by Dr. Nikolai Sokov, CNS Senior Research Associate, August 2004

Statements about Russia's increased reliance on nuclear weapons have become commonplace since 1993, when Moscow formally dropped the Soviet no-first-use policy. In reality, nuclear doctrine changed more slowly, and almost the entire 1990s was spent on debates, most of them behind closed doors. Only in 1999 did a new, post-Soviet nuclear doctrine take shape. Analysis of official documents, as well as official and unofficial statements, suggests that the main innovation was a new mission assigned to nuclear weapons, that of deterring limited conventional wars.

Available evidence suggests that there were two key variables that affected the emergence of the new nuclear doctrine. First, there was a perception of an acute external threat (especially in the mid-1990s and in 1999, when Russia anticipated that NATO might threaten to use force on a limited scale to achieve limited political goals in a manner similar to the wars in the Balkans). Second, there was an acute sense of the weakness of Russia's conventional forces vis-à-vis the prospect of a limited conventional war, especially a limited war with both numerically and qualitatively superior NATO forces. From the perspective of the Russian military, reliance on nuclear weapons was a logical response to the glaring inadequacy of conventional forces premised on the idea that nuclear weapons had greater utility than simply to deter a large-scale nuclear attack. Official documents suggest, however, that reliance on nuclear weapons is seen as a temporary "fix" intended to provide for security until conventional forces are sufficiently modernized and strengthened.

Following the terrorist attacks on the United States in September 2001, the perceived tension in U.S.-Russian relations diminished; both governments have proclaimed that they are allies in the fight against international terrorism, and even the disagreement over the war in Iraq in 2003 proved to be only temporary. The calming of political relations has not, however, had a visible effect on Russia's nuclear doctrine. On the one hand, it is not directed solely against the United States, although concern about the overwhelming U.S. military power persists, especially among the military. On the other hand, changes in foreign policy are always regarded as transitory whereas military and economic capabilities are constants. It is not inconceivable that Moscow's relations with Washington might worsen, and then Russia would again need a viable deterrence vis-à-vis the United States, according to this line of thinking.

This section of the database reviews key pieces of data on the Russian nuclear doctrine since 1999. These include:

the National Security Concept (2000);

the Military Doctrine (2000);

an overview of a major debate on the future of Russia's strategic nuclear forces, which took place in 2000-2002;

the so-called "White Paper" published by the Ministry of Defense in the fall of 2003; and

an overview of significant military maneuvers in 1999-2004, which yield important bits and pieces of data that complement official pronouncements with regard to the missions, the modes of use, and the targets assigned to nuclear weapons.

Sources:
Nikolai Sokov, "Why States Rely On Nuclear Weapons? The Case Of Russia And Beyond," The Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 9, No. 2 (Summer 2002).

Page last updated 16 November 2004
For more recent developments, see the General Nuclear Weapons Developments file.

Comments or questions? E-mail Nikolai Sokov:  nsokovATmiis.edu.

This material is produced independently for NTI by the Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies and does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been independently verified by NTI or its directors, officers, employees, agents. Copyright © 2002 by MIIS.

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