|
|||||
|
|||||
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|||||
|
 |
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
 |
Jacob Quamme, CNS Research Assistant Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia has had difficulty maintaining adequate early warning radar coverage - potentially creating the risk that it could mistake a peaceful missile launch for a nuclear attack, and to fire its own missiles in response. “Gaps” in coverage – inability to detect an incoming missile or aircraft from some directions – also create unnecessary tension among military and political leadership. Ground-based Radars The early-warning radar network, which Russia inherited from the Soviet Union, included facilities located on foreign soil -- in Latvia, Ukraine, Belarus and Azerbaijan. In addition to encountering financial difficulties and budget shortfalls, which affected its ability to maintain equipment and personnel, Russia has had difficulty renewing its leases for these early warning facilities because its relations with some of these countries have been strained. During the mid-late 1990s, Latvia forced Russia to dismantle its radar facilities at Skrunda, creating a significant gap in the coverage of the north-western sector of its airspace.[1] Russia has also lost control over its radars at Sevastopol and Mukachevo in Ukraine. Ukraine now has control over these installations, while Russia pays a fee for receipt of the early warning information, which they obtain. However, there is currently a movement toward Russian withdrawal from the agreement with Ukraine because of the high cost of operations, Russian complaints about frequent misreading of data, and the expiration of the guaranteed service lives of the facilities.[2] The radar in Belarus is considered to be the only radar on foreign soil to which Russian access is secure. The relatively stable political and military relationship between Russia and Belarus has made this possible, and Russia is likely to continue to make use of this installation into the future. Finally, Russia also maintains a Soviet-era radar at Gabala in Azerbaijan. The use and maintenance of this station has been highly controversial during the 1990s, and the long-term status of the agreement between Russia and Azerbaijan regarding the leasing of the radar remains unclear. The Gabala station has been in the news recently with regard to the debate over potential deployment of U.S. anti-ballistic missile (ABM) and radar elements in Poland and the Czech Republic. Moscow has opposed the proposed locations for the ABM system elements out of fear that they would undermine Russia's strategic deterrent capabilities. For this reason, Russia has proposed joint use of the Gabala radar and joint control of the new Armavir radar for monitoring Iranian missile developments. [3] Russian proposals are still being considered, however, and the status of the Gabala station remains to be determined. Most recently, Russia has been moving to restore its early warning coverage through the use of newly-developed Voronezh-class radars. At the first stage, this effort has been intended to cover gaps left following the decommissioning of the radar at Skrunda, and loss of Russian control over the radars at Sevastopol and Mukachevo. The Voronezh-class radars represent a qualitatively new stage for the Russian early warning network. Whereas even the latest Soviet-era radars consisted of large concrete structures, were expensive and required long periods of time for construction, the new generation of early warning radars is advertised as “modular.” They are also known as "off-the-shelf" radars because their components are assembled at the factory and are then quickly put together at the selected site. This allows major savings on both the cost and the time required for construction – one to two years instead of five or more years for their predecessors. The qualitative breakthrough offered by Voronezh has allowed Russia to quickly cover gaps and replace Soviet-era radars that have remained outside Russia's territory. The first Voronezh-class radar was constructed in December 2006 at Lekhtusi near St. Petersburg to cover the gap left by the Skrunda radar. The second radar is currently under construction at Armavir in southern Russia and is expected to be completed in 2008.[4] One remaining issue for Russia’s early warning system is the coverage of the north-eastern sector, which was laid bare by the elimination of the Krasnoyarsk radar under the ABM Treaty in late 1980s. Research and development of the Voronezh-class radar systems began prior to the fall of the Soviet Union, and funding for the program may have continued during the 1990s. The radars are said to be capable of detecting not only intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) launches, but also launches of tactical and cruise missiles. The published range of the system is 4,500 kilometers (km), however according to its developers, the technical capability of the Voronezh-class radars may be increased to 6000 km. According to experts' estimates, Voronezh radars are on the order of 4 times cheaper than Dnepr-class radars, and 10-15 times cheaper than a Daryal. Power consumption is also greatly reduced, from approximately 2 MW for Dnepr Radars and 50 MW for Daryal, to approximately .7 MW.[5]
**Table is taken from Pavel Podvig's Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces website. Early-Warning Satellites The Soviet Union’s constellation of early-warning satellites has fallen into disrepair since the early 1990s, when funding dried up for such programs as a result of government and economic crises. As of October, 2007, the satellite component of Russia’s early-warning system appears to include three satellites –two in high-elliptical orbits (HEO), and one in geostationary orbit (GEO).[6] The HEO satellites are able to monitor US missile fields for approximately 12 hours per day. The GEO satellite was moved in September 2007 from its usual position at 24 degrees west to its new position at 12 degrees east.[7] This configuration would not allow for 24-hour coverage of U.S. territory, but may provide some coverage of submarine-launched missiles from the North Atlantic.[7] According to official sources, Russia’s next-generation early-warning satellite system, (likely that which is known as EKS, or the Integrated Space System) will undergo testing in 2009.[8] Until that time, older-generation satellites will likely continue to be launched when those currently in orbit reach the end of their relatively short service lives.
Sources: For most recent information, please, see:
Comments or questions? E-mail Anya Loukianova: anna.loukianovaATmiis.edu. 
HOME | CONTACT US | SITE MAP |
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
To return to the main
Command and Control, ABM, and Early Warning entry, see the
