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Russia: Weapons Facilities: Other Nuclear: Central Test Site, Novaya Zemlya Russia: Central Test Site, Novaya Zemlya

Click on image for a larger map.  
LOCATION: Novaya Zemlya
SUBORDINATION: 12th Main Directorate of the Ministry of Defense
[Vladimir Georgiyev, "Novaya Zemlya Is Ready for Detonations," Nezavisimoye voyennoye obozreniye, 16-22 October 1998, p. 3; in "Conditions for Reactivation of Novaya Zemlya," FBIS-UMA-98-301, 28 October 1998.] {Entered 7/30/99 jl}
ADMINISTRATION
Chief: Rear Admiral Viktor Shevchenko
[Vasiliy Belousov, ITAR-TASS, 6 September 1998; in "Novaya Zemlya Hostage-Taking Unrelated to Daghestan," FBIS Document FTS19980906000582.] {Updated 9/21/98 SP}
BACKGROUND
In 1954, the Soviet Union established its largest nuclear testing grounds at Novaya Zemlya.[1,2]. During the testing program, the Soviet Union conducted tests at different sites in several zones, the numbers and designations of which frequently changed.[3]  Most of the testing was consolidated in three zones at Novaya Zemlya (please see the map of Novaya Zemlya). At Zone A in the Chernaya Gulf region,  low- and medium-yield atmospheric explosions, and underwater and surface nuclear tests were staged from 1955-1962. After 1963, six underground tests were staged.[3]  From 1964 through 1990, nuclear tests were conducted in deep underground shafts in Zone B on the Gulf of Matochkin Shar's southern bank.[2,3] Zone B also houses the test site's administrative and scientific center.[3] Zone C, where atmospheric tests were conducted from 1957 through 1962, is located on Sukhoy Nos peninsula, north of Matochkin Shar strait. In February 1992, President Boris Yeltsin signed the decree On the Test Site at Novaya Zemlya, designating the official name of the site as the Central Test Site of the Russian Federation.
Sources:
[1]"Yadernyye ispitaniya na severnom poligone: 1955-1990 gg," Atompressa, No. 32, September 1999, p. 4.
[2] Vadim A. Logachev and Antoliy M. Matushchenko, "The Current Impact of Past Nuclear Testing on Novaya Zemlya," Russian Conservation News, No. 22, Winter/Spring 2000, p.23.
[3] Yadernyye ispitaniya SSSR. Novozemelskiy poligon: obespecheniye obshchey i radiatsionnoy bezopasnosti yadernykh ispytaniy (Moscow: IzdAT, 2000), pp. 75.-78. {Entered 7/27/00 SS}
ACTIVITIES
Testing:  
From 1955 to 1990, the Soviet Union conducted 130 nuclear tests--88 atmospheric, 39 underground, and 3 underwater tests--at Novaya Zemlya. The Soviet Union/Russia has not conducted a nuclear test since 24 October 1990.[1,2] A nuclear test moratorium was initially announced by President Gorbachev in October 1991. On 19 October 1992, Russian President Boris Yeltsin extended the moratorium to July 1993. On 3 July 1993, President Yeltsin extended the moratorium through September 1994. The test moratorium was extended indefinitely in January 1995. Russia signed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty on 24 September 1996 and ratified it on 27 May 2000.[3,4,5] Russia conducts hydrodynamic or subcritical tests at the country's only remaining internal test site, which is located on the Gulf of Matochkin Shar. Using hydrodynamic tests, scientists examine the fissile materials in stockpiled nuclear munitions to study the service life, reliability and safety of the munitions.[6] Russia staged seven non-nuclear explosions in 1999 and one subcritical test in January 2000.[7] (For details, see development from 30 May 2000 below.) (See also the entries under Russia: Treaties: CTBT and Nuclear Testing Developments.)
Sources:
[1] "Yadernyye ispitaniya na severnom poligone: 1955-1990 gg," Atompressa, No. 32, September 1999, p. 4.
[2] Vadim A. Logachev and Antoly M. Matushchenko, "The Current Impact of Past Nuclear Testing on Novaya Zemlya," Russian Conservation News, No. 22, Winter/Spring 2000, pp..23-24.
[3] 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, "Note Verbale Dated 24 April 1995 from the Delegation of the Russian Federation Addressed to the Secretary-General of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons," NPT/Conf.1995/25, April 25, 1995, p. 6.
[4] Ivan Sofronov and Viktor Sevastyanov, "On the Question of the Technology of Conducting Nuclear Tests," Vooruzheniye, Politika, Konversiya, 1/24/95, pp. 43-45; in "Nuclear Test Technology," JPRS-UMA-95-026, 6/28/95.
[5] "Prezident RF podpisal zakon o ratifikatsii Dogovora o zapreshchenii yadernykh ispytaniy." Interfax, 28 May 2000. {Updated 7/21/00 SS}
[6] Dmitriy Litovkin, "Voyennyye programmy Minatoma stali bezopasnymi," Krasnaya zvezda, 21 August 1999, p. 4. {Updated 5/31/00 SS}
[7] Anna Bazhenova,  ITAR-TASS, 30 May 2000; in "Russia to Continue Experiments with Non-Nuclear Explosions," FBIS Document CEP20000530000055.
 
Other Activities:
Apart from nuclear tests, the Novaya Zemlya test site has been evaluated as a site for a range of other activities, including nuclear waste storage. For more than a decade, Russia has been considering the storage of low-, medium-, and high-level radioactive waste, as well as spent fuel and nuclear reactors from nuclear submarines, on Novaya Zemlya.  The first plans, for the storage of low- and medium-radioactive waste, including cesium and cobalt, were developed in 1991 by the All-Russian Scientific Research and Design Institute of Industrial Technology (VNIPI Promtekhnologii) and the All-Russian Scientific Research and Design Institute of Energy Technology (VNIPIET).  A site on the south of the southern island, north of Bashmachnaya Bay, was selected, and construction of the storage site included in the special federal program "On the Treatment of Radioactive Waste and Spent Nuclear Materials, Their Recycling, and Their Disposal from 1996-2005."[1,2,3,4]  According to current plans, the facility will house radioactive waste from Northern Fleet nuclear-powered submarines in addition to waste in temporary storage at  the Mironova Gora site near Severodvinsk, Arkhangelsk Oblast.  Public hearings regarding construction of the facility were carried out in 2001, and a positive environmental impact assessment was completed in March 2002.  Construction will cost an estimated $73 million and take three to four years.[5]  Russian environmental groups are protesting against the facility, saying that spending levels are too low to implement adequate safety measures, and that Novaya Zemlya lacks the infrastructure for constant radiation monitoring.[6]

A large solid radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel storage facility may also be built on Novaya Zemlya. By May 2001, five 300-meter test shafts had already been drilled to test radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel burying technologies.[7] The waste would be stored underground in cement-lined shafts that are 90 meters deep. Novaya Zemlya was chosen because of its permafrost conditions: groundwater can be found only at a depth of 600 meters. According to Nikolay Lobanov, scientific head of the project, the shafts can withstand a 150-megaton (MT) nuclear explosion and a 7.0 earthquake.[8] The project has been ordered by Atomredmetzoloto, and a design drafted by VNIPI Promtekhnologii; its main subcontractors are VNIPIET and Gidrospetsgeologiya.[5,9]  The facility’s projected capacity is 50,000 cubic meters. An international consortium, consisting of Deutsche Gesellschaft zum Bau und Betrieb von Endlagern fuer Abfallstoffe mbH (Germany), Gesellschaft fuer Anlagen- und Reaktorsicherheit mbH (Germany), Posiva Oy (Finland), AEA Technology (United Kingdom), Institutt for energi teknikk (Norway), and Svensk Kaernbraenslehantering AB (Sweden), is assessing the project's safety.[7]  Environmentalists oppose the plan due to safety concerns and fears that imported spent nuclear fuel may eventually be stored at the site.  Arkhangelsk Governor Anatoliy Yefremov has denied this, saying that all wastes will originate in northwest Russia.[6]

Another proposal for dealing with the problem of spent fuel, nuclear reactors, and radioactive waste from nuclear-powered submarines involves the use of underground nuclear explosions to vitrify the spent fuel and radioactive waste in tunnels at the Central Atomic Test Site on Novaya Zemlya.  The proposal, first introduced in 1994, soon met with opposition over the possibility that the explosions might violate the CTBT.   Nevertheless, at the request of then-president Boris Yeltsin, the Central Physical-Technical Institute (TsFTI) in Sergiyev Posad developed techniques for implementing the project, which never came to fruition.[10]  In June 1999, TsFTI Chief Scientific Associate Leonid Yevterev and several other scientists published an article in Nezavisimoye voyennoye obozreniye, again making an argument for the implementation of their plan.[11] 
Sources:
[1] “Okhrana okruzhayushchey sredy,” Russian Ministry of Natural Resources Web Site, http://www.mnr.gov.ru/index.php?8+2+&glava=37.
[2] M. Kondratkova, “Novaya Zemlya: Unexpected View on Possibility of Use,” Atompressa, No. 13, April 1999; in “Use of Novaya Zemlya for Radwaste Storage,” FBIS Document FTS19990602001203.
[3] “Yadernyy mogilnik na Novoy Zemle?” Volna, 14 April 1998, p. 7.
[4] “Na arkhipelage Novaya Zemlya planiruyetsya postroit khranilishche yadernykh otkhodov,” Interfax, 5 July 2001.
[5] “Na sostoyavshemsya 22 maya zasedanii kollegii Minatoma Rossii obsuzhdalsya vopros o stroitelstve na arkhipelage Novaya Zemlya mogilnika dlya zakhoroneniya radioaktivnykh otkhodov sredney i nizkoy stepeni aktivnosti,” Nuclear.ru Web Site, http://www.nuclear.ru, 23 May 2002.
[6] “Russian Environmentalists Opposed to Nuclear Waste Burial on Arctic Archipelago,” Interfax, 27 May 2002.
[7] Ivan Moseyev, “‘Mogilnyy’ proyekt dostalsya Arkhangelsku,” Delovoy Peterburg, May 22, 2001, p.7; in WPS Yadernyye materialy, No. 22, 8 June 2001.
[8] Nadezhda Breshkovskaya, “Komu bolshe nuzhen yadernyy mogilnik na Novoy Zemle: nam ili gosudarstvu?” Pravda Severa, February 20, 2001; in WPS Yadernyye materialy, No. 12, 23 March 2001.
[9] “Na zasedanii ekspertnoy gosudarstvennoy ekologicheskoy komissii v Severodvinske bylo soobshcheno, chto ekologicheskaya ekspertiza proyekta stroitelstva mogilnika radioaktivnykh otkhodov na Novoy Zemle dolzhno zavershitsya v marte 2002,” Nuclear.ru Web Site, http://www.nuclear.ru,  8 February  2002.
[10] Viktor Litovkin, “Yadernyy vzryv pod grifom ‘sekretno,’” Izvestiya, 6 May 1997, p. 5.
[11] Leonid Yevterev, Vladimir Klimenko, Varfolomey Korobushin, Vladimir Loborev, Anatoliy Panshin, “Klin klinom vyshibayut,” Nezavisimoye voyennoye obozreniye, No. 23,  18-24 June 1999, p. 5. {Updated 5/28/2002 CC}

 
NOVAYA ZEMLYA DEVELOPMENTS:
 
6/30/2002: RUMYANTSEV: NUCLEAR TESTS MAY RESUME IN FUTURE
On 30 June 2002, after his joint trip with Defense Minister Sergey Ivanov to the Novaya Zemlya archipelago, Minister of Atomic Energy Aleksandr Rumyantsev told ITAR-TASS that maintaining the Central Test Site of the Russian Federation on Novaya Zemlya was a matter of national security and necessary to maintain Russia's status as a nuclear state. He said that nuclear testing may well resume in future in response to political developments elsewhere in the world.[1] According to Sergey Ivanov, who inspected the security arrangements at the testing ground, Russia has no plans to resume full-scale nuclear testing but intends to maintain and upgrade the existing testing infrastructure.[2]
Sources:
[1] Aleksey Kravchenko, Vladimir Rogachev, "Glava Minatoma Rossii ne isklyuchayet teoreticheskuyu vozmozhnost vozobnovleniya yadernykh ispytaniy," ITAR-TASS, http://www.itar-tass.com/, 30 June 2002;
in Integrum online database, http://www.integrum.com/.
[2] Dmitriy Safonov, "Materik osvobozhdayut ot yadernykh otkhodov," Izvestiya online edition, http://www.izvestia.ru, 27 June 2002. {Entered 8/19/2002 DA}

6/27/2002: MINISTER OPPOSES CONSTRUCTION OF RADIOACTIVE WASTE DEPOSITORY ON NOVAYA ZEMLYA
On 27 June 2002, Minister of Atomic Energy Aleksandr Rumyantsev told ITAR-TASS that he opposed the construction of a radioactive waste burial site on the Novaya Zemlya archipelago as it would involve granting access to territories surrounding the Central Test Site of the Russian Federation to foreign inspectors.[1] In addition, he noted that although Sweden and Finland host similar facilities, their waste depositories are located in granite rock formations, while Novaya Zemlya's limestone bedrock is unsuitable for waste disposal. Minatom is now considering three alternative sites in continental Russia: in Arkhangelsk Oblast, near Murmansk, and on the Kola peninsula. According to Rumyantsev, the cost of a future facility, if built on the mainland, would be four times lower.[2]
Sources:
[1] ITAR-TASS report, 27 June 2002; in "Russian Atomic Energy Minister opposes nuclear waste dump on Novaya Zemlya," FBIS Document CEP20020628000032.
[2] "Posle poseshcheniya poligona na Novoy Zemle ministr RF po atomnoy energii Aleksandr Rumyantsev zayavil, chto khranilishche radioactivnykh otkhodov tselesoobraznee stroit ne na arkhipelage, a na materike," Nuclear.ru Web Site, http://www.nuclear.ru/, 1 July 2002. {Entered 8/15/2002 DA}

5/22/2002: MINATOM PLANS TO BUILD RADIOACTIVE WASTE BURIAL FACILITY ON NOVAYA ZEMLYA
On 22 May 2002, Minatom's board discussed the construction of a burial facility for low- and medium-level radioactive waste on Novaya Zemlya. According to Minatom's press service, the archipelago's Yuzhnyy island was selected to store waste from nuclear submarines and icebreakers belonging to the Russian Northern Fleet, including radioactive waste accumulated in the Mironova Gora temporary storage facility near Severodvinsk. The new waste depository will allow the reduction of radioactive materials in Arkhangelsk and Murmansk Oblasts. The estimated cost of the future facility, to be built in 36 months, is $73 million. A positive state environmental impact statement was completed in 2002.   An international consortium that includes Sweden and Norway has also endorsed the project. Detailed engineering will start in 2002.
["Na sostoyavshemsya 22 maya zasedanii kollegii Minatoma Rossii obsuzhdalsya vopros o stroitelstve na arkhipelage Novaya Zemlya mogilnika dlya zakhoroneniya radioaktivnykh otkhodov sredney i nizkoy stepeni aktivnosti," Nuclear.ru Web Site, http://www.nuclear.ru/news/full/955.shtml, 23 May 2002.] {Entered 7/3/2002 DA}
 
5/22/2001: SOLID RADWASTE AND SPENT FUEL STORAGE FACILITY PLANNED FOR NOVAYA ZEMLYA
Plans to build a large solid radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel storage facility on Novaya Zemlya, Arkhangelsk Oblast, are moving ahead. As of 22 May 2001, five 300m test shafts had been drilled to test radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel burying technologies.[1] The facility will be used to store waste from Arkhangelsk and Murmansk Oblasts. It will be constructed on a 10-hectare site 17km from Bashmachnaya Bay, on the southern coast of Novaya Zemlya. The waste will be stored underground in 90m cement-lined shafts. Novaya Zemlya was chosen because of its permafrost conditions: groundwater can be found only at a depth of 600m. According to Nikolay Lobanov, scientific head of the project, the shafts can withstand a 150MT nuclear explosion and a 7.0 earthquake.[2] The project was ordered by Atomredmetzoloto; the design was drafted by VNIPI Promtekhnologii; the main subcontractors are VNIPIET and Gidrospetsgeologiya. The facility should be completed in 36 months. Its projected capacity is 50,000m3. One estimate for the facility's construction puts the cost at 1.548 billion rubles (over $53 million as of 22 May 2001).[1]  A higher estimate, provided at an international seminar on nuclear submarine dismantlement problems held in Arkhangelsk in July 2001, put the likely cost at $80 million. As of July, a working draft for the construction of a facility to house low- and medium-level radioactive wastes, including cesium and cobalt, was nearly complete.[3] An international consortium, consisting of Deutsche Gesellschaft zum Bau und Betrieb von Endlagern fuer Abfallstoffe mbH (Germany), Gesellschaft fuer Anlagen- und Reaktorsicherheit mbH (Germany), Posiva Oy (Finland), AEA Technology (United Kingdom), Institutt for energi teknikk (Norway), and Svensk Kaernbraenslehantering AB (Sweden), is assessing the project's safety.[1]
Sources:
[1] Ivan Moseyev, "'Mogilnyy' proyekt dostalsya Arkhangelsku," Delovoy Peterburg, 22 May 2001, p.7; in WPS Yadernyye materialy, No. 22, 8 June 2001.
[2] Nadezhda Breshkovskaya, "Komu bolshe nuzhen yadernyy mogilnik na Novoy Zemle: nam ili gosudarstvu?" Pravda Severa, 20 February 2001; in WPS Yadernyye materialy, No. 12, 23 March 2001.
[3] "Na arkhipelage Novaya Zemlya planiruyetsya postroit khranilishche yadernykh otkhodov," Interfax, 5 July 2001. {Entered 6/26/2001 EF}
 
9/3/2000: THREE SUBCRITICAL NUCLEAR TESTS STAGED IN LATE AUGUST-EARLY SEPTEMBER 2000
On 28 and 31 August and 3 September 2000 Minatom and the Russian Ministry of Defense conducted three subcritical nuclear tests at Novaya Zemlya.[1,2] Plutonium of various ages was used to assess the aging of munitions.[1,2]  The purpose of the tests was to determine whether prolonging the service life of nuclear warheads is possible. During the Soviet era, the plutonium in all nuclear warheads was replaced every six to10 years to ensure good performance of the device; today funding shortfalls do not allow Russia the same rate of plutonium replacement. Aleksey Yablokov, former environmental advisor to President Yeltsin, did not rule out that the experiments could also serve to improve and design new nuclear weapon devices.[1] Gazeta.ru echoed this assumption by quoting unnamed Russian experts, who believe that the tests could support research on new ignition devices for nuclear warheads, which could lead to the creation of the next generation of weapons.[2] According to Minatom spokesman Yuriy Bespalko, each tested device contained 100g of weapon-grade plutonium.[1,2] 
 [1]Thomas Nilsen and Igor Kudrik, "Russia Performed Three Subcritical Nuclear Tests," Bellona Foundation Web Site, http://www.bellona.no/imaker?id=17814&sub=1, 8 September 2000.
 [2]Lyuba Michurina, "'Neyadernyye' ispytaniya na Novoy zemlye," Gazeta.ru, http://195.2.70.250/neyadnewland.shtml, 4 September 2000. {Entered 7/12/2001 RA}
       
 
5/30/2000: MINATOM: SUBCRITICAL TESTING WILL CONTINUE AT NOVAYA ZEMLYA AFTER CTBT RATIFICATION
On 30 May 2000, the Minatom press service stated that Russia's 27 May 2000 ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) would not end its practice of conducting subcritical tests at Novaya Zemlya. According to an official at Minatom, Russia conducts subcritical tests to ensure that nuclear materials are being stored safely and the source contended that "calculations and computer programs alone cannot make this certain."[1] Russia has not carried out any nuclear tests since October 1990.  It staged seven non-nuclear explosions in 1999 and the most recent subcritical test was conducted in January 2000.[2]
Sources:
[1] "Russia to Continue Testing its Nuclear Devices without Test Explosions," Interfax, 1 June 2000.
[2] Anna Bazhenova, "Russia to Continue Experiments with Non-Nuclear Explosions," 30 May 2000; in "Russia to Continue Experiments with Non-Nuclear Explosions," FBIS Document CEP20000530000055. {Entered 7/21/00 SS}
 
11/10/99: GOVERNMENT TO GRANT NOVAYA ZEMLYA NATIONAL PARK STATUS
On 10 November 1999, Novyye izvestiya reported that the Russian government will announce plans by the end of 1999 to turn several hundred thousand hectares of Novaya Zemlya into the country's first arctic national park. The paper further reported that the archipelago's restricted status under the Soviet and Russian nuclear testing programs actually helped to restore indigenous populations of animals decimated by local hunters, including walruses and polar bears. Radiation released during the nuclear tests and radioactive wastes that were sunk off shore contributed to serious environmental contamination at Novaya Zemlya, and the government plan to open up the archipelago to tourists does not include plans for dealing with the radioactive waste. Reportedly, background radiation levels on the archipelago are considered safe at all but a few areas around the test site, and the park itself does not include any contaminated areas. According to Novyye izvestiya, the military will permit small groups of researchers and "well heeled aficionados of northern flora and fauna" access to bunkers and territory adjacent to the testing areas at Novaya Zemlya. Environmentalists are also lobbying Russian officials to create a larger nature preserve, which would cover almost a million hectares and include Franz Josef Land and part of the Kola Peninsula coast.
[Dmitriy Barinov, "Novaya Zemlya Will be Given National Park Status," Noviye izvestiya, 10 November 1999, pp. 1, 5; in "Nuclear Nature Preserve," Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press, Vol. 51, No. 45, 8 December 1999, p. 17.] {Entered 2/23/2000 SS}


5/99: PREPARATIONS UNDERWAY FOR SUBCRITICAL TESTS
As of early May, a document authorizing subcritical tests at Novaya Zemlya was awaiting President Boris Yeltsin's signature, according to comments by Minister of Atomic Energy Yevgeniy Adamov reported in Nezavisimoye voyennoye obozreniye. The article also cites Colonel General Igor Valynkin, Chief of the 12th Main Directorate of the Ministry of Defense as stating that the results of the five tests conducted at the Novaya Zemlya test site in 1998 may allow the modernization of older warheads so that they can remain in service until as late as 2007.  After that time, according to Valynkin, a massive reduction in deployed nuclear warheads would take place. (Valynkin is referring to plans under the Helsinki accords to delay full implementation of the START II treaty to 2007, although removal of warheads from launchers scheduled to be destroyed under START II is to be carried out by the end of 2003.)  The article also claimed that the priority of the tests to be conducted at Novaya Zemlya in 1999 will be higher, and the amount of money to be spent on them will be substantially greater, than in 1998.
[Vladimir Georgiyev, "Rossiya sovershenstvuyet yadernyye sily," Nezavisimoye voyennoye obozreniye, 21-27 May, 1999, p. 3.]{Entered 7/29/99 JL}
 
4/29/99: RUSSIAN SECURITY COUNCIL CONSIDERS NUCLEAR TESTING AND STOCKPILE
The Russian Security Council meeting of 29 April 1999 considered the reliability and maintenance of nuclear weapons, including the issue of nuclear testing.  For more information please see the Overview: The April 1999 Russian Federation Security Council Meeting on Nuclear Weapons.{Entered 7/29/99 JL}
 
4/99: MEETING OF MINATOM SCIENTIFIC TECHNICAL COUNCIL DISCUSSES PROPOSED RADWASTE STORAGE PROJECT
In its April 1999 issue, Atompressa reported that Minatom's Scientific-Technical Council voted to continue designing an experimental radioactive waste storage facility on the southernmost island of the Novaya Zemlya archipelago. The Council also voted to include possible global warming scenarios in the safety evaluation for the proposed repository, which would be used to bury low- and medium-level radioactive waste from submarines, icebreakers, and nuclear enterprises in northern Russia. Opponents have questioned whether the repository could operate safely and have advocated locating a storage facility in Murmansk Oblast or Arkhangelsk Oblast.  The project's supporters from the All-Russian Research, Planning and Surveying Institute of Production Technology (VNIPI Promtekhnologii), the All-Russian Scientific Research and Design Institute of Energy Technology (VNIPIET), Minatom, and the Russian Academy of Sciences argue that burying radioactive waste in Novaya Zemlya's nonporous, permanently frozen rock would prevent leakage of the waste from the repository, thus ensuring safe long-term storage. Moreover, the proposed location is far from population and industrial centers and the area has no prospects for economic development. According to VNIPI Promtekhnologii Director Vladimir Lopatin, the radioactive waste storage facility will have an initial storage capacity of 50,000 cubic meters, and construction costs are estimated at $110-130 million. First Deputy Minister of Atomic Energy and Scientific Council Chairman Viktor Mikhailov conceded that Novaya Zemlya may not be the optimal site for locating a storage facility because radioactive waste would have to be transported by sea. Mikhailov also expressed concern that there is little control over radioactive waste buried in permafrost, but he stressed that the project needed to be completed because northern Russia needs a storage facility. He added that a second facility may be built and noted that this facility could be located at Kola or another part of continental northern Russia.
[M. Kondratkova, "Novaya Zemlya: Unexpected View on Possibility of Use," Atompressa, No. 13, April 1999; in "Use of Novaya Zemlya for Radwaste Storage," FBIS Document FTS19990602001203.] {Entered 7/27/00 SS}
 
2/18/99: MINATOM PROPOSES 1999 SUBCRITICAL TEST SERIES
According to Minister of Atomic Energy Yevgeniy Adamov, the Russian ministries of defense and atomic energy have prepared a report on subcritical testing plans for 1999 that was to be presented to President Boris Yeltsin.  Adamov noted that if the report was approved the subcritical testing work would proceed.
["Minatom i Minoborony RF namereny prestavit Yeltsinu predlozheniya o provedenii neyaderno-vzrynykh eksperimentov na poligone na Novoy Zemle," Interfax, 18 February 1999].{Entered 7/29/99 JL}
 
1/24/99: RUSSIA DEVELOPING NEW TACTICAL NUCLEAR WARHEAD?
According to a report in the Washington Post, citing US government intelligence analysts, three subcritical tests conducted in Russia in 1998 may have been intended to help design a new generation of tactical nuclear warheads.  [The basis for singling out three of the reported five tests was not indicated.]  However, the report also quoted a US intelligence official as stating that "the Russian tests were so small that we can only speculate what they were doing."  Brookings Institution analyst Bruce Blair noted that Russia recycles (or remanufactures) its nuclear weapons on a 10-year cycle and that old tactical nuclear weapons are being replaced by new ones.  [For additional information on this topic please see the 1/14/99 entry below.  For more information on new tactical nuclear weapons please see the Tactical Nuclear Weapons file.]
[Walter Pincus, "Russian Tests Raise U.S. Speculation About New Nuclear Design," The Washington Post,  24 January 1999, p. A24].{Entered 7/29/99 JL}
 
1/14/99: RESULTS OF 1998 SUBCRITICAL TESTS REVIEWED, WARHEAD MODERNIZATION DISCUSSED
According to the Russian military newspaper Krasnaya zvedza, Russia conducted five subcritical or "hydrodynamic" tests at the Novaya Zemlya nuclear test site between 14 September and 13 December 1998 in order to test the reliability of current nuclear weapon designs.  The Krasnaya zvezda article, based on interviews with First Deputy Minister of Atomic Energy Lev Ryabev, and the chief of the Department of Development and Testing of Nuclear Warheads, Nikolay Voloshin, summarizes the goals and results of the controversial series of subcritical tests.  The tests were all conducted underground at the Novaya Zemlya site, and were designed not to result in a nuclear chain reaction.  The total explosive yield of the tests was reported as having an energy release equivalent to 10kg  of TNT, presumably due to the chemical explosive component of the nuclear warhead being tested.  [Subcritical or hydrodynamic tests are defined as those which do not trigger a nuclear yield, hence the nuclear energy released from this series of tests should be negligible.  For a Russian discussion of the distinction between these tests and the more powerful "hydronuclear" tests, which do release nuclear energy in the kilogram-TNT range, see article by Vladimir Belous cited below.  Hydronuclear tests are prohibited by the CTBT, and Russian authorities have denied that they have conducted any such tests.]  According to Ryabev, tests of warhead components and electronics are conducted at "internal" Minatom facilities in the closed cities (presumably at facilities in Snezhinsk and Sarov), but these need to be supplemented by subcritical tests of the assembled components. In the subcritical tests the amount of fissile material is reduced so as to prevent a nuclear chain reaction, but the device is in all other respects a functional nuclear warhead.  These devices are to produce no more than a 0.1 micro-kilogram [sic] TNT energy-equivalent due to nuclear reactions, and the tests are conducted in such a manner as to be environmentally safe.  The warheads tested in 1998 had been in service for 13 to 14 years. [Most estimates of the standard service life of a Russian nuclear device are in the range of 10 to 15 years, suggesting that these weapons were near the end of their service life.]  Ryabev told Krasnaya zvezda that the tests were successful and that the result would be the modernization of the non-nuclear components of the warheads, particularly the chemical explosives and electronics.  According to Voloshin, the fissile material component would remain unchanged because modernizing it would make "no sense." The cost of the testing program for 1998 was estimated at 30-40 million rubles (approximately $1.5 million at late 1998 exchange rates) out of Minatom's total military nuclear budget of 2 billion rubles (approximately $90 million).
[1] Dmitriy Litovkin, "Sekrety podkriticheskikh vzryvov," Krasnaya zvezda, 14 January 1999, p. 1.
[2] Vladimir Belous, "A Nuclear Explosion Inside a Computer," Nezavisimoye voyennoye obozreniye, 2-8 October, 1998, pp. 2, 8; in "More Modern Nuclear Testing Methods Needed," FBIS-SOV-98-306, 2 November 1998.{Entered 7/29/99 JL}
 
12/16/98: TEST SITE'S EXISTENCE THREATENED BY INSUFFICIENT FUNDING
At hearings in the State Duma, the head of the Defense Ministry's 12th Main Directorate, Igor Valynkin, testified that the existence of the Novaya Zemlya test site was threatened due to insufficient funding.  According to Valynkin, just ten percent of the requisite amount was allocated for test site maintenance in 1998.   He also stressed the need for the Duma to expedite the approval of legislation related to the nuclear weapons complex.
["Underfunding Said To Threaten Novaya Zemlya Test Site," Kommersant, p. 3, 16 December 1998; in "Defense Ministry's Nuclear Test Site May Have To Close," FBIS Document FTS19981216000830]  {Entered 3/4/99 SK}
 
12/8/98: RUSSIA CONDUCTS SUB-CRITICAL TEST AT NOVAYA ZEMLYA
Russia conducted a sub-critical nuclear test at Novaya Zemlya on 8 December 1998.  According to Russia's Minister of Atomic Energy Yevgeniy Adamov, the purpose of the test was to ensure the safety and reliability of the nuclear weapons. Sub-critical tests do not violate the CTBT.[1,2] Russia intends to carry out additional sub-critical tests by the end of 1998 and in 1999.[1,3]
Sources:
[1] BBC, 11 December 1998; in "Russia Carries Out Nuclear Test Simulation In Novaya Zemlya," Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, http://web.lexis-nexis.com/universe.
[2] Agence France Presse, 10 December 1998; in "Bombed Japanese Cities Protest Over Russia's Nuclear Reliability Test," Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, http://web.lexis-nexis.com/universe.
[3] Igor Kudrik, "Russia Performs Subcritical Nuclear Test, Drafts START-II Law," Bellona web site, http://www.bellona.no/e/russia/981210.htm, 10 December 1998.  {Entered 12/18/98 SK}
 
10/98: MINATOM CONFIRMS THAT SUB-CRITICAL NUCLEAR TESTS WILL BE CONDUCTED AT NOVAYA ZEMLYA THIS FALL
Western journalists and environmentalists have reported that Russia might be preparing to carry out nuclear weapons tests in fall 1998.[1]  (See the seismic event overview for more information regarding previous concerns.)  There has been some confusion over the nature of the tests, since some journalists did not point out that the planned tests will be sub-critical (using a small amount of plutonium and therefore not resulting in a real nuclear explosion)[2], and therefore not prohibited by the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.[1]  Russia has been conducting these tests since 1995 and they are performed by the United States as well.[3]  Even though sub-critical tests do not violate the CTBT, they might influence other countries' decisions to conduct nuclear tests.   Responding to the questions raised by the international mass media, Yevgeniy Adamov, the Minister of Atomic Energy, confirmed that Russia is conducting sub-critical experiments at Novaya Zemlya, in addition to computer simulations.[4] Colonel-General Igor Valynkin, the head of the Defense Ministry's 12th Main Directorate, which oversees nuclear weapons, further emphasized that Russia does not plan to conduct full-scale tests and stressed Russia's adherence to the CTBT.  Valynkin also acknowledged that Russia is ready to resume full-scale nuclear testing in case any current CTBT member backs out of the treaty.[5]
Sources:
[1] "Russia Denies Nuclear Testing," Washington Times, p. A7, 10 October 1998.
[2] Marat Karelov, "Kazna pusta - ekologiya chista," Segodnya online edition http://www.ipres.ru/news/sg/, 11 September 1998.
[3] Igor Kudrik, "Russia to Counter U.S. Subcritical Test Shortly: Nuclear Test Imminent on Novaya Zemlya," Bellona website, http://www.bellona.no/e/russia/980928-1.htm
[4] "Russia is not Carrying out Nuclear Tests," Kommersant-Daily, p. 3, 26 September 1998; in "Alleged N-Tests are 'Subcritical Experiments'," FBIS Document FTS19980928000468.
[5] Mikhail Shevtsov, ITAR-TASS, 9 October 1998; in "Russia Doesn't Plan To Resume Nuclear Tests On Novaya Zemlya," Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, http://www.lexis-nexis.com/universe. {Entered 10/20/98 SK}
 
9/5/98: SERVICEMEN TAKE HOSTAGES IN NOVAYA ZEMLYA
In an incident on Novaya Zemlya, a group of five servicemen stationed at the Central Test Site took hostages while on duty.[1, 2, 3, 5, 6] (Other sources indicate that four or six servicemen were involved in the incident.[4, 7]) The servicemen, all of Dagestani origin, took around 50 hostages and threatened to execute them unless their demands were met, which included the procurement of weapons and a plane to carry them to Dagestan.[3, 7] The incident was apparently related to a bomb explosion that occurred one day earlier in Makhachkala, the capital of Dagestan.[4, 6] The explosion killed 17 people, and one of the servicemen stationed in Novaya Zemlya feared that his relatives might have been included in that number. The serviceman, by his own account, wished to return immediately to Makhachkala, and his four comrades decided to join him out of solidarity.[6] The incident began when the five servicemen killed a sentry guard in Belushya Guba and took his weapons.[7] Next they commandeered a bus and drove to the nearby village of Rogachevo, where they stormed a local school, taking 40 children, six teachers and the school's headmaster hostage. At this point, they demanded weapons and a plane to carry them to Dagestan.[1, 3, 6, 7] During the ensuing negotiations, the head of Russia's Central Nuclear Test Site, Rear Admiral Viktor Shevchenko, offered himself as a voluntary hostage in exchange for the release of some of the children and schoolteachers. The five servicemen accepted his offer, and Shevchenko was voluntarily joined by several more of his staff.[3, 4, 7] When further negotiations failed, the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) stormed the school and captured the five servicemen.[1, 2, 6, 7] None of the hostages or FSB troops were hurt seriously in the takeover, but one of the servicemen did sustain injuries.[3, 7] The five servicemen all served in Unit 707510, which is subordinate to the Defense Ministry's 12th Main Directorate, the unit responsible for nuclear safety in the Russian armed forces.[1] Regional Security Chief Sergey Poskrebetyev stated that the men had no access to nuclear weapons.[7] The servicemen have been charged with several crimes, including murder and terrorism.[2, 4, 7]
Sources:
[1] Interfax, 5 September 1998; in "FSB Director Tells Chernomyrdin of Hostage Operation," FBIS Document FTS19980905001919.
[2] ITAR-TASS, 5 September 1998; in "Russian Hostage-Takers to be Charged With Terrorism," FBIS Document FTS19980905002459.
[3] Vasiliy Belousov, ITAR-TASS, 6 September 1998; in "Novaya Zemlya Hostage-Taking Unrelated to Daghestan," FBIS Document FTS19980906000582.
[4] Konstantin Petrov, "Tragediya v Dagestane otozvalas vystrelami na Novoy Zemle," Krasnaya zvezda, 8 September 1998, p. 1.
[5] Vladimir Demchenko and Viktor Litovkin, Izvestiya, 8 September 1998; in FBIS Document FTS 19980908000868.
[6] Polina Zvereva, "Prestupniki vedut voyny v Dagestane," Russkiy telegraf, 8 September 1998, p. 2.
[7] Vladimir Anufriyev, Interfax, 8 September 1998; in "Dagestani Terrorists 'Had No Access to Atomic Equipment'," FBIS Document FTS19980908001586. {Entered 9/21/98 SP}
 
8/98: OFFICIALS VISIT NOVAYA ZEMLYA, NOTE SERIOUS PROBLEMS
A group of senior Russian officials, including First Deputy Defense Minister Nikolay Mikhaylov, Minister of Atomic Energy Yevgeniy Adamov, and Deputy Finance Minister Andrey Astakhov visited the Novaya Zemlya Test Site on 29-30 July 1998.[1] While the officials noted that the test site is prepared to carry out its tasks, they also noted that the government must resolve serious problems that could affect Novaya Zemlya's operations.[1, 2]
Sources:
[1] Russian Federation Defense Ministry Press Service, "News: Test Site Ready," Krasnaya zvezda, 5 August 1998, p. 1; in "Senior Officials Visit Novaya Zemlya Test Site 29-30 July," FBIS Document FBIS-UMA-98-217.
[2] ITAR-TASS, Sergey Ostantin, 4 August 1998; in "Serious Problems at Novaya Zemlya Testing Ground Noted," FBIS Document FBIS-SOV-98-216. {Entered 9/28/98 SP}
 
3/31/98: FEASIBILITY STUDY FOR NOVAYA ZEMLYA WASTE FACILITY REVIEWED
The feasibility study for a proposed radioactive waste and spent fuel reprocessing facility on Novaya Zemlya was reviewed at a conference in Moscow convened by Deputy Minister of Atomic Energy N. N. Yegorov on 31 March 1998.  Arkhangelsk Oblast Environmental Protection Committee Chairman Anatoliy Petrovich Minyayev represented Arkhangelsk Oblast at the conference.  The feasibility study was prepared by two Minatom institutes.  The study's economic assessment, the main addition to the original 1994 proposal, demonstrates that it will be more economical to dispose of waste in Russia than abroad.  Despite the facts that engineers' soil surveys are not complete and Minatom has not addressed 60 observations from a 1994 environmental impact study, project architects state that the proposed facility will be safe.
 
In 1994, two proposals were made for the location of a new waste facility: the bedrock of the Kola Peninsula and the Novaya Zemlya archipelago. At that time, the only decision made was that liquid radioactive waste would be processed at Atomflot facilities. Since then, the Kola Peninsula facility proposal has been waived in favor of the Novaya Zemlya proposal, which is thought to have been more thoroughly prepared.
 
Funding sources remain controversial. A special federal program for radioactive waste and spent fuel treatment, reprocessing, and storage until 2005 will provide partial financing for the project.  The Arkhangelsk newspaper Volna expressed concern that Minatom cited the Arkhangelsk and Murmansk Oblast budgets as funding sources for the facility since the facilities that required the waste processing services are state owned.  Minyayev explained that local funding could take the form of donated land or services, and that local administrations may be able to fund the disposal of ionizing radiation sources used in hospitals and fire-safety devices.
 
Project architects are scheduled to visit Arkhangelsk in May and June in order to report on the project to local engineers and to the public. Minyayev hopes that local specialists will participate in an environmental impact study.  At the Northwest Economic Association conference to be held in Murmansk in June, local authorities plan to discuss the radioactive waste situation in the region. Following the conference, meetings with Murmansk residents are planned in order to come to consensus about a radioactive waste facility in the region.
["Yadernyy mogilnik na novoy zemle?" Volna, 14 April 1998,  p. 7.] {Entered 8/12/98 LBB}
 
10/23/97: MINATOM PLANS NEW SOLID WASTE FACILITY ON NOVAYA ZEMLYA
For details, please see the 10/23/97 entry in the Naval Reactor Northern Fleet Waste Developments file.
{Entered 8/27/99 jt}
 
8/28/97: SUSPECTED NUCLEAR TEST NEAR NOVAYA ZEMLYA
For details of this event, please see the overview, "The "Seismic Event" at Novaya Zemlya: Earthquake or Nuclear Test?"
 
5/6/97: SCIENTISTS PROPOSE UNDERGROUND NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS TO VITRIFY SPENT FUEL AND RADIOACTIVE WASTE
For details, please see the 5/6/97 entry in the Naval Radioactive Waste Developments file.
{Entered 8/27/99 JET}
 
4/2/97: PLANS TO BUILD A NUCLEAR WASTE STORAGE FACILITY ON NOVAYA ZEMLYA
Russia proposes to build a terminal radioactive waste storage facility on Novaya Zemlya in the Arctic Ocean. The facility would store various types of radioactive waste from northern Russia. The proximity of the storage facility to northern Russia would decrease the distance that radioactive waste would have to be transported. Russia has already begun technical studies of Novaya Zemlya for the venture, but researchers continue to wait for adequate funding. Plans for construction of the facility and research on how waste should be isolated are ongoing. Nikolay Lobanov, laboratory chief at the VNIPI in Moscow, believes that Novaya Zemlya would be an appropriate terminal storage location for radioactive waste because the region is already highly polluted with radiation. In addition, Lobanov asserts that the permafrost in Novaya Zemlya makes storage of radioactive waste more secure. However, Gosatomnadzor Deputy Managing Director Aleksandr Dimitriyev fears that permafrost may not be a secure condition for radioactive waste storage. Dimitriyev referred to the greenhouse effect as one potential danger of relying on permafrost, which may warm and melt over time. Dimitriyev also sees disadvantages with terminal storage because it would eliminate Novaya Zemlya as a military testing ground. The major difficulty to date remains uncertainty of adequate funding.
[Katarina Koivisto, Helsinki Hufvudstadsbladet, 4/1/97, p. 8; in "Nuclear Waste Storage Facility on Novaya Zemlya Viewed," FBIS-SOV-97-092.] {Entered 7/21/97 LK}

7/27/96: MIKHAILOV VISITS NOVAYA ZEMLYA NUCLEAR TEST SITE
Minister of Atomic Energy Industry Victor Mikhailov visited the Central Nuclear Test site at Novaya Zemlya. Mikhailov, together with representatives of the Ministry of Defense, was inspecting the site to check on the implementation of presidential and governmental resolutions calling for the site to be maintained in readiness to conduct nuclear tests.
["Gotovnost k yadernym ispytaniyam na kontrole ministra," KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 7/27/96, p. 1] {Entered 8/21/96 KVY, Revised 1/8/97 JL}
 
3/9/96: NORWAY: RUSSIA DID NOT CONDUCT NUCLEAR TEST ON NOVAYA ZEMLYA
Norwegian Foreign Minister Bjoern Tore Godal refuted the 3/7/96 US allegation that Russia conducted a nuclear test at Novaya Zemlya. The Norwegian Radiation Safety Institute and Norwegian Seismological Service confirmed that they had not detected any testing, even of the smallest yield.
[Scott Parrish, "Norway Doubts Russia Conducted Nuclear Test," OMRI DAILY DIGEST, vol. 2, no. 50, 3/11/96, p. 2.]
 
3/7/96: POSSIBLE RUSSIAN NUCLEAR TEST ON NOVAYA ZEMLYA
US Secretary of Defense Perry, testifying before the US Congress, stated that there was "some evidence" that Russia may have conducted a low-yield nuclear test at the Novaya Zemlya test site in mid-January 1996. However, US Department of State Spokesman Nicholas Burns denied that Russia has conducted any tests, stating that "we believe the moratorium continues."
[Scott Parrish, "Did Russia Conduct A Nuclear Test?" OMRI DAILY DIGEST, vol. 2, no. 49, 3/8/96, p. 2.]
 
1989: FUNDS FOR REPAIR OF NOVAYA ZEMLYA TUNNELS REQUESTED
After the Semipalatinsk test site in Kazakhstan was closed, nuclear officials requested 3.8 billion rubles for rehabilitating underground testing tunnels at the Novaya Zemlya test site.
[Nikolay Vorontsov, "Bad Example Set By The French Might Inspire Russian Pro-Nuclear Lobby," LITERATURNAYA GAZETA, 9/20/95, pp. 1, 2.]

 

Last updated 30 July 2003

Comments or questions? Contact Elena Sokova at MIIS CNS: esokova@miis.edu

 

CNSThis material is produced independently for NTI by the Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies and does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been independently verified by NTI or its directors, officers, employees, agents. Copyright © 2003 by MIIS.

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