To return to the main
Command and Control, ABM, and Early Warning entry, see the
Overview
file. For a discussion
of the problem of control over "suitcase nuclear weapons" please see "Are
Suitcase Nukes on the Loose? The Story Behind the Controversy," an overview
by CNS Senior Research Associate Scott Parrish.
2/16/2004: LUKASHENKA LINKS GAS DISPUTE TO AIR DEFENSE SYSTEM Izvestiya reported on 16 February 2004 that a conflict between Russia
and Belarus may have ramifications for the Russian air defense
system, in particular the Volga early warning radar located near Baranovichi, Belarus.[1]
The dispute centers on the price that Belarus pays for gas imported from Russia
and on the terms of the sale of the Beltransgaz gas pipeline to the Russian
company Gazprom.[1,2] Responding to Russian demands during the course of
negotiations, President Alyaksandr
Lukashenka intimated that Belarus would consider withdrawing the Baranovichi
radar from the unified air defense system shared by the two countries.[1,3] The joint
system, introduced as part of plans to create the Union of Russia and Belarus,
is important to Russia both in terms of military security and support for civil
aviation.[1] Although the crisis reached its boiling point on 18 February 2004
when Gazprom completely stopped delivery of gas to Belarus,
Belarusian
Minister of Defense Leonid Maltsev indicated that the air defense system
would continue to function according to plan.[4] However, in the aftermath of
the decision by Gazprom, President Lukashenka ordered his Prime Minister to
review all Russian-Belarusian bilateral agreements, which would include the
terms of use of the Volga station.[2] The Baranovichi radar is one of eight stations that form the Russian
Missile Attack Warning System
(SPRN) but is the newest and most modern, given that it entered combat duty in October 2003. Its
entry into operation addressed a gap in the air defense system that had existed
since the dismantlement of the Skrunda radar
station in Latvia in October 1999. As a result, the loss of Baranovichi,
which covers the majority of the territory of western Europe, would
represent a blow to the viability of the SPRN. According to
Russian
Space Forces Commander Anatoliy Perminov, Russia eventually plans to move away from
its reliance on fixed radar stations, such as Baranovichi, in favor of cheaper
mobile stations. At the present time, however, given the
already weakened status of SPRN (in comparison with the Soviet-era system), Russia
continues to need access to Baranovichi.[1] Sources:
[1] Yekaterina Grigoryeva, Dmitriy Litovkin, "Budete polzat za
dengi," Izvestiya, No. 027-M (26584), 16 February 2004; in Integrum
Techno, http://www.integrum.com.
[2] "Prezident Respubliki Belarus Aleksandr Lukashenko segodnya provel
soveshchaniye po situatsii, slozhivsheysya v svyazi s polnym prekrashcheniyem
postavok prirodnogo gaza iz Rossii v nashu stranu," Press-sluzhba Prezidenta
Respubliki Belarus; in "Gazovyy shantazh mozhet nadolgo isportit otnosheniya
Belarusi i Rossii," Vechernyy Minsk, 19 February 2004; in Integrum
Techno, http://www.integrum.com.
[3] Aleksandr Krivtsov," Soyuz dvukh stran raspadayetsya," Stolichnaya
online edition, http://www.stog.ru,
No. 28.1 (246), 18 February 2004.
[4] Viktor Kuzmin, Aleksandr Kolpakov, et al, "Segodnya," NTV Television; in Integrum
Techno, http://www.integrum.com.
{Entered 2/23/2004 EMC}
10/1/2003: MISSILE WARNING RADAR PUT
ON COMBAT DUTY IN BARANOVICHI
On 1 October 2003, the Volga early warning radar was put on combat duty near Baranovichi
(Belarus). Since the mid-1990s, the western space flank of Russia
has had no missile attack
warning system facility. When in October 1999 the Skrunda (Latvia) radar station was
dismantled, Moscow and Minsk signed an agreement, which made possible the lease
of the land and missile warning radar facilities near Baranovichi
to Russia for 25 years. The Volga early warning radar is able to detect
ballistic targets at a distance of up to 5,000km. The radar can be used for
space monitoring. It is the newest and most modern radar in the Russian missile
attack warning system. (For more information, see the 12/20/2002 and
5/16/2002 entries, below.) [Alexandr Bogatyrev,
"Vse pod kontrolem," Krasnaya zvezda, 4 October 2003; in
Integrum Techno, http://www.integrum.com.]
{Entered 11/7/2003 TS}
4/23/2003: NEW EARLY WARNING
SATELLITE LAUNCHED
WPS Oborona i bezopasnost, with reference to Novosti kosmonavtiki,
reportedon 23 April 2003 that the
Russian Ministry of Defense had launched the Kosmos 2397 satellite
into high elliptical orbit. Kosmos 2397 is an Oko-class (US-KS) satellite, and
part of the
high elliptical orbit component of Russia's early warning system. An orbital group
of four high elliptical orbit satellites is the minimum required to ensure
round-the-clock surveillance of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs)
based on US territory. However, as a result of a
fire at the Serpukhov-15 early
warning command post in May 2001, control over two of the four satellites in
orbit at that time was
lost. Now that Kosmos 2397 has been launched, the high elliptical orbit
component of the first-generation early warning system has reached the minimum
required strength of four satellites.[1,2] Since the satellites are placed in orbit
at irregular intervals, they cannot ensure non-stop surveillance of US-based
missiles. However, there is an additional Kosmos 2379 satellite,
classified as a second-generation early warning system satellite, which
functions in geostationary orbit. This satellite is designed to detect ICBM
launches against the Earth's surface (in contrast to first-generation
satellites that could only detect missile launches against the sky or space). While this satellite is not able to
survey missile launches from the United States, its position, however, makes it possible to
survey a number of countries possessing or developing ballistic missiles, such as
Israel, Iraq, Iran, Pakistan, India, China, and North Korea.[1] [1]Yu. Zhuravin,
"V kosmose - novoye 'Oko'," Novosti kosmonavtiki, No. 2, p. 38-39; in WPS Oborona
i bezopasnost, April 2003; in Integrum Techno,
http://www.integrum.com.
[2] Vladislav Kuznetsov, "Kosmicheskiy
apparat, zapushchennyy s Baykonura, vyshel na raschetnuyu orbitu i vzyat na
upravleniye," ITAR-TASS, 24 April 2003; in Integrum Techno,
http://www.integrum.com.{Entered
11/19/2003 TS} {Updated 4/5/2004 EMC}
4/19/2003: RUSSIA'S "NUCLEAR
SUITCASE" EMERGENCY RESPONSE SYSTEM Trud
reported on 19 April 2003 that Russian Minister of Defense Sergey Ivanov
arrived in Tokyo on an official visit aboard the Il-62M plane that serves as his airborne
command center. The plane has new engines that comply with
International Civil Aviation Organization noise requirements. The crew
consists of captains, majors, and lieutenants colonel. The plane is usually
stationed in Chkalovskiy,
located near Moscow, where the special purpose unit of the Ministry of Defense
of the Russian Federation is based. Minister Ivanov
traveled to Japan accompanied by officers of the special service and by the
"nuclear button" or "nuclear suitcase" that every Russian
defense minister is
responsible for while in office. The "nuclear button" is a portable Cheget
terminal, a part of the Kazbek conference communications system,
which can be used to bring the entire command system of the strategic
nuclear forces of Russia to full combat readiness. There are only three such
devices in Russia. They are held by the president, the minister of defense, and
the chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces. [Sergey
Ishchenko, "Puteshestviye yadernoy knopki," Trud, 19 April 2003; in
Integrum Techno, http://www.integrum.com.] {Entered 11/17/2003 TS}
2/21/2003: RELIABILITY OF MOSCOW ABM
SYSTEM SCRUTINIZED Nezavisimoye voyennoye obozreniye reported in its 21 February 2003
issue on concerns about the future viability of the anti-ballistic missile
(ABM) and missile attack early warning systems deployed to defend Moscow. These
concerns stem from a decision to transfer responsibility for
maintenance of these military assets to
Radio-Technical and Information Systems (RTI Sistemy), a private firm. The
decision, which primarily would affect the
Moscow A-135 ABM system and
the Volga early warning radar near Baranovichi (Belarus) that is part of the
Missile Attack Warning System, may be an indication of the increasing role that
commercial and political interests play in the decision to award state
contracts. As a result of this development, companies traditionally active in
space-missile defense such as the Main Production Technical Enterprise [GPTP Granit], its
parent company PVO Almaz-Antey, the Radio Instrumentation Construction
Scientific Research Institute (NIIRP), and the Vympel
Interstate Joint Stock Corporation have experienced a sharp cut in funding and
face questions about their future sustainability. This turn of events appears to
contradict directly an edict issued by President Putin that designates PVO Almaz-Antey as the chief space-missile defense contractor. In this
instance, RTI Sistemy will replace GPTP Granit, which for the past 50 years oversaw
assembly, installation, maintenance, and modernization of the Don-2N [NATO name
'Hen House'] multifunctional radar station, one of the key components of the
A-135 system. RTI Sistemy
assumed its new role in January 2003 in accordance with a decision adopted by the
Space Forces and
the Ministry of Defense
in October 2001, despite concerns expressed by the leadership of the ABM
Division headquartered in Sofrino, which operates strategic ABM defenses around
Moscow, that the
change could undermine combat readiness. This decision, the legality of which has been questioned, effectively
reassigned the state defense order for ABM-related activities, and
correspondingly a considerable amount of federal funding, to RTI Sistemy, a
company that some allege does not possess the necessary experience and specialized
personnel to conduct these activities. Difficulties maintaining the ABM system
are further exacerbated by rapid staff turnover: the Space Forces had to
replace 300 experienced officers who resigned in 2002 with freshly inducted and
inexperienced junior lieutenants. In addition, the development of skilled
specialists has been hampered by the lack
of a suitable facility in Russia that could replace the academy in the Ukrainian
city of Zhitomir that provided training for ABM specialists during the Soviet period. [Petr Polkovnikov, "Okno uyazvimosti," Nezavisimoye
voyennoye obozreniye online edition,
http://nvo.ng.ru/armament/2003-02-21/1_window.html, No. 6, 21 February 2003.]
{Entered 3/5/2003 EMC}
2/6/2003: ISRAEL REPORTEDLY TO RECEIVE RUSSIAN EARLY WARNING DATA Utro.Ru, citing unnamed foreign sources, reported on 6 February 2003 that
Russia purportedly has concluded a secret agreement on
cooperation that includes providing Israel with data on missile launches from Iraqi territory
in the context of the impending war in the region. According to the report, the
agreement was negotiated even though Israel possesses its own modern radar systems
and national technical means and has been promised launch data by the United States
as well. The report states that the terms of the agreement call for Russia to
forward to Israel information processed by the Gabala
early warning radar station located near Mingechaur,
Azerbaijan. [In accordance with an agreement
with Azerbaijan, Russia leases the station at an annual cost of $7 million.]
The Daryal [US designation 'Pechora']-class
radar at Gabala is an integral part of the Russian
Missile Attack Warning System
and as such is equipped to monitor missile launches from the Middle East and
Central Asia in particular. The report further indicates that the two countries reached the
agreement during visits to Moscow by high-ranking Israeli officials in September
2002 and January 2003. [A.Kogan, "Dva radara khorosho, a tri-luchshe," Novosti
nedeli, 6 February 2003; in Utro.Ru Web Site,
http://www.utro.ru/articles/20030206012332126237.shtml] {Entered 5/13/2003
EMC} 1/21/2003: SPACE FORCES TO RETAIN CURRENT FUNCTIONS Interfax reported on 21 January 2003 that as of that date there were no plans for
structural changes in the Russian anti-ballistic missile (ABM) defense system. In particular, the Commander of
the Space Forces,
Colonel
General Anatoliy Perminov, dismissed rumors about an official proposal to
transfer responsibility for missile-space defense from his organization to the
Air Force.[1] Defense Minister Sergey Ivanov,
during a visit in mid-January 2003 to the Don-2N [NATO name 'Hen House']
multifunctional radar station, one of the key components of
the A-135 ABM system
that defends Moscow, also emphasized the wisdom of the 2001 decision to
create the Space Forces as an inter-service organization.[2] He
stated that the Space Forces, which he termed one of the most promising
organizations in the Russian Armed Forces, would not be subjected either to
reorganization or personnel cuts.[2,3] This statement ended speculation that had
begun in late 2002 when Lieutenant General Yuriy Solovyev, the Head of the
Special Purpose Command, had called for the transfer of missile-space defense
functions to the Air Force based on the argument that the same body should
control both space and airspace. Defense Minister Ivanov furthermore stressed
that the Air Force and the Space Forces, rather than competing, must cooperate
on implementing a 2002 decision to create an aerospace defense system.[2]
Colonel General Perminov indicated that the Russian ABM system remains in
complete military readiness in large part due to the entry into operation in 2002 of two new
Missile
Attack Warning System (SPRN) assets. The Volga early warning radar station near Baranovichi, Belarus, and the Okno optronic
space tracking system located near the town of Nurek
(Tajikistan) will complement efforts to modernize and extend the service lives
of the aging missile interceptors employed by the ABM system. Perminov cited
recent tests of the missile interceptors and SPRN as evidence
that the Russian ABM system remains viable. Colonel General Perminov also
expressed hope that the Space Forces would possess 60-65 military and 15-16 dual-use satellites
by 2003-2005 and would be able to eliminate the last remaining "dead zones" in the ABM
system.[4] Sources:
[1] "Soyedineniye PRO ne planiruyetsya vyvodit iz sostava Kosmicheskikh voysk-
general-polkovnik Perminov," Interfax, 21 January 2003.
[2] Ivan Safronov and Konstantin Lantratov, "Sergey Ivanov zashchitil voyennyy
kosmos," Kommersant, No.5, 16 January 2003; in Integrum
Techno, http://www.integrum.com.
[3] Aleksandr Bogatyrev and Aleksandr Dolinin, "Na peredovom rubezhe- v Sofrino,"
Krasnaya zvezda online edition,
http://www.redstar.ru/2003/01/16_01/1_01.html, 16 January 2003.
[4] Dmitriy Litovkin, "Protivoraketnaya oborona budem modernizirovana,"
Izvestiya.Ru,
http://www.izvestiya.ru/politic/article29083,
22 January 2003. {Entered 5/14/2003 EMC}
12/24/2002: EARLY WARNING SATELLITE
LAUNCH On 24 December 2002, Russia launched an Oko-class early warning satellite (designated Kosmos 2393),
using a Molniya launch vehicle, from the Plesetsk
State Test Site. This launch increased the
total number of operational Oko early warning satellites in orbit to four,
considerably less than the nine required to maintain continuous coverage. With
this launch, Russia has managed to recover from the damage caused by the
10 May 2001 fire at the Serpukhov command center,
following which the Space Forces briefly lost control of all four Oko satellites
then in orbit, and never regained control of two of them.[1] However, the oldest
of the satellites currently in orbit was launched in May 1997, and since Oko satellites have a five-year service life (although some have stayed in orbit
for six or seven years), another launch will be required in 2003 to preserve the
system's strength. The US-KS system, whose Oko satellites are in low elliptical
orbits, is supplemented by the US-KMO system with a single Prognoz early warning
satellite in a geostationary orbit.[2] Sources:
[1] Philip S. Clark, "Russia Boosts Satellite
Constellations," Jane's Defence Weekly online edition,
http://jdw.janes.com/, 15
January 2003.
[2] Ivan Safronov, "Four 'Eyes' Watch for Russia," Kommersant, 25
December 2002, p. 4; in "Russia Launches New Early Warning Satellite," FBIS
Document CEP20021227000142. {Entered 1/21/2003 MJ}
12/20/2002: BARANOVICHI EARLY WARNING RADAR IN TRIAL OPERATION According to the Space Forces' press service,the Volga early warning radar located near the town of Baranovichi (Belarus) was put in trial operation
on 20 December 2002, after a commission headed by
Space Forces Commander Colonel General Anatoliy Perminov inspected the
station. (However, the Baranovichi radar was already announced as having started
trial operation in June 2002, at which time Space Forces
also announced it would commence regular operations by the end of 2002. CNS
believes the delay probably suggests difficulties of a financial or technical
nature. For more information, see the 5/16/2002 entry,
below.)
[Agentstvo voyennykh novostey, 20 December 2002; in "New Russian radar station
placed on duty in Belarus," FBIS Document CEP20021220000248.] {Entered 1/21/2003
MJ}
12/11/2002: CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF MYERS VISITS SPACE FORCES SITE On 11 December 2002, Chairman of the U.S.
Joint Chiefs of Staff General Richard
Myers visited the Space Forces command post in Solnechnogorsk (Moscow Oblast),
where he met Russian Minister of Defense
Sergey Ivanov. Myers and Ivanov
discussed further development of US-Russian cooperation on ballistic missile
launch early warning and completion of the
Joint Data Exchange Center. [ITAR-TASS, 11 December 2002; in "Russia, US Discuss Problems
of Warning of Missile Attacks," FBIS Document CEP2002121000434.] {Entered
1/21/2003 MJ}
12/9/2002: AEROSPACE DEFENSE PROSPECTS DISCUSSED On 9 December 2002, Vremya novostey reported on plans to create an
Aerospace Defense command that would control assets belonging to the Air Force,
the Space Forces (which are in charge
of Russia's ABM,
space tracking, and missile early warning systems), and even air defense units
of the Ground Forces.
According to the article, the new formation would be created at the
Special Purpose Command, which replaced the Moscow Air Force and Air Defense
District in September 2002. Special Purpose Command head Lieutenant
General Yuriy Solovyev said that he had been directed to create the first
component of a unified aerospace defense of Russia, which Solovyev believes ought
to become a component of the Russian Air Force.[1] The proposed
reorganization has raised concerns about the motives of its
proponents. Critics of the reform compare it to the earlier (and since reversed)
transfer of Russia's space and ABM assets to the Strategic Rocket Forces.[2] An exercise will be held in the first half
of 2003 involving Space Forces, Air Force, and air defense components of the
Ground Forces in order to further develop the concept.[1] Sources:
[1] Nikolay Poroskov, "Voyenno-kosmicheskiy kulak,"
Vremya novostey, 9 December 2002, p. 4; in WPS Oborona i bezopasnost, 11
December 2002; in Integrum
Techno, http://www.integrum.com.
[2] Agentstvo voyennykh novostey, 9 December 2002; in "Russian Air Force, Space
Troops to pool efforts to create national aerospace defense," FBIS Document
CEP20021209000043. {Entered 1/21/2003 MJ}
12/9/2002: SPACE FORCES HOUSING ISSUES DISCUSSED Agentstvo voyennykh novostey reported on 9 December 2002 that some 7,000
Space Forces troops lacked housing, and the rate at which Space Forces are
acquiring new housing will not resolve the issue in the immediate
future. In 2002, the command's housing pool was expanded by only 174 apartments;
current plans call for additional 258 units. Furthermore, the command issued 764
housing certificates. Space Forces Commander Colonel General Anatoliy Perminov
stated that his command was improving cooperation with regional authorities in
order to address the social problems of his troops. [Agentstvo voyennykh novostey, 9 December 2002; in "Russian
Space Troops commander says 7,000 troops need housing," FBIS Document
CEP20021209000099.] {Entered 1/21/2003 MJ}
11/25/2002: NEW EQUIPMENT ANTICIPATED FOR SPACE FORCES Agentstvo voyennykh novostey reported on 25 November 2002 that, according to
Space Forces Commander Colonel General Anatoliy Perminov, the Space Forces are on
the verge of starting tests of a range of new systems. They include new types of
satellites that are to begin space flight tests within two to three years.
According to Perminov, in 2002 the Space Forces completed work on a satellite
flight control system, and conducted tests of optronic and radar equipment space
tracking systems.[1] Furthermore, by 2005 the Missile-Space Defense units of the Space
Forces are to begin receiving new-generation early warning radars, the testing
of which is scheduled to commence by the end of 2003. The new radars reportedly are far less
energy- and personnel-intensive to operate than previous models.[2] Perminov attributed these
advances to the increased attention paid to Space Forces development by the
Russian government and senior military leadership.[1] Sources: [1] Agentstvo voyennykh novostey, 25 November 2002; in
"Russian Space Troops Preparing To Test Future Systems," FBIS Document
CEP20021125000068.
[2] Vladislav Kuznetsov, "Arsenal rossiyskoy Raketno-kosmicheskoy oborony k 2005 godu popolnitsya
radarami novogo pokoleniya," ITAR-TASS, 16 January 2003;
in Integrum
Techno,
http://www.integrum.com.
{Entered 1/21/2003 MJ}
11/18/2002: PERMINOV STRESSES RUSSIAN
SPACE FORCES NOT ON HIGH ALERT In comments to Agentstvo voyennykh novostey on 18 November 2002,
Space Forces Commander Anatoliy Perminov
denied reports in the media that the
Space Forces had been placed on high alert, possibly due to a
meteorite threat. On the contrary, Perminov indicated that the Space Forces
continue to operate at the standard level of preparedness. [Agentstvo voyennykh novostey, 18 November 2002; in
"Russian space troops said operating in regular mode, not on high alert," FBIS
Document CEP20021118000005.] {Entered 12/12/2002 EMC}
11/14/2002:
IMPROVEMENTS PLANNED FOR SPACE-MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEM
ITAR-TASS reported on 14 November 2002 that by 1 December 2002 the
Space Forces plan to bring online three new radio-technical elements to enhance the existing
space-missile defense system: a powerful radar [most likely the early warning
radar located near Baranovichi, Belarus], a command and control structure for
Missile Attack Warning System satellites, and a data
retrieval and transfer unit.[1] These new components will increase the efficiency
and reliability of space monitoring efforts and will be complemented by development of a global reconnaissance
system for the Russian "strategic space zone" adjacent to the Russian and CIS
borders.[1,2] This new system will be based on the existing Space Monitoring System,
which currently monitors approximately 1,450 objects, including 800 foreign
ones, in space.[2] The new equipment and system will allow the Space Troops to
provide expanded intelligence support for Russian military operations.[1,2]
These latest efforts to improve the space-missile defense system follow the
entry into operation of the Zelenchuk
(Karachay-Cherkessiya) and
Nurek (Tajikistan) space monitoring stations in the summer of 2002 as well as
previous steps to revamp the Missile Attack Warning System satellites.[1]
Sources:
[1] Vladislav Kuznetsov, "Kosmicheskiye voyska RF gotovyat k vvodu v stroy tri
obyekta raketno-kosmicheskoy oborony," ITAR-TASS, 14 November 2002; in
Integrum
Techno, http://www.integrum.com.
[2] "V Rossii budet sozdana 'kosmicheskaya razvedka', "Natsionalnaya
Informatsionnaya gruppa, 10 November 2002;
in
Integrum
Techno,
http://www.integrum.com.
{Entered 12/18/2002 EMC}
11/6/2002:
RUSSIA AND US DISCUSS JOINT MISSILE DEFENSE PROGRAM Jane's Defence Weekly reported on 6 November 2002 that the United States and
Russia are close to agreement on a program that would study the feasibility of
tracking ballistic missile bodies -- rather than the missile plumes -- through
a system of satellites and infrared (IR) wavebands. The report cited US Air
Force Lieutenant General Ronald Kadish, Director of the Missile Defense Agency
(MDA), as characterizing ongoing negotiations on a memorandum of understanding
(MOU) as "very encouraging." The Russian-American Observation Satellite (RAMOS)
program, first proposed in 1992 as a means of exploring post-Cold War
cooperation on ballistic missile defense (BMD), calls for the United States and Russia to
build, launch, and jointly operate two experimental satellites by the end of
Fiscal Year (FY) 2008. The United States, whose efforts are led by the Space Dynamics
Laboratory at Utah State University, will provide more than $300 million to fund
the project and will supply IR sensors and "pushbroom" cameras for the
satellites' payload. In turn, Russia, through Rosoboroneksport and TsNPO Kometa,
will build the satellites, assume launch responsibility, and equip a jointly
staffed operations center in Moscow. Both the United States and Russia will participate in
mission operations and receive access to data generated by the program. The MOU
also outlines the legal framework for the construction of the satellites and an
initial two-year on-orbit phase that potentially could be extended for as much
as an additional three years. Although US withdrawal from the 1972
Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty and its commitment to fund the project have
revitalized the RAMOS program, obstacles still remain. In particular, the US
Congress has expressed concerns about technology transfer issues and authorized
only $50.1 million of the $69 million requested by the MDA for the project for
FY 2003. Nonetheless, according to General Kadish, the US and Russia intend to
explore possible cooperation on other joint BMD projects. [Michael Sirak, "Russia, USA near agreement on joint
missile defence experiment," Jane's Defence Weekly online edition,
http://jdw.janes.com, 6
November 2002] {Entered 12/19/2002 EMC}
10/30/2002: STATE DUMA RATIFIES GABALA AGREEMENT WITH AZERBAIJAN Vremya MN reported
on 31 October 2002 that the State Duma
had ratified an agreement between Russia and
Azerbaijan on the status and conditions of operation of the Gabala
early warning radar station located near Mingechaur, Azerbaijan. Russian President Vladimir Putin and Azerbaijani
President Heydar Aliyev had concluded almost five
years of protracted negotiations by signing
the agreement on 25 January 2002.[1,2] Under the agreement, which
Azerbaijan already ratified, Russia will pay $31 million in compensation for past use, and lease the station at an annual cost
of $7 million until 2012. At that time, plans call for a replacement station
in Russia to
enter into operation.[2,3] The Daryal [US designation 'Pechora']-class radar at Gabala
is capable of providing
information about missile launches from Iran, Pakistan, India,
and the Indian Ocean. As during the Gulf War and Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan, Gabala also would be expected to track developments in the event of a new
conflict in Iraq.[2,3] According to Russian Ministry of Defense State Secretary Igor Puzanov, ratification will allow Russia
to maintain the integrity of its Missile
Attack Warning System since it has concluded similar agreements with
Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Belarus, and Ukraine, which also host early warning
radar stations.[3] Chairman of the Duma Defense Committee Andrey Nikolayev
also emphasized that the agreement legalizes the status of the more than 1,600
Russian soldiers and their families who live in the Gabala military settlement
and serve at the station.[2]
Sources:
[1] Viktor Litovkin, "Gosudarstvennaya duma Rossii ratifitsirovala yeshche
odin voyennyy dogovor," Vremya MN online edition,
http://www.vremyamn.ru, No. 1046, 31 October 2002.
[2] Vladimir Urban, "Moskva ne prozevayet novuyu 'Buryu v pustyne'," Novyye
izvestiya, 1 November 2002;
in
Integrum
Techno,
http://www.integrum.com.
[3] Dmitriy Litovkin, "Gosduma usilila rossiyskuyu sistemu PRO," Izvestiya
online edition,
http://www.izvestia.ru/politic/article25907, 30 October 2002. {Entered 1/9/2003 EMC}
10/12/2002: ABM SYSTEM
APPEARS TO MODEL NMD IN TRAINING EXERCISE A comprehensive command and training
exercise that concluded on 12 October 2002 tasked the Russian anti-ballistic
missile (ABM) system with simulating the destruction during the final stage of
flight of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs)
and sea-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) launched by counterparts from the
Strategic Rocket Forces, the
Space Forces, and the Pacific and
Northern Fleets. It appears that the ABM system, which utilized
early-warning radars and command posts in Belarus for the first time, played
the role of US national missile defense (NMD). The Russian military therefore
may have planned the simulation, in which reportedly all of the missiles
overcame the ABM system and successfully "struck" the programmed targets, as a
demonstration of the ability of its ICBMs to penetrate NMD. [Vladimir Levin, "Yadernyye rakety proleteli nad Moskvoy," Press Center.Ru,
15 October 2002; in Integrum
Techno, http://www.integrum.com.]
{Entered 11/26/2002 EMC}
10/7/2002: SERVICE LIFE
OF ABM INTERCEPTOR EXTENDED ITAR-TASS reported on 7 October 2002 that the Russian military successfully
launched a "long-range" anti-ballistic missile (ABM) interceptor
of unspecified type from the Sary-Shagan
testing range in Kazakhstan. (See the 9/30/2002 entry,
below.)
[It is likely that the exercise tested the 51T6 [NATO name 'Gorgon']
interceptor since the other missile used by the Moscow ABM system, the 53T6 [NATO name
'Gazelle'], is considered a short-range interceptor.] The 2 October 2002 test sought to confirm the reliability of this
missile interceptor, which has been deployed for more than 20 years
at a Space-Missile Defense Forces garrison outside of Moscow. The success of the launch
will permit the
Space Forces to extend the
service life of this missile type for up to three years.[1] It also is believed
that the test concluded efforts begun in mid-2000 to upgrade the Moscow ABM
system.[2]
Sources:
[1] Vladislav Kuznetsov, "Ocherednoy tekhnicheskiy resurs nakhodyashchikhsya na
boyevom dezhurstve rossiyskikh protivoraket prodlen do trekh let," ITAR-TASS, 7
October 2002; in
Integrum
Techno, http://www.integrum.com.
[2] David C. Isby, "Russia tests ABM interceptor," Jane's Missiles and
Rockets online edition,
http://jmr.janes.com, 1 December 2002.
{Entered 12/12/2002 EMC}
9/30/2002: ABM MISSILE LAUNCH
PLANNED On 30 September 2002 ITAR-TASS reported that the Ministry of Defense was
planning a launch of an unspecified anti-ballistic missile interceptor in
October 2002. The launch was to be conducted in order to extend the service life
of the weapon. The missile, which had already been in service for 12 years, was
transported from a Space Forces unit to an unnamed proving ground. [CNS believes
the test will be conducted at the
Sary-Shagan proving ground in Kazakhstan.] A successful
launch would enable the service life of
this missile type to be extended by 3 years. The ITAR-TASS report did not specify
the type of missile to be tested. The most recent test launch of a Russian
strategic ABM interceptor took place in November 1999, when
a 53T6 [NATO name 'Gazelle'] endo-atmospheric interceptor was test-launched at Sary-Shagan.
[ITAR-TASS, 30 September 2002; in "Russian military to test antimissile missile,
hope to extend service life," FBIS Document CEP20020930000316.] {Entered
10/2/2002 MJ}
9/20/2002: MINISTRY OF DEFENSE ASKS DUMA TO ACCELERATE SARY-SHAGAN LEASE TREATY
RATIFICATION Interfax reported on 20 September 2002 that the
Ministry of Defense's Main
Directorate for International Military Cooperation sent the
Duma a document
arguing for accelerating the ratification of the treaty with Kazakhstan on
leasing the
Sary-Shagan testing range
(also known as the 10th State Proving Ground of the Ministry of Defense of the
Russian Federation). The proving ground is used for anti-ballistic missile
tests and support activities for Russian ICBM and SLBM tests. Its
facilities include monitoring systems for recording flight characteristics of
ballistic missiles and warheads. Although the treaty was signed in 1996, it has
not been ratified by Russia, and the delay could lead to its lapse, argued the
Ministry of Defense. So far Russia has paid Kazakhstan $200 million for leasing the
site. ["Minoborony RF prosit Gosdumu uskorit ratifikatsiyu dogovora
s Kazakhstanom ob arende ispytatelnogo poligona," Interfax, 20 September 2002.]
{Entered 10/2/2002 MJ}
7/18/2002: OKNO SPACE TRACKING
FACILITY BEGINS TEST SERVICE
Agentstvo voyennykh novostey
reported on 18 July 2002 that the Okno optronic
space tracking system located near the town of Nurek
(Tajikistan)
began test operation. Since the
Okno system
was already announced
as starting test service in November 1999,
the latest announcement suggests continued problems with the system. [Agentstvo
voyennykh novostey, 18 July 2002; in "Russia's space control facility put on
test duty in Tajikistan," FBIS Document CEP20020718000214.] {Entered 8/23/2002
MJ}
6/4/2002: BARANOVICHI RADAR BEGINS TRIAL
OPERATION Russian Space Forces press service announced on 4 June 2002 that testing of
the Baranovichi early warning radar have been completed. The radar has begun
trial operation and its crew is preparing for assuming regular operations, which
are planned to start during the summer 2002 training season. ["Strategicheskiye yadernyye sily Rossii ispytyvayut novyye
vooruzheniya," Yadernyy kontrol, 18 September 2002; in Integrum-Techno,
http://www.integrum.ru.] {Entered 10/3/2002
MJ}
5/16/2002: RUSSIAN RADAR STATION IN BELARUS TO START
OPERATION BY END OF 2002 Belorusskaya delovaya
gazeta reported on 16 May
2002 that, according to Russian Defense Attaché
to Belarus Viktor Morukov,
the Volga missile attack early warning radar station near Baranovichi may begin test operation in the fall of 2002. Morukov
also said that data collected by the radar will be transmitted to the central
command post of Belarusian air and air defense
forces. Although Belarusian citizens have been involved in the
station's construction, the station's crew will consist solely of Russian troops.
(For more information, see the 6/28/2001 and
10/28/2000 entries, below.) [Belorusskaya
delovaya gazeta, 16 May 2002; in "Belarus: Russia to launch early warning
radar station in Belarus this year," FBIS Document CEP20020517000268.] {Entered
8/26/2002 MJ}
4/22/2002: RUSSIAN MAFIA ALLEGEDLY GAINS ACCESS TO
MILITARY VIP AIRCRAFT RenTV
reported on 22 April 2002 that Russian law enforcement organs were investigating
allegations that Russian mafia figures belonging to the so-called Izmaylovo-Golyanovsk
organization used Ministry of Defense Il-62M passenger aircraft equipped with special systems for communications between senior Ministry of
Defense officials and the head of state. The organized crime group reportedly
was able to rent the specially-equipped aircraft through front companies. [RenTV, 22
April 2002; in "Russia: TV says 'shadow economy' bosses fly air force planes,"
FBIS Document CEP20020422000188.] {Entered 8/26/2002 MJ}
4/17/2002: JOINT DATA EXCHANGE CENTER
NEARS COMPLETION On 17 April 2002 retired Lieutenant General Vasiliy Lata,
an advisor to the PIR Center, informed ITAR-TASS
reporters that the Joint Data Exchange Center,
whose creation has suffered delays,
was nearing completion. Lata
linked this development to the upcoming May 2002 US-Russian summit in Moscow. Lata
also said that Russia would like to expand the number of the Center's
information sources and enlarge the number of countries to which its information is
distributed. [Vladislav Kuznetsov,
"Zavershayutsya raboty po sozdaniyu rossiysko-amerikanskogo Tsentra obmena dannymi sistem rannego preduprezhdeniya
o raketnom napadenii," ITAR-TASS,
17 April 2002; in Yadernaya
Rossiya segodnya, 19 April
2002.] {Entered 10/3/2002 MJ}
4/9/2002:
UPGRADES TO ABM DEFENSES, EARLY WARNING SYSTEMS PLANNED Izvestiya
reported on 9 April 2002 that the Ministry of Defense is planning to complete an
upgrade of the A-135 ABM system by late 2003.[1] The upgrade will center on the
system's electronic components, such as computer hardware, communications
equipment, and
transmission equipment, rather than the missiles. The Ministry of Defense
reportedly studied the possibility of involving Belarusian equipment in
the upgrade project.[2] According to
Russian Agency for Control Systems (RASU)
General Director Vladimir Simonov, the issue of Russian ABM capabilities was
raised at a meeting with President Putin and, while there are no plans for a
Russian national missile defense system, there is nevertheless concern that
the Russian technological and scientific base is deteriorating and must be preserved
if Russia is to retain such capabilities in the future. Therefore a decision was
made to continue ABM research at a minimum level to save enterprises involved in
this field from bankruptcy.[1] The Radio Instrumentation Construction Scientific
Research Institute (NIIRP), which designed the A-135 system, is on the verge of
bankruptcy and owes 172 million rubles to utility companies alone. Its fate is
to be decided by a Moscow arbitration court.[3] Two of the enterprises, Vympel Interstate Joint Stock Corporation and Sistema Radio Electronics and
Information Systems, are to establish a new scientific research association to
develop new early warning radar systems, including over-the-horizon radars.
Although upgrading
ABM system missiles is not a top priority, some work in this area is already underway at
the Novator Design Bureau. The
Russian military is also to receive the S-400 Triumf long-range surface-to-air
missile system with some capability against non-strategic ballistic missiles.[1]
However, the missile system's state acceptance tests have not yet been
completed, and according to NPO Almaz, which is the developer of the S-400
system, it will not enter service in the near future.[4]
Sources: [1] Dmitriy Safonov, "A-135 System Facility," Izvestiya, 9 April 2002; in
"Russia Plans To Rebuild Antimissile Defense System by Fall," FBIS Document
CEP20020409000234. [2] "Russia plans Moscow ABM upgrade," Jane's Rockets and Missiles, April
2002, p. 7. [3] Vladimir Temnyy, "Asimmetrichnyy bardak," Grani.ru Web Site,
http://www.grani.ru/nmd/articles/niirp/, 19 March 2002. [4] Agentstvo voyennykh novostey, 9 April 2002; in "Russian official denies new
antimissile system passed all tests," FBIS Document CEP20020409000159. {Entered
5/2/2002 MJ}
4/1/2002: EARLY WARNING
SATELLITE LAUNCHED On 1 April 2002 Russia launched an
Oko-class early warning satellite (designated Kosmos 2388) into a
low-Earth orbit from the Plesetsk space launch facility using a
Molniya-M SLV. This launch brings the number of Oko satellites in orbit to five.
Russia also has a single Prognoz-M second-generation early warning
satellite in a geosynchronous orbit, and a second Prognoz-M is slated for launch
later this year.
[Phillip S. Clark, "Russia begins to expand early warning
satellite network," Jane's Defence Weekly online edition,
http://jdw.janes.com/, 17
April 2002.] {Entered 5/2/2002 MJ}
3/20/2002: JOINT COMMAND POST EXERCISE HELD
BY SPACE FORCES Agentstvo voyennykh novostey reported on 20
March 2002 that officers of Space Forces took part in
a command post exercise under the supervision of Space Forces Commander Anatoliy Perminov. This was the first exercise of its kind. The purpose of
the exercise was to improve communications and commanders' performance in
difficult situations. The exercise was headed by Major General
Sergey Kurushkin of the Space Forces and First Deputy Chief of General Staff Colonel General Yuriy Baluyevskiy.
[Agentstvo
voyennykh novostey, 20 March 2002; in "Missile, Space Defense Army Starts Command Post
Exercise," FBIS Document CEP20020320000056.]
{Entered 4/9/2002 IA}
1/28/2002: SECOND US-RUSSIAN
JOINT TMD COMMAND EXERCISE CONDUCTED The second US-Russian joint TMD
command exercise took place between 28 January and 4 February 2002. The exercise
began at Schriever
Air Force Base (AFB) in Colorado and ended at Fort Bliss, Texas. The TMD
exercise involved 96 US officers and 40 Russian officers. The simulation
consisted of planning coordinated operations to defend a third country against
non-strategic ballistic missile attacks. [1] No actual missiles or TMD
systems were involved in the simulation.[2] The first US-Russian joint TMD
exercise took place in February 2001 at the Joint National Testing Facility (JNTF)
at Schriever
AFB.
Sources: [1] Agentstvo voyennykh novostey, 31 January 2002; in "Russia, US begin second
stage of command post exercise," FBIS Document CEP20020131000146. [2] "Russian military experts to attend US exercises," Interfax, 25 January
2002; in "Russian military experts to attend US command exercise on missile
defense," FBIS Document CEP20020131000146. {Entered 2/26/2002 RG}
1/26/2002: KAMCHATKA SPACE FORCES
INSTALLATION LOSES POWER DUE TO UNPAID DEBTS The Russian television station ORT 1 reported on 26
January 2002 that Dalenergo, part of the Unified Energy System of Russia (YeES Rossii), temporarily cut power to various military
facilities in the Far East, including a Space Forces control and
monitoring installation in Kamchatka. The Space Forces installation
participates in monitoring satellites and the International Space
Station.[1] Dalenergo cut power to the military facilities due to unpaid
power debts from 2001 exceeding 123 million rubles ($4 million as of 26
January 2002).[2] Power was restored to the facilities after the Defense
Ministry sent a letter of credit to Dalenergo.[1] The Defense Ministry
claimed that the power cutoff endangered the International Space Station and
almost caused the loss of a satellite.[2] YeES Rossii responded that the
Space Forces installation commander was warned of the shutoff and that the
company had
met a request to continue electrical supply during the times when satellite
monitoring was being conducted.[1]
Sources: [1] Television Station ORT 1, 26 January
2002; in "Military say Kamchatka power cut endangered International Space
Station," FBIS Document CEP20020126000071. [2] Television Station ORT 1, 26 January
2002; in "Power cuts disrupt operation of Russian Space Troops centre in Far
East," FBIS Document CEP20020126000094. {Entered 1/30/02 RG}
1/25/2002: AZERBAIJAN AND RUSSIA SIGN AGREEMENT
ON THE STATUS AND LEASE TERMS OF GABALA BALLISTIC MISSILE EARLY WARNING RADAR
STATION On 25 January 2002, Azerbaijani President Heydar
Aliyev and Russian President Vladimir Putin signed an agreement, determining the status,
lease terms, and conditions of operation of the Gabala ballistic early warning
radar station. The agreement declared the radar station the property of
Azerbaijan and granted the station the status of an information and analysis
center.[1,2] It also stated that Russia will lease the station for the
period of 10 years at a cost $7 million per year and will compensate Azerbaijan in the amount of
$31 million for usage and other related expenses for the period from July 1997 through December
2001.[1,3,4] Both parties agreed that the Azerbaijani Air Force will
be responsible for the security of the radar station. Finally, both
parties pledged not to supply any of the information obtained at the radar
station to third parties or use the station with an intent to jeopardize each
other's security and sovereignty.[2,3] According to Azerbaijani Prime Minister Artur Rasizada, who visited Moscow on 14 January
2002 to prepare documentation for the meeting, there are no unresolved
questions related to the status and lease terms of the Gabala radar station.[5]
However, despite the fact
that it has been agreed that the station is environmentally safe, the
debate over potential environmental and health risks are expected to
continue, as there is still a substantial number of Azerbaijani officials and
experts that dispute the findings.[6]
Sources: [1] Agentstvo Voyennykh Novostey, 25 January 2002; in "Russia: Agency Details Planned Payments for
Use of Azerbaijan Radar Station," FBIS Document CEP20020125000137. [2] ANS Television, 25
January 2002; in "Azerbaijan: Analysts View Details of Radar Station Agreement
with Russia," FBIS Document CEP20020126000007. [3] ITAR-TASS, 26 January 2002; in
"Russian Radar in Azerbaijan Seen as Response to US ABM Withdrawal," FBIS
Document CEP20020126000092. [4] ANS Television, 25 January 2002;
in "Azerbaijani, Russian Presidents Sign Radar Station Deal," FBIS Document
CEP20020125000082. [5] ANS Television, 16
January 2002; in "Azerbaijani Prime Minister Says Baku, Moscow in Full Accord
Over Radar Station," FBIS Document CEP20020117000009. [6] MPA, 16 January 2002;
in "Azerbaijan: Plans Continue to Lease Qabala Radar Station to Russia,"
FBIS Document CEP20020117000269. {Entered 1/29/02 IA}
10/3/2001: STATUS OF SPACE FORCES SITES DISCUSSED In the course of discussions with journalists on 3 October 2001, Space
Forces Commander Anatoliy Perminov announced that the Baranovichi early
warning radar would enter regular service in the first half of 2002. Perminov
also expected that the Russian government would finalize the status of the
Gabala early warning radar in Azerbaijan and make the Nurek optronic space
tracking system in Tajikistan fully operational by year's end. Commenting on
the combat operations in Afghanistan, Perminov said that Nurek's proximity to
the Afghan border did not significantly affect its operation. However,
Perminov also emphasized that Space Forces increased the security measures at
the Baranovichi, Gabala, and Nurek sites to prevent possible terrorist attacks.
Perminov also stated that reconstruction work at the
Serpukhov-15 command center, which suffered a fire in May 2001, was
nearing completion. Perminov reported that the spacecraft control and data
processing capabilities were fully restored.
["Stantsiya preduprezhdeniya o raketnom napadenii v Baranovichakh budet
postavlena na boyevoye dezhurstvo v pervoy polovine budushchego goda,"
Interfax, 3 October 2001.] {Entered 4/17/2002 MJ}
10/3/2001: RUSSIA TO DEPLOY MOBILE MISSILE DEFENSE RADARS Interfax reported on 3 October 2001 that, according to the Space Forces
Commander Anatoliy Perminov, Russia will deploy mobile missile attack warning
radars using "new physical principles" to replace existing stationary early
warning radars in Russia and in CIS countries. According to Perminov, mobile
stations would use less electricity, and would require fewer personnel
to operate. Their deployment could start "in the nearest future."
["V Rossii planiruyetsya razvernut mobilnyye stantsii preduprezhdeniya o
raketnom napadenii," Interfax, 3 October 2001.] {Entered 4/17/2001 MJ}
9/24/2001: RUSSIA PROPOSES MORATORIUM ON DEPLOYING
WEAPONS IN OUTER SPACE While speaking at the UN General Assembly on 24 September 2001, Russian
Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov proposed a moratorium on deploying weapons in outer
space. According to Ivanov, the moratorium would be the first step in
forming an international agreement to prevent the further weaponization of outer
space. Ivanov stated that such an agreement should include prohibition of
weapons deployment in space of any type or form, a commitment not to attack
spacecraft, and verification measures to ensure compliance.
["Rossiya predlagayet vvesti
moratoriy na razmeshcheniye oruzhiya v kosmose," Interfax, 24 September
2001.] {Entered 9/28/01 RG}
9/7/2001: RUSSIA TO LEASE GABALA BALLISTIC
MISSILE EARLY WARNING RADAR STATION FROM AZERBAIJAN Gazeta.Ru reported on 9 September 2001 that
after a 10-year debate, Russia and Azerbaijan have finally
come to an agreement that the ballistic missile early warning radar station
near Gabala will remain under Russian control. The following terms of
the agreement have been reported: first, Russia will be allowed to formally lease the station from
Azerbaijan with the contract to be renewed every 10 years; second,
Azerbaijani military
personnel will not have access to the facility; third, Azerbaijanis will be allowed to work on the premises as civilians
only; and finally, in compensation, Baku officials will be permitted to have
access to certain information. In addition to this, it has been agreed that the radar station does not
pose any environmental or health
risks, which significantly reduces the amount of money Russia will
have to pay Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan's government allegedly intentionally delayed the process of negotiation in
order to achieve shorter terms of lease and used the station as a means of
extracting concessions from Russia on other issues. Azerbaijan insisted
on a three to four year lease while Russia favored a 20-year lease. Although other details of the negotiation have not yet been
released, the decisions, according to Gazeta.Ru, were final. The
official agreement is
expected to be signed some time at the end of this year during Azerbaijani
President Heydar Aliyev's
visit to Moscow.
[Aleksandr Kornilov, "Moskva i Baku
podelili Gabalinskuyu RLS,"Gazeta.Ru Web Site, http://www.gazeta.ru/, 9 September
2001.]
{Entered 9/20/01 IA}
8/24/2001: RUSSIA LAUNCHES EARLY WARNING
SATELLITE On 24 August 2001, Russia launched a new missile early warning satellite
from Baykonur, Kazakhstan. It was designated Cosmos 2379 and belongs to
the Prognoz network of geostationary satellites. The last satellite, the
Cosmos 2350, failed in orbit two months after it was launched in April 1998. The
operation of geostationary early warning satellites came to a halt when the
Russian Space Command decided to retire the Cosmos 2224 in May 1999.
[Phillip S. Clark, "Russia relaunches
Cosmos early warning satellite, "Jane's Defence Weekly, 5 September 2001,
p. 12.] {Entered 9/20/2001 IA}
7/9-15/2001: UKRAINIAN EARLY WARNING RADAR
STATIONS TO UNDERGO MODERNIZATION Ukrainian Air Defense Commander Colonel-General
Vladimir Tkachev reported that the two early warning radar stations on
Ukrainian territory, in Mukachevo and near Sevastopol, will undergo gradual modernization. The stations are part of
Ukraine's air defense system, and are also used as part of the Russian
early warning defense system. According to Tkachev, Russia has paid its $6
million debt for the use of the stations and has even paid in advance for
their further use. Tkachev
reported that the stations are operating around the clock and are monitoring
their assigned areas.
["Ukrainskiye stantsii
preduprezhdeniya o raketnom napadenii budut modernizirovatsya -
komanduyushchiy voyskami PVO," UNIAN, No. 28, 9-15 July 2001.] {Entered
9/28/01 RG}
6/28/2001: WORK CONTINUES ON BARANOVICHI
RADAR Soyuz reported on 28 June 2001 that work on
fine-tuning the computer software and combat algorithms of the Volga early
warning radar located in Baranovichi, Belarus, was recently completed. The next stage in the commissioning process
will consist of system checks and government tests. Once these are completed, the
radar will begin experimental operation, and then will be placed on alert
status. ["Rakety ne vzletyat nezamechennymi," Soyuz,
28 June 2001, p. 1; in WPS Oborona i Bezopasnost, 2 July 2001; in Integrum
Techno, http://www.integrum.ru/.]
{Entered 8/29/2001 MJ}
6/11/2001: JOINT DATA EXCHANGE CENTER DELAYED UPI reported on 11 June 2001 that the construction of
the Joint Data
Exchange Center (for more information see the
6/4/2000
entry in the ABM Treaty Developments
section) has been delayed by contractual disagreements. Although the US
Defense Department estimated that work on the site would begin in June 2001
and the center would be fully operational by October 2001, no work has yet
been done due to a disagreement with the Russian government on whether US
contractors would have to pay taxes or be liable for any damage or injuries
suffered during construction. The US government has consistently insisted US
contractors involved in cooperative projects in Russia be exempt from Russian
taxes and liability claims, and is concerned that accepting
Russian terms on these issues would create a precedent that could
then be applied to other US-Russian cooperative projects. A US government
official cited in the report stated that Russian Foreign and Defense
ministries, although eager to proceed with the project, were reluctant to
contravene the Russian tax and liability laws, which prohibit granting tax and
liability exemptions. Changes to these laws can only be made by the State Duma, and the
project appears unlikely to proceed further before necessary changes are made.
[Pamela Hess, "U.S.-Russia missile warning center
stalled," UPI, 11 June 2001; in Johnson's Russia List, No. 5294, 12 June
2001.] {Entered 8/28/2001 MJ}
6/1/2001: SPACE FORCES HEADQUARTERS BEGINS
OPERATIONS On 1 June 2001 Russia's missile attack early warning,
ballistic missile defense, satellite communications, and military satellite
launch and flight control assets, hitherto belonging to the Strategic Rocket
Forces, began operating as the Space Forces, a separate organization subordinated
directly to the General Staff.[1] Space Forces Commander Colonel General
Anatoliy Perminov considers the need to modernize the missile attack
early warning network to be one of the most urgent issues facing his command.
As part of military reform, the aging early warning radars could be replaced
with more compact and mobile early warning radar systems, which have already
been developed. New models of early warning satellites are reportedly in
development as well. Perminov also believes that while no
country is preparing to place weapons in space at the moment, such a course of events could
not be ruled out, and that Russia should be prepared for this eventuality.[2]
Sources: [1] "Kosmicheskiye voyska uzhe na boyevom postu," Sankt-Peterburgskiye
vedomosti, 2 June 2001; in Integrum Techno, http://www.integrum.ru/. [2] Boris Talov, "Dezhurstvo po kosmosu prinyal," Rossiyskaya
gazeta, 1 June 2001; in Integrum Techno, http://www.integrum.ru/.
{Entered 6/7/2001 MJ}
5/25/2001: IMPROVEMENTS AND PROBLEMS NOTED AT RUSSIAN ABM TESTING SITE On 25 May 2001, Nezavisimoye voyennoye obozreniye
reported that Sary-Shagan, a Russian ABM testing site operating under a 10-year lease from Kazakhstan, is suffering from social support
problems affecting its personnel. The Sary-Shagan
test site was established in 1956 as the 10th State
Scientific Research Testing Range where missiles used for ABM systems, air defenses, and laser
weapons were tested. It was the
only Soviet ABM test site permitted under the 1972 ABM Treaty. Sary-Shagan's
facilities fell into disrepair due to a lack of funding between 1990 and 1997. In 1998, work began at Sary-Shagan
to restore its capabilities, enabling it to resume some test activities.[1] On 2 November 1999, a close intercept
anti-ballistic missile was test-launched from Sary-Shagan.[2] Another
test of an ABM missile was reported on
2 May 2001.[3] However, Sary-Shagan is still suffering from a range
of social problems. Due
to its ambiguous legal status as a Russian-controlled facility in
Kazakhstan, basic services such as
transportation, child support, and medical care are not being provided to
personnel assigned there. According to Nezavisimoye voyennoye
obozreniye, the absence of basic services is threatening the morale and effectiveness
of personnel at Sary-Shagan.[1]
Sources: [1] Sergey Sokut, "Poligon boretsya s
proizvolom chinovnikov: Vazhneyshiy obekt rossiyskoy PRO dlya
moskovskikh byurokratov ne sushchestvuyet," Nezavisimoye voyennoye obozreniye
online edition, http://nvo.ng.ru,
25 May 2001. [2] Sergey Sokut, "Dialogue with Help
of Missiles. Russia has Made Countermove to U.S. Preparations To Deploy
Missile Defense System," Nezavisimaya gazeta, 16 November 1999,
p. 6; in "Russia Test Seen as Response to US NMD," FBIS Document
FTS199911117999294.
[3] "Kazakhstan-RVSN," ITAR-TASS,
2 May 2001; in Integrum Techno, http://www.integrum.ru.
{Entered 6/6/01 RG}
5/10/2001: FIRE AT EARLY WARNING COMMAND POST
SEVERS SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS On 10 May 2001, a fire broke out in the cable shafts of
the Serpukhov-15 command post. The fire destroyed all the
cables and two thirds of the equipment at the post, putting the transmitter
that controls the
four 'Oko' early warning satellites monitoring the United States out of
service.[1,2] Colonel General Anatoliy Perminov reported on 14
May 2001 that communications had been restored by using another command
post.[1,3] The fire raised concerns about the deteriorating condition
of Russia's space assets. According to the Ministry
of Defense, 80% of Russian military satellites currently in orbit have
exceeded their service lives. No
replacement satellites were launched in 2000. Command
posts are also long overdue for modernization.[2]
Sources: [1] Sergey Ponomarev, "Americans Gain
Right to Nuclear First Strike," Komsomolskaya pravda, 15 May
2001; in "Excerpt: chronicle of events at the Space Troops'
Serpukhov command Post during the fire on 10 May. Assertion made that
KP is unable to detect U.S. nuclear ICBM launches." FBIS Document
CEP200010515000430. [2] Oleg Vladykin, "I and the Past
Seven Days": "The Guard Fell Asleep. On Orbit - A Ground
Fire Has Dispelled Faith in the Space Saving Umbrella," Obshchaya
gazeta, 17-23 May 2001; in "Fire at Serpukhov-15 Symptom of
Generally poor Condition of Russian Space Troops," FBIS Document
CEWP20010523000257. [3] "Russians regain comms with
military satellites after control centre fire," Interfax, 14 May 2001;
in "Russians regain communication with military satellites after
control center fire," FBIS Document CEP20010514000023. {Entered 6/11/01
RG}
3/23/2001: SPACE FORCES TO CONTROL RUSSIA'S EARLY
WARNING, MISSILE DEFENSE, AND SPACE ASSETS According to a 23 March 2001 Vek report, in June 2001
Russia's early warning, missile defense, and space assets will be transferred
to the Space Forces, a new organization uniting the Military Space Troops and
the Missile-Space Defense Forces, which have been part of the SRF since 1997.
The Space Forces will be subordinate to the General Staff. For more information,
see the 3/23/2001 entry in the Russia:
ICBM Force/SRF General Developments section. {Entered
5/9/2001 MJ}
2/11/2001: RUSSIA PARTICIPATES IN JOINT TMD
EXERCISE WITH UNITED STATES Jane's Defence Weekly reported that Russian and US officials
concluded a 12-day joint theater missile defense (TMD) exercise on 11 February
2001 at the Joint National Test Facility (JNTF) at Schriever Air Force Base,
Colorado.[1] The exercise involved 32 Russian and 80 US officials whose
task was to coordinate the command, control, and communications techniques
needed for cooperative US-Russian TMD operations against a common enemy. The
exercise involved computer-simulated scenarios using forces representative of
Russian S-300 and US Patriot missile defense systems against ballistic missile
attacks by a fictitious adversary. No actual TMD systems or equipment were
involved in the exercise. Data from the exercise are expected to be used
in scenarios for a limited joint field exercise scheduled for January 2002 at
Fort Bliss, Texas.[1] Shortly after the training exercise concluded,
Russia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs voiced criticism of a space war simulation
involving elements of a national missile defense system, which was conducted at
the JNTF immediately prior to the joint TMD exercise.[2,3]
Sources: [1] Michael Sirak, "Russia and USA
conduct joint TMD exercise," Jane's Defence Weekly, 14 February
2001, p. 4. [2] Dmitriy Safonov, "Koloradskiye
strelby: Voyennye izuchayut 'zvezdnye voyny' po kompyuteram," Izvestiya,
3 February 2001. [3] Nicholas Berry, "Space War Games
and China as Vader's Empire," 1 February 2001; in The Weekly Defense
Monitor, Vol. 5, No. 5. {Entered 4/16/01 RG}
1/12/2001: UKRAINE RATIFIES EARLY WARNING
AND SPACE CONTROL SYSTEM AGREEMENT WITH RUSSIA Agentstvo voyennykh novostey reported that on
12 January 2001 Ukraine's Verkhovna Rada ratified an agreement with Russia
on the missile attack early warning and space monitoring system in Ukraine.[1]
The agreement defines basic principles for Russian-Ukrainian cooperation at the early
warning radar stations located near the cities of Sevastopol and Mukachevo.[2]
According to the agreement, Ukraine is responsible for the continual support
of the radar stations while Russia agrees to provide information from its early-warning and space monitoring
system to Ukraine.[3] Russia will also provide economic aid for the operation of the stations and will forgive
Ukrainian debts for previous services.[4]
Sources: [1] "Ukraine Ratifies Early Warning
System Agreement With Russia," Agentstvo voyennykh novostey, http://www.militarynews.ru/fcl_l/enews.asp?id=61208,
12 January 2001; in FBIS Document CEP20010112000246. [2] "Parlament ratifitsiroval dva
soglasheniya o protivoraketnoy oborone," Nu vse, http://www.nuvse.com/.../?ACT=SHOW&ID=105073,
11 January 2001. [3] "Parlament Ukrainy ratifitsiroval
ukrainsko-rossiyskoye soglasheniye o sredstvakh sistem preduprezhdeniya o
raketnom napadenii," Interfax, 11 January 2001. [4] "Russia, Ukraine Hammer Out
Disagreements Over Early Warning Radars," Agentstvo voyennykh novostey, http://www.militarynews.ru/fcl_l/enews.asp?id=61350,
19 January 2001; in FBIS Document CEP20010119000203. {Entered 1/23/01 RG}
1/9/2001: RUSSIA AND AZERBAIJAN HOLD TALKS ON
GABALA RADAR STATION On 9 January 2001 Russian President Vladimir Putin met
in Baku with Azerbaijani President Heydar Aliyev to discuss the status
of the Gabala radar station. According to press reports, the main point of disagreement was the duration of
the Gabala station lease agreement. Whereas Russia wants a 20-year lease, and
has sought such terms for other early warning radar stations located on the
territory of CIS countries, Azerbaijan would like to limit the term of lease
to only five years. Moreover, Azerbaijan wants the station and all associated
territory and equipment transferred into its possession. No agreement was reached during the discussions.
Commenting on the
negotiations, Putin's Deputy Chief of Staff Sergey Prikhodko stated that an agreement will be signed as soon as the military experts work out the
details. Prikhodko also announced that if Azerbaijan agrees to Russian lease
terms, Russia would share some of its secret information on aircraft
movements in Transcaucasian airspace, and may also agree to train
Azerbaijani soldiers and repair military equipment as partial payment for the
lease.
["Rossiya i Azerbaidzhan vedut peregovory o statuse Gabalinskoy RLS,"
Yadernaya Rossiya segodnya, 12 January 2001] {Entered 1/24/2001 MJ}
11/2000: VOYENNAYA MYSL ARTICLE DISCUSSES STRATEGIC
C3 SYSTEMS SURVIVABILITY, FLEXIBILITY In an article published in the November 2000 issue of
Voyennaya mysl, First Deputy Chief of the Operational Department of the General
Staff Lieutenant General A.S. Rukshin lays out a number of ideas and concepts
concerning the role and possible modes of use of strategic and tactical
nuclear forces and the requirements Russia's military doctrine places on Russia's
nuclear command and control system. Noting that Russia's need for effective
nuclear deterrence has increased due to the deterioration of its conventional
capabilities, and that the importance of strategic C3 will grow as the size of
Russia's strategic arsenal decreases, Rukshin identifies a number of factors
which will affect the future structure of Russia's nuclear C3 system. These
include the doctrinal shift toward limited, rather than mass, use of nuclear
weapons, the increased role of non-strategic nuclear weapons, the fluidity of
the situation during the transition period between conventional and nuclear war,
and the probability of significant degradation of strategic forces and C3
systems by enemy conventional and nuclear strikes. Rukshin also lays out the requirements
that Russia's nuclear C3 system must meet to remain
effective in view of these factors. They include improving the flexibility of
response of C3 systems, which would be accomplished by centralization and
elimination of intermediate levels of command, and guaranteeing the
survivability of C3 systems. Rukshin argues that C3 systems ought to emphasize
survivability even if a "launch on warning" ("otvetno-vstrechnyy
udar") posture is adopted. Although a "launch on warning"
posture places relatively low survivability requirements on C3 systems, since
launch commands are issued before the system is degraded by the enemy
nuclear strike, there is always the possibility that, due to erroneous
assessments of the situation or an unusually slow response, C3 systems will be
exposed to enemy strikes. The need for enhanced survivability is also dictated
by the possibility that strategic forces and C3 systems could suffer
significant degradation by conventional weapons during the non-nuclear phase
of conflict. [A.S. Rukshin, "Yadernoye sderzhivaniye:
sovershenstvovaniye sistemy upravleniya yadernymi silami," Voyennaya
mysl, November 2000, pp. 6-8.] {Entered 1/24/2001 MJ}
10/28/2000: BARANOVICHI RADAR UNDERGOES TESTING,
EXPERIENCES FUNDING PROBLEMS As reported by Strana.ru on 28 October 2000, the Volga early warning radar at Baranovichi has completed
its preliminary tests. According to Strategic Rocket Forces Commander General
Vladimir Yakovlev, the date of the radar station's entry into service will
largely depend on the availability of funding, which has been lacking. Some of
the companies working on the station's construction reportedly have not been
paid by the Russian government for their work.[1] Moreover, the radar station
is already in debt to local organizations, on which it is dependent for
electricity, food, and water. One local organization, a regional consumers'
union that has been providing dairy products to the unit's kindergarten,
reportedly stopped its services on account of the debt. The unit's officers have
expressed concerns that inadequate funding of the Baranovichi garrison may
affect its combat readiness.[2]
Sources: [1] "Testing Completed on Russian Space
Missile Defense Strategic Installation in Baranovichi (Belarus),"
Strana.ru Web Site, http://www.strana.ru,
28 October 2000; in "Testing Completed on Baranovichi Space Missile
Defense Installation," FBIS Document CEP20001031000004. [2] Aleksandr Babkin, "An All-Seeing Eye From the Backwoods," Rossiyskaya
gazeta, 10 November 2000; in "Secret Work on Large Radar Installation
in Belarus Described," FBIS Document CEP20001110000093. {Entered
12/4/2000 MJ}
6/4/2000: JOINT DATA EXCHANGE CENTER TO FACILITATE
INFORMATION SHARING ON MISSILE LAUNCHES For more information, please see the 6/4/2000
entry in the Russia: ABM Treaty
Developments file. {Entered 12/5/2000 MJ}
3/21/2000: PRESIDENT PUTIN REMAINS IN CONTROL OF NUCLEAR BRIEFCASE, EVEN IN
AN SU-27 According to Interfax, President Putin was at all times in control of the
so-called "nuclear briefcase" during his visit to Chechnya. Even during his ride
in an Su-27 fighter on 21 March 2000, armed forces sources reported that the
nuclear suitcase was with an officer riding in a nearby Su-27 chase plane. ["V Chechnyu 'yadernyy chemodanchik' dlya Putina byl dostavlen na
vtorom istrebitele Su-27," Interfax, 21 March 2000.] {Entered 11/16/2001 RG} 12/27/99: YAKOVLEV: NO FALSE ALARMS IN 1999 Speaking to a RIA correspondent on 27 December 1999,
Strategic Rocket Forces (SRF) Commander General Yakovlev stated that in 1999
Russia's missile early warning systems gave no false missile attack warnings.
Yakovlev also stated that the early warning systems did detect 10 ballistic
missile launches and 80 foreign space objects, without giving any additional
details. Commenting on the condition of the early warning network, Yakovlev noted that over the course of 1999 the network received a new space
tracking and control center, and a radio communication center in Zelenchuk (Karachay-Cherkessia).
Furthermore, a tracking and control station located in Nurek (Tajikistan)
began test operations. [Yuriy Nikolayev, RIA, 27 December 1999; in "Russia: No
False Missile Attack Alarms in 1999," FBIS Document FTS19991227000528.]
{Entered 12/5/2000 MJ}
11/18/99: OKNO OPTRONIC SPACE MONITORING SYSTEM BEGINS TRIAL SERVICE The first Okno optronic space
object tracking system, which has been under construction since 1980, began trial service
on 18 November 1999. Okno is
located in Tajikistan near the city of Nurek.[1] As part of the Strategic
Rocket Forces (SRF) space monitoring system, its task is to detect
space objects, determine their orbit and trajectory, and identify their national
affiliation.[1,2] It uses high-precision optronic equipment including an automated
telescope and a high-resolution television camera designed to track objects
at altitudes up to 10,000km. It operates during night and twilight
hours and uses the visible part of the electromagnetic spectrum.[1] Also entering
trial service in 1999 were two Krona space monitoring stations
located in the Far East and North Caucasus as part of the space monitoring system.[3]
These stations have also been under construction since 1980, and use radar
and laser-optical locators to identify and track space objects in low
orbits.[1]
Sources: [1] K. Lantratov, "U SPRN - novyye
opticheskiye sredstva," Novosti kosmonavtiki, No. 3, p. 64-65;
in WPS Oborona i Bezopasnost, No. 71, 21 June 2000. [2] Yevgeniy Shalnev, "The Army
Today: A 'Window' With a View on Space," Krasnaya zvezda,
3 October 2000; in "Shalnev: 'Okno' Space Surveillance System Now
Online," FBIS Document CEP 20001130000188. [3] Yuriy Golotyuk, "Russia's Orbital
Defense," Izvestiya, 10 November 1999; in "Antimissile
Missile Test Shows Russia's Preparedness," FBIS Document FTS
19991109001719. {Entered 2/7/01 RG}
11/2/99: RUSSIA TESTS INTERCEPTOR MISSILE FOR
MOSCOW ABM SYSTEM Against the background of the ongoing US-Russian
dispute over possible amendments to the ABM Treaty, the Russian Strategic
Rocket Forces (SRF) on 2 November 1999 launched a 53T6 [NATO name 'Gazelle']
short-range interceptor missile at the
Sary-Shagan
testing range in Kazakhstan.[1] According to SRF Commander-in-Chief
Colonel General Vladimir Yakovlev, it was the first test launch of its
kind since 1993. The 53T6 missile is used to equip the A-135 anti-ballistic
missile system deployed around Moscow. According to Jane's
Intelligence Review, this missile has an effective intercepting range
of 80km and is armed with an AA-84 thermonuclear warhead.[3] The Moscow
anti-ballistic missile system includes the full complement of 100 interceptor
missiles permitted by the ABM Treaty. The system has a dual defense
against ballistic missiles. According to the Washington Post,
"if radars spot incoming missiles, Russia could launch up to 36 longer-range
SH-11 Gorgon missiles. Should any missiles penetrate this layer,
the system also has 64 short-range SH-08 Gazelle missiles, which are quick-reaction,
high-acceleration interceptors."[2] The missile tested was withdrawn
from combat duty in a silo launcher near Moscow and transferred to Kazakhstan
for the test launch. Yakovlev said that the aim of the test was to
extend the missile system's service life, adding that its success confirmed
the combat readiness of the interceptor missile, and extend its planned
service life by 12.5 years.[1,3] Interfax reported that this
statement suggests that the missiles involved in the test have been deployed
for some time.[4,2] Ivan Safranchuk, an analyst with the PIR
Center for Policy Studies in Russia, said that the test served as a
reminder that Russia has an operational missile defense system, and that
it may decide to modernize it. Yakovlev himself pointed out that the test
should be viewed as illustrating a possible symmetrical and asymmetrical
response by Russia to US plans to deploy limited national missile defenses.[5]
According to Reuters, an anonymous US State Department Official said that
the United States found the test launch "distressing," and that "Russia
is raising the specter of an arms competition when what we're trying to
do is work cooperatively with them to focus on rogue states."
In his public comments on the Russian test, US Defense Secretary William
Cohen said that he was not sure what point Russia was trying to make with
its test. "It only proves they have an Anti-Ballistic Missile system,
which we do not, " Cohen said. [6] The United States briefly deployed
an ABM system at Grand Forks, North Dakota, but dismantled it over 20 years
ago.
Sources: [1] Nikolai Novichkov, "Test aimed
at extending missile life," Jane's Defense Weekly, 10 November 1999,
p. 4. [2] David Hoffman, "Russia Test-Fires
Interceptor Missile; Military Lobs Warning Shot to Counter Talk of U.S.
National Defense System," Washington Post, 4 November 1999, p. A25;
in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, http://web.lexis-nexis.com. [3] Steven J. Zaloga, "Moscow's ABM
shield continues to crumble," Jane's Intelligence Review,
February 1999, p. 12. [4] "Russian Anti-Missile Rocket Tested
in Kazakhstan," Interfax, 3 November 1999. [5] Vladimir Isachenkov, "Russia highlights
its forces amid war of nerves on nuclear treaty," Associated Press,
5 November 1999; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, http://web.lexis-nexis.com. [6] "Unconfirmed Russian Missile Test
Underscores ABM Tensions," Monitor, 5 November 1999. {Entered 11/22/99
EV} 10/21/1999: SKRUNDA RADAR DISMANTLED The Skrunda radar station, which formerly constituted
a part of Russia's missile attack early warning system, was dismantled
by 21 October 1999, nearly a year ahead of the agreed upon September 2000
deadline. The station was taken out of operation in August
1998.[1, 2]
Sources: [1] "Moscow Tests Latvian Resolve on
Skrunda Radar," Jamestown Monitor, 10 August 1998. [2] "Rossiya ne mozhet dopustit odnostoronnego snizheniya svoyey
oboronosposobnosti v rezultate demontazha RLS v Skrunde - MID," Interfax,
No. 1, 21 October 1999. {Entered 12/5/2000 MJ}
9/3/99: RUSSIA REJECTS US OFFER TO LAUNCH EARLY WARNING
SATELLITES On 3 September 1999, RIA Novosti reported that the
Russian Space Agency (RSA) announced that it had rejected the proposal by the US
Congress to help Russia launch early warning satellites (please see the 8/27/99
entry).
[RIA Novosti, 3 September 1999; in
"Rossiya ne nuzhdayetsya v pomoschi SShA po zapusku sputnikov rannego opovescheniya
o yadernom udare," UNIAN, No. 035(071), 30 August - 5 September 1999.]
{Entered 10/26/99 VT}
8/27/99: US MAY LAUNCH SIX RUSSIAN EARLY WARNING
SATELLITES According to an article in the Baltimore Sun on
27 August 1999, the US is considering funding the launch of six early warning
satellites for Russia, "enough to give Russia 24 hour coverage of US missile
fields." While the US has been constantly maintaining and upgrading
its early warning system, Russia's is so "seriously degraded [that it]
poses risks to both countries," according to a Congressional
Budget Office (CBO) letter. Senate Majority Leader Tom Daschle
requested that the CBO investigate the matter and write the letter.
Russia and the US have been exploring different ways of dealing with the
problem since at least last year, when another CBO study suggested giving
Russia access to the US early warning satellite system. However,
political pressure resulted in the CBO investigating other alternatives
in order to avoid giving Russia access to sensitive information.
One alternative the CBO put forward is for the US to purchase Russian rockets
and launch the six satellites for a total cost of $200 million. The
US has since learned that Russia has built seven additional early warning
satellites, but "is unable or unwilling to devote the resources necessary
to launch them." Opponents of the idea argue that if Russia was sufficiently
concerned about false alarms, it would find the money to pay for the launches
itself. One drawback of the program is that the six satellites would
only allow for monitoring of the United States, not for global coverage.
In addition, the United States would not provide any money to scientists
responsible for designing and building early warning satellites, meaning
that engineers could be driven from the field due to a lack of money.
Proponents of the program argue that assistance is necessary because "one
of the greatest strategic threats the United States faces is inadvertent
nuclear war caused by a failure in Russia's command-and-control system."
The fact that the satellites are Russian-built means that Moscow would
trust their data and the project might lead to further cooperation on other
early warning issues, and arms control in general. However, the current
political climate in Washington makes the US paying for Russian satellite
launches a thorny issue. John Pike of the Federation of American
Scientists notes that "assisting Russia would be better than doing nothing,"
but he seconds the notion that the idea of the US paying for the launches
does not have much of a chance to survive in Congress.
[Greg Schneider, "Nuclear Option: Aid
for Russia?" Baltimore Sun, 27 August 1999; in Johnson's Russia
List, No. 6, 27 August 1999.] {Entered 9/23/99 CEM}
8/99: BARANOVICHI RADAR TO BECOME OPERATIONAL IN 2000 Strategic Rocket Forces Commander Vladimir Yakovlev announced that the
Volga radar station located near the
town of Baranovichi, Belarus will begin trial operations by the end of this
year. Regular operation is to commence in 2000. The new station is to fill the
gap in the Russian missile attack early warning system that was created by the
shutdown of the Skrunda radar station.
[Sergey Sokut, "Novaya tekhnika RVSN,"
Nezavisimoye
voyennoye obozreniye, No. 30 (153), 6-12 August 1999, p. 1.] {Entered
10/26/99 VT}
7/2/99: RUSSIA'S NUCLEAR LAUNCH NETWORK
IN JEOPARDY Severe personnel problems could compromise the safety
of Russia's nuclear launch systems. On 2 July 1999 Agence France Presse,
referring to an article in Novyye izvestiya, described problems in
attracting younger employees to replace
military computer systems experts, whose average age was reported as 50 years.
These problems were attributed to inadequate and irregularly paid salaries.
Novyye izvestiya also stated that mounting personnel problems
have resulted in untrained soldiers being tasked with monitoring computer
systems, and warned that the effectiveness of "nuclear suitcases" used to authorize launching a nuclear attack can only
be guaranteed for the next three years.
[Agence France Presse, 2 July 1999;
in "Russia's Nuclear Launch Network Faces Safety Threat: Report," Lexis-Nexis
Academic Universe, http://web.lexis-nexis.com.] {Entered 9/20/99
CEM}
4/23/99: SERGEYEV ON RUSSIAN EARLY-WARNING
STATION Speaking to reporters on 23 April 1999 in Belarus,
Russian Defense Minister Igor Sergeyev commented that the Russian early-warning
station near the city of Baranovichi in western Belarus should begin operation in early 2000. According to Sergeyev, the station is 91% to 96%
ready. The funds necessary for its completion have been included
in the 1999 budget.
[Andrey Fomin and Mikhail Shevtsov,
ITAR-TASS, 23 April 1999; in "Sergeyev Praises Nuclear Pullout from Belarus," FBIS Document
FTS19990424000179.] {Entered 9/24/99 CEM}
3/99: GABALA RADAR STATUS REMAINS UNCLEAR The dispute over whether Russia needs to pay Azerbaijan
for the use of the Gabala radar station (located in Azerbaijan), which is a part of the Russia's early warning system,
remains unresolved. Azerbaijani authorities maintain that the station "is the property
of the republic and by no means a Russian military installation." According
to Azerbaijani First Deputy Prime Minister A. Abbasov, a special government commission
has been tasked with determining how much rent the Russian Ministry of Defense
ought to pay for
using the station.[1] However, according
to Izvestiya, the Russian Defense Ministry maintains that the Gabala
radar station remains at its "complete disposal."[2] Azerbaijan is also charging
Russia for the station's electricity use, but payments have been late.
As of March 1999, Russia had paid only $850,000 of its $4.5 million energy debt
for the second half of 1998.[1]
Sources: [1] "To Whom Does the Qabala Radar
Station Belong?" Panorama, 13 March 1999, p. 3; in "Unresolved Status
of Qabala Radar Noted," FBIS Document FTS19990401000800. [2] Yuriy Golotyuk, "'Problema-2000'
ugrozhayet Rossii s Ukrainy," Izvestiya, No. 39, 5 March 1999, p.
1. {Entered 11/2/99 VT}
2/17/99: JOINT RUSSIAN-US CONSULTATIVE GROUP DISCUSSES Y2K ISSUE During its Moscow conference held 17-21 February 1999 at the Russian Defense
Ministry, the Russian-American Consultative Group on Defense Issues discussed
current projects "connected with the further development of bilateral relations
in the military field."[1] The agenda included discussion of US and Russian
defense ministries' efforts to resolve the Y2K computer problem that could
occur in the year 2000 as most computers recognize only the last two digits
of a given year. While Russian nuclear forces rely more heavily on computers
than Russia's other military branches, older mainframe computers are used
for the strategic work and most of the Russian officer corps do not use
computers. Russian specialists agree that there will be no serious problems
such as accidental nuclear launches, but rather "months of fits and starts,"
to get the systems back into working order. Vladimir Orlov of the Center
for Policy Studies in Russia (PIR Center) noted that problems will most
likely occur with tracking the location and alert status of nuclear weapons,
as opposed to problems with the targeting systems.[2] Other issues discussed
included "possible threats to security of Russia and the United States,
bringing trust and security measures into the military field, prospects
of bilateral military cooperation and progress with the START I Treaty."[3]
[1] "In the Interests of Developing Mutually Advantageous
Cooperation," Krasnaya zvezda,23 February 1999, p.1; in "Russia,
US Group Discusses START I, Y2K Bug," FBIS Document FTS19990222001204. [2] Pyotr Yudin, "Technology Lag Provides Protection for
Russia,": Defense News, 2-8 February 1999, p.10. [3] Anatoly Yurkin, "Russo-US Consultative Group Meeting
in Moscow 17-21 Feb," Itar-Tass, 12 February 1999; in "Russo-US
Consultative Group Meeting in Moscow 17-21 Feb," FBIS Document FTS19990212000861.
{entered 3/25/99 SS}
1/27/99: RUSSIA RATIFIES AGREEMENT WITH UKRAINE ON MISSILE ATTACK
WARNING AND SPACE MONITORING SYSTEMS ITAR-TASS reported that 120 members of the Federation Council passed the
federal law On ratifying the agreement between the governments of Russia
and Ukraine on the equipment of missile-attack early-warning systems and
space verification on 27 January 1999, with one vote against and two
absentions. The two countries signed the agreement in Kiev on 28
February 1997, and it was ratified by the State Duma on 23 December 1998.
The agreement "defines the principles of Russia's use of radar systems
and stations in Mukachevo and Sevastopol, which are the property of Ukraine
and belong to the missile attack warning and space monitoring systems,
as well as the order of financing and cooperation between the two sides
in maintenance and development of these facilities in the future."[1]
The provisions of the agreement allow for Russia to compensate Ukraine
for expenditures on facility maintenance, while personnel expenses will
be the responsibility of Ukraine.[1,2]
Sources: [1] Ludmila Alexandrova, "Russia Ratifies Agreement
on Missile Attack Warning," ITAR-TASS, 27 January 1999; in Lexis-Nexis
Academic Universe, http://web.lexis-nexis.com. [2] "Federation Council Ratifies Early-Warning Agreement
with Ukraine," Interfax, 27 January 1999; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe,
http://web.lexis-nexis.com. {Entered 9/29/99 CEM}
9/2/98: US AND RUSSIA SIGN EARLY WARNING AGREEMENT On 2 September 1998 US President Bill Clinton and Russian President Boris
Yeltsin signed an agreement to
share information from national early warning systems about possible
missile launches. As Special Assistant to the President for National Security
Affairs Robert Bell explained, "...the agreement strengthens strategic
stability by establishing further protection against the possibility of
a nuclear launch by one side triggered by the misinterpretation of data
concerning the origin, aim point or missile type associated with a particular
launch."[1] The agreement does not cover US and Russian launches, since
the two countries already have a notification regime for these. Rather,
the point of the agreement is to monitor third-country missile activities
and is meant to allow both Russia and the United States to avoid mistaking
a missile launch by a third country for a nuclear attack. According
to US officials the cooperation will probably involve information sharing
between the US Defense Department's North American Aerospace Defense Command
(NORAD) and Russia's equivalent, the Early Warning Army of the Strategic
Rocket Forces (SRF).[2] (Please see the section on the Strategic
Rocket Forces for information on the merger of early warning forces
with the SRF.) Details of the system had not been worked out at the
time of signing; the agreement is more of an agreement in principle than
a plan for specific action. US officials, nevertheless, predicted the system
would be operational in one to two years.[3] There are also hopes to eventually
expand that collaboration into a joint US-Russian monitoring facility where
officials from both the United States and Russia can provide immediate
information to each other as they jointly analyze incoming data about possible
missile launches.[1,2] The two sides have even discussed the possibility
of an international warning system in which countries from around the world
could voluntarily supply missile or space launch information to each other
to avoid misidentification and possible confrontation.[2,3] (The full
text of the agreement is available in the NIS Nuclear and Missile Database, as is
a US government Fact Sheet
on the agreement. Also available is a related letter and
interim
Congressional Budget Office study on means of sharing early warning
information and technology.)
Sources: [1] "U.S., Russia Sign Pact for Missile Launch Early Warning
Data," Post-Soviet Nuclear & Defense Monitor, 16 September 1998,
p. 5. [2] Walter Pincus, "U.S., Russia May Swap Data on Third-Party
Missiles," Washington Post, 1 September 1998, p. 15. [3] Michael R. Gordon, "U.S. And Russia Plan Accord to Share
Missile-Launch Data," New York Times online edition, http://www.nytimes.com/.../090298russia-arms.html,
2 September 1998. {Entered 1/14/99 PBI}
8/31/98: SKRUNDA RADAR SHUT DOWN According to Deputy Chief of Staff of the Russian
Strategic Rocket Forces Aleksandr Kozlov, the early warning radar station in
Skrunda, Latvia, ceased its operations on 31 August 1998 at 1:00 pm local
time.[1] Russian attempts to extend the 1994 lease agreement, which expired
on 31 August 1998, failed. Chief of Staff of
the Russian Missile-Space Defense Forces Major General Anatoliy Shishkin
stated that Skrunda's shutdown will create hard-to-close breaches in the Russian early warning system. Shishkin also announced
that the Russian Ministry of Defense has already taken
compensatory measures.[2] In the immediate future, the gap created by closing
Skrunda will be covered by radar stations located near Moscow; after 2000 this
will be done by
a radar station near Baranovichi in Belarus.[3]
Sources: [1] ITAR-TASS, 31 August 1998; in "Radar
in Skrunda (Latvia) closes down," Inquisit Agent Report, http://www.inquisit.com/,
31 August 1998. [2] "Moscow Tests Latvian Resolve on
Skrunda Radar," Jamestown Monitor, 10 August 1998. [3] Sergey Sokut, "Yadernaya Rossiya
slepoy ne budet," Nezavisimoye voyennoye obozreniye, No. 32, 20-26
August 1999, pp. 1, 6. {Entered 10/28/99 VT}
10/3/97: REDUT-97 EXERCISE INCLUDES TOPOL,
SLBM, ALCM TEST LAUNCHES "Redut-97," Russia's largest strategic force exercise since the end of
the Cold War, was held on 1-3 October 1997 and featured highly publicized
test launches of land-, air- and submarine-based strategic weapons. At
least some elements of this exercise were reportedly designed to simulate
the "special period" of a conflict, i.e. the transition from crisis to
war.[1,2] An RS-12M (SS-25) Topol missile was launched from the Plesetsk
complex; a Murena (Delta I) class SSBN of the Northern fleet conducted
a submerged launch of two SS-N-8 SLBMs from the Barents Sea; a Kalmar (Delta
III) class Pacific Fleet SSBN launched an SLBM (presumably an SS-N-18/RSM-50
SLBM) from the Sea of Okhotsk; and Tu-160 (Blackjack), Tu-95MS
(Bear-H16), and Tu-22M (Backfire) bombers fired AS-15 ALCMs and other
types of cruise missiles.[2,3,4] The exercise was held under the
command of Defense Minister Igor Sergeyev, who expressed satisfaction with
the results of the training, and Strategic Rocket Forces commander Vladimir
Yakovlev supervised the Topol launch from an airborne communications center.[3,5]
Sources: [1] Yuriy Karnakov, "Russian Nuclear Triad to Demonstrate
its Combat-Readiness Tomorrow," Russkiy Telgraf, 2 October 1997,
p. 2, in "Strategic Command-Staff Exercises to Start," FBIS-UMA-97-276. [2] David C. Isby, "Russians raise strategic exercise numbers
to make a point," Jane's Missiles and Rockets, vol. 1, no. 8, November
1997, p. 15. [3] Arkadiy Ukrainsky and Aleksandr Nosov, "Prisyaga" program,
Russian Television Network, 12 October 1997, in "Redut-97 Strategic Missile
Exercises End Successfully," FBIS-TAC-97-287. [4] "Korotko: Rossiya," Nezavisimoye voennoye obozreniye,
no. 38, 10-16 October 1997, p. 2. [5] "Korotko: Sergeyev ostalsya dovolen," Nezavisimaya
gazeta, 4 October 1997.{Entered 7/17/98 FW}
5/97: RUSSIA ISSUES ASSURANCES: NO RISK OF UNAUTHORIZED
LAUNCH The Press Center of the Strategic Rocket Forces (SRF)
announced that organizational and technical safety measures implemented by the
SRF exclude the possibility of an unauthorized missile launch. No incidents of
loss of control over nuclear weapons were reported in the 38 years of the SRF's
existence. This announcement was made in response to concerns expressed in the US
media about the growing risk of an authorized nuclear strike against
the United States.
[Ilshat Baychurin, "Sluchaynyye puski
isklyucheny," Krasnaya zvezda, No. 109, 16 May 1997, p. 1.] {Entered
10/21/99 VT}
3/1/97: RUSSIA TO LEASE MISSILE WARNING STATIONS FROM UKRAINE On 1 March 1997 Reuters reported that Russia and Ukraine signed an agreement
according to which Ukraine will lease missile early warning stations in
the towns of Mukachevo and Sevastopol to Russia in exchange for spare parts
supplies for the Ukrainian air force. According to military sources
in Kiev, the lease will cost about $4 million per year, but details of
the agreement were not released.[1] Interfax reported on 3 March
1997 that Russia owed Ukraine $2.5 million for use of the missile attack
warning stations. According to Ukrainian Defense Minister Oleksandr
Kuzmuk, Ukraine no longer needs the stations because it is no longer a
nuclear power and the stations are not used for anything else. Kuzmuk
added that all future expenses for extending the service lives of these
stations must be covered by Russia starting from 1 January 1997.[2]
Sources: [1] "Ukraine Leases Russia Missile Warning Stations,"
Reuters, 1 March 1997. [2] Interfax, 3 March 1997; in "Russia Must Fully Fund
Two Missile Warning Stations," FBIS-SOV-97-062. {Entered 9/29/99
CEM} 1/15/97: PRESIDENT ALIYEV CONFIRMS THAT GABELINSK MILITARY BASE WILL
REMAIN RUSSIAN In an interview with an Ecully Euronews reporter in France, Azerbaijani
President Heydar Aliyev stated that the Russian ballistic missile early
warning (BMEWS) radar station near Gabelinsk remains under Russian control
and that negotiations are being carried out to clarify its status as Russian
property. The radar system is highly important to Russia’s security due
to its ability to detect incoming missile attacks.
["President Aliyev Interviewed in France," Ecully Euronews
Television Network, 25 January 1997, FBIS-SOV-97-017.] {entered 2/10/97, djw}
11/5-6/96: AUTHORITY TO RELEASE NUCLEAR WEAPONS TRANSFERRED TO CHERNOMYRDIN
DURING YELTSIN'S SURGERY In accordance with a decree published on 19 September 1996, Prime Minister
Viktor Chernomyrdin assumed the authority to release nuclear weapons while
President Boris Yeltsin underwent surgery. Chernomyrdin retained control
of the "nuclear button" for only 23 hours. The smooth transfer of release
authority came after a lengthy period of debate in the Russian and Western
press over the security of Russian nuclear weapons and the stability of
the nuclear C3 system.
Sources: [1]"On the Temporary Exercise of the Duties of the President
of the Russian Federation," Rossiyskiye vesti, 21 September 1996, p. 3, in "Yeltsin
Decrees Intent to Transfer Power Briefly," Current Digest of the Post-Soviet
Press, vol. XLVIII, no. 38 (1996), p. 7. [2] OMRI Daily Digest, 11/6/96. {Entered
11/18/96 JL}
10/22/96: LEAKED CIA REPORT CLAIMS RUSSIAN NUCLEAR FORCES ARE INSECURE The Washington Times published excerpts from a leaked top-secret
CIA report entitled "Prospects for Unsanctioned Use of Russian Nuclear
Weapons." The report, issued in September 1996, examines the possibility
of theft, unauthorized use, or accidental launch of Russian nuclear weapons.
Excerpts from the report included in the Times article indicate
that "the technical ability to launch [strategic nuclear weapons] without
authorization of political leaders" may extend to Russian Strategic Rocket
Forces (SRF) command posts and other units below the level of the General
Staff. The report also notes that a new system for reporting improper missile
launches has been established within the SRF, presumably indicating increased
concern about this possibility. The Times quotes the report as saying
that "some submarine crews probably have an autonomous launch capability
for tactical nuclear weapons and might have the ability to employ SLBMs
as well." However, concerning strategic nuclear weapons the report concludes
that the probability of an unauthorized missile launch or blackmail attempt
is low "under normal circumstances." Greater concern is evinced over the
security and control of tactical nuclear weapons, particularly in the Russian
Far East, where poor living conditions for troops could give rise to nuclear
blackmail attempts by nuclear-armed units. Nuclear torpedoes are singled
out as of particular concern, as they are secured by locks that might be
readily removed. The CIA report notes that blocking devices, or permissive
action links (PALs) on nuclear weapons, "can be circumvented--probably
within weeks or days depending on the weapons involved." The Washington
Times
story received widespread distribution due to ongoing concern
over the reliability of Russian C3 during President Boris Yeltsin's illness.
According to a Reuters dispatch, CIA officials confirmed the accuracy of
the quoted material, but expressed concern over its appearance in the Times.
US Department of Defense spokesman Kevin Bacon declined to comment on the
report, but stated that while the security of Russian nuclear weapons was
of "grave concern," Russian forces had "taken prudent steps to keep the
forces safe and secure." A Reuters report filed from Moscow cited responses
from Russian commentators that were largely critical of the report, with
Russian officials and analysts stating that nuclear weapons security remained
good. General Aleksandr Lebed, former secretary of the Russian Security
Council noted that he was "very confident about the tactical nuclear weapons
of our Russian state" and discounted the study's conclusions.
Sources: [1] Bill Gertz, "Russian renegades pose nuke danger," Washington
Times, 22 October 1996, p. 1. [2] Extensive excerpts from the story may be found at http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/cia9609.htm;
Reuters, 23 October 1996. [3] DOD News Briefing, 10/22/96, http://www.dtic.mil/defenselink/news/ Oct96/t102296_t1022asd.html;
Reuters, 23 October 1996. [4] Bill Gertz, "Lebed says nuclear problems in Russia pose
no global threat," Washington Times, 24 October 1996, p. 11. {Entered 11/18/96
JL}
10/2-3/96: REDUT-96 STRATEGIC FORCES EXERCISE
HELD A two-day command staff exercise was held that included ICBM, SLBM, and
ALCM test launches. According to ITAR-TASS, the Redut-96 training
program had started in March 1996, and this exercise was apparently the
culmination of the program. Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin visited
the Ministry of Defense command post during the exercise, which was commanded
by Defense Minister Igor Rodionov. Krasnaya zvezda reported that
on 3 October, the "presidential button" was used to transmit, via satellite,
the command to launch an SLBM from an SSBN of the Northern Fleet. On the
same day, an SS-25 ICBM (RS-12M Topol) was launched from the Plesetsk test
range. Two long-range ALCMs were also launched on 3 October, with over
40 aircraft from the Russian air force taking part in the exercise. All
launches were reportedly successful.
Sources: [1] "'Prezidentskaya knopka' srabotala," Krasnaya
zvezda, 4 October 1996, p. 1. [2] "Strategicheskaya komandno-shtabnaya trenirovka," Krasnaya
zvezda, 3 October 1996, p. 1. [3] ITAR-TASS, 3 October 1996, in "Cruise Missiles Hit Targets in
Launch Exercise," FBIS-SOV-96-194. [4] ITAR-TASS, 2 October 1996, in "Rodionov Oversees Strategic Headquarters
Command Exercise," FBIS-SOV-96-193. [5] ITAR-TASS, 3 October 1996, in "New Intercontinental Ballistic
Missile Launched from Plesetsk," FBIS-SOV-96-194. {Entered JL 11/17/96}
4/16/96:CONSTRUCTION OF UNDERGROUND FACILITY REPORTED According to the TheNew York Times, Russia is continuing
construction of an underground military complex inside Yamantau mountain
in the Beloretsk region. The Pentagon believes that the project may result
in an underground nuclear bunker for the Russian military command or in
a weapons manufacturing plant. Russian Defense Ministry officials recently
refused to elaborate on the purpose of the project. However, Russian officials
formerly described it as a civilian facility, a nuclear waste storage site,
or a bunker for the Russian troops in case of a nuclear war. In commenting
on this project, anonymous Russian sources confirmed the existence of a
"dead hand" system for strategic command and control and indicated that
the system is almost ready for operation. (See the discussion of the "Perimeter"
system, below.) However, the sources claimed that the bunker under construction
is not directly associated with this program. Colonel General Victor Yesin,
Chief of Staff of the Strategic Rocket Forces, and Igor Sergeyev, Commander
of the Strategic Rocket Forces, denied Russia is building a nuclear bunker
in the Beloretsk region. He also stated that Russia is not planning to
build additional nuclear weapons deployment sites.
Sources: [1] Michael R. Gordon, "Despite Cold War's End, Russia Keeps
Building A Secret Complex," New York Times, 16 April 1996, p. A6. [2] Pavel Felgengauer, "Russian 'Dead Hand' Frustrates Americans,"
Segodnya, 17 April 1996, p. 1. [3] "A Bunker Is Being Constructed Secretly In The Urals," Segodnya,
18 April 1996, p. 1. [4] Interfax, 18 April 1996. {Revised 9/6/96 KVY}
1/96: AGING EARLY WARNING SYSTEMS ARE CAUSING RUSSIA TO LOSE EDGE According to Krasnaya zvezda, Russia's military satellites and early
warning system could wear out by the year 2000, forcing Russia to "get
used to the idea of losing strategic equality with the United States."
Up to four satellites had been launched per year under the Brezhnev era
in order to monitor US nuclear missile silos and airbases. A lack of funding
has caused the launching program to stop, relying on satellites that have,
in some cases, outlived their life spans by three times.
[Penny Morvant, "Spy Satellite System on Verge of Collapse,"
OMRI Daily Digest, No.14, pt. I, p. 3, 19 January 1996.]
1/20/95:RUSSIA, UKRAINE TO JOINTLY FINANCE EARLY WARNING SYSTEM Ukrainian and Russian Defense Ministers, Pavel Grachev and Valerii Shmarov,
agreed on a plan to jointly finance a ballistic missile early warning system
(BMEWS) using a former Soviet radar in Ukraine. The two sides disagreed
on an air defense system for other Soviet states. (The radar in question
is located in Mukhachevo and is a part of the former Soviet BMEWS system.
Construction of a modern phased-array radar to replace the old radar was
halted late in the 1980s due to opposition by local residents.)
["In Russia," Post-Soviet Nuclear and Defense Monitor, 30
November 1995, p. 11.]
Last updated 24 May 2004. This file is no longer being updated.
For major recent developments, see the General
Nuclear Weapons Developments file.
Comments or questions? E-mail Nikolai Sokov: nsokovATmiis.edu.
This file is no longer
being updated. For more recent developments, please see the
