Russia: Archived ICBM Force/SRF General Developments

This file is no longer being updated.  For more recent developments, please see the Strategic Forces General Developments file.

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This file contains an archive of information on developments in the Russian Strategic Rocket Forces. More recent major developments on general strategic nuclear forces developments may be found in the Nuclear Weapons General Developments file.  Archived developments concerning the SSBN force and the bomber forces may be found in their respective developments archives. Please see the ICBM Test Launch Archives file for information on missile tests.

2/20/2004: SRF MAY RECEIVE NEW DEFENSE-PENETRATING WARHEAD
According to First Deputy Chief of the General Staff Colonel General Yuriy Baluyevskiy, cited in a 20 February article in Izvestiya, the Strategic Rocket Forces is developing a new weapons system that will enable the Russian strategic forces to overcome any missile defense system. The defense-penetrating warhead, also termed a hypersonic flight vehicle (giperzvukovoy letatelnyy apparat), successfully passed its first full flight test during the Security 2004 command and staff training exercise; it was launched from the Plesetsk Test Site on a Topol [NATO designation SS-25 'Sickle'] intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) that targeted the Kura testing ground on the Kamchatka Peninsula.[1,2] This came after a partial test in 1999, on a Topol-M, when Russian military representatives said the warhead could undertake "a side antimissile maneuver."[3] The experimental warhead has the ability to deviate from the traditional elliptical trajectory and move in and out of the atmosphere in order to avoid interceptors.[2] These characteristics are supposed to complicate the ability of missile defense systems to track the missile.[1] It is theorized that the new warhead may be based on a X-90 hypersonic cruise missile [NATO designation AS-19 'Koala'] that Russia began to develop but did not bring to fruition in the 1990s.[2]
Sources:
[1] Dmitriy Litovkin, "U Rossii- novoye oruzhiye," Izvestiya, No. 031 (26588), 20 February 2004; in Integrum Techno, http://www.integrum.com.
[2] Dmitriy Litovkin, "Giperzvukovaya 'koala'," Izvestiya, No. 032 (26589), 20 February 2004; in Integrum Techno, http://www.integrum.com.
[3] Yuriy Golotyuk, "Zato my delayem rakety" Izvestiya, 5 June 1999.{Entered 3/1/2004 EMC}

1/19/2004: SUICIDE IN SRF
On 19 January 2004, ITAR-TASS reported that the office of the Military Prosecutor of the Strategic Rocket Forces has started an investigation into a suicide that took place in a unit of the Space Forces located in Kubinka, near Moscow. According to the prosecutorial press service, a private in his first year of service shot himself to death on the territory of the unit on 18 January 2004. A criminal investigation has been initiated in accordance with Article 110 of the Criminal Code (incitement to commit suicide), and a separate commission has been set up to inquire into the reasons behind the suicide.
["Voyennaya prokuratura RVSN vozbudila ugolovnoye delo po faktu samoubiystva soldata pervogo goda sluzhby v odnoy iz chastey PRO," ITAR-TASS, 19 January 2004; in Integrum Techno, http://www.integrum.com.] {Entered 3/16/2004 TS}

1/10/2004: NEW HOUSING FOR SRF PERSONNEL IN 2004
On 10 January 2004, citing the Strategic Rocket Forces (SRF) press service, Krasnaya zvezda reported that hundreds of SRF personnel will receive new housing in 2004. Fifteen residential buildings, with a total of 1,132 apartments, are scheduled to be built. Presently, more than 13,000 SRF members are not provided with housing, including 1,600 from Vlasikha garrison (Moscow Oblast), home to the SRF headquarters. Slightly more than half of SRF personnel currently live in their own apartments, almost 20% are accommodated in dormitories, and the rest are forced to rent housing. 1,656 apartments were provided to SRF personnel in 2003, including 1,504 financed by the government.
["Zhilye dlya raketchikov," Krasnaya zvezda, 10 January 2004; in Integrum Techno, http://www.integrum.com.] {Entered 3/16/2004 TS}

12/24/2003: FUTURE SRF PERSONNEL REDUCTIONS
Strategic Rocket Forces (SRF) deputy commander Lieutenant General Viktor Alekseyev announced on 24 December 2003 that over 10,000 positions in the SRF will be cut by 2007. According to Alekseyev, the reduction in the number of military commands and units is associated with plans for military reform and implementation of the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty. Some of the personnel from the divisions to be disbanded will be discharged from service, while others will be reassigned to other short-staffed military commands. Alekseyev added that he believes that a support system for decommissioned personnel has been developed and effectively used in the SRF. More than 670 SRF personnel were retrained in the last two years thanks to the system.
[Sergey Ostanin, "Boleye desyati tysyach dolzhnostey voennosluzhashchikh budet sokrashcheno v Raketnykh voyskakh strategicheskogo naznacheniya RF k 2007 godu," ITAR-TASS, 24 December 2003; in Integrum Techno, http://www.integrum.com.] {Entered 3/16/2004 TS}

12/23/2003: SRF 2003 WRAP-UP
ITAR-TASS, citing the Strategic Rocket Forces (SRF) press service, reported on 23 December 2003 that the SRF had ensured proper management of its missile and nuclear resources in 2003. The year was marked by ongoing introduction of new missile systems. For example, a fourth regiment equipped with Topol-M [NATO designation SS-27 'Sickle'] intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) entered into service in December. Missiles of this type will become the major component of SRF combat strength after 2015. Presently, the backbone of the SRF is the UR-100N [NATO designation SS-19 'Stiletto'] missile series, which will stay in service until the mid-2030s. One hundred percent of the missile regiments were positively graded in 2003, and at least 96% of ICBM launchers are combat ready. In 2003, for the first time in the last five years, the influx of new officers exceeded the outflow of officers. As of 1 December 2003, the SRF included three armies consisting of 15 divisions with more than 700 ICBM launchers.
[Vladislav Kuznetsov, "Vpervyye za neskolko let v Raketnykh voyskakh strategicheskogo naznacheniya otmechen povyshennyy pritok molodykh ofitserov," ITAR-TASS, 23 December 2003; in Integrum Techno, http://www.integrum.com.] {Entered 3/23/2004 TS}

12/22/2003: PLANS FOR FUTURE SRF ARSENAL
ITAR-TASS, citing an unnamed representative of the Russian Defense Ministry General Staff, reported on 22 December 2003 that Russia will start developing a new liquid-fuelled missile in 2004. The new missile, due to its technical characteristics, will be able to increase its throw weight to four metric tons, and will be able to carry ten nuclear warheads. The General Staff representative also indicated that a new mobile Topol-M [NATO designation SS-27 'Sickle'] intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) is scheduled to enter into service in 2004. Unlike the existing silo-based Topol-M, the mobile Topol-M will have multiple independently-targeted reentry vehicles (MIRVs) and will be equipped with a system designed to overcome missile defense systems. This innovation will increase the target kill accuracy of the missile up to 90%. The mobile Topol-M will carry 4-6 nuclear warheads. It is expected that the Strategic Rocket Forces will eventually have 2-3 divisions equipped with the mobile Topol-M. Every two and half years a regiment equipped with this type of ICBM will be put into service. According to the source in the General Staff, 30 RS-18 [NATO designation SS-19 'Stiletto'] ICBMs received from Ukraine will become operational in 2010, replacing obsolete ICBMs, and will be in service for 10-15 years. The official stressed that by putting the new mobile Topol-M into operation, maintaining current silo-based Topol-M ICBMs, and introducing the RS-18 missiles into service in 2010, Russia will have 1,700-2,200 nuclear warheads by 2012, as envisioned by the Strategic Offensive Reduction Treaty. This will allow Russia to maintain its balance of nuclear power with the United States.
[ Aleksandr Konovalov, "V Rossii c 2004 goda nachnetsya razrabotka zhidkostnoy strategicheskoy rakety; v voyskakh budet 2-3 divizii s mobilnym kompleksom 'Topol-M'," ITAR-TASS, 22 December 2003; in Integrum Techno, http//www.integrum.com] {Entered 3/2/2004 TS}

12/21/2003: NEW TOPOL-M REGIMENT IN SERVICE AT TATISHCHEVO
On 21 December 2003, an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) regiment equipped with six Topol-M [NATO designation SS-27 'Sickle'] ICBMs entered the service of the 60th division of the Strategic Rocket Forces (SRF) based in Tatishchevo, Saratov Oblast. This is the fourth ICBM regiment armed with Topol-M ICBMs deployed in Tatishchevo. Another three regiments were re-equipped with the Topol-M in 1998, 1999, and 2000, respectively.[1,2] Russian Minister of Defense Sergey Ivanov stated that Topol-M ICBMs will be in service for decades and will continue to be improved, as will other components of the Russian nuclear triad. After 2015, missiles of this type will form the foundation of the combat might of the SRF.[3,4] According to the minister, Russia deploys its new ICBM regiments in strict observation with its international treaty obligations. Ivanov stressed that the government places importance on further development and improvement of the SRF through deployment of silo-based and rail-mobile missiles equipped with modern control systems.[1,4] For example, Colonel General Nikolay Solovtsov, commander of the SRF, announced that the rail-mobile Topol-M missile will enter service in 2004 following the completion of testing.[1]
Sources:
[1] Aleksandr Konovalov, "Raketnyy kompleks 'Topol-M' budet nakhoditsya na boyevom dezhurstve yeshche desyatiletiya – Sergey Ivanov," ITAR-TASS, 21 December 2003; in Integrum Techno, http://www.integrum.com.
[2] "V Rossii na boyevoye dezhurstvo postavlen chetvertyy raketnyy polk, osnashchennyy kompleksami 'Topol-M'," Xinhua, 21 December 2003; in Integrum Techno, http://www.integrum.com.    
[3] Aleksandr Konovalov, "Strategicheskiye yadernyye sily ostayutsya glavnym fundamentom natsionalnoy bezopasnosti Rossii, zayavil Sergey Ivanov," ITAR-TASS, 21 December 2003; in Integrum Techno, http://www.integrum.com.
[4] Aleksandr Konovalov, "Chetvertyy raketnyy polk s kompleksom 'Topol-M' postavlen na boyevoye dezhurstvo v Raketnykh voyskakh strategicheskogo naznacheniya RF," ITAR-TASS, 21 December 2003; in Integrum Techno, http://www.integrum.com. {Entered 2/24/2004 TS}

12/17/2003: PLANS FOR ICBM TEST LAUNCHES IN 2004
On 17 December 2003, Strategic Rocket Forces (SRF) Commander Colonel General Nikolay Solovtsov announced that the SRF will carry out more than 10 intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) test launches in 2004. The main purpose of these launches is to check missile reliability and to extend the service life of existing missile types. In the context of the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty, Solovtsov noted that the SRF will continue to play a major role in the Russian nuclear triad. Solovtsov also added that the service life of the R-36M-series [NATO designation SS-18 'Satan'] missile has been extended: these ICBMs will remain in service for another 10-15 years. The SRF Commander stressed that SS-18 ICBMs possess the technical means to overcome current and prospective missile defense systems.
[Sergey Babkin, Vladislav Kuznetsov, "V 2004 godu Raketnyye voyska strategicheskogo naznacheniya osushchestvyat svyshe 10 puskov ballisticheskikh raket," ITAR-TASS, 17 December 2003; in Integrum Techno, http://www.integrum.com.] {Entered 3/16/2004 TS}

12/10/2003: MOBILE ELECTRICAL POWER STATION REPORTEDLY MISSING FROM SRF DIVISION
On 10 December 2003, RIA Novosti, citing the head of the Department for Economic Crimes of the Kalinin police district of Novosibirsk, reported that a mobile electrical power station at the Strategic Rocket Forces (SRF) division in Novosibirsk was missing. According to the police, the power station was discovered later in the possession of representatives of a local commercial organization, and a criminal case was initiated and filed with the military prosecutor's office for further investigation.[1] The police believe that the SRF division's commanding officers were involved in the illegal transfer of the mobile electrical power station. The police allege that forged documents were used to sell the station to civilians at a substantially decreased price, even though it remains fully operational. The authorities also expressed their concern that the power station went missing from a SRF division that is on constant combat duty, equipped with Topol-M [NATO designation SS-27 'Sickle'] intercontinental ballistic missiles, and considered a high security facility.[2] However, commander of the Novosibirsk SRF Division Major General Ivan Reva refuted press reports about the loss of military property a few days later. According to Reva, an inquiry conducted within the division accounted for all mobile electrical power stations. The major general added that the Kalinin district prosecutor's office did not acknowledge that a criminal investigation has been initiated, and the deputy military prosecutor charged with oversight for the SRF division confirmed this information.[3]
Sources:
[1] Maksim Koshmarchuk, "Militsiya Novosibirska vyyavila fakt rastraty voyennoy tekhniki v divizii raketnykh voysk strategicheskogo naznacheniya," RIA Novosti,10 December 2003; in Integrum Techno, http://www.integrum.com.
[2] Mikhail Marchuk, "Raketchiki rasprodayut imushchestvo," Gazeta, 11 December 2003; in Integrum Techno, http://www.integrum.com.
[3] "V Novosibirskoy divizii RVSN oprovergli informatsiyu nekotorykh SMI o propazhe voyennogo imushchestva," ITAR-TASS, 13 December 2003; in Integrum Techno, http://www.integrum.com. {Entered 2/17/2004 TS}

12/1/2003: TOPOL-M PRODUCTION DELAYS
Production of Russia's Topol-M [NATO designation SS-27 'Sickle'] silo-based ICBM has been delayed by the disintegration of the Soviet-era military industrial complex, as well as financial constraints, Jane's Missiles and Rockets reported on 1 December 2003. Ballistic missile programs are especially exposed to these problems, since a significant number of the foremost ICBM production plants are based in Ukraine. In addition, the Topol-M program faces difficulties specific to production of this particular missile. A number of enterprises that provide component parts for the Topol-M have been suffering from internal problems that hamper the production rate. For example, the Tverkhimvolokno Joint Stock Company, which was the sole source of the carbon fiber needed for the Topol-M’s engine casings, nozzle clusters, and other components, has gone bankrupt. The Polema Company, which produces heat-resistant components for the Topol-M, stopped production due to technical difficulties. These developments have caused a number of the Strategic Rocket Forces (SRF) regiments to deploy six missiles instead of ten. Also, the presence in the SRF of R-36M-series [NATO designation SS-18 'Satan'] ICBMs lessens the importance of immediate Topol-M deployment.
[David C. Isby, "Industrial problems slow Topol-M production," Jane’s Missiles and Rockets online edition, http://jmr.janes.com, 1 December 2003]. {Entered 12/24/2003 TS}

10/6/2003: RUSSIA TO DEVELOP NEW MISSILE SYSTEMS
On 6 October 2003, Russian Defense Minister Sergey Ivanov stated that, thanks to the availability of the UR-100N-series [NATO designation SS-19 'Stiletto,' START designation RS-18] intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), Russia will focus on designing new missile systems instead of maintaining aging systems. The minister added that Russia will concentrate on developing missiles to be used 20-30 years in the future. (CNS believes that these statements suggest that Russia may lack the financial means to maintain current ICBMs, is unlikely to procure further Topol-Ms, and may not introduce a new ICBM for many years to come.)
[Boris Grushin, Aleksandr Konovalov, "Sergey Ivanov: Rossiya budet razvivat svoi strategicheskiye yadernyye sily putem sozdaniya printsipialno novykh raketnykh kompleksov," ITAR-TASS, 6 October 2003; in Integrum Techno, http://www.integrum.com] {Entered 10/31/2003 TS}

10/3/2003: SS-19 ICBMs WILL STAY IN SERVICE IN RUSSIA UNTIL MID-2030s
According to a Regions.ru report on 3 October 2003, First Deputy Chief of the Ministry of Defense General Staff Colonel-General Yuriy Baluyevskiy stated that UR-100N-series intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) [NATO designation SS-19 'Stiletto,' START designation RS-18] may stay in service in the Strategic Rocket Forces (SRF) until the mid-2030s. According to Baluyevskiy, SS-19 ICBMs are able to carry up to 10 nuclear warheads, have an effective system of overcoming antiballistic missile defenses, and are among the most powerful ICBMs. Baluyevskiy noted that SS-19 ICBMs were developed during the Soviet era and have been preserved to the present time. On 2 October 2003, Russian President Vladimir Putin announced that Russia possesses several dozen SS-19s that were never deployed. [CNS believes that Putin most likely meant the 30 SS-19s transferred from Ukraine to Russia; for more information, see the 7/30/2003 entry, below. These statements by Russian high-ranking officials suggest that Russia will rely on Soviet-produced ICBMs for the time being and does not pl-+an to deploy new ICBMs in the foreseeable future.]
["Tyazhelyye rakety UR-100N UTTKh ostanutsya na boyevom dezhurstve do serediny 2030-kh godov," Regions.ru Web Site, http://www.regions.ru/, 3 October 2003; in Integrum Techno, http://www.integrum.com] {Entered 11/3/2003 TS}

9/30/2003: TWO TOPOL MISSILE REGIMENTS TO BE REMOVED FROM OPERATIONAL STATUS
ITAR-TASS reported on 30 September 2003 that two Strategic Rocket Forces (SRF) regiments will be removed from operational status by the beginning of 2004.  The article also stated that a missile regiment based near Nizhniy Tagil was removed from the SRF inventory in September 2003. [CNS note:  it is not clear whether the Nizhniy Tagil regiment is one of the two SRF regiments mentioned above, or an additional regiment.]  The regiments being removed from service are equipped with RS-12M Topol [NATO designation SS-25 'Sickle'] mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles that have exhausted their service lives.
[Vladislav Kuznetsov, "K nachalu 2004 goda iz sostava Raketnykh voysk strategicheskogo naznacheniya budut vyvedeny dva polka raket Topol," ITAR-TASS, 30 September 2003; in Integrum Techno, http://www.integrum.com.] {Entered 11/3/2003 TS}

9/22/2003: TOPOL-M REGIMENT TO ENTER SERVICE IN DECEMBER 2003
Citing the Strategic Rocket Forces Command Headquarters, ITAR-TASS reported on 22 September 2003  that the fourth regiment equipped with Topol-M intercontinental ballistic missiles [NATO designation SS-27 'Sickle'], located in Tatishchevo (Saratov Oblast), will officially enter service by the end of December 2003.
[Vladislav Kuznetsov, "Chetvertyy raketnyy polk, osnashchennyy mezhkontinentalnymi ballisticheskimi raketami Topol–M, zastupit na boyevoye dezhurstvo v dekabre," ITAR-TASS, 22 September 2003; in Integrum Techno, http://www.integrum.com.] {Entered 11/5/2003 TS}

7/31/2003: RUSSIAN STRATEGIC ROCKET FORCES WELCOME NEW OFFICERS
On 31 July 2003, Krasnaya zvezda reported that the Strategic Rocket Forces (SRF) are welcoming more than 1,500 new officers who graduated from such prominent military schools as the Peter the Great SRF Military Academy, Rostov Military Institute, Stavropol Branch of the Rostov Military Institute, Perm Military Institute (scheduled for closure this year, see the 7/1/2003 entry below), and Serpukhov Military Institute. The SRF have developed measures to make the transition for new officers easier, including financial support, accommodations, orientation, training, and testing the new officers for their new responsibilities. For instance, graduates have been provided with more than 400 apartments and about 1,200 spaces in dormitories. Peter the Great SRF Military Academy graduates appointed to high-ranking positions receive their diplomas simultaneously with orders for apartments. Employment for officers' spouses has been offered at enterprises and establishments situated in the missile units as well as iun their immediate vicinity. Child care facilities have been also provided. Another SRF tradition that is being observed is the pairing of newcomers with experienced officers as mentors. The graduates with a GPA of 4.5 (on a scale from 1 to 5) or higher, including 10 officers who graduated with honors, were appointed to positions at the Fourth Central Scientific Research Institute. Military institutions reported an average of two applicants for each position in 2003, and as many as four to five applicants for positions in some specialties.
[Aleksandr Vovk, Aleksandr Dolinin, "To Your Health, Young Stock!" Krasnaya zvezda, 31 July 2003; in "Life of New Officers of Russian Strategic Missile Forces Described," FBIS Document CEP20030731000361.] {Entered 11/17/2003 TS}

7/30/2003: RUSSIA PURCHASES BALLISTIC MISSILES FROM UKRAINE
Russia has purchased 30 UR-100N-series [NATO designation SS-19 'Stiletto,' START designation RS-18] intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) from Ukraine, Kommersant reported on 30 July 2003. The sale was authorized in October 2002 at a cost of $50 million.[1] The SS-19 missiles transferred to Russia were produced by the Khrunichev State Space Scientific Production Center in the 1980s. They were stockpiled in Ukraine and were never operationally deployed. After the demise of the Soviet Union, the Ukrainian National Space Agency assumed responsibility for the missiles.[2] According to some sources, after Russia received the SS-19s they were warehoused in Strategic Rocket Forces arsenals in Pibanshur (Udmurtiya) and Khrizolitovyy (Sverdlovsk Oblast). The missiles will be used by the Tatishchevo division, which can continue to deploy them for another 17 years.[1] On 2 October 2003, President Putin highly praised the effectiveness of the SS-19s, speaking of them as fearsome missiles capable of overcoming any ABM defense systems.[3] (CNS believes that this statement indicates Russia is placing less emphasis on new ballistic missiles, such as the Topol-M, and putting more stress on the modernization of existing missiles.)
Sources:
[1] Ivan Safronov, "Rossiya kupila posledneye raketnoye dostoyaniye Ukrainy," Kommersant, http://www.kommersant.ru, 30 July 2003.
[2] Interfax – Agentstvo voyennykh novostey, 25 July 2003; in "Russian Strategic Forces to Take on Former Ukrainian RS-18 Missiles, 25 July 2003, FBIS Document CEP 20030725000126.
[3] Vladimir Mukhin, "Preventivnyy udar ot Ivanova," Nezavisimaya gazeta online edition, http://ng.ru/printed/politics/2003-10-03/1_ivanov.html, 3 October 2003. {Entered 10/3/2003 TS}

7/7/2003: WORKING GROUP ADDRESSES KEDROVYY CLOSED CITY ISSUES
On 7 July 2003, a working group convened to consider the issues of the sustainability of the Kedrovyy closed administrative territorial formation (ZATO, or closed city). Representatives of the Strategic Rocket Forces (SRF) participated in the meeting to discuss a range of issues pertinent to SRF unit deactivation in Kedrovyy. These issues included construction of a boiler-house, preparation for winter, ZATO residents' employment, and the use of property transferred from the military for civilian use. It was stressed in the course of the meeting that the most important issue for the local authorities and SRF at this point was to develop a program to sustain the locality during the transition period and to ensure the prospects for Kedrovyy's continued existence.
["Krasnoyarskiy kray. Na stroitelstvo novoy kotelnoy v Kedrovom neobkhodimo 196 millionov rubley," Regions.ru, 8 July 2003; in Integrum Techno, http://www.integrum.ru.] {Entered 11/21/2003 TS}

7/1/2003: SRF OFFICER ACADEMY TO CLOSE
The Perm Military Institute of the Strategic Rocket Forces (SRF) retired its colors on 1 July 2003. According to the SRF press service, the Perm Institute will be closed by December 2003 as part of the reform of the military education system. The SRF will retain three other officer training schools, including the Peter the Great Military Academy, the Serpukhov Military Institute, and the Rostov Military Institute, which, together with the Perm Institute, commissioned 1,600 officers in 2003.
[Vladislav Kuznetsov, "Permskiy voyennyy institut Raketnykh voysk prostilsya s Boyevym Znamenem," ITAR-TASS, 1 July 2003; in Integrum Techno, http://www.integrum.com.] {Entered 7/16/2003 MJ}

6/25/2003: DEFENSE MINISTER IVANOV SUPPORTS SRF UNIT SPONSORSHIP
ITAR-TASS reported on 25 June 2003 that Defense Minister Igor Ivanov has welcomed Tver Oblast's efforts to sponsor military units stationed on its territory, in particular an SRF division. Ivanov sent a letter to Oblast Governor Vladimir Platov praising this sponsorship as an example to be emulated by other parts of the Russian Federation, and expressing the hope that the assistance would be provided on a systematic basis. The sponsorship arrangement dates to 1999, when the SRF missile division began accepting only conscripts from Tver Oblast for one of its regiments. Tver Oblast assistance to SRF units includes supplies of food, medicine, and books.
[Aleksandr Kharchenko, ITAR-TASS, 25 June 2003; in "Russian Defense Minister Welcomes Regional Initiative on Military Unit Patronage," FBIS Document CEP20030625000120.] {Entered 7/17/2003 MJ}

6/21/2003: HOUSING ISSUES CONTINUE TO PLAGUE THE SRF
On 21 June 2003, Krasnaya zvezda published an article detailing the housing shortage besetting the SRF. While there are 13,500 military and civilian personnel awaiting housing, a similar number of already separated former officers still reside in closed military cities. According to the chairman of the Central Housing Commission of the SRF, Major General Andrey Khvorostyanov, no breakthrough has yet been achieved. The SRF continues to receive new housing only at a rate sufficient to furnish newly retired officers with apartments. It has not been possible to reduce the number of retired officers who still occupy base housing in closed military cities. The SRF has been focusing on building housing in large cities in order to address the issue of retired officers without off-base housing. The SRF hopes to receive 1,800 apartments during 2003. In some cases, instead of apartments the retired officers receive state housing certificates. In 2002 over 1,700 such certificates were issued. However, Khrovostyanov also acknowledged that the housing certificate approach was insufficient in itself to address the problem, and that the program required changes. In some instances, where SRF units are located within so-called "closed administrative-territorial formations" (closed cities, or ZATOs), ZATO authorities are responsible for addressing the housing issue. However, in some cases ZATO administrations have been unwilling or incapable of dealing with such issues, while military authorities have limited authority to resettle retired officers residing in housing within a ZATO.
[Vadim Koval, "S uchetom mestnogo faktora," Krasnaya zvezda, No. 121, 21 June 2003; in Integrum Techno, http://www.integrum.com.] {Entered 7/17/2003 MJ}

5/29/2003: NINE DESERT FROM SRF UNIT IN YURYA
Nine conscripts serving in a Strategic Rocket Forces unit in Yurya (Kirov Oblast) deserted without weapons on 29 May 2003. They were apprehended after several hours in a nearby forest. According to the prosecutor's office, their desertion was caused by an overload of work at the maintenance shops where the soldiers worked, although other sources suggested work there was within the norm. Hazing was apparently not a motive in the desertion.
["Voyennaya prokuratura ne vyyavila faktov neustavnykh otnosheniy v raketnoy chasti, kotoruyu samovolno ostavili 9 soldat," ITAR-TASS, 29 May 2003; in Integrum Techno, http://www.integrum.com.] {Entered 7/16/2003 MJ}

5/14/2003: RETENTION SITUATION IMPROVES
Strategic Rocket Forces (SRF) Commander Colonel General Nikolay Solovtsov announced on 14 May 2003 that the SRF had experienced an improvement in retaining trained cadres. According to Solovtsov, for the first time in five years the number of officers commissioned into the SRF exceeded the number of officers who tendered their resignations.
[Vladislav Kuznetsov, "Vpervyye za posledniye pyat let v Raketnykh voyskakh strategicheskogo naznacheniya pritok ofitserskikh kadrov prevysil ikh ottok," ITAR-TASS, 14 May 2003; in Integrum Techno, http://www.integrum.com.] {Entered 7/16/2003 MJ}

4/16/2003: YURYA MISSILE DIVISION PROFILED
Krasnaya zvezda, the official newspaper of the Russian armed forces, published an article on 16 April 2003 profiling the Yurya missile division, equipped with RS-12M [NATO designation SS-25 'Sickle'] road-mobile ICBMs. Since 1 May 1994, the missile division has had the status of a "city-forming organization," and is the basis of a closed administrative-territorial formation (closed city, or ZATO) that also comprises the villages of Pervomaysk and Oktyabrsk with a total population of 11,000. Krasnaya zvezda's interviewees praised the ZATO concept, stating that it has made it easier to interact with the Oblast government, and that in its absence the situation would deteriorate. The Oblast government maintains close relations with military authorities. As a result of the cooperation, a large proportion of the unit's soldiers are from Kirov Oblast, and one of the division's regiments received the honorific designation of "Kirovskiy" through a 1999 presidential directive. The Kirov Oblast governor has donated a Volga car to the division, while the Oblast government provides social assistance to military veterans. Krasnaya zvezda did not specify what the governor's motivation was for aiding the division, but it ruled out the pursuit of votes due to the small size of the unit. Krasnaya zvezda's interviewees indicated that the ZATO has been relatively open to outside commercial interests, and suggested such practices had to be tolerated to ensure proper maintenance of the garrison. Access to the ZATO was apparently tightened in the recent past, although not to the point of completely closing it. The division has also been plagued by illegal scrap metal scavengers, whose targets included the wreckage of demolished IRBM silos, eliminated under the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty. The division is attempting to deal with financial problems by, among other things, maintaining its own agricultural enterprise, which includes several hundred heads of livestock, greenhouses, and other activities. In addition to providing food for the division, the enterprise makes a profit by selling its produce. The division appears to have some housing problems, although the shortages may not be as pronounced as in other units. The most significant problems identified by Krasnaya zvezda include lack of heat during the winter and decrepit division housing. Both division personnel and the Oblast government are concerned about the uncertain future of the division. Division morale has been undermined by the lack of knowledge of whether the division is going to be retained in service, reduced, or eliminated. Contributing to this concern is the division commander's history of "reforming" other missile divisions. At the same time, morale has been bolstered by more regular salary payments.
[Gennadiy Miranovich, Aleksandr Dolinin, "Yurya is not giving up," Krasnaya zvezda, 16 April 2003; in "Russia: status, prospects of RVSN missile division garrison at Yurya," FBIS Document CEP20030416000394.] {Entered 7/17/2003 MJ}

3/30/2003: MOBILE ICBM SURVIVABILITY ASSESSED
On 30 March 2003, the Strategic Rocket Forces concluded a 10-day inspection conducted by the Military Inspectorate of the Ministry of Defense, the first such check of the SRF's capabilities since 1991. SRF Commander Colonel General Nikolay Solovtsov announced shortly before the inspection that its results likely would influence the future course of the SRF, and might determine whether Russia retains mobile ICBM launchers or concentrates its funds on maintaining the silo-based ICBM force. During the exercise, Russian surveillance satellites, aircraft, and GRU special operations troops sought to locate and destroy mobile ICBM launchers. According to reports from the exercise, one ICBM launcher may have been located by a GRU reconnaissance team. The head of the Military Inspectorate, Aleksandr Lukin, said that he identified a number of problems within the SRF. They included insufficient decoy missile launchers capable of fooling enemy surveillance systems, and inadequate protection provided for mobile systems.  According to Lukin, the SRF disbanded its mobile ICBM escort forces and has since relied only on surveillance systems to warn of intruders approaching mobile launchers. Lukin claimed that the exercise revealed the inadequacy of such arrangements, as the surveillance systems even were set off by falling snow. The exercise also tested the ability of the SRF to transmit launch orders by radio (rather than by cable) under conditions of heavy jamming. Lukin said that the exercise confirmed the need for mobile systems, which he viewed as necessary in the current global situation. However, the Ministry of Defense denied the exercise was in any way linked to the war in Iraq.[1] SRF Commander Solovtsov was also pleased by the outcome of the exercise, during which one Topol [NATO designation SS-25 'Sickle'] ICBM was launched.[2] The exercise involved the Teykovo missile division, the Vladimir missile army headquarters, and a total of 6,000 troops.[3]
Sources:
[1] Dmitriy Litovkin, "Burya pod snegom," Izvestiya, 31 March 2003, p. 3; in WPS Oborona i bezopasnost, 2 April 2003; in Integrum Techno, http://www.integrum.com.
[2] Vladislav Kuznetsov, "Ucheniye v Raketnykh voyskakh podtverdilo vysokiye boyevyye kharakteristiki ballisticheskoy rakety 'Topol'," ITAR-TASS, 31 March 2003; in Integrum Techno, http://www.integrum.com.
[3] Vladislav Kuznetsov, "Po itogam komandno-shtabnogo ucheniya v RVSN deystviya Teykovskoy raketnoy divizii poluchili khoroshuyu otsenku," ITAR-TASS, 4 April 2003; in Integrum Techno, http://www.integrum.com. {Entered 7/17/2003 MJ}

3/20/2003: WAR IN IRAQ PROMPTS HIGHER SRF ALERTNESS
On 20 March 2003, Strategic Rocket Forces (SRF) Press Service chief Colonel Aleksandr Vovk said that while the SRF is always in a state of combat readiness, the ongoing combat operations in Iraq have resulted in increased vigilance and alertness on the part of the SRF alert forces.
["Rossiyskiye raketnyye voyska strategicheskogo naznacheniya nesut sluzhbu v obychnom rezhime," Regions.ru, 20 March 2003; in Integrum Techno, http://www.integrum.com. {Entered 7/17/2003 MJ}

2/21/2003: SRF REGIMENT IN TVER OBLAST USES LOCAL CONSCRIPTS ONLY
ITAR-TASS reported on 21 February 2003 that one Strategic Rocket Forces regiment based in Tver Oblast uses draftees who come exclusively from that region. As a result of this practice, which began three years ago, the regiment currently is one of the better SRF units, in the opinion of Tver Oblast Governor Vladimir Platov. Platov also announced that there are plans to form in Tver Oblast a company within the armed forces of the Ministry of Interior based on the same conscription policy. He believes that allowing soldiers to serve closer to home creates a healthier environment within units and leads to the elimination of hazing (neustavnyye otnosheniya).
["Pervoye vo vnutrennikh voyskakh podrazdeleniye, sformirovannoye iz zemlyakov, budet sozdano v Podmoskovye," ITAR-TASS, 21 February 2003; in Integrum Techno, http://www.integrum.com.] {Entered 4/23/2003 EMC}

2/20/2003: SRF PRIVATE KILLS FOUR OTHER SOLDIERS, SELF
A conscript serving in the Strategic Rocket Forces (SRF) division based in the village of Kedrovyy near Krasnoyarsk shot and killed four fellow soldiers before committing suicide in the early morning of 20 February 2003.[1] The soldier, Sergey Khanov, reportedly opened fire from his AK-74 assault rifle upon entering the guard room of a petroleum product storage facility, killing a senior warrant officer, two privates, and a private first class.[2] SRF Commander Colonel General Nikolay Solovtsov traveled to Kedrovyy to oversee an investigation to be conducted by the Military Prosecutor's Office.[3] The criminal investigation, led by Krasnoyarsk Garrison Prosecutor Sergey Fedorov, intends to explore several possible motives for the shooting, including hazing (dedovshchina), a nervous breakdown, personal problems, and the possibility that alcohol or narcotics was involved.[2,3] Concerns that dedovshchina played a role in the incident stem from the fact that the deceased had served longer than Private Khanov, who reportedly told family members that bullying by more senior soldiers was a widespread occurrence in the division.[1,2,4] In addition to hazing, the investigation initially focused upon the psychological stress encountered by soldiers forced into guard detail every other day due to a shortage of conscript soldiers.[1,5] In general, the division has experienced difficulties since March 2001 when the Minister of Defense ordered the dealerting of ballistic missiles stationed in Kedrovyy and a reorientation of the unit towards providing security for launch sites and fuel storage facilities, a move which cost more than 1,500 officers their jobs.[1,3] Although future cuts to the officer corps are envisioned, the leadership of the Kedrovyy division remains confident that existing security measures are more than adequate to prevent an accidental missile launch.[1]
Sources:
[1] Aleksandr Makarov, "Strategicheskaya tragediya," Izvestiya, 20 February 2003, p. 10; in Integrum Techno, http://www.integrum.com.
[2] Yuriy Gavrilov, "Karaulu prishla khana," Moskovskiy komsomolets, No. 23219, 21 February 2003; in Integrum Techno, http://www.integrum.com.
[3] Anatoliy Monakhov, "Ogon po sosluzhivtsam," Rossiyskaya gazeta, No. 34, 21 February 2003; in Integrum Techno, http://www.integrum.com.
[4] Andrey Khokhlov, "Rasstrel pod shchitom rodiny," Vremya-MN, No. 25, 22 February 2003; in Integrum Techno, http://www.integrum.com.
[5] "Ryadovoy rasstrelyal karaul i zastrelilsya," Grani.ru Web Site, http://www.grani.ru/Events/Crime/p.23463.html, 20 February 2003. {Entered 2/26/2003 EMC}

2/14/2003: CONTINUED ICBM SAFETY QUESTIONED
According to an article co-written by Duma Defense Committee Deputy Chairman Nikolay Bezborodov that appeared in Nezavisimoye voyennoye obozreniye on 14 February 2003, the recent tragedy involving the US space shuttle Columbia should serve as a warning sign for the Russian military. In particular, Bezborodov expresses concern about the future safety of the Russian intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) force. He focuses upon the common practice, due to inadequate funding, of prolonging the recommended service life of existing ICBMs rather than producing new missiles, and argues that this leads to the physical degradation of missiles as a result of metal fatigue and other factors. In support of his opinion that the Russian military should adhere strictly to the service life limits set by rocket designers, Bezborodov cites Army General Yuriy Yashin, the former Deputy Commander of the Strategic Rocket Forces, who states that attempts to extend the service life of ICBM force assets beyond the intended 10-15 years will likely lead to a catastrophe. In addition, attempts to extend the service life of the nuclear warheads deployed on the ICBMs represent an even greater threat, given that the conventional explosives and tritium used in the warheads to obtain the critical mass required for a nuclear reaction have a tendency to fissure and decay over time. It is not likely, however, that the Russian military, lacking specialized personnel and funds, will be able to replace nuclear warheads whose service life has expired. Combined with an inability to test the continued functionality of warheads under the terms of the existing moratorium on nuclear testing, Bezborodov concludes that these issues raise serious questions about the continued safety of the ICBM force.
[Mikhail Khodarenok, Nikolay Bezborodov, "Batsilla stareniya razyedayet yadernyy shchit i voyennuyu aviatsiyu," Nezavisimoye voyennoye obozreniye online edition, http://nvo.ng.ru/forces/2003-02-14/1_bacilla.html, 14 February 2003.] {Entered 2/26/2003 EMC}

12/25/2002: RESUMPTION OF SILO TEST LAUNCHES STUDIED
ITAR-TASS reported on 25 December 2002 that the Ministry of Defense is considering resuming ICBM test launches from launch silos at line SRF missile units. During the 1990s test launches were conducted exclusively from specialized test launch facilities. However, during the Soviet era ICBMs were frequently launched directly from launch silos belonging to SRF divisions.
["Rossiyskiye voyennyye izuchayut vozmozhnost vozobnovleniya uchebno-boyevykh puskov MBR s raketnykh baz," ITAR-TASS, 25 December 2002; in Integrum Techno, http://www.integrum.ru/.] {Entered 1/10/2003 MJ}

12/17/2002: SOLOVTSOV ON SRF FUTURE
On 17 December 2002, during a TV news interview to mark the anniversary of the SRF, SRF Commander Colonel General Nikolay Solovtsov said that only three rocket armies remain in the SRF.[1] The command post and communications center of the Chita-based 53rd Rocket Army[2] was taken off combat alert on 1 July 2002. One of the army's divisions was also deactivated, while the remaining two, h eadquartered in Kansk and Irkutsk, will be subordinated to the Omsk rocket army headquarters.[1] However, according to Solovtsov, by 2010 the SRF is to have only two rocket armies and 10-12 missile divisions. Rail-mobile RT-23UTTKh [NATO designation SS-24 'Scalpel'] ICBMs will most likely be withdrawn from service by that time, according to Solovtsov. Units equipped with these missiles are to be transformed into storage facilities, where the missiles will be stored and maintained unarmed.[3] R-36M-series [NATO designation SS-18 'Satan'] missiles are to remain in service until 2016. The SRF is also to receive another Topol-M regiment, which will also be based in Tatishchevo. According to Solovtsov, Topol-M ICBMs will enter service at a rate of one regiment every two to two and a half years. Topol-M production will be around six to 10 missiles annually.[4] Solovtsov also said the the SRF had raised the issue of designing a new medium-range ballistic missile, which would require up to 10 years to develop.[5]
Sources:
[1] Sergey Babkin, "V boyevom sostave Raketnykh voysk strategicheskogo naznacheniya ostayutsya 3 raketnykh armii, soobshchil komanduyushchiy RVSN," ITAR-TASS, 17 December 2002; in Integrum Techno, http://www.integrum.ru/.
[2] "Chitinskaya oblast. Osnovnyye sobytiya Chitinskoy oblasti - 2002," VolgaInform, 5 January 2003; in Integrum Techno, http://www.integrum.ru/.
[3] Sergey Babkin, "Zheleznodorozhnyye raketnyye kompleksy ostanutsya v sostave Raketnykh voysk strategicheskogo naznacheniya do 2010 goda," ITAR-TASS, 16 December 2002; in Integrum Techno, http://www.integrum.ru/.
[4] Sergey Babkin, "Mobilnaya i statsionarnaya gruppirovki Raketnykh voysk na blizhayshiye desyatiletiya ne preterpyat sushchestvennykh izmeneniy," ITAR-TASS, 15 December 2002; in Integrum Techno, http://www.integrum.ru/.
[5] Sergey Babkin, "Obvalnykh sokrashcheniy po gruppirovke Raketnykh voysk strategicheskogo naznacheniya ne budet," ITAR-TASS, 15 December 2002; in Integrum Techno, http://www.integrum.ru/. {Entered 1/10/2003 MJ}

12/6/2002: NEW VLADIMIR ROCKET ARMY COMMANDER ON SECURITY FORCE PROFESSIONALIZATION
The Vladimir-headquartered rocket army of the SRF received a new commander, Lieutenant General Vladimir Gagarin, a career SRF officer who previously served in the Novosibirsk, Kansk, and Irkutsk SRF units, On 10 October 2002. Prior to assuming army command he served as the commander of the Chita SRF division. His predecessor, Viktor Alekseyev, was promoted to the post of SRF Deputy Commander.[1] During an interview Gagarin gave in early December 2002, he said that while about half of the enlisted ranks in the army were conscripts, the so-called "constant readiness" units were manned exclusively by contract soldiers. Further professionalization depends on funding, according to Gagarin. Since members of the security force protecting the army headquarters earn a monthly salary of only 1,300 rubles [$40 as of January 2003] during their first year of service and only 1,750 [$55 as of January 2003] per year after 20 years, the security force consists mostly of women. Another problem facing the army is housing, although the situation in the Vladimir army may be better than in other units. In 2003 Vladimir headquarters is to receive an 80-apartment building for families of servicemembers, and missile divisions in Kostroma, Yoshkar-Ola and Teykovo are to receive apartment buildings as well.[2]
Sources:
[1] "U vladimirskoy raketnoy armii novyy komanduyushchiy," Moskovskiy komsomolets, 5 December 2002; in "Novyy komanduyushchiy vladimirskoy raketnoy armii V. Gagarin dal press-konferentsiyu," Novosti-online, 6 December 2002; in Integrum Techno, http://www.integrum.ru/.
[2] Yevgeniy Nizov, "Yadernyy shchit strany derzhat vo Vladimire," Argumenty i fakty, 4 December 2002; in "Vladimirskoye obyedineniye raketnykh voysk strategicheskogo naznacheniya - odno iz elitnykh podrazdeleniy rossiyskoy armii," Novosti-online, 4 December 2002; in Integrum Techno, http://www.integrum.ru/. {Entered 1/10/2003 MJ}

10/3/2002: HOUSING ISSUES TROUBLE SRF
In August-September 2002, a series of articles about social problems encountered by the Strategic Rocket Forces (SRF) appeared in Russian mass media focusing on military issues. The articles describe difficulties encountered by the SRF as it implements a reform program ordered by presidential edict. In particular, the articles outline the implications of a chronic housing shortage. In an interview published on 5 September 2002 in Krasnaya zvezda, SRF Commander Colonel General Nikolay Solovtsov admitted that the housing problem is the most pressing social issue confronting the SRF. There are 14,500 SRF members, or 28% of the total number of contract servicemen, who lack housing, an increase of 11% over 1998.[1] An additional 14,300 discharged SRF servicemen (as opposed to 12,600 in 1998) continue to occupy SRF housing while awaiting transfer from military settlements (voyennyye gorodki), which constitutes both a security threat and a drain on existing resources.[1,2] The amount of housing occupied by discharged servicemen represents 40-80% of existing resources.[3] Cuts in extra-budgetary funding earmarked for the purchase of housing lie at the heart of the shortage. The 22 million rubles ($696,000 as of 5 September 2002) in funding provided in 2002 will purchase 26 apartments, in contrast to the 138 apartments acquired in 2000 when the SRF received 76.2 million rubles ($2.7 million as of 1 June 2000). As a result, the number of military settlements with difficulties providing incoming officers with housing has doubled in the past three years, and the SRF cannot meet its legal obligation to provide discharged servicemen with housing. There has been better success concerning officers from disbanded military settlements: 60% of these individuals are transferred to other units, and almost all officers who choose to retire have received state housing certificates.[1] In a 23 August 2002 interview with Nezavisimoye voennoye obozreniye, Solovtsov suggested that increased funding to construct housing for discharged servicemen in larger outlying cities will free up housing in the military settlements for current SRF members and address the shortage, which particularly is pronounced in the Novosibirsk, Yoshkar-Ola, and Barnaul garrisons.[3] To date the state housing certificate program designed to address the problem of providing housing for former servicemen has proved ineffective due to differences between market prices and the calculations on which the certificates are based.[2] The plight of the Novosibirsk SRF division, described in an article in Krasnaya zvezda on 10 September 2002, is indicative of the housing crisis: 505 servicemen, 148 recent graduates of military institutes, and 117 families transferred from other military units currently require housing while families of already discharged servicemen occupy two-thirds of existing housing. This forces servicemen to rent housing in communities surrounding the settlement at a cost that can be prohibitive.[2] The negative effect of the housing crisis offsets positive developments in the social support system for the SRF, such as success in equating the pay of servicemen and federal employees.[1]
[1] Aleksandr Vovk and Aleksandr Dolinin, "Lyudi i rakety: sotsialnyy aspekt," Krasnaya zvezda online edition, http://www.redstar.ru/2002/09/10_09/2_03.html, 5 September 2002.
[2] Vadim Koval, "Gde zhit leytenantam?," Krasnaya zvezda online edition, http://www.redstar.ru/2002/09/05_09/1_01.html, 10 September 2002.
[3] Salavat Suleymanov, "Moskva utochnyayet raketnyye prioritety," Nezavisimoye voennoye obozreniye online edition, http://nvo.ng.ru, 23 August 2002. {Entered 10/3/2002 EMC}

8/2002: MORE ON PLANS TO RETAIN MIRVED ICBMS
Defense Minister Sergey Ivanov announced on 16 August 2002 that Russia will retain R-36M-series [NATO designation SS-18 'Satan'] ICBMs (154 of which are permitted by the START I treaty) until 2016.[1] Under the new plan, SS-18-equipped divisions in Kartaly, Uzhur, and Dombarovskiy, with a total of 154 SS-18 silos, may be kept in service.[2] According to the SRF Commander, Colonel General Nikolay Solovtsov, the decision to retain two SS-18 divisions has already been made, and the decision concerning a third is pending.[3]  In addition, the Kostroma-based rail-mobile RT-23UTTKh [NATO designation SS-24 'Scalpel'] ICBM division with 12 launch units will also be retained.[2] The SS-18s are to have their service life extended through reconfiguring the missiles and their payload. Acknowledging the high cost of maintaining these missiles, which were manufactured in Ukrainian facilities, Solovtsov added that Topol-M production may be reduced to help pay for SS-18 modernization.[3] On 16 August 2002, during a visit to the Kartaly SS-18 division, Defense Minister Sergey Ivanov said that the decision to retain these missiles was not linked to the US decision to withdraw from the ABM Treaty.[4] Some Russian observers have interpreted these decisions to retain SS-18s and SS-24s as a sign that the Chief of the General Staff Chief, Army General Anatoliy Kvashnin, who had earlier sought to reduce the SRF, was losing influence.[5] On 13 September 2002, US Undersecretary of State John Bolton said that the United States had no objections to the Russian decision to retain SS-18 ICBMs, adding that such a decision was fully justified after the signing of the Moscow Treaty made START II moot.[6]
Sources:
[1] "Russia to keep multiple warhead nuclear missiles until 2016," Agence France Presse, 16 August 2002; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, http://www.lexis-nexis.com.
[2] Vladimir Levin, "Satan against Topol-M," Press-tsentr.ru, 21 August 2002; in "Russia: Commentary on Decision To Retain SS-18 Missile Division," FBIS Document CEP20020821000239.
[3] Dmitriy Litovkin, "Missiles Will Fly in Another Direction," Izvestiya, 15 August 2002; in "Russia: RVSN Commander Solovtsov on Future of R-36 (SS-18 Satan) Missiles," FBIS Document CEP20020815000261.
[4] RTR Planeta TV, 16 August 2002; in "Russia's decision on Satan missiles not linked to US withdrawal from ABM," FBIS Document CEP20020816000334.
[5] Vladimir Urban, "With 'Satan' in Your Bosom: The Next RVSN Reform Is Fertile Soil for the Resignation of Chief of the General Staff Anatoliy Kvashnin," Novyye izvestiya, 20 August 2002; in "Russia: Retention of SS-18 ICBMs Shows CoGS Kvashnin May Be Losing Influence," FBIS Document CEP20020823000462.
[6] Interfax, 13 September 2002; in "US official says no objection to Russia maintaining Satan missiles," FBIS Document CEP20020913000114. {Entered 10/7/2002 MJ}

6/15/2002: SRF OFFICER CANDIDATES CAUGHT SELLING EXPLOSIVES
ORT reported on 15 June 2002 that two graduates of the Rostov Strategic Rocket Forces Institute were arrested while attempting to sell two kilograms of plastic explosives in the center of Rostov. The arrests were made by the Rostov Oblast directorate for combating organized crime. Details of the case were immediately classified by the FSB.
[ORT, 15 June 2002; in "Russia: Graduates of military institute caught selling explosives," FBIS Document CEP2002615000018.] {Entered 8/26/2002 MJ}

5/24/2002: SS-18s TO REMAIN IN SERVICE
Colonel General Yuriy Baluyevskiy, First Deputy Chief of the Russian General Staff, announced on 24 May 2002 that the SRF would retain R-36M-series [NATO designation SS-18 'Satan'] ICBMs for several more years. Given proper service life extension procedures, the missiles could remain in service beyond 2010. The Russian Federation, Baluyevskiy said, did not intend to continue SS-18 cuts beyond those required by START I, which were completed in December 2001. The decision to retain these missiles may be due to the unlikelihood of START II entry into force, which the Russian Duma made contingent on continued US adherence to the ABM Treaty. However, in view of the difficulty involved in maintaining these heavy and relatively old missiles (further complicated by the fact that their main production facility is in Ukraine) and the reduction of funding for strategic forces, it is not clear whether the SRF will be able to afford to modernize these missiles.
[ITAR-TASS, 24 May 2002; in "Russia: Senior General Says 'Satan' Missiles to Remain in Service," FBIS Document CEP20020524000299.] {Entered 5/28/2002 MJ}
 
3/18/2002: RUSSIA TO RESUME TOPOL-M TESTING
Russian Ministry of Defense announced on 18 March 2002 that it planned to resume test launches of the mobile variant of the RS-12M1 Topol-M [NATO designation SS-27 'Sickle'] ICBMs. The system is to be formally adopted into service following up to 10 launches. The first (and so far the only) launch of a mobile Topol-M variant took place in September 2000.
["Russia Announces Topol-M Testing," Jane's Defence Weekly, 27 March 2002,  p. 16.] {Entered 4/19/2002 IA}
 
3/15/2002: SRF LIEUTENANT COMMITS SUICIDE DURING INSPECTION
Agentstvo Voyennykh Novostey reported on 15 March 2002 that Lieutenant Igor Boytsov, who was in charge of a warhead protection unit at an SRF base near Novosibirsk, shot himself with his service pistol on 14 March 2002 while his unit was being inspected by SRF Commander General Nikolay Solovtsov.  Military psychologists have concluded that the suicide was caused by stress overload and Boytsov's exaggerated sense of duty as the new head of a warhead protection unit.  The 33rd Missile Army command has launched an investigation to determine whether there were any other underlying reasons for the suicide. 
[Agentstvo Voyennykh Novostey, 15 March 2002; in "Strategic Missile Forces Serviceman Commits Suicide in Southern Siberia," FBIS Document CEP20020315000040.] {Entered 3/27/2002 IA}
 
3/14/2002: SRF CUTBACKS ACCOMPANIED BY CHANGES IN NUCLEAR POSTURE
Reports of cutbacks in the Strategic Rocket Forces (SRF) in 2001 and 2002 have been accompanied by reports of changes in Russia's nuclear posture. Colonel General Yuriy Baluyevskiy, First Deputy Chief of the General Staff, acknowledged on 19 January 2002 that naval forces have been given priority in Russia's future plans for its nuclear triad.[1] Evidence of this change included orders for resumption of SLBM production, plans to modernize Project 667 BDRM Delfin [NATO name 'Delta-IV'] class SSBNs, and the decision to retain three Project 941 Akula [NATO name 'Typhoon'] class SSBNs in service. (For more information please see the 1/19/2002 entry in the Russia: Strategic Forces General Developments file.) Further cutbacks in SRF strength are progressing according to plan.  Rail-mobile ICBM SRF divisions at Kostroma, Krasnoyarsk, and Bershet are being disbanded and are carrying out missile elimination activities.[2] The Krasnoyarsk SRF Division was officially taken off alert duty and disbanded on 14 March 2002.[3] The disbanded division plans to release 500 civilian and 800 military personnel from duty. The SRF training institute at Perm will also be closed in 2003.[2] The Chita Army HQ has already been deactivated and Orenburg Army HQ is to share its fate. As a result, another five SRF divisions--located at Kartaly, Nizhniy Tagil, Yoshkar-Ola, Yasnaya, and Yurya--will be deactivated. Of the 19 SRF missile divisions that existed in 2000, only 10 will remain by 2010. Only two missile divisions, the Tatishchevo Division at Saratov and the Uzhur Division at Omsk, are considered combat-ready.[4] In addition, the latest regiment to be re-equipped with Topol-M ICBMs in 2001 received only six missiles instead of the usual 10.[1]
Sources:
[1] Sergey Sokut, "Russia is Changing Its Concept of Constructing Nuclear Forces," Nezavisimoye voyennoye obozreniye, 19 January 2002; in "Report on Radical Change in Priority in Triad of Strategic Nuclear Forces in Favor of Navy," FBIS Document CEP20020118000353.
[2] Nikolay Ivanov, "From Alert Duty to the Market:  1,300 People Will Be Unemployed After the Elimination of the RVSN Urals Division," Nezavisimaya gazeta, 11 March 2002, p. 4; in "Ivanov report on reorganization of Perm Strategic Missile Troops division, replacement of rail-mobile missile systems, impact on local population in terms of unemployment, housing problems," FBIS Document CEP20020312000267.
[3] RIA-Novosti, 14 March 2002; in "Russia: Venskaya missile division taken off alert duty, disbanded," FBIS Document CEP20020314000326.
[4] Yuriy Gavrilov, "Under the Protection of the 'Topols.' Each of Them Represents 50 Hiroshimas," Moskovskiy komsomolets, 14 March 2002, p. 2; in Strategic Missile Troop Cuts Having 'No Effect' on Russia's Defense Capability," FBIS Document CEP20020314000065. {Entered 3/28/02 RG}
 
3/11/2002: TOPOL-M PRODUCTION SETBACKS CAUSED BY FUNDING PROBLEMS AND ALLEGED RACKETEERING
Setbacks in production of the RT-2PM2 Topol-M [NATO designation SS-27 'Sickle'] in 2001 were reportedly caused by a combination of poor funding allocation and alleged racketeering in connection with the Votkinsk Machine Building Plant in Udmurtiya, which is the sole facility that produces the Topol-M.  Moscow Institute of Thermal Technology (MITT) Director Yuriy Solomonov announced on 7 February 2002 that only 18% of the designated funds for Topol-M production in 2001 were actually allocated, and only 2% of the intended funds for research and development were received.  This was partly caused by the Defense Ministry's inability to advance the allocated funds after they were diverted by a court order in 2001 to pay off other debts.[1]  Another problem, however, reportedly involves the issue of control of money flows. It has been alleged that Vladislav Kochetkov, a local businessman who is accused of being involved in racketeering, has been able to obtain access to the Votkinsk Plant's finances.[2]  The Defense Ministry proposed directly paying the Votkinsk facility to build the missiles instead of going through MITT channels, but Votkinsk Director Viktor Tolmachev allegedly turned down the proposal for fear that the money would fall under Kochetkov's control. However, as a result of channeling funds through MITT, the Votkinsk Plant receives its funding with considerable delays, which in turn delays missile production.[1]
Sources:
[1] Vladimir Kucherennko, "Topolya Shumyat, Topolya," Stringer Agency, No. 22, 11 March 2002.
[2] "Udmurtskaya bratva delayet rakety," Agentstvo politicheskikh novostey, 6 March 2002. {Entered 3/22/2002 RG}
      
2/15/2002: AUDIT CHAMBER TO CHECK SRF SPACE LAUNCH ACTIVITIES
On 15 February 2002 the State Duma instructed the Audit Chamber to conduct an audit of space launch operations conducted by the SRF between 1 September 2001 and 1 June 2001. During this time the SRF controlled Russia's space assets, which on 1 June 2001 were removed from the SRF and formed into a separate command. The SRF conducted 41 commercial space launches and put 84 foreign satellites into orbit; earnings from such activities were approximately $200 million. However, there are concerns that these funds have been misused on such projects as the renovation of the SRF Main Staff building in Vlasikha or the high-profile celebrations of the SRF's 40th anniversary, and that the SRF may have violated Russia's contracting laws by issuing lucrative space launch insurance contracts to favored companies. [1] Whereas a single space launch may bring in several million dollars in revenue, the actual cost of a single launch is, on average, only $50,000.  Low launch costs were achieved by the use of existing space launch facilities, converted ballistic missiles, and regular SRF missile crews. However, in spite of the high profitability of such activities, few of these funds have found their way into cash-strapped SRF defense projects, such as the Topol-M ICBM development program.[2]
Sources:
[1] Ivan Safonov, "Comptroller's Office Will Check Space," Kommersant, 16 February 2002, p. 2; in "Russia: Comptroller's Office To Check Missile Troops, Aviastar Company," FBIS Document CEP20020219000048.
[2] Viktor May-Mayevskiy, "Davayte-ka, rebyata, sochtemsya posle starta," Grani.ru Web Site, http://www.grani.ru/space_mil/articles/vinidiktov, 19 February 2002. {Entered 5/3/2002 MJ}
 
2/7/2002: SRF PROSECUTOR REPORTS DROP IN CRIME, FOCUS ON REFORM
SRF Prosecutor and Lieutenant General of Justice Aleksandr Vertukhin announced that in 2001, the number of crimes registered by the SRF Procuracy dropped by six percent.  In addition to the drop in crime, Vertukhin reported that 148 victims of prior political repression were rehabilitated and 16.5 million rubles in damages were collected for the state in 2001.  He also emphasized that the SRF Prosecutor's priority for the year 2002 will be supervising SRF and Space Forces reform, and protecting the rights of military servicemen and their families.
[Dmitriy Yutov, "Priority-Protecting Rights of Military Servicemen," Krasnaya zvezda, 7 February 2002; in "Russia:  RVSN Procuracy Notes Six Percent Drop in Crime During Past Year," FBIS Document CEP20020207000347.] {Entered 4/2/2002 RG}
 
2/5/2002: DROVYANAYA SRF BASE SUFFERS FROM ELECTRICITY CUTS
The Drovyanaya SRF missile base in Chita Oblast has been suffering from intermittent power outages due to the unit's inability to pay electricity bills. The base's garrison area, which houses some 4,800 troops and their families, has had electricity turned off for four hours every day. The unit's missile facilities apparently have not been affected by the cuts.
[Interfax, 5 February 2002; in "Russia: Power Cut Continues at Siberian Missile Forces Base," FBIS Document CEP20020205000048.] {Entered 5/29/2002 MJ}
 
1/29/2002: SRF TO RECEIVE ONLY SIX TOPOL-MS IN 2002
Deputy Defense Minister and Chief of Armaments Aleksey Moskovskiy announced on 29 January 2002 that the SRF will receive only six Topol-M ICBMs. The reduction in the Topol-M deployment rate was caused by the drop in the share of the defense budget allocated for strategic nuclear forces. In 1998 strategic forces (including the SRF) received 40% of the defense budget, but in 2001 and 2002 their share was reduced to only 18%.
["Rossiyskiye vooruzhennyye sily poluchat v 2002 godu shest raketnykh kompleksov 'Topol-m'," Interfax, 29 January 2002.] {Entered 5/3/2002 MJ}
 
7/11/2001: KOZELSK DIVISION COMMANDER ON LOCAL TIES
In an article published in the Kaluga newspaper Vest shortly before his reassignment to Moscow, Kozelsk Missile Division Commander Major General Sergey Karakayev praised Kozelsk city authorities for their understanding and cooperation in helping the division address its social concerns. Karakayev noted that the city also benefited from having the 6,000 strong division stationed in Kozelsk, which has fallen on hard economic times. With most of the factories and collective farms in and around the city inactive, the division has become the most important employer in the area. Karakayev expressed hope the cooperation between local and military authorities will continue.
[Sergey Karakayev,"Raketnaya krepost," Vest, 11 July 2001; in Integrum Techno, http://www.integrum.ru/.]  {Entered 8/30/2001 MJ}
 
12/4/2001: SOCIAL ASPECTS OF SRF UNIT DISBANDMENT DISCUSSED
An article in the 4 December 2001 issue of Krasnaya zvezda discussed the need to address the issue of the bases being vacated by SRF divisions that are in process of deactivation. As of late 2001 the SRF controlled 15 closed administrative units (ZATOs), but that number is expected to decrease by more than half in the next few years. In spite of this, the Russian government has not yet prepared a program that would define the future of these bases or military and civilian personnel residing on their territory, and address the concerns of the regions in which these missile units are based and whose economy depends on their existence. For example, the Yurya missile division, whose associated ZATO houses about 2,000 families, is a source of employment to the officers' wives and the local civilian population of Yurya. The article recommends transferring the responsibility for the communal services at the missile units to the ZATO administrations, in order to facilitate the work on missile and warhead transfers by reducing the workload on the unit commanders, and to ensure the sites are not abandoned to scrap metal scavengers. The extent of the threat is illustrated by a case of theft of metals from eliminated IRBM sites by scavengers who somehow managed to enter the missile base in spite of security measures. The SRF leadership is reportedly interested in having the General Staff station other military formations at sites vacated by SRF divisions.[1] Such measures have already been adopted in regard to a number of deactivated SRF facilities. For example, the site of the deactivated Aleysk missile division became the home for a motorized rifle division previously stationed elsewhere in the Siberian Military District.[2] Nevertheless, not all deactivated bases can be reoccupied in this fashion, and the remainder will need to be demilitarized. To avoid widespread theft of military property, the Krasnaya zvezda article advocates retaining the closed status of the sites, a move which would also facilitate creating business enterprises on the sites and address the social problems of the families of former military servicemen of deactivated units. Subordinating them directly to oblast or kray authorities has been proposed in order to ensure closer attention to their needs. Finally, given the sensitive nature of the bases, even after deactivation they will need to be guarded against espionage.[1]
Sources:
[1] Aleksandr Dolinin, Gennadiy Miranovich, "Vzglyad na problemu. Nevedomstvennyy vopros," Krasnaya zvezda, 4 December 2001, p. 2; in East View Universal Database of Russian Military & Security Periodicals, http://www.russianlibrary.ru/.
[2] Agentstvo voyennykh novostey, 3 April 2002; in "Motorized rifle division moves from 36th joint-arms [sic] army to 41st army," FBIS Document CEP20020403000068.{Entered 5/1/2002 MJ}
 
7/1/2001: UR-100NUTTKh MODERNIZATION PROGRAM UNDERFUNDED
Gerbert Efremov, director of NPO Mashinostroyeniya in Reutov, complained that in the first half of 2001 he received only 4% of the funds budgeted for the program to extend the service life of the UR-100NUTTKh [NATO designation SS-19 'Stiletto'].  
["Aviastroyeniye," MPTsDS Mashinostroyeniya, 1 July 2001; in Integrum Techno,  http://www.integrum.ru/.] {Entered 9/21/2001 IA}
 
6/23/2001: NEW SRF COMMANDER ON REFORM PROCESS
Speaking during a graduation ceremony on 23 June 2001 at the Peter the Great Military Academy, which trains future SRF officers, SRF Commander Colonel General Nikolay Solovtsov said that his organization has already completed the first step of its reforms, which involved reducing its status from a separate branch of service to a separate command, and transferring strategic early warning and ABM assets from the SRF to the newly created Space Forces. Solovtsov said that the SRF's reform process would continue until 2005,[1] and expressed confidence that his command would remain viable in the foreseeable future and be able to render ineffective any US attempts to create ballistic missile defenses.[2]
Sources:
[1] "Pervyy etap reformirovaniya RVSN zavershen, zayavil Nikolay Solovtsov," ITAR-TASS, 23 June 2001; in Integrum Techno, http://www.integrum.ru.
[2] "Raketnyye voyska strategicheskogo naznacheniya, sposobny obespechit stabilnost v Rossii i vo vsem mire, zayavil Nikolay Solovtsov," ITAR-TASS, 23 June 2001; in Integrum Techno, http://www.integrum.ru. {Entered 8/28/2001 MJ}
 
6/8/2001: IRKUTSK OBLAST TO SUPPORT SRF UNITS
On 8 June 2001 Irkutsk Oblast Governor Boris Govorin met with SRF Commander Colonel General Nikolay Solovtsov to discuss the situation in the SRF units located in the oblast. Govorin promised that his administration would aid local SRF units in maintaining and expanding their social infrastructure.
["Oblast pomozhet raketchikam," Teleinform-Irkutsk, 8 June 2001; in Integrum Techno, http://www.integrum.ru/.] {Entered 8/29/2001 MJ}
 
5/23/2001: SRF, ALTAY KRAY ADMINISTRATION SIGN PROTOCOL ON ALEYSK DIVISION DEACTIVATION
For more information, see the 5/23/2001 entry in the Russia: ICBM Deactivation and Dismantlement section. {Entered 5/25/2001 MJ}
 
5/17/2001: SRF TO RECEIVE ANOTHER TOPOL-M REGIMENT BY YEAR'S END
On 17 May 2001 the SRF announced that it expected to declare operational its fourth regiment of Topol-Ms [NATO designation SS-27 'Sickle'] ICBMs in December 2001. Like other Topol-M units, the new regiment will belong to the missile division based near Tatishchevo (Saratov Oblast). The announcement did not indicate whether the regiment would have the full complement of 10 missiles.[1,2] 
Sources:
[1] "K kontsu goda na boyevom dezhurstve v Rossii budet boleye 30 raketnykh kompleksov 'Topol-M'," ITAR-TASS, 17 May 2001.
[2] "V dekabre etogo goda na boyevoye dezhurstvo budet postavlen ocherednoy polk MBR 'Topol-M', zayavil glavkom RVSN," ITAR-TASS, 17 May 2001. {Entered 6/7/2001 MJ}
 
4/27/2001: NEW SRF COMMANDER APPOINTED
On 27 April 2001 Vladimir Putin appointed Colonel General Nikolay Solovtsov to the position of SRF commander, replacing Army General Vladimir Yakovlev who served in this position since May 1997, when he succeeded Igor Sergeyev following the latter's appointment as defense minister.[1] The fact that the SRF highest position was officially downgraded from Commander-in-Chief to Commander indicates that the SRF is not expected to remain an independent branch of the military. Solovtsov is a career SRF officer, and prior to his current appointment he headed Peter the Great Military Academy.[2] General Yakovlev was subsequently appointed to the post of Chief of the CIS Military Cooperation Coordination Staff.[3] 
Sources:
[1] Agentstvo Voyennykh Novostey, 27 April 200; in "Russia:  New Strategic Missiles Forces commander appointed," FBIS document CEP20010427000274. 
[2] Washington Post, 28 April 2001, p. A18; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, http://web.lexis-nexis.com.
[3] Vladimir Petrov, "Pukh 'Topoley' v Ministerstve oborony," Novyye izvestiya, 8 June 2001, p. 2; in WPS Oborona i Bezopasnost, 11 June 2001; in Integrum Techno, http://www.integrum.ru/. {Entered 6/11/2001 MJ}
 
3/28/2001: SENIOR SRF OFFICERS ACCUSED OF FRAUD
Moskovskiy komsomolets reported on 28 March 2001 that an investigation of the SRF revealed corruption at high levels of the service. The most senior officer implicated is the former SRF Equipment and Automation Directorate Chief, Colonel Mazykin. A total of 11 SRF officers have been implicated. The paper also adds that the Mazykin case represented only a small fraction of corrupt activities in the SRF, and that a Ministry of Defense audit conducted at the same time as the investigation allegedly uncovered losses of about 50 million rubles (approximately $1.8 million as of 8 June 2001) worth of equipment in the SRF. The paper also accused Ministry of Defense senior leadership of attempting to cover up the scandal. The investigation may have had political motives, as it was conducted simultaneously with military reforms that reduced the SRF's status, and its results were reported on the day that Defense Minister Igor Sergeyev, himself a career SRF officer, was replaced by Sergey Ivanov. 
["Zaversheno rassledovaniye faktov o kolossalnykh khishcheniyakh v Raketnykh voyskakh strategicheskogo naznacheniya," Moskovskiy komsomolets, 28 March 2001, p. 1; in WPS Oborona i Bezopasnost, 30 March 2001; in Integrum Techno, http://www.integrum.ru/.] {Entered 6/8/2001 MJ}
 
3/23/2001: SRF TO LOSE SPACE COMPONENTS
On 23 March 2001 Vek reported that in June 2001 the Military Space Troops and the Missile-Space Defense Forces, which were merged into the SRF in 1997, will be taken from under the SRF's jurisdiction in June 2001. The two organizations will be merged into a new entity called Space Forces, which will be subordinate to the General Staff and which will control missile early warning, missile defense, and space assets. The SRF itself will be reduced in status. According to Vek, these changes will be implemented in accordance with the military reform plan for 2001-2005, which was approved by President Putin in January 2001.[1] Proponents of the reforms claim that the reorganization will simplify the organizational structure and will improve prospects for modernizing Russia's deteriorating space assets. According to some experts, the deterioration was caused by the 1997 decision to integrate the Military Space Troops and Missile-Space Defence Forces with the SRF, which used funds intended for these organizations to finance its own modernization programs.[2] Opponents of the reforms have attributed the new organizational changes to political maneuvering by General Staff Chief General Anatoliy Kvashnin rather than any alleged economic or organizational benefits.[1]
Sources:
[1] "Pilim raketu, na kotoroy sidim," Vek, 23 March 2001; in Integrum Techno, http://www.integrum.ru/. 
[2] Oleg Odnokolenko, "Osobennosti natsionalnoy voyennoy reformy," Segodnya, 2 March 2001; in Integrum Techno, http://www.integrum.ru/. {Entered 5/9/2001 MJ}
 
12/26/2000:  THIRD TOPOL-M MISSILE REGIMENT COMMISSIONED
On 26 December 2000 a third missile regiment armed with the new RS-12M2 [NATO designation SS-27] Topol-M entered active service.[1]  The new regiment, along with the other two Topol-M regiments, is part of the Tamanskaya Red Banner Missile Division stationed near Tatishchevo in Saratov Oblast.  SRF Commander Vladimir Yakovlev remarked that the SRF had fulfilled President Putin's and Defense Minister Igor Sergeyev's order to have three operational Topol-M regiments by the end of 2000.[2]  However, whereas the first Topol-M regiment, which became operational in 1998, and the second regiment, which  entered service in 1999, each had 10 Topol-M missiles, the third regiment had less than half of its authorized missile complement of 10 missiles at the time it was declared operational. Nezavisimaya gazeta reported that the newly commissioned missile regiment had only three combat-ready Topol-Ms, although it would receive a fourth missile in the near future.[2]  Earlier plans had called for a continual increase in the rate of Topol-M deployment each year.  Some have suggested that the reduced deployment rate may be a possible indicator of a shift in military spending priorities toward conventional forces.[3]
Sources:
[1] Sergey Sokut, "Topol-M's Instead of Scalpels.  Russia Has Said Goodbye to Ukrainian Missiles and Armed Itself With Its Own Ones," Nezavisimaya gazeta, 28 December 2000, p. 1; in "'Incomplete' Third Topol-M Missile Regiment Commissioned in Russia," FBIS Document CEP20001228000156. 
[2] Agentstvo Voyennykh Novostey, 26 December 2000; in "Russia:  3rd Topol-M Regiment declared operational," FBIS Document CEP20001226000148.
[3] David Hoffman, "Shift Seen In Russian Nuclear Policy," Washington Post, 27 December 2000, p. 20. {Entered 1/3/01 RG}
 
11/15/2000:  SRF TO BE REDUCED BY 10,000 SERVICEMEN IN 2001
Strategic Rocket Forces Commander Vladimir Yakovlev stated in an interview on 15 November 2000 that the SRF will be reduced by 10,000 servicemen in 2001.  This is part of the overall plans to reduce the SRF by 60,000 servicemen by 2006.  Yakovlev stated that SRF reductions still depend on the success of future arms control negotiations with the United States and continued cooperation on the ABM treaty.  Yakovlev also announced that in 2001 the SRF will conduct tests to evaluate its ability to successfully operate under the expected reductions in personnel.
["V budushchem godu v raketnykh voyskakh strategicheskogo naznacheniya Rossii planiruyetsya sokratit okolo 10 tysyach voyennosluzhashchikh," Interfax, No. 1, 15 November 2000.] {Entered 12/11/2000 RG}
 
11/4/2000:  SRF EVALUATING CHANGES IN ORGANIZATION AND DOCTRINE
SRF Commander Vladimir Yakovlev stated on 4 November 2000 that despite radical changes on the world scene, the role of nuclear forces as the "ultimate instrument" of the armed forces has not changed. At the same time, Yakovlev announced that Russia's nuclear forces may undergo changes in their composition and doctrine to reflect the world changes that have taken place in the last decade. Yakovlev emphasized the need to protect SRF assets, including support facilities, from conventional high-precision long range weapons through the use of air and missile defense systems as well as passive defense measures.[1] An unrelated article in Nezavisimaya gazeta announced that the SRF is equipping its Topol-M units with a countermeasures system that would render ICBM silos less vulnerable to attack by precision-guided weapons.[2]
Sources: 
[1] "Seychas rassmatrivayutsya neskolko variantov oblika i primeneniya strategicheskikh sil budushchego - glavkom RVSN RF," Interfax, No. 2, 4 November 2000. 
[2] Sergey Sokut, "Topol-M's Instead of Scalpels.  Russia Has Said Goodbye to Ukrainian Missiles and Armed Itself With Its Own Ones," Nezavisimaya gazeta, 28 December 2000, p. 1; in "'Incomplete' Third Topol-M Missile Regiment Commissioned in Russia," FBIS Document CEP20001228000156. {Entered 1/12/01 RG}
 
11/3/2000:  SRF DECIDES TO EXTEND RS-18 (SS-19) SERVICE LIFE  
On 3 November 2000 SRF Press Service Chief Colonel Ilshat Baychurin announced the SRF will extend the service life of the RS-18 [NATO designation SS-19 'Stiletto'] ICBM by one year.  This decision was  based on the successful test launch of a single-warhead RS-18 variant from the Baykonur Cosmodrome on 1 November 2000.  SRF commander Vladimir Yakovlev stated that the launch confirmed Russia's commitment to fulfill START treaty obligations and  verified the RS-18's reliability.  START II permits 105 single-warhead RS-18s to remain in service.
["Resheniye o vozmozhnosti prodleniya srokov ekspluatatsii RS-18 budet prinyato po rezultatam nedavnego uspeshnogo zapuska etoy rakety s 'Baykonura' - RVSN," Interfax, No. 4, 3 November 2000.]{Entered 11/15/2000 RG}
 
10/16/2000:  NEW TOPOL-M MOBILE VARIANT POISED FOR PRODUCTION IN NEAR FUTURE, FACES FUNDING PROBLEMS
Defense News reported on 16 October 2000 that the Russian Strategic Rocket Forces (SRF) could begin production of the mobile variant RS-12M1 Topol-M [NATO designation SS-27 'Sickle'] as early as 2002.[1]  The mobile Topol-M was first tested on 27 September 2000. An official of the Moscow Institute of Thermal Technology (MITT) stated that the missile will enter service after four more successful test launches.[1]  However, a report from Vremya novostey claims President Putin has already secretly signed the order to accept the mobile Topol-M into service.[2]  The mobile Topol-M uses the MZKT-79221 16-wheeled transporter erector launcher (TEL), manufactured in Belarus.  A new feature of the TEL is its ability to launch the Topol-M from unpaved surfaces.[3]  The mobile Topol-M is expected to replace the aging mobile RS-12M Topol [NATO designation SS-25 'Sickle'] which is scheduled for retirement in 2010.  The Topol-M has a shorter boost phase than the SS-25 which reportedly makes it less vulnerable to ABM systems. The MITT official reported that improvements are being made in the navigation systems to improve its accuracy, which is not as good as that of the silo-based version.[1]  The Topol-M has also been designed to be suitable for use as a commercial space launch vehicle.[3] Due to general funding difficulties, Topol-M procurement has progressed slowly.  Less than 20 missiles had been produced by the end of 1997.[4]  Vremya novostey reported that the Russian government order for silo-based Topol-Ms for 2000 was limited to six missiles and might be reduced to four due to funding problems.[2]  Deputy Prime Minister Ilya Klebanov recently announced that according to current plans a minimum of six Topol-Ms will be produced each year.[5] 
Sources:
[1] Simon Saradzhyan, "Russia Poised To Begin Building Mobile Topol-M," Defense News, 16 October 2000, p.22.
[2] Aleksandr Dolinin and Aleksandr Bogatyrev, "'Topol-M' startoval s grunta," Krasnaya zvezda, No. 184, 29 September 2000, p. 3.
[3] Yuriy Golotyuk, "Rossiya vooruzhilas novoy raketoy," Vremya novostey, No. 136, 29 September 2000; in Integrum techno, http://www.integrum.ru.
[4] Ivan Safronov, "'Topol-M' stal mobilnym," Komersant, No. 181, 28 Sep 2000; in Integrum techno, http://www.integrum.ru. 
[5] "Shest 'Topoley' v god," Nezavisimoye voyennoye obozreniye, No. 39, 20-26 October 2000, p. 6.{Entered 10/20/2000 RG}
 
10/12/2000:  TOPOL-M MOBILE VARIANT TO ENTER SERVICE BY 2002
On 12 October 2000 Kommersant reported that Russia's Defense Ministry plans to accept the mobile variant of the Topol-M [NATO designation SS-27] ICBM into SRF service by 2002.
[Ivan Safronov, "Ne khuzhe molodogo," Kommersant online edition,  http://www.online.ru/rproducts/.../17947273.DOC.rhtml, 12 October 2000.] {Entered 1/02/01 RG}
 
9/12/2000:  UNIFIED ENERGY SYSTEM OF RUSSIA SHUTS OFF POWER AT SRF FACILITIES IN IVANOVO OBLAST, RAISING CONCERNS ABOUT SAFETY
According to Interfax reports, Ivenergo, a regional branch of the Unified Energy System of Russia (YeES Rossii) warned Strategic Rocket Forces (SRF) facilities in Ivanovo Oblast that their power supply would be cut off on 11 September due to defaults in electric bill payments.[1,2]  On 11 September Ivenergo shut off the power at certain military base facilities, but shortly thereafter a group of soldiers stormed the main power center, took the plant personnel hostage, and restored power.  The SRF facilities in Ivanovo Oblast have accumulated a debt of over 19 million rubles ($682,000 as of 12 September 2000).  Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov stated that the power shut-off was "unacceptable, especially considering that the facility is on the essential power list."[1]  YeES Rossii responded that the power shut-off did not affect critical SRF facilities, and that they acted "...strictly in accordance with Russian legislation."[1]  The power shut off only affected the soldier barracks and dining areas at the base.  YeES Rossii Chairman Anatoliy Chubais also signed an order canceling any future power shut-offs at essential SRF facilities that are in debt.[2]  A similar incident had occurred when Altayenergo, another YeES Rossii regional branch, warned SRF facilities in Altay Kray on 13 September that their power supply would be cut off due to debts exceeding 5 million rubles ($180,000 as of 13 September 2000).[3]  The incidents in Ivanovo Oblast and Altay Kray have raised concerns about hostile reactions from SRF military units.[4] 
Sources:
[1] "Rossiyskiy premer nazyvayet nedopustimymi deystviya RAO EES, otkluchivshego podachu elektroenergii divizii RVSN," Interfax, No. 3, 12 September 2000.
[2] "Chubays zapretil regionalnym energosistemam otklyuchat ot elektroenergii chasti RVSN," Interfax, No. 3, 13 September 2000.
[3] "Energetiki Altayskogo kraya predupredili diviziyu RVSN o prekrashchenii energosnabzheniya za dolgi," Interfax, No. 1, 13 September 2000.
[4] Konstantin Katanyan, "Otklyucheniye ot energosnabzheniya voinskikh chastey mozhet vyzvat politicheskiy krizis," Vremya MN, 14 September 2000; in WPS Oborona i Bezopasnost, No. 109, 18 September 2000. {Entered 9/25/2000 RG}
 
8/11/2000: SECURITY COUNCIL PRESERVES SRF UNTIL 2006, CHANGES SPENDING PRIORITIES
For additional information, please see the 8/11/2000 entry in the Russia: Strategic Forces General Developments section. {Entered 8/16/2000 MJ}
 
7/24/2000: SRF PLANS 14 MORE SPACE LAUNCHES BY THE END OF 2000
The Strategic Rocket Forces (SRF) intend to carry out 14 additional space launches by the end of the year, according to the SRF press service, which cited SRF Space Assets Deputy Commander Lieutenant General Valeriy Grin.  In the past month and a half alone, the SRF conducted eight space launches, including six from Baykonur and two from Plesetsk, putting into orbit 13 satellites and other objects, including the Zvezda International Space Station service module. Five of the eight launches were conducted by SRF missile crews, while the remaining three were conducted by the Rosaviakosmos civilian space agency with SRF support.  According to SRF Press Service Chief Colonel Ilshat Baychurin it was the most intensive period of launches since the breakup of the USSR. The press service also stated that the successful launches validate the earlier decision to create a unified automated ground control complex for tracking space objects, currently in process of being implemented by the SRF and Rosaviakosmos.
["RVSN do kontsa goda planiruyet 14 zapuskov kosmicheskikh apparatov," Interfax, No.2, 24 July 2000.] {Entered 7/27/2000 MJ}
 
7/11/2000: FUTURE OF SRF UNDER DISCUSSION
The leadership of the Russian General Staff, including its Chief, Army General Anatoliy Kvashnin, is proposing to eliminate the Strategic Rocket Forces (SRF) as an independent branch of the armed forces.  The SRF would be downgraded to a command subordinate either to the Air Force or directly to the Commander-in-Chief.[1] In accordance with General Staff proposals, the SRF structure would eventually be reduced from 19 rocket divisions to only two, with only 150 ICBMs remaining in service.[2] The reorganization being proposed by Kvashnin would be completed by 2003. Kvashnin believes that the SRF's status and organizational structure ought to be reduced in light of the planned reduction of Russia's land-based strategic arsenal. Experts believe that by 2006 the SRF will eliminate 400 ICBMs and launchers, and Kvashnin proposes disbanding rocket divisions armed with aging MIRVed ICBMs as their missiles are withdrawn from service. At the same time, Kvashnin supports preserving the current triad structure of Russia's strategic nuclear forces, which consists of land-, sea-, and air-based components.[3] While the General Staff acknowledges that Russia's strategic nuclear forces will continue to serve a useful role as a deterrent in the foreseeable future, it also believes that the SRF will be capable of inflicting "unacceptable damage" on any potential enemy even in reduced form, particularly when backed up by some 3,000 non-strategic nuclear weapons. Kvashnin's proposal brings him into conflict with the current Minister of Defense of Russia, Marshal Igor Sergeyev, himself a former SRF commander, who earlier proposed creating a unified strategic forces command which would unify all three components of Russia's nuclear triad.  While Sergeyev's proposal appears to have had President Yeltsin's support, it is currently being opposed by the General Staff.[4] Kvashnin's desire to reduce the SRF appears to be at least partly motivated by the poor condition of Russia's underfunded general purpose forces, which in his view have deteriorated to such a degree that they are incapable of performing their mission of localizing potential regional conflicts.[5] Reduction of the SRF would permit a reallocation of funds to general purpose forces. While appearing at the Ural Arms Expo in Nizhniy Tagil on 14 July 2000, President Vladimir Putin stated that at present there are no plans to reform the SRF, and that the issue is still under discussion.[6] Following Putin's consultations with Sergeyev and Kvashnin, "informed sources" indicated that "the General Staff's proposals were not used as the basis for the SRF reform plans," but that "work on the SRF reform proposals will continue."[7] General Staff sources informed journalists that Putin will not accept any "drastic or excessively radical" decisions on the future of SRF.[8]Discussion on the future of SRF is likely to continue in Russia's Security Council, of which General Kvashnin recently became a member.[9] In addition to encountering resistance from SRF leadership and Defense Minister Sergeyev, Kvashnin's proposal came under criticism by several Russian defense experts on the grounds that it would amount to unilateral disarmament and undermine Russia's position in ABM and START III negotiations with the United States, require additional expenditures to eliminate missiles and silos, and enhance the effectiveness of any future US national ABM system.[10,11] (For more information on SRF reform plans, please see the article "'Denuclearization' of Russia’s Defense Policy?" by Nikolay Sokov.)
Sources:
[1] "Rukovodstvo Genshtaba vystupilo s initsiativoy reorganizatsii Raketnykh voysk strategicheskogo naznacheniya," Interfax, No. 4, 11 July 2000.
[2] Vadim Solovev, "Ottyagivaniye resheniy o naznachenii politika ministrom oborony lish usugublyayet situatsiyu. Podkovernaya borba generalov vyryvayetsa naruzhu," Nezavisimaya gazeta online edition, http://news.mosinfo.ru/news/2000/NGA, 14 July 2000, p.1.
[3] "Nachalnik Genshtaba RF predlagayet k 2003 godu preobrazovat RVSN v rod voysk vooruzhennykh sil tsentralnogo podchineniya," Interfax, No. 2, 12 July 2000.
[4] Aleksey Melnikov, "Putinu predstoit reshit spor mezhdu Sergeyevym i Kvashninym o budushchem Raketnykh voysk strategicheskogo naznacheniya," Interfax, No. 4, 12 July 2000.
[5] "Genshtab otsenivayet sostoyaniye vooruzhennykh sil RF kak kriticheskoye," Interfax, No. 1, 13 July 2000.
[6] "Putin zayavlyayet, chto reorganizatsii RVSN kak takovoy net," Interfax, No. 3, 14 July 2000.
[7] "Predlozheniya Genshtaba po reformirovaniyu vooruzhennykh sil RF ne nashli odnoznachnoy podderzhki u rukovodstva strany, utverzhdayut informirovannye istochniki v Moskve," Interfax, No. 3, 17 July 2000.
[8] Viktor Baranets, "Voyenshchina. Gosduma prosit Putina ne sokrashchat rakety," Komsomolskaya pravda online edition, http://news.mosinfo.ru/news/2000/KPR/, 22 July 2000, p. 3.
[9] Zoya Kanka, "Yadernyye sily vymrut kak vid," Vedomosti, 13 July 2000, p. A3.
[10] Sergey Sokut, "Igra bez kozyrey," Nezavisimaya gazeta online edition, http://new