the number of nuclear employees willing to work abroad is only one-fifth to
one-sixth the level it was in 1992 and these are most opposed to working in
Iraq, Pakistan, Libya, Iran, and North Korea, in that order. Although
"the emigration potential in the nuclear-missile complex remains
dangerously high," the
study noted that in addition to the changed attitude toward emigration, two
other factors help avert scientists from emigration--their low income and
administrative restrictions that prevent residents of the closed cities from
leaving the country on their own. The study argues that the most serious
damage to the nuclear enterprises is posed not by emigration but by
specialists taking jobs with private companies or starting their own
businesses. "In the 1990s, the intensity of the outflow from
enterprises to private business was five to six times greater than
emigration." According to the report, the aging of the work force and
the absence of an inflow of young people to the nuclear industries also pose
serious threat to personnel situation in nuclear complex. Tikhonov warns that without
adequate funding, education, and improved living standards, Russia's problems with the safety and reliability of
the nuclear sector might worsen in the years ahead.
[Valentin Tikhonov, Russia's Nuclear
and Missile Complex: The Human Factor in Proliferation (Washington, DC:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2001).] {Entered 8/03/01
ES}
4/18/2001: RYABEV REPORTS TO DUMA ON RUSSIAN
NUCLEAR WEAPONS PRODUCTION COMPLEX On 18 April 2001, First Deputy
Minister of Atomic Energy Lev Ryabev delivered a report to the Russian State
Duma entitled The
Prospects for Maintaining the Russian Nuclear Weapons Complex and Supporting
Fundamental Nuclear Science During the Reorganization of the Ministry of Atomic
Energy. According to Ryabev, the government
program for arms purchases and the presidential program for developing the nuclear
weapons complex contain clear guidelines for the Russian nuclear complex
with respect to nuclear munitions production until 2010. Ryabev also noted that the service life of the current
nuclear arsenal would expire in a few years and enjoined the nuclear weapons
complex to develop new scientific and technological means to compensate
for the absence of actual nuclear testing. To this end, three
supercomputers in Russia have already begun analytical operations to test the reliability and safety of nuclear arsenal. Speaking of the reorganization of the Ministry
of Atomic Energy, Ryabev stated that by 2003, two of the four plants that
assemble and dismantle nuclear munitions, and one of the two
uranium and plutonium warhead component manufacturing plants, would be
closed.[1] Nezavisimoye voennoye
obozreniye names "Elektrokhimpribor
(Sverdlovsk-45), PO Start (Zlatoust-36) [sic: the name of the facility in
Zlatoust-36 is Instrument-Making Plant,
not PO Start], and PO
Mayak (Chelyabinsk-40)" as the only facilities to be involved in the manufacturing of
nuclear warheads by 2004.[2] Furthermore, the present number of specialists in the nuclear weapons
complex (75,000) would be reduced by 35,000-40,000. Ryabev called for federal measures focused on
creating new jobs for excess
nuclear workers and developing
closed cities' infrastructure to
compensate for the restrictions placed on investment zones in closed nuclear
cities.[1]
Sources: [1] "The Prospects for Maintaining
Russian Nuclear Weapons Complex and Supporting Fundamental Nuclear Science
in the Conditions of the Minatom's Reorganization," The Duma and
Arms Control Newsletter, April-May, 2001. {Entered 6/15/01 GG} [2] "Novosti OPK i VTS," Nezavisimoye voennoye obozreniye on-line
edition, 11 May 2001, http://nvo.ng.ru.
{Revised 8/17/01 ES}
3/2001: GLENN SCHWEITZER
REPORTS ON NUCLEAR CITIES
Glenn Schweitzer from the US National Research Council presented
a report entitled Nuclear Perestroika - TechnoBusiness in Russia's Atomic Cities to representatives of major
US companies.[1] This report resulted from a two-year pilot study conducted in Obninsk, Snezhinsk and Zarechnyy
in partnership with Lev Tochenyy from the
International Science and
Technology Center. Schweitzer believes that promising research projects in non-military
areas, such as molecular disintegration
(Snezhinsk), nuclear waste disposal (Obninsk), and laser and optical
diagnostics (Zarechnyy), could be of interest to international investors. In
Schweitzer's view, the Russian government could facilitate technological
development in Minatom closed cities by establishing stable tax regime,
introducing tax incentives, enforcing protection of intellectual property,
giving preference to Russian suppliers of high-tech goods and services,
assisting development of innovative products and supporting scientific research.
The government should also separate defense and civilian activities in the cities
and ease access for potential investors and customers.[1,2]
Sources: [1] Washington Online,
http://www.washonline.org/ICArchives/march2001.htm, 3 March 2001; in "Razvitiye mirnykh tekhnologiy -
nadezhda 'atomnykh gorodov'," Yadernaya bezopasnost, No. 46-47,
April 2001, p. 13. [2] Glenn Schweitzer, Lev Tocheny, Nuclear
Perestroika - TechnoBusiness in Russia's Atomic Cities (Arlington, VA:
Cameron Publications Services, December 2000). {Entered 9/16/02 DA}
12/8/2000: US-RUSSIA HEU DEAL FACILITATES CONVERSION Russian Minister of Atomic Energy Yevgeniy Adamov
announced that the Ministry spent 1.5 billion rubles on conversion
programs in 2000. The funds were available as a result
of the implementation of the 1993
US-Russian HEU Agreement. ["Deal with USA help Russian conversion programmes,"
ITAR-TASS, 8 December 2000; in FBIS Document CEP20001208000457.] {Entered
6/1/01 GG}
11/2000: ADAMOV: RUSSIAN NUCLEAR INDUSTRY SHOWS
12% INCREASE IN OUTPUT Russian Atomic Energy Minister Yevgeniy Adamov told reporters
that the Russian nuclear industry's output has grown by 12% since the
beginning of 2000. The output of the nuclear defense industry has
grown by 8%.
["Russian nuclear industry shows 12% increase
in output," RIA, 11 October 2000; FBIS Document
CEP20001011000099.] {Entered 11/6/00 OC}
8/25/2000: MIKHAIL KASYANOV VISITS SAROV, VNIIEF On 25 August 2000, Prime Minister Kasyanov visited VNIIEF in
Sarov to acquaint himself with the Minatom nuclear weapons complex. He was
accompanied by Minister of Atomic Energy Adamov, other top Minatom
officials, representatives of the regional administration, and directors of
the federal nuclear centers.[1] Kasyanov emphasized the importance of
maintaining the minimum required level of nuclear weapons, regardless of
financial difficulties. He said it is necessary to reduce Russia's nuclear
arsenal to the lowest acceptable level, while ensuring that existing
weapons are secure and well-maintained.[2] Kasyanov spoke against tax
privileges for closed cities and said these cities and nuclear complex
facilities should be financed solely from the federal budget. He
said the government intends to implement measures to improve the standard of
living for employees of the Russian nuclear complex and referred to the
decree increasing benefits for nuclear complex employees signed on 23 August
2000 by President Putin.[1]
Sources: [1] Nataliya Kocheshkova "Mikhail
Kasyanov: "K nalogovym lgotam otnoshus otritsatelno," Gorodskoy
kurer online edition, http://infra.sr.nnov.ru,
No. 35, 31 August 2000. [2] Petr Netreba, "Kasyanov
podvergsya yadernoy opasnosti," Kommersant-Daily online edition,
www.online.ru/rproducts/commersant-daily -month026-Aug-2000/17445764.DOC/rhtml,
26 August
2000. {Entered 9/18/00 OC}
8/23/2000: PRESIDENT PUTIN SIGNS DECREE
ON SOCIAL BENEFITS TO EMPLOYEES OF RUSSIAN
NUCLEAR COMPLEX On 23 August 2000 President of the Russian
Federation Putin signed edict No. 1563, On Urgent Measures to Provide
Social Support to Specialists of the Russian Federation Nuclear Weapons
Complex. The decree is targeted at increasing pensions and salaries of
employees directly involved in the development, production, maintenance,
monitoring, and dismantlement of nuclear weapons, and reprocessing of nuclear
materials. Support will be provided by supplemental monthly life-long
payments to retired employees of the nuclear complex if they were involved
in the aforementioned activities or worked for federal agencies in
charge of these activities. The monthly payments to retired nuclear
complex employees will range from 55 to 75 percent of the average salary
before retirement.
Salaries of civilian employees and servicemen of the Russian Armed Forces
who are directly involved in the nuclear weapons complex will be
increased to 1.5 times the average salary for similar work outside the
nuclear weapons complex.
[Presidential edict No. 1563, O neotlozhnykh merakh sotsialnoy
podderzhki spetsialistov yadernogo oruzheynogo kompleksa Rossiyskoy
Federatsii, 26 August 2000; in "Ofitsialno,"
Rossiyskaya
gazeta Web Site, www.rg.ru/official/doc/ukazi/1563.shtml.]
{Entered 9/19/00 OC}
6/23/2000: MINATOM OFFICIAL
DISCUSSES STATE ORDERS AND FINANCING OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAMS On 23 June 2000, Vek published an interview
with the head of Minatom's Nuclear
Munitions Development and Testing Department, Nikolay Voloshin, who
reported that the value of the FY 2000 state defense order had increased
by a factor of 1.5 in comparison with the state defense order for FY 1999,
but he noted that the actual increase is lower because of inflation. Voloshin
added that the defense order has also been increased by approximately the
same factor for his department. The Nuclear Munitions Development and Testing
Department manages the presidential program "Development of the nuclear
weapons complex," which constitutes 40 percent of the department's work
and consists of five smaller programs: replacing aging nuclear weapons;
creating production facilities to replace former Soviet facilities located
outside of Russia; constructing new equipment to conduct physics experiments;
developing supercomputer complexes, and supporting internal test sites.
Approximately half of the work under the program is related to maintaining
the existing arsenal. Voloshin added that the five subprograms comply with
the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.
Financing for each of the subprograms will be appropriated annually. Other
federal programs focus on safety and security, prevention of unauthorized
use of nuclear weapons, as well as weapons design and modernization, including
warheads for the Topol-M complex. He estimated that 45 to 85 percent of
the state defense order focuses on new projects, R&D, and nuclear weapons
stewardship. Although a small portion of the state defense orders from
FY 1997 and FY 1998 remained unpaid, the state was able to pay in full
and on time for the FY 1999 defense order. According to Voloshin, the budget
for Minatom's Nuclear Munitions Development and Testing Department was
30 times less than the budget allocated to the US national laboratories.
[Vladimir Dernovoy, "Nash shchit ne
figovyy listok, ubezhden rukovoditel Departamenta proyektirovaniya i ispytaniya
yadernykh boyepripasov Minatoma Nikolay Voloshin," Vek, No. 25,
23-30 June 2000.] {Entered 8/3/00 SS}
6/20/2000: CLOSED CITIES TRANSFER BUDGETARY AUTHORITY
TO RUSSIAN FEDERAL TREASURY On 20 June, Head of the Federal Treasury's Main Directorate
Tatyana Nesterenko reported that 30 of Russia's 40 closed cities (ZATOs)
had complied with federal legislation requiring the closed cities to transfer
control over ZATO budgets to the Federal Treasury.[1] She noted that eight
more closed cities had transferred either tax collection or their budget
expenditures to the Federal Treasury as required by a Russian government
resolution.[1,2] According to Nesterenko, only Sarov
(Arzamas-16) and Trekhgornyy (Zlatoust-36)
had failed to conclude an agreement with the Federal Treasury on the transfer
of their financial resources. Nesterenko warned that the Federal
Treasury could suspend payments to those closed cities that failed to comply
with the legislation approved by the Russian State Duma in December 1999
as part of the FY 2000 budget.[1] (See development from 3
December 1999 below). The legislation rescinded the closed cities'
authority to grant tax concessions to enterprises located on their territories
as part of the ZATO investment zones. The Duma voted to keep investment
zones at Sarov (Arzamas-16) and Snezhinsk
(Chelyabinsk-70) and stipulated that tax exemptions cannot exceed two billion
rubles ($73 million as of 31 December 1999).[2] Regional leaders and officials
from the Ministry of Finance had argued that the ZATO investment zones
had become little more than offshore investment zones. According
to Chelyabinsk Oblast Deputy Governor Vladimir Utkin, the four ZATO investment
zones operating in this oblast caused the federal and oblast budgets to
lose 32 billion rubles in FY 1999 ($1.16 billion as of 31 December 1999).
The new federal legislation does not regulate regional or local tax benefits.
The Ministry of the Economy was put in charge of coordinating the transfer
of cities' budgets and financial resources to the Federal Treasury.
Sources: [1] "Byudzhety rossiyskikh zakrytykh
administrativno-territorialnykh obrazovaniy perevedeny na kaznacheyskoye
obsluzhivaniye," Interfax, 20 June 2000. [2] Anatoliy Khodorovskiy, "ZATO sdali
v kaznacheystvo, " Vedomosti, 22 March 2000, p. 3. {Entered
7/6/00 SS}
3/31/2000: PUTIN ATTENDS
EXPANDED MINATOM COLLEGIUM SESSION IN SNEZHINSK On 31 March 2000, President-elect
Vladimir Putin visited Snezhinsk, which hosted an expanded session of
the Minatom Collegium. Deputy Prime
Minister Ilya Klebanov, Defense Minister Igor Sergeyev, Minister of Atomic
Energy Yevgeniy Adamov, Security Council Secretary Sergey Ivanov, and Unified
Energy System of Russia Chairman Anatoliy Chubais also attended the collegium.[1]
In his opening remarks, Putin stated that the work conducted at VNIITF
"is an absolute priority for the country and beyond any doubt makes it a great
power."[2] According to Putin, the importance of the nuclear weapons complex
is increasing as Russia seeks to improve the reliability of its nuclear deterrent.
He also made clear his interest in the problem of reliability and safety of
the nuclear arsenal.[5] Putin stressed the importance of Russia's nuclear
power industry and noted that a lack of cash and prevalence of barter had
taken its toll on the nuclear power industry. He stated that restructuring
and conversion of the nuclear defense complex remains a key problem for Russia.
Putin noted that conversion must be pursued "energetically and intentionally,"
in ways that do not simply protect defense workers in the closed cities, but
create alternative jobs.[5] He noted that money from state defense orders
is "often distributed irrationally and [does] not allow new breakthrough technologies
to develop."[2] Putin stated that the government has appropriated 1.5 billion
rubles ($52.4 million as of 31 March 2000).[3] Putin also noted that Minatom
should strengthen and increase its role in resolving environmental problems,
including radiation safety and the reprocessing of nuclear waste. In
response to a question regarding whether Russia would continue to restrict
access to the closed cities (ZATOs), Putin replied
that the ZATOs should be opened, but the approach must take into account fundamental
security issues. He further noted that the Minatom Collegium had discussed
the need to modernize certain elements of the nuclear weapons complex, including
the security systems in place at the ZATOs, and he added that a gradual and
consistent approach would allow Minatom to resolve issues related to opening
the ZATOs. Chair of the Association of Minatom Closed Cities and Trekhgornyy
Mayor Nikolay Lubenets asked Minatom to reinstate the ZATO tax status at all
10 closed cities. Putin spoke against the idea of granting tax privileges
to the ZATOs and criticized Lubenets's decision to spend 6 billion rubles
(approximately $232 million as of 6 April 1999) on the construction of a ski
resort near Trekhgornyy.[5] In 1999, the federal budget funded all state orders
in full and Putin stated that the government would continue to meet its budgetary
commitments. The government also expects to settle Ministry of Defense FY
1997 debts owed to Minatom by the end of FY 2000.[4]
[1] "The Atom Brooks no Delay," ITAR-TASS,
1 April 2000; in "Putin on Nuclear Arms, Atomic Energy," FBIS Document
CEP20000331000186. [2] "Vystupleniye na zasedanii rasshirennoy
Kollegii Ministerstva Rossiyskoy Federatsii po atomnoy energii," 31 March
2000, President of the Russian Federation Web Site, http://president.kremlin.ru/events. [3] Oleg Osipov, RIA-Novosti, 31 March
2000; in "Putin Recalls Reasons for Snezhinsk Visit," FBIS Document CEP20000331000147. [4] "Zaklyuchitelnoye slovo na zasedanii
rasshirennoy Kollegii Ministerstva Rossiyskoy Federatsii po atomnoy energii,"
President of the Russian Federation Web Site, http://president.kremlin.ru/events. [5] Elena Mazanova, "Snezhinskiy forum,"
Gorodskoy
kuryer online edition, http://www.sar.ru/~courier/14/txt/m140402.htm,
No. 148 (14), 6 April 2000. {Entered 4/26/00 SS}
3/17/2000: LLNL AND VNIITF'S SPEKTR SIGN TWO NCI
CONTRACTS On 17 March 2000, representatives from Lawrence
Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) and Spektr
State Unitary Enterprise signed two contracts as part of the strategic
planning process for the city of Snezhinsk under the DOE's Nuclear
Cities Initiative. According to the first contract, which will last
for one year, Spektr will receive $200,000 in US support to develop
oil well casing perforators for the Russian civilian market. The
second contract, which will last for two years, focuses on the development
of multi-mode optical fiber for use in local area networks. As part of
the second contract, Spektr will develop business relationships with cable
suppliers to help commercialize the multi-mode fiber. LLNL and VNIITF
also agreed in principle to establish an open computer center at Snezhinsk
similar to the open computing center
established in Sarov in October 1999.
["U.S. Department of Energy Announces
Russian Contracts," US Department of Energy Web Site,
http://www.doe.gov/news, 21 March 2000.] {Entered 4/12/00 SS}
3/14-15/2000: CONFERENCE ANALYZES DOWNSIZING OF
RUSSIAN NUCLEAR WEAPONS COMPLEX Beginning on 14 March 2000, Princeton University
hosted the two-day conference "Helping Russia Downsize its Nuclear Weapons
Complex." Participants included Russian First Deputy Minister of Atomic
Energy Lev Ryabev, US Assistant Secretary of Energy for Nonproliferation
Rose Gottemoeller, representatives from both governments, research institutes,
Russia's closed nuclear cities, and from US national
nuclear laboratories. The conference discussed Russian and US approaches
to reducing their nuclear weapons complexes, the current situation within
Russia's closed nuclear cities, the status and Russia's implementation
of existing downsizing programs, US assistance, and prospects for further
downsizing and conversion. In his presentation, Ryabev noted that Russia
has stopped production of highly-enriched uranium (HEU) and weapons-grade
plutonium, and Minatom has planned to close two of its four warhead assembly
plants and one of its fissile material production facilities, and to halve
its nuclear weapons workforce by 2005. A report based on the conference
may be downloaded from Princeton University's Center
for Energy and Environmental Studies web site.
[Center for Energy and Environmental
Studies, Helping Russia Downsize Its Nuclear Complex: A Focus on the
Closed Nuclear Cities, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University, March
2000), http://www.princeton.edu/~cees/arms.]
{Entered 8/3/00 SS} 3/2/2000: MINATOM RELEASES INDUSTRY FIGURES FOR
PAST TEN MONTHS On 2 March 2000, Okno published data released
by Minatom concerning economic growth, funding, social policies, personnel,
new technology and scientific developments that affected the Russian nuclear
industry. In the first half of 1999, capital within Minatom enterprises
increased by nearly 12 percent and the year's hard currency profits increased
one and a half times. Sales of low enriched uranium contributed to the
increase in hard currency earnings and were used to finance state military
orders. As of 1 October 1999, companies owed Minatom 42.9 billion rubles
($1.69 billion as of 1 October 1999), and Minatom owed its creditors 41.9
billion rubles ($1.65 billion as of 1 October 1999). During the first half
of 1999, Minatom enterprises created 1661 new jobs. Minatom spent 278.9
billion rubles ($10.2 billion as of 31 December 2000) to create new jobs
and maintain previously existing jobs. In 1999, Minatom hired 1270 young
specialists, including graduates of technical institutes and universities.
Also in 1999, Minatom continued research related to the reprocessing, storage,
and transport of spent nuclear fuel; nuclear submarines; radioactive waste
and the rehabilitation of polluted territories; and safety procedures at
nuclear power plants. In July 1999, Minister of Atomic Energy Yevgeniy
Adamov issued the decree "On the creation of a system of financial returns
of investment projects and scientific design bureaus." Minatom approved
a series of implementation measures, which included the formation of the
"Fond-M" group of nonprofit organizations.
["Minatom: Oblik otrasli," Okno,
No. 3, 2 March 2000.] {Entered 3/27/2000 SS}
2/5/2000: FY 2000 BUDGET INTRODUCES UNCERTAINTIES
FOR ZATOs On 5 February 2000, Komsomolskaya pravda assessed
the impact on the 40 closed nuclear cities (ZATOs) of the recently approved
FY 2000 budget (see 12/3/99 development below). The
FY 2000 budget eliminated the tax concessions in all but two ZATOs and
allocated 210 million rubles ($7.3 million as of 5 February 2000) to each
ZATO. According to Komsomolskaya pravda, an earlier budget proposal
had appropriated an average of 150 million rubles ($5.2 million as of 5
February 2000) to each ZATO, which would be allowed to finance their remaining
expenses from taxes collected in the ZATOs. Komsomolskaya pravda
reported that the average ZATO budget totals 500 million rubles ($17.4
million as of 5 February 2000).
[Yevgeniy Protnikov, "V ZATO my delayem
rakety!" Komsomolskaya pravda online edition, http://www.mosinfo.ru/news,
No. 22, 5 February 2000.] {Entered 4/28/00 SS}
1/25/2000: SNEZHINSK HOSTS SEMINAR FOR MAYORS OF
US AND RUSSIAN NUCLEAR CITIES From 25-28 January 2000, Snezhinsk hosted the second
meeting meeting of US and Russian legislators and mayors from the two countries'
nuclear cities. Seminar participants discussed a draft memorandum of understanding
between representatives from the Association of Minatom Closed Cities,
the US Union of Energy Associations, and the International Association
for City Administration. On the final day of the meeting, US and Russian
participants signed a memorandum for further cooperation. According to
VNIITF Deputy Director for International Contacts Boris Vodolaga, VNIITF
does not plan to reduce the number of nuclear weapons specialists during
the restructuring process. Vodolaga reported that VNIITF has considered
new projects and new technologies with the goal of creating new jobs and
minimizing its dependence on state financing. In 1998, VNIITF created the
separate enterprise Spektr, which now employs approximately 400 specialists.
Spektr projects include computer assisted tomography (CAT) equipment, hydroabrasive
cutting, fiber optic communications lines, and superplastic forming. Although
these products generated widespread interest among Russian enterprises,
most of these enterprises are unable to pay for the new technologies.
Vodolaga also reported that VNIITF had created a business plan for the
CAT equipment, which it presented to the US investors. During the first
phase of the VNIITF restructuring program, Snezhinsk officials must convince
the federal government and residents to make the closed cities more accessible
to private business. The second phase of the restructuring program will
create new jobs. Deputy Director Aleksandr Makarenko from Minatom's Department
of Social Policy stated that discussions about opening the closed cities
are premature because Minatom's reasons for restricting access still exist.
Makarenko added that removing guards from the city's external perimeters
means that the city would need to increase its internal security. According
to Trekhgornyy Mayor and President of the Association of Minatom Closed
Cities Nikolay Lubenets, Trekhgornyy is currently working on 20 different
projects and is able to sell its products to 20 constituencies of the Russian
Federation. Lubenets noted that the Russian government has rushed the restructuring
process, spending a lot of money to retrain nuclear specialists to "sew
gloves and crochet vegetable netting." Instead, Lubenets argued, Russia
should find work that corresponds to the level of skill of the unemployed
nuclear specialists.
[Viktor Riskin, "Tomograf vmesto bomby,
" Chelyabinskiy rabochiy online edition, http://www.chelpress.ru,
1 February 2000.] {Entered 3/31/00 SS}
12/3/99: 2000 FEDERAL BUDGET
GUARANTEES FUNDING FOR CLOSED CITIES, LIMITS TAX BREAKS On 3 December 1999, the Russian State Duma approved
the FY 2000 budget that guarantees federal funding for Russia's closed
nuclear cities (ZATOs). The new budget curtailed tax breaks previously
granted to the ZATOs to facilitate business investment in these cities.
Disagreement over the three previously submitted FY 2000 budget proposals
centered on the ZATO investment zones, which First Deputy Prime Minister
Viktor Khristenko called a "real threat to the budget and the country's
economic security."[3] According to Khristenko, ZATO tax credits could
cause the federal budget to lose as much as 100 billion rubles ($3.7 billion
as of 12/3/99) and the consolidated budget to lose roughly 200 billion
rubles.[3] After the Duma rejected the third draft of the 2000 budget
proposal, a parliamentary Conciliatory Commission was formed to develop
recommendations for financing the ZATOs.[1] Speaking before the Duma, Khristenko
argued that next year's budget should reduce the amount of tax credits
that ZATO officials had been allowed to grant under previous legislation.[1]
According to Khristenko, the Duma Conciliatory Commission developed three
budgetary mechanisms to finance the closed cities in the next fiscal year.[1,2]
The new FY 2000 budget limits the volume of ZATO tax credits to no more
than 50 percent or two billion rubles ($2.8 billion as of 12/3/99) and
tax credits will not be extended to goods subject to excise tax.[1,2]
Sarov (Arzamas-16) and Snezhinsk (Chelyabinsk-70)
will be excluded from the new investment zone regulations.[1,2] The
2000 federal budget will allocate a total of 2.6 billion rubles ($98 million
as of 12/3/99) to ZATO development programs, with two billion rubles coming
from Minatom and 600 million rubles coming from the Ministry of Defense.[1]
Khristenko added that financing for ZATO military enterprises would come
from Minatom and the Ministry of Defense and it would not be reduced in
any circumstances.[1,2] The Duma passed the budget in its fourth reading,
with 308 deputies voting for the budget and 52 voting against it.[1,2]
[1] "Gosduma RF prinyala byudzhet-2000
v chetvertom chtenii," Interfax, No. 2, 3 December 1999. [2] "Gosduma RF podderzhala resheniye
soglasitelnoy komissii po ZATO," Interfax, No. 2, 3 December 1999. [3] Irina Granik, "ZATO," Kommersant
Daily online edition, http://www.online.ru/rproducts/commersant,
30 November 1999. {Entered 1/26/2000 SS}
11/12/99: CHRONIC UNEMPLOYMENT CALLED BIGGEST
PROBLEM FOR CLOSED CITIES On 12 November 1999, Vek reported that restructuring
and conversion programs currently planned for the principal enterprises
located within Russia's closed cities (ZATOs) are threatening the ZATO
economies with mass unemployment. Vek cited the example of
Novouralsk's Urals Electrochemical
Combine, which has been able to sell products on the world market and
reinvest its proceeds in the combine and in the city at large. In
spite of these sales, however, Novouralsk Mayor Valentin Feldman called
the situation in the city's labor market critical. Sarov (Arzamas-16)
and Snezhinsk (Chelyabinsk-70) have received
funding for 224 joint research projects totaling $31.3 million through
international research programs, including the International
Science and Technology Center (ISTC). Sarov and Snezhinsk also concluded
contracts with General Atomics
and Mobil Technology as part of the Initiatives
for Proliferation Prevention (IPP), and in December 1998 Sarov, Snezhinsk
and Zheleznogorsk (Krasnoyarsk-26)
became the pilot cities for the US Department of Energy's Nuclear
Cities Initiative (NCI), which has appropriated $20 million to help
finance conversion and investment programs in these ZATOs. According to
Vek,
ZATO mayors have likened foreign assistance to "therapy for chronic unemployment,"
recognizing that the ZATOs and the principal enterprises located within
them must resolve the unemployment problems themselves. In 1994, when ZATO
officials expected unemployment to increase from four percent to 14 percent,
city officials granted financial assistance and loans to the principal
enterprises to develop more efficient production technologies and save
jobs. After 1995, the Siberian
Chemical Combine in Seversk (Tomsk-7) began working on three major
projects as part of the Siberian Uranium for Power Engineering program,
which will enlarge existing production facilities and increase production
at the Combine. Mayor Nikolay Kuzmenko expressed hope that other
nuclear power engineering projects will create thousands of new jobs in
Seversk. Officials from the cities of Zheleznogorsk (Krasnoyarsk-26)
and Zelenogorsk (Krasnoyarsk-45)
want their ZATOs to be designated as scientific cities. The designation
would make Zheleznogorsk and Zelenogorsk eligible to participate in the
New Technology for Regional Administration and Development program, which
the Russian government approved in September 1999 as part of the decree
On
the Approval of the Criteria for the Conferment of Scientific-City Status
on Municipalities. The Russian government also adopted the Special
Program of Employment Assistance for the Population of ZATOs in 1998-2000,
which will use federal and municipal budget resources and contributions
from employers to save jobs and create new jobs in the closed cities. In
spite of these measures, the average unemployment rate within the ZATOs
was five percent, and it is higher in Zarechnyy
and Novouralsk.
[Gennadiy Aleksandrovich, "From the
Couch to the Lathe," Vek, 12 November 1999, p. 7; in "Programs Improve
Workers' Prospects in Closed Cities," FBIS Document CEP1999112300016.]
{Entered 2/16/2000 SS}
10/26/99: RYABEV: MINATOM MIGHT CUT WORKFORCE
BY 40,000 On 26 October 1999, Minatom First Deputy Minister
Lev Ryabev confirmed that Minatom plans to stop assembly of nuclear munitions
at two of the Ministry's four assembly plants. (Please see the 3/25/99
item in this file for more information.) Ryabev added that the nuclear
weapons complex must be efficient and he estimated that 40,000 workers
would be discharged as a result of conversion and restructuring efforts.
[Oleg Lebedev, RIA Novosti, 26 October
1999; in "2 Russians Plants to Stop Assembling Nuclear Ammunition," FBIS
Document FTS19991026001218.] {Entered 1/13/2000 SS}
10/1/99: MINATOM SURVEYS HOUSING AND WAGES OF
YOUNG SPECIALISTS On 1 October 1999, Atompressa published two
articles detailing the findings from a study of working conditions, housing,
and wages of specialists within the nuclear weapons complex. Minatom's
Social Policy, Industrial Relations, and Cadres Department, together with
the Nuclear Fuel Cycle Department, the Nuclear Munitions Development
and Testing Department, the Nuclear Munitions Production Department, the
Nuclear Power Engineering Department, and the Nuclear Science and Engineering
Department carried out the survey, which examined the working conditions
within various enterprises subordinate to the individual departments. Forty-five
enterprises submitted lists of specialists considered to have critical
knowledge, along with their ages, spheres of activity, and salary levels.
The survey estimated that the nuclear enterprises employ 3,000 specialists
who have knowledge essential to the production of nuclear munitions, but
this estimate does not include specialists working at the Federal Nuclear
Centers at VNIIEF and VNIITF.
The study also focused on the social support given to the specialists,
including access to housing, medical, and child care services, and what
enterprises can do to prevent specialists from seeking employment elsewhere.
The loss of older specialists combined with the difficult task of recruiting
new specialists could contribute to the decline of both individual enterprises
and the entire nuclear weapons complex. The study concluded that nuclear
weapons specialists are paid one-and-a-half to three times more than other
industrial personnel and that medical and childcare services were generally
at an acceptable level. According to Atompressa, most enterprises
are having difficulty recruiting young specialists and retaining older
specialists because of low wages, lack of housing, and insufficient demand
for the technologies and services produced at the enterprises. The study
recommended that Minatom allocate funds to construct housing for young
specialists and that employees working in the nuclear weapons enterprises
should be allowed to defer their compulsory military service. The study
also called for broader involvement of nuclear weapons specialists in international
joint research projects, such as those financed through the International
Science and Technology Center. According to the survey's conclusions,
enterprises should use nonstate pension funds to help retired weapons specialists,
with such social support provisions being included in the enterprises'
collective contracts.[1] A second article published in Atompressa
summarized findings from a study of the hiring practices at 36 Minatom
enterprises and the ability of these enterprises to provide housing to
young specialists recruited from other cities. The enterprises submitted
lists of young specialists hired from 1995-1999, forecasts for hiring new
specialists from 2000-2004, the number of young specialists in need of
housing as of 1 October 1999, planned housing construction from 2000-2004,
and the need for federal funding to finance additional housing. Beginning
in 2000, the Nuclear Munitions Development and Testing Department, Nuclear
Power Engineering Department, and the Nuclear Science and Engineering Department
plan "an appreciable increase" in the number of young specialists hired.
Enterprises have established practical training programs at seven universities
that have departments staffed by specialists from the Federal Nuclear Centers.
After graduation, these students are offered employment. Each year, these
seven universities graduate approximately 750-800 specialists; 65-70 percent
of these young specialists find employment in nuclear sector enterprises
and 30 percent of the graduates find employment in the closed city nuclear
enterprises. According to the article, it is somewhat easier for enterprises
to hire those university graduates who grew up within the closed cities
because these young specialists can live with their parents whereas specialists
new to the closed cities must stay in workers' dormitories and wait for
an apartment. To attract and keep young specialists in the nuclear sector,
the housing survey recommended establishing a housing construction program
for university graduates and compiling a list of young specialists in line
for housing. According to the survey, Minatom enterprises employ 5,000
young specialists and these enterprises reported that 2,400 young specialists
have registered for improved housing conditions.[2]
Sources: [1] A. Munistov, "A Critical Profession,"
Atompressa,
No. 38, 1 October 1999, p. 1; in "Status, Problems of Atomic Sector Workers,"
FBIS Document CEP19991116000004. [2] A. Voronkov, "Housing for the Young
Specialist," Atompressa, No. 38, 1 October 1999, p. 1; in "Status,
Problems of Atomic Sector Workers," FBIS Document CEP19991116000004.
{Entered 1/18/2000 SS}
9/27/99: US AND RUSSIAN OFFICIALS WORK TO MAKE
CLOSED CITIES MORE ACCESSIBLE On 27 September 1999, US and Russian officials signed
a memorandum of understanding under the auspices of the DOE's Nuclear
Cities Initiative to work to improve US access to Russia's closed nuclear
cities. According to press reports, officials from the city of Snezhinsk
agreed to work with the Russian Federal
Security Service (FSB) to reduce the current 45-day advance notice
required for access to the closed city. The United States and Russia also
agreed to develop multi-year visas for lab-to-lab exchanges.
["U.S., Russia Working to Improve Access
to Closed Nuclear Cities," Nuclear Weapons & Materials Monitor,
27 September 1999, p. 9] {Entered 4/7/00 SS}
9/21/99: NUCLEAR ENTERPRISES UNVEIL CONVERSION
PRODUCTS AT NIZHNIY NOVGOROD CONFERENCE From 21-24 September 1999, Nizhniy Novgorod hosted
the conference "Nuclear Technologies for the Non-Nuclear Market," which
displayed civilian and commercial projects developed at nuclear enterprises.
Minatom, the Nizhniy Novgorod Division of Russia's Nuclear Society, the
oblast administration, and enterprises from Nizhniy Novgorod Oblast and
the city proper organized the conference. In all, 14 enterprises displayed
and demonstrated their conversion projects, including VNIIEF,
Avangard,
NIIS, the Experimental Machine-Building Design Bureau (OKBM),
NPO
Luch, VNIITF Spektr State Unitary Enterprise,
the All-Russian Science and Research Institute of Atomic Reactors (SRIAR),
Omsk Etalon Experimental Plant, the Bochvar Institute (VNIINM),
Dzerzhinsk KhimMash, Nizhniy
Novgorod State Technical University, Ulba
Metallurigcal Plant, Lazurit
Central Design Bureau, and the Start
Production Association. Seventeen nuclear enterprises attended the
conference. During the technical sessions of the conference, nuclear enterprise
specialists presented 70 reports on activities and issues related to conversion.
According to the final document adopted at the conclusion of the conference,
many of the conversion projects had already developed production plans,
prepared investment proposals, and established product manufacturing and
supply lines. Participants said the conference demonstrated how nuclear
enterprises are independently seeking financial opportunities, researching
new products, and supporting advanced developments in spite of chronic
underfunding. Participants acknowledged that they must seek customers abroad
because most Russian businesses lack the resources to invest in their projects.
They further expressed concern that selling this advanced technology keeps
Russia from using its scientific and technical potential to develop its
domestic industries. Participants voted to continue the Nuclear Society's
conversion conferences, to create a database of conversion projects, and
to provide mutual assistance in marketing and promoting new products.
[M. Gorbacheva, "The Week of the Peaceful
Atom in Nizhniy Novgorod," Atompressa, No. 35, 1 October 1999,
pp. 4-5; in "Conference on Nuclear Technology Held," FBIS Document CEP19991108000007.]
{Entered 3/3/2000 SS}
8/30/99: RUSSIAN NUCLEAR WEAPONS COMPLEX
VITAL TO NATIONAL SECURITY On 30 August 1999 at the 50th anniversary celebration
of the first Soviet nuclear test, Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin
told journalists that the existence of Russia's nuclear weapons complex
"remains the guarantor of national security and global peace in the current
geopolitical setting." Putin believes that developing and upgrading
the nuclear weapons complex is one of the main tasks facing Russia.
"If we do not preserve our nuclear weapons capability in the next five
to seven years, the situation will cardinally change in our country," according
to Putin.[1] At the same ceremony, Defense Minister Marshal Igor
Sergeyev said that Russia's nuclear weapons are the most modern and "the
best in the world." While acknowledging that Russia is reducing its
nuclear arsenal, Sergeyev noted that it would be a long process, due to
"US double standards" in the nonproliferation of nuclear technologies.[2]
Sources: [1] "V sovremennykh geopoliticheskikh usloviyakh yadernoye
oruzhiye Rossii garantiruyet sokhraneniye mira - Putin," Interfax, No.
4, 30 August 1999. [2] "Marshal Sergeyev schitayet rossiyskoye yadernoye
oruzhiye luchshim v mire," Interfax, No. 4, 30 August 1999. {Entered 9/9/99
CEM}
8/26/99: MODERNIZATION OF RUSSIAN NUCLEAR WEAPONS CONTINUES On 26 August 1999 at a meeting with journalists at VNIIEFin
connection with the 50th anniversary of the first Soviet nuclear test,
Deputy Minister for Atomic Energy Lev Ryabev said that Russia's weapons
are currently undergoing modernization in four different areas. The
first area is safety, specifically the prevention of accidental detonations
or launches. He noted that nuclear weapons have safety features that
prevent their use if stolen by terrorists. The second area is extending
the service life of Russia's current nuclear arsenal. The third is
continuing research and development to maintain the nuclear arsenal in
the event of a test ban (through laboratory modeling.) The fourth
is improvement of nuclear weapons in view of the development of anti-missile
defense systems. Ryabev also called for the formation of a smaller
nuclear weapons complex, noting that Russia has already reduced its production
of nuclear weapons more than ten-fold. Weapons assembly facilities
will be cut from four to two, and industry staff from 75,000 to 35,000
by the year 2005. Ryabev commented that Russia has received $215
million from the United States, Japan, and the European Union to assist
in conversion efforts. The cities of Sarov, Snezhinsk, and Zheleznogorsk
are scheduled to receive an additional $20 million in 2000 from the United
States for defense conversion. With regard to nuclear waste, Ryabev
said "no nuclear wastes will be brought to Russia from abroad--only spent
fuel from nuclear power stations, specifically uranium 235 and plutonium.
Plutonium will be extracted from the spent nuclear fuel for energy purposes.
The wastes will then be vitrified and returned to the sender country."
["Rossiya prodolzhayet sovershenstvovat yadernoye oruzhiye,"
Interfax, No. 2, 26 August 1999.] {Entered 9/10/99 CEM}
7/5/99: INVESTMENT ZONES IN CLOSED CITIES CRITICIZED On 5 July 1999, Ekspert reported that the
Russian Ministry of Finance audited the investment zones of 16 closed nuclear
cities (ZATOs) and concluded that the federal budget lost more than 15
billion rubles ($614 million as of 5 July 1999) in tax revenues from
these cities. Ekspert included a rebuttal written by Chairman of
the Duma Subcommittee on Small Enterprises Ivan Grachev, who dismissed
the figures cited by the Ministry of Finance as incorrect. The law On
Closed Administrative-Territorial Formations, which the Duma approved
in 1992, granted special investment zone status to 43 closed cities and
permitted these cities to keep all taxes and revenues collected within
their territory. The ZATO law further permitted the closed cities to grant
tax breaks to enterprises in an effort to stimulate private investment
in the closed cities. Grachev argued that the ZATO law is necessary
until such time when the Russian federal budget can guarantee funds for
the closed nuclear cities. However, critics asserted that the ZATOs
have become a tax haven, where enterprises would register without actually
establishing new firms that would in turn create new jobs. Ekspertreported
that 390 enterprises from other regions had registered in Snezhinsk
(Chelyabinsk-70). According to one official at the Ministry
of Finance, the amount of tax benefits granted to some ZATO investment
zones in the first quarter of 1999 was 20 to 30 percent higher than for
all of 1998. The Ministry of Finance warned that if benefits to the ZATOs
continued to increase, the federal budget would suffer enormous losses.
In response, the Duma included a law in the federal budget for 1998, giving
authority to the Ministry of Finance to determine privileges granted to
enterprises registered in the ZATO investment zones. The Duma also amended
the original ZATO law and specified the criteria for a business to register
in a ZATO. According to the amendment, an enterprise must have 90
percent of its fixed assets located within the ZATO, 70 percent of the
enterprise's business activities must be conducted in the investment zone,
and 70 percent of the workforce must live within the ZATO. In response
to the new requirements, enterprises with production facilities in other
regions moved their marketing operations to the investment zones.
[Galina Kostina, "ZATO Heaven.
Secret Installations of the Atomic Energy Ministry Have Become Popular
Refugees for Tax Evaders," Ekspert, 5 July 1999, pp. 10-11;
in "Closed Cities Seen as Boon for Tax Evaders," FBIS Document FTS19990719001335.]
{Entered 11/30/99 SS}
6/16/99: NUCLEAR ASSOCIATION MEETING DISCUSSES
FUTURE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS COMPLEX On 16 June 1999, Atompressa reported that
the Council of the Association of Professional Organizations of the Nuclear
Weapons Complex met in Trekhgornyy to discuss problems of "strategic character."
According to Atompressa,Minatom had recently paid most of
the wage arrears owed to specialists working in the nuclear weapons complex.
During the meeting, council members discussed the lack of funding to implement
conversion projects and the problem of finding employment for those specialists
who lose their jobs to downsizing the complex. There was a general consensus
that considerable financial investments would be necessary to efficiently
produce competitive goods. The council recognized that the high level of
security associated with the closed cities introduces additional obstacles
to conversion projects in these cities. Those in attendance further agreed
that attracting young specialists to work in the nuclear weapons complex
had become more difficult in these circumstances. Representatives
from Lesnoy (Sverdlovsk-45) and Trekhgornyy
(Zlatoust-36) criticized the government's decision to place defense
orders with enterprises outside of the nuclear weapons complex. According
to them, if these orders were transferred to Lesnoy's Elektrokhimpribor
or Trekhgornyy's Instrument-Making Plant, more jobs would be preserved
and in turn, this would lead to greater cooperation within the nuclear
weapons complex. The Council plans to develop a similar proposal for discussion
with the appropriate departments within Minatom.
["Problemy kompleksa obsuzhdalis v
Trekhgornom," Atompressa, No. 21, 16 June 1999, p. 3.]
{Entered 11/9/99 SS}
5/8/99: ADAMOV: NUCLEAR CENTERS PRACTICALLY WITHOUT
FUNDING On 8 May 1999, Parlamentskaya gazeta reported
that Minster of Atomic Energy Yevgeniy Adamov appeared before the State
Duma to discuss federal funding for the Federal Nuclear Centers (VNIIEF
and VNIITF). According to Adamov,
as of 1 January 1998, VNIIEF and VNIITF received 80 percent of the
financing they needed. Adamov stated that through sales of "nuclear components,"
the federal debt to VNIIEF and VNIITF, which totals 196 million rubles
($8.2 million as of 8 May 1999), will drop to 86 million rubles ($3.6 million
as of 8 May 1999). Adamov also reported that the Ministry of Finance was
able to meet all of its financial obligations in the first quarter of 1999;
however, funding was sufficient only to pay seven weeks of wages to VNIIEF
and VNIITF employees. Adamov stated that the budget is formulated in such
a way that the nuclear centers are essentially without funding, and he
proposed that the Federal Nuclear Centers should be exempted from paying
value-added taxes. According to Adamov, Russia's conversion programs have
not been financed for "several years." Adamov further remarked that Russia
has not developed computing technology that would permit reliable maintenance
of its nuclear arsenal.
["Yadernyye tsentry opyat bez deneg,"
Parlamentskaya
gazeta, 8 May 1999, p. 4; in WPS Oborona i Bezopasnost, No. 54, 12
May 1999.] {Entered 10/21/99 SS}
4/23/99: RYABEV ASSESSES NUCLEAR INDUSTRIES' CONVERSION
EFFORTS In an interview published by Vek on 23 April
1999, First Deputy Minister for Atomic Energy Lev Ryabev stated that
military production, which once totaled more than half of Minatom's production,
now makes up roughly three percent of Minatom's activities. Over
the past decade, Ryabev noted, nuclear munitions production fell ten-fold,
prompting Minatom to develop a restructuring and conversion program, which
the Russian government approved in 1998. The Minatom program, which calls
for defense production to be scaled back and for enterprises to be "reprofiled,"
will phase out 75,000 positions in nuclear enterprises over the next five
years. Ryabev cited increasing demand for nuclear energy as proof
that the civilian industries will benefit from hiring highly qualified
employees who will lose their jobs to restructuring and conversion. In
1998, VNIIEF and VNIITF
signed an agreement with Gazprom to develop prospecting and transporting
technology for the oil industry. He further emphasized untapped possibilities
to manufacture electronics for the automobile industry and microelectronics.
According to Ryabev, conversion efforts are currently supported with money
from the US-Russian HEU Deal,
taxes collected in the closed cities' investment zones, and financial assistance
from the US Nuclear Cities Initiative.
Ryabev noted, however, that many employees are not looking for work outside
of the nuclear weapons complex. Minatom plans to stop producing nuclear
munitions at two of its factories by the year 2000 and disassembly of nuclear
munitions will cease by 2003.
[Gennadiy Vosskresenskiy, "Iskusstvennaya
pochka vmesto atomnoy bomby," Vek No. 16, 23-28 April 1999,
p. 7.] {entered 10/21/99 SS}
4/23/99: MIKHAILOV: SUPPORT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS
COMPLEX RUSSIA'S HIGHEST PRIORITY In an article published 23 April 1999 in Nezavisimoye
voyennoye obozreniye, First Deputy Minister of Atomic Energy Viktor
Mikhailov wrote that Russia's nuclear weapons status must be "guarded like
the apple of our eye" and warned that underfunding is taking its toll on
the nuclear weapons complex. According to Mikhailov, if Minatom were allowed
to keep hard currency proceeds from exports, it could use them for wages,
new equipment and modernization. Mikhailov stressed that Russia must implement
stewardship programs similar to those in place in other states, and emphasized
three components for Russian nuclear stockpile maintenance: new computer
technology, laboratory test simulations, and hydronuclear tests, which
release a minimal amount of nuclear energy. (For more information on subcritical
and hydronuclear tests please see the Novaya
Zemlya Test Site file.) According to Mikhailov, there are two reasons
to focus on new technologies for Russia's nuclear weapons complex. First,
trends in world politics are leading to the return of "full scale" nuclear
testing and underscore the need to introduce test limits and institute
laboratory test simulation technologies to head off such developments.
Second, equipment at Russia's nuclear weapons complex is aging and needs
to be replaced before underfunding reduces Russia's nuclear deterrent.
[Viktor Mikhailov, "Perspektivy novykh
tekhnologiy razrabotki yadernogo oruzhiya," Nezavisimoye voyennoye obozreniye,
No. 15, 23-29 April 1999, p. 6.] {Entered 10/15/99 SS}
3/25/99: RYABEV SPEAKS ON CONVERSION AT
RUSSIA'S NUCLEAR WEAPON FACILITIES On 25 March 1999 Russian First Deputy Minister of Atomic Energy Lev Ryabev
stated at a press conference that by the year 2000 all production of nuclear
munitions will stop at Sarov (Arzamas-16)
and Zarechnyy (Penza-19). Ryabev
also stated that numerous conversion initiatives are being carried out.
Sarov is planning to create a public computer center within the framework
of the Nuclear Cities Initiative.
In Zheleznogorsk (Krasnoyarsk-26)
the conversion initiative envisions the development of silicon production,
which is in high demand on the world market. Snezhinsk
(Chelyabinsk-70) plans to develop an enterprise for packaging medicine.
Ryabev underlined the importance of creating an alternative job base for
people formerly and currently employed by the weapon development facilities.
[ Anna Bazhenova, ITAR-TASS, 25 March 1999; in "Russia's
Nuclear Arms Facilities Undergoing Conversion," FBIS Document FTS19990325001894.]
{Entered 6/8/99 KP}
3/13/99: ADAMOV WANTS TO KEEP NUCLEAR CENTERS AT BOTH SAROV AND SNEZHINSK Russian Minister of Atomic Energy Yevgeniy Adamov stated that he would
prefer that Russia keep both federal nuclear centers at Sarov
and at Snezhinsk open. In response to
criticism that only one center should stay open, Adamov maintains that
mutual control and competition between both centers is beneficial to the
industry.
[Yevgeny Tkachenko, ITAR-TASS, 13 March 1999; in "Minister
Wants Russia To Keep Both Of Nuclear Centres," Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe,
http://web.lexis-nexis.com/universe.]{Entered
5/4/99 SK}
2/99: PAPER ANALYZES POPULATION
AND MIGRATION PROCESSES IN CLOSED CITIES In February 1999, Valentin Tikhonov from the Russian
Academy of Science's Institute for Economic Forecasting published a paper
that analyzed internal migration into Russia's ten
closed nuclear cities (ZATOs) and argued that if the flow of new personnel
into the ZATOs were interrupted, then the "normal functioning of the nuclear
complex would be under serious threat." According to Tikhonov, the role
of Russia's nuclear enterprises has changed to emphasize the safety of
existing nuclear stockpiles and dismantlement of nuclear warheads.
He added that the change does not lessen the importance of highly qualified
specialists for the nuclear enterprises and that Russian nuclear weapons
complex must ensure a kind of succession from one generation of specialists
to the next. From 1989 to 1998, the number of residents living in the ZATOs
increased by 57,000 and Tikhonov observed that changes in population depended
on the activities conducted at the nuclear enterprise within a particular
ZATO. Novouralsk (Sverdlovsk-44)
and Zelenogorsk (Krasnoyarsk-45)
reported the largest population increase, which Tikhonov argued is linked
to the uranium enrichment activities conducted at the cities' nuclear enterprises
and the export of enriched uranium. Lesnoy
(Sverdlovsk-45) witnessed a net population decrease in the last five years,
and Tikhonov argued that the drop in the number of residents is related
to the decline of activities at Elektrokhimpribor
Combine, which is responsible for the assembly, disassembly and storage
of nuclear warheads. Although data on migration into the ZATOs is not published
in open source materials, official yearly statistics dating back to 1989
record population fluctuations within the ten closed cities. Tikhonov observed
that migration into the ZATOs was generally higher than migration into
other Russian cities, but beginning in 1997, the number of Russians migrating
into the ZATOs decreased. Although the greater availability of housing
and the relatively low crime rate may prompt Russians to migrate to the
ZATOs, Tikhonov argued that the low wages and growing unemployment had
reduced the attractiveness of the closed cities. Tikhonov noted that the
nuclear weapons enterprises are also losing their ability to attract young
specialists. Recent graduates specializing in technical fields take jobs
unrelated to their studies and young specialists already working within
the nuclear enterprises attempt to leave the state sector for jobs in the
commercial sector. Furthermore, the prestige associated with a technical
education has dwindled among Russian students. Tikhonov noted that the
majority of academic institutions that train nuclear specialists are located
far away from most ZATOs, and rising transportation and tuition costs will
compel more specialists to stay closer to the ZATOs and to study at provincial
institutions, which may offer a lower quality of education. He observed
that the general situation in the Russian labor market and the labor market
within the ZATOs are very similar. According to his calculations,
every tenth ZATO resident of working age is unemployed. Tikhonov warned
that if current migration trends continue, then the population of the closed
cities will shrink and the exodus of young specialists will adversely effect
the nuclear weapons complex. (See also the development from 24
November 1998 below).
[Valentin Tikhonov, "Atomnyye goroda
Rossii: migratsionnyy fenomen," Yadernoye rasprostraneniye, No.
20, February 1999, pp. 17-27.] {Entered 5/31/00 SS}
1/12-14/99: SEVEN MAJOR NUCLEAR INDUSTRY TRADE UNIONS FORM AN
ASSOCIATION On 12-14 January 1999, a meeting of seven nuclear complex trade-union committee
chairmen took place at VNIIEF. The outcome of this meeting was the
formation of the Association of Trade Union Organizations of Minatom Nuclear
Weapons Complex Enterprises. Aleksey Nikitin, the Trade-Union Chairman
of the Scientific Research Institute of Automation, was appointed the coordinator
of the association. The main goal of the association, as announced
by the coordinator, is the defense of the social and labor rights of nuclear
weapons industry workers. By working together, the trade unions hope
to deal more effectively with Minatom and government agencies, and will
work to promulgate legislation to advance the interests of the nuclear
complex workers. The association intends to influence the review
process of federal bills on nuclear weapons and on the social protection
of nuclear test participants. Also, the member unions are concerned
with the social impact of conversion and erratic financing of state defense
orders. Among the seven trade unions that joined were PO
Start, Urals Electromechanical
Plant, VNIIEF, VNIITF,
VNIIA,
Instrument-Making
Plant, and Avangard Electromechanical
Plant.
[Weapons Workers Unite, Atompressa, No. 3, January
1999, p.3; in "Nuclear Weapons Workers Merge Unions," FBIS Document FTS19990226001120.]
{Entered 6/14/99 KP}
12/22/98: STATE DUMA AMENDS ZATO TAX LEGISLATION On 22 December 1998, the Russian State Duma approved
the bill On introducing amendments and additions in Russian Federation
legislative acts on closed administrative territorial formations [ZATOs],
which allows local officials to temporarily grant tax breaks to businesses
registered in the ZATOs beginning on 1 January 1999. The Duma
Committee on the Budget, Taxes, Banks, and Finances recommended passage
of the bill, noting that the closed city investment zones would provide
economic support to important fundamental scientific research, including
the nuclear weapons complex.[1] According to the legislation, closed city
officials would no longer be able to grant tax concessions after January
2000. Duma members argued that the original ZATO tax legislation
had a negative impact on tax collection, and the closed cities had in effect
become tax-free offshore zones, which allowed businesses located in the
closed cities to avoid payment of federal taxes. According to the original
ZATO legislation, all federal taxes levied on enterprises within the investment
zone remain in the closed cities. Vek reported that ZATO officials
used the taxes collected within the investment zones to strengthen the
social welfare and support services.[2] Vek noted that the
tax breaks allowed Snezhinsk
(Chelyabinsk-70), Ozersk
(Chelyabinsk-65), and Trekhgornyy
(Zlatoust-36) to reduce their federal subsidies ten-fold. According to
First Deputy Minister for Atomic Energy, Lev Ryabev, tax breaks gave the
closed cities more than 1.6 billion denominated rubles, and Ryabev estimated
that closed city officials spent half of these funds on "innovative projects
and investment programs."[2]
Sources: [1] Duma Committee on the Budget, Taxes,
Banks, and Finances, "Zaklyucheniye Komiteta po byudzhetu, nalogam, bankam
i finansam Na proyekt federalnogo zakona 'O vnesenii izmeneniya i dopolneniya
v zakonodatelnyye akty Rossiyskoy Federatsii o zakrytykh administrativno-territorialnykh
obrazovaniyakh,'" 22 December 1998. [2] Gennadiy Aleksandrovich, "Tuchi
nad gorodami. Zakrytymi," Vek, No. 2, 15-21 January 1999, p. 8.
{Entered 5/22/00 SS}
12/98: RUSSIAN PARLIAMENT HOLDS HEARINGS ON THE STATUS OF NUCLEAR
WEAPONS First Deputy Minister of Atomic Energy Lev Ryabev delivered a report to
the Duma in which he addressed several fundamental issues concerning Russia's
nuclear weapons sector. First, he stated that the budget allocations
for weapons development in 1999 were less than those in 1998. He
then addressed the issue of the investment zones in ZATOs (Closed Administrative-Territorial
Units) and stated that the investment zones should be put under tight
control of the ministry. Many parliamentarians gave speeches in support
of the idea of investment zones. The dispute over the "uranium money"
expected from the HEU deal, to which both Minatom and the Ministry of Defense
laid claim, was not resolved but reserved for governmental arbitration.
Finally, the parliament heard suggestions about adopting a new federal
law that would assure social protection for nuclear weapons industry personnel.
[L. Saratova, "Gosduma pered zavodom v dolgu," Gorodskoy
kurer online edition, http://www.sar.nnov.ru:80/~courier,
24 December 1998.] {Entered 6/9/99 KP}
11/24/98: MEETING FOCUSES
ON JOB MARKET, TRAINING OF SPECIALISTS IN CLOSED CITIES On 24 November 1998, Moscow's Carnegie
Center hosted a seminar on migration and the job market within Russia's
10
closed nuclear cities (ZATOs) and their effect on the Russian nuclear
weapons complex. The seminar was based on the research of Valentin Tikhonov
from the Russian Academy of Sciences' Institute of Economic Forecasting,
which began studying the 10 ZATOs in 1992 (see 2/99 development
above). Tikhonov reported that Russia's financial problems had increased
the average age of specialists working within the nuclear weapons complex.
According to his data, younger specialists are leaving the state sector
to find employment in the commercial sector and older, pensioned specialists
remain at the enterprises. He also noted that fewer students are receiving
a technical education at universities in Moscow and larger cities and speculated
that it is linked to the reluctance of young people to work far away from
the country's economic centers. He further noted that low salaries deter
recent technical graduates and young specialists from seeking employment
at technical and scientific research institutes. Tikhonov reported that
in 1992 unemployment was virtually nonexistent within Russia's nuclear
weapons complex, but by 1997 official figures recorded 20,000 unemployed
persons and unofficial estimates claimed that 60,000 persons lacked jobs
in the ZATOs. Tikhonov concluded that the safety of the Russian nuclear
weapons complex is presently maintained by older workers, who subsist on
low wages, and he warned that if the Russian government does not undertake
radical measures to address social problems unfolding in the ZATOs, then
in the near future no one will be left to take care of the complex.
["Snizhayetsya uroven podgotovki spetsialistov
v ZATO," Yadernyy kontrol, No. 1, January-February 1999, p. 27.]
{Entered 6/2/00 SS}
11/98: UNEMPLOYMENT IN NUCLEAR CITIES REPORTED While the critical level of unemployment is considered
to be at 5 percent, the registered unemployment is 7.9 percent in Zarechny,
4.6 percent in Trekhgorny, 4.4 percent in Seversk, 4.1 percent in Lesnoy,
4 percent in Zheleznogorsk, 2.2 percent in Snezhinsk, 1.9 percent in Zelenogorsk,
and 1.6 percent in Sarov. (See the corresponding entry in the Sarov
file for more information.)
[ I. Muravieva, "Bez raboty syt ne
budesh," Gorodskoy Kurer http://www.sar.nnov.ru:80/~courier/19
November 1998] {Entered 6/8/99 KP}
10/7/98: MINATOM NUCLEAR ENTERPRISES STAGE GENERAL
STRIKE On 7 October 1998, employees at nuclear research
institutes throughout Russia and the nuclear weapons enterprises in Minatom's
closed cities (ZATOs) staged protests in support of demands put forth
by the Federation of Independent Trade Unions (FNPR). The trade unions
called for Minatom to settle wage arrears and increase salaries. Protesters
sought guaranteed employment and also argued that fees for utilities should
not be increased without a corresponding pay increase. In
Sarov
(Arzamas-16), residents and employees of VNIIEF
and Avangard demanded that the
Russian government include in its conversion plans employment programs
and social support for employees of ZATO enterprises undergoing restructuring.
Protesters from PO Start in Zarechnyy
(Penza-19) and municipal officials agreed to create a commission composed
of representatives from municipal governments, nuclear enterprises, and
the trade unions that would reconcile workers' demands. In Ozersk (Chelyabinsk-65)
more than 1,000 people from trade unions and social and municipal organizations
protested Russia's "inhumane economic policies" on behalf of tens of thousands
of workers. Participants approved a resolution warning that low wages and
failure to pay employees at PO
Mayak and at local schools and hospitals for months at a time had caused
"an extremely critical situation" in Ozersk. In Snezhinsk
(Chelyabinsk-70) more than 5,000 VNIITF
employees staged a two-hour protest and warned that reforms threatened
the economic, defense, scientific, and technical potential of the country
and would bring Russia to the brink of losing its nuclear arsenal and its
national sovereignty. The protesters also expressed their dissatisfaction
with VNIITF Director Yevgeniy Avrorin. In Dimitrovgrad, workers from the
All-Russian Scientific Research Institute of Atomic Reactors (SRIAR)
objected to funds being transferred from the oblast to the federal budget
until the Russian government pays back wages, pensions, and subsidies to
workers. During a meeting held on 6 October 1998, Novouralsk's
(Sverdlovsk-44) trade union drafted proposals for municipal officials on
the work situation within the city, and protesters also decided to appeal
to Minister of Atomic Energy Yevgeniy Adamov to preserve the ZATO status
of the city. In Lesnoy (Sverdlovsk-45),
workers petitioned Minatom to pay debts owed for state defense orders from
1997 and 1998. Residents and employees of Krasnokamensk's Priargunskiy
Mining and Chemical Association Joint Stock Company joined the protests,
and in Moscow, approximately 1,500 representatives from enterprises and
organizations from Moscow and the surrounding areas staged meetings.
["V den protesta rabotniki otrasli
potrebovali: zarplati, zanyatnosti, zakonnosti," Atompressa, No.
37, 14 October 1998, p. 3.] {Entered 6/5/00 SS}
9/15/98: GOVERNMENT, PROMPTED BY PROTESTS, RELEASES
FUNDS TO NUCLEAR WORKERS On 16 September 1998, Vladimir Kashkin, the deputy chair of the Russian
nuclear industry workers' union informed Interfax that the Ministry of
Finance had disbursed funds, to be used to repay wage arrears, according
to a 9 September plan arranged by Kashkin and Acting Finance Minister Mikhail
Zadornov.[1] The payment, totaling 137 million rubles ($9.6 million at
the 8-15 September average exchange rate), was scheduled to be remitted
by 15 September, and was "fulfilled on the dot."[1,2] Another 180 million
rubles ($12.6 million) is scheduled to follow by the end of the month.[1]
Nuclear industry workers began staging protests over delayed wages on 7
September. Thousands of VNIIEF and VNIITF employes participated in one-hour
strikes at the institutes.[3,4] Workers from research centers participated
in protests outside the Ministry of Atomic Energy on 8 September.[3] Nationwide,
the number of protesters was estimated at 47,000. The government owes Minatom
3.3 billion rubles ($230 million), 2.8 billion rubles ($196 million) of
which is owed for state orders.[2] Wage arrears amount to 800 million rubles
($56 million).[3] Russian Minister of Atomic Energy Yevgeniy Adamov met
with trade union representatives on 8 September, stating, "The action is
absolutely justified. The Ministry of Finance sabotages all the resolutions."[4]
Sources: [1] Radio Rossii Network, 16 September 1998; in "Government
Meets Wage Repayment Pledge To Nuclear Staff," FBIS Document FTS19980916001102. [2] Veronika Romanenkova, ITAR-TASS, 11 September 1998; in
"Russian Nuclear Industry Staffers To Join 7 Oct Protest," FBIS Document
FTS19980911001511. [3] Interfax, 8 September 1998; in "Russian Nuclear Industry
Workers Demand Wages Payment," FBIS Document FTS19980908000321. [4] Veronika Romanenkova, ITAR-TASS, 8 September 1998; in
"Nuclear Scientists Picket Ministry Building Over Wages," FBIS Document
FTS19980908001324. {Entered 10/23/98 SK}
4/25/98: NO FUNDS FOR RUSSIAN NUCLEAR CENTERS The government owes Russian nuclear centers 306.1 million rubles for 1997,
a third of which should have been used as wages. (N.B. On 1 January
1998 the Ruble was redenominated, so that 1 million rubles in 1998 is equivalent
to 1 billion in 1997 rubles.) Minatom is allowed to use the money
it received from the sale of special raw materials to make up for the lack
of funds. However, according to Minister of Atomic Energy Yevgeniy
Adamov, Minatom revenues from such sales in April is unlikely to bring
more than 52 thousand rubles, whereas the government received $431 million
from the sale of LEU to the US in 1995-1996, and $261 million in 1997.
Adamov hopes that the Program for Development of the Nuclear Military Complex
for 1998-2005, will help the situation, which is complicated by mass layoffs
due to conversion of military enterprises to civil production.
[Vladimir Koltsov, "Rossiyskiy atom deneg prosit," Russkiy
Telegraf online edition, http:// www.mosinfo.ru:8080/news/rtf/index.html,
25 March 1998.] {Entered 6/11/98, AAM}
2/18/98: FIVE OF EIGHT NUCLEAR WEAPONS PLANTS TO BE SHUT DOWN A