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Russia: Weapons: ICBM Force: Old ICBM Modernization Programs Russia: Old ICBM Modernization Programs

To return to the main Strategic Rocket Forces entry, see the Strategic Rocket Forces Overview file.

Michael Jasinski, CNS Research Associate
February 2001

Although Russia's Strategic Rocket Forces (SRF) modernization program is centered on the deployment of the new Topol-M ICBMs which, in both silo and mobile variants, are intended eventually to become the backbone of Russia's strategic nuclear arsenal, at present the Topol-M force represents a negligible percentage of Russia's ICBM force, and will continue to do so in the foreseeable future. Out of 756 ICBMs and 3540 ICBM-carried nuclear warheads declared as deployed in the 31 July 2000 START I Memorandum of Understanding, the Topol-M force accounted for only 20 missiles and 20 warheads. The balance of the force consisted of  180 R-36M-series [NATO designation SS-18 'Satan', START designation RS-20], 150 UR-100N family [NATO designation SS-19 'Stiletto', START designation RS-18], 10 silo-based and 36 rail-mobile RT-23 [NATO designation SS-24 'Scalpel', NATO designation RS-22], and 360 road-mobile RT-2PM [NATO designation SS-25 'Sickle', START designation RS-12M] ICBMs. Considering the relatively slow rate of deployment of Topol-Ms, the SRF will not be able to maintain its force levels without significant efforts to extend the lives of older missile types. This is one of the key reasons for the Russian proposals to reduce strategic nuclear weapon ceilings to 2,500 warheads and, since 2000, to 1,000-1,500 warheads.

After the eliminations under START II are complete Russia's ICBM force will consist of silo-based RS-18s and road-mobile RS-12Ms, which will be gradually replaced by both mobile and silo-based Topol-Ms. However, the majority of all strategic missiles have already exceeded their original factory warranty period, which varies between 10 and 15 years, depending on missile type. Speaking with Krasnaya zvezda reporters in December 1997, SRF Commander General Vladimir Yakovlev noted that about half of the SRF's missiles have already been in service for at least 15 years.[1] By early 1998, 62% of missiles in service with SRF have already exceeded their original warranty periods.[2] 

To a limited extent, the problem of aging missiles is alleviated by the existence of stocks of non-deployed, spare missiles which are used to replace the oldest of the missiles in service. However, these stocks are finite, and with the exception of the Topol-M no ICBM is currently in production. To guarantee the reliability and safety of remaining older types of ICBMs, the SRF has been pursuing modernization and life extension programs. These programs consist of periodic examinations of missiles for metal fatigue and structural deformations, as well as the replacement of certain sensitive components, such as their inertial guidance systems. The SRF has been verifying the reliability of their older ICBMs by periodically conducting test launches, and has also used launches of retired ICBMs converted to space launch vehicles to gather data on the effectiveness of life extension programs.  

R-36M-Series Modernization

Russia declared 180 R-36M missiles of all variants to be in service as of 31 July 2000, a number which does not include non-deployed, spare missiles. The number of R-36Ms in service has remained relatively stable during the decade, gradually dropping from 204 missiles declared in September 1990 to 180 by January 1998. This total includes 58 relatively new (deployed in 1987-1990) R-36M2 missiles, whose 15-year service life will not require extension until 2003. However, the remainder of the missiles belong to the older R-36MUTTKh variant, which required life-extending programs just to stay in service until 2003.[3] 

In spite of the difficulties, which include being cut off from the missile's design and production facilities located in Ukraine, the SRF did implement a modernization program for its older R-36Ms, verifying their reliability with test launches. They included the 17 April 1997 and 15 April 1998 launches of R-36M missiles, both of which have been in service for at least 20 years, from the Baykonur Cosmodrome.[4,5]  

Another method for assessing the life extension potential of R-36Ms has been test launching old missiles that have been converted into space launch vehicles (SLVs). Following a successful 26 September 2000 test launch of the Dnepr space launch vehicle (a converted R-36M ICBM), in October 2000 the SRF decided to extend the R-36M's service life to 24 years. Pending the results of another such launch, the SRF intends to extend the service life to 25 years.[6] 

In spite of these successful launches, there are concerns about the reliability of the R-36M. Critics of the missile note that the successful Dnepr launch in September 2000 took place only after two earlier launches had to be cancelled due to various technical problems. The 28 December 2000 failed launch of a 10-year-old Tsiklon-3 rocket booster, which is closely related to the R-36M, cast further doubt on the reliability of this aging missile.[7] Tests performed on missiles have also revealed that R-36Ms have shown considerably more advanced signs of aging than lighter UR-100N-series missiles of comparable age.[8] Writing in December 1998 on the prospects for modernizing the R-36Ms and retaining them in service, then-First Deputy Prime Minister Yuriy Maslyukov expressed doubts concerning the usefulness of such initiatives. According to Maslyukov, even after modernization the missiles would still have lower reliability, and overhauling the missiles would not address some of the problems caused by metal fatigue. In Maslyukov's view, retaining these aging, liquid-fuelled missiles in service would be fraught with risks.[9] 

UR-100N Family Modernization

The number of UR-100Ns also remained relatively level during the 1990s. Whereas 170 were declared in September 1990, on 31 August 2000 150 were still deployed. The SRF intends to keep 105 of these missiles, in a single-warhead mode, in service after START II-mandated reductions are complete, which adds importance to the modernization efforts.

The basic UR-100N entered service in 1975 and its final modified variant UR-100NUTTKh in 1982, which makes them the oldest ICBM type in Russian service. At the time of their introduction the missiles' guaranteed service life was put at 10 years; however, the break-up of the USSR and Russia's inability to introduce next-generation missiles rapidly enough meant that the RS-18s have had to remain in service for much longer than they were designed for.

In 1995 the service life of UR-100N family missiles was officially extended to 25 years, which would allow them to remain in service until at least 2005.[10] In November 2000 the SRF announced plans to extend to 30 years the service life of the 105 UR-100Ns that will remain in service past 2003, and convert them to a single-warhead configuration to satisfy START II requirements.[11]  According to the SRF, the "downloading" will not present serious technical problems, and will be done without modifications to the warhead bus on which the warheads are mounted.[12] 

As with other missile types, test launches have played a significant part in verifying the missiles' continued reliability. Five UR-100N test launches have been conducted since 1996 at the Baykonur Cosmodrome, usually involving missiles at the end of or past their warranty periods.[13,14,15] The most recent UR-100N test, conducted on 1 November 2000 at the Baykonur Cosmodrome, involved a missile with 25 years in service. In addition to verifying the missile's reliability, the launch also tested the UR-100N in the single-warhead variant.[16] As a result of that test the SRF decided to extend the UR-100N service life from 25 to 26 years.[11] SRF leadership hopes that additional modifications will allow the missiles' service lives to meet the 30-year goal.[12]

The slow rate of Topol-M deliveries may force the UR-100Ns to remain in service even longer than 30 years. Due to delays in replacing them with Topol-Ms, UR-100Ns belonging to the Tatishchevo and Kozelsk missile divisions will remain in service longer than initially planned. Furthermore, UR-100N evaluations have reportedly indicated that they suffer deterioration caused by metal fatigue at a slower rate than the  heavier R-36Ms, potentially allowing them to stay in service for up to 35 years. Since the latest UR-100N variant began to enter service in 1982, these missiles could potentially remain in service until at least 2017. [8] 

UR-100N modernization efforts will likely be assisted by the implementation of plans to convert retired missiles into space launch vehicles, including the Rokot and Strela. At least some UR-100Ns being removed from service will be converted into Rokots. The first test launch of a Rokot took place on 16 May 2000 at the Plesetsk Cosmodrome. [12]  In addition to earning badly needed hard currency for the Russian military and providing training opportunities for SRF launch crews, launches of converted UR-100Ns may also help the SRF to assess the effectiveness of its UR-100N modernization programs.

RS-12M Topol Modernization

The number of deployed Topol ICBMs in Russia has actually increased from 234 deployed in 1990 to 360 in service in 2000, due to continued production and the transfer of missiles from Belarus. These weapons currently represent the most prevalent missile type in SRF and do not pose particular modernization challenges due to their mostly Russian origin and START II-compliant single-warhead design. Moreover, unless the Topol-M reaches the originally planned 30-40 missiles per year production rate, the Topol will constitute the SRF's backbone long after the START II-mandated reductions are completed.  This fact underscores the Topol's importance in Russian strategic planning and Topol life extension plans will likely figure high on the SRF's list of priorities.

When initially introduced in 1985, the RS-12Ms had a guaranteed service life of only 10 years. Like other ICBMs in SRF service it, too, has benefited from modernization programs and reliability-verifying test launches. Following a successful test launch in October 1999 of a missile with 15 years in service, the SRF officially extended the service life for all RS-12Ms to 15 years.[17,18] A similar test took place on 11 October 2000 when the Plesetsk Cosmodrome launched a RS-12M Topol ICBM belonging to an early production batch that had already spent 16 years on combat alert.[19]  As a result of this successful test SRF announced that the missile's service life would be extended to at least 20 years.[20]

Conclusion

The success of ICBM life extension programs, like the success of other strategic nuclear forces modernization programs, will depend on the level of funding provided. However, in recent years the SRF, even under the conditions of relatively favorable resource allocation, has not been able to fulfill even its high-priority goals, such as increasing the deployment rate of Topol-Ms. In view of the greater emphasis being placed on general-purpose forces in Russian defense doctrine and the plans to reduce the status of the SRF, it appears unlikely that Russia will be able to modernize a sufficient number of its older ICBMs in service to stay close to the START II ceilings, unless it does so by retaining in service a significant number of unmodernized ICBMs of doubtful reliability and high accident potential. This prospect is one of the motivations behind the 1500-warhead ceiling proposed by Russia for START III, and may render the idea of re-MIRVing ICBMs more attractive.

Sources:
[1] Ilshat Baychurin, Aleksandr Dolinin, "S vysokoy stepenyu nadezhnosti," Krasnaya zvezda, 17 December 1997, p. 1; in WPS Oborona i Bezopasnost, 19 December 1997; in Integrum Techno, http://www.integrum.ru/
[2] Oleg Vladykin, "'Yadernyy shchit' vetshayet, no ne grozit katastrofoy," Obshchaya gazeta, 26 February 1998, p. 2; in WPS Oborona i Bezopasnost, 11 March 1998; in Integrum Techno, http://www.integrum.ru/.
[3] Vladimir Lata, "Strategicheskiye yadernyye sily Rossii segodnya i v perspektive," Nauchnyye Zapiski PIR-Tsentra, No. 14, 2000, pp. 25-30. 
[4] "Uspeshno osushchestvlen pusk rakety RS-20, 20 let nakhodivsheysya na boyevom dezhurstve," Krasnaya zvezda, 17 April 1998, p. 1; in WPS Oborona i Bezopasnost, 20 April 1998; in Integrum Techno, http://www.integrum.ru/.
[5] Ilshat Baychurin, "Pervyy v 1997 godu pusk MBR podtverdil nadezhnost raketno-yadernogo shchita Rossii," Krasnaya zvezda, 15 April 1997, p. 1.
[6] "Prodlen srok ekspluatatsii gruppirovki mezhkontinentalnykh ballisticheskikh raket RS-20 do 24 let," ITAR-TASS, 2 October 2000; in Integrum Techno, http://www.integrum.ru/.
[7] Oleg Odnokolenko, "Missiles Past Their Best," Segodnya, 29 December 2000, p. 1; in "Tsiklon Failure Seen Highlighting Dangers of Old ICBMs," FBIS Document CEP20001229000080.
[8] Sergey Sokut, "Topolinyy les zamedlil svoy rost," Nezavisimoye voyennoye obozreniye, 19 January 2001; in Integrum Techno, http://www.integrum.ru/.
[9] Yuriy Maslyukov, "Dogovor i sudba strategicheskikh yadernykh sil Rossii," Izvestiya, 18 December 1998; in Integrum Techno, http://www.integrum.ru/
[10] "RVSN uspeshno proizveli pusk MBR s kosmodroma Baykonur," ITAR-TASS, 20 October 1999; in Integrum Techno, http://www.integrum.ru/.
[11] "Komandovaniye Raketnykh voysk strategicheskogo naznacheniya RF planiruyet prodlit srok ekspluatatsii parka mezhkontinentalnykh ballisticheskikh raket RS-18 do 30 let," ITAR-TASS, 3 November 2000; in Integrum Techno, http://www.integrum.ru/.
[12] "V Glavkomate Raketnymi voyskami strategicheskogo naznacheniya reshayetsya vopros prodleniya srokov ekspluatatsii nesushchego boyevoye dezhurstvo raketnogo kompleksa RS-18 na odin god," ITAR-TASS, 3 November 2000; in Integrum Techno, http://www.integrum.ru/.
[13] Boris Yamshanov, "Dumali--starushka, a poletala--kak molodaya," Rossiskaya gazeta, 10 October 1998, p. 1.
[14] Ilshat Baychurin, "Raketchiki vnov podtverdili nadezhnost yadernogo shchita Rossii," Krasnaya zvezda, 11 June 1997, p. 1. 
[15] "Pusk unikalnoy rakety," Krasnaya zvezda, 8 June 1996, p. 1.
[16] "General Vladimir Yakovlev: Uspeshnyy pusk ballisticheskoy rakety s Baykonura podtverdil vysokuyu tekhnicheskuyu gotovnost kompleksa RS-18 pri prodlenii srokov ego ekspluatatsii," ITAR-TASS, 1 November 2000; in Integrum Techno, www.integrum.ru/.
[17] "Raketnyye voyska strategicheskogo naznacheniya Rossii otmechayut 15-yu godovshchinu postanovki na boyevoye dezhurstvo kompleksa 'Topol'," ITAR-TASS, 23 July 2000; in Integrum Techno, http://www.integrum.ru/.
[18] "V RVSN za vremya ispytaniy i ekspluatatsii MBR 'Topol' bylo uspeshno osushchestvleno 57 kontrolno-ispytatelnykh i uchebno-boyevykh puskov, zayavil Vladimir Yakovlev," ITAR-TASS, 1 December 1999; in Integrum Techno, http://www.integrum.ru/.
[19] "Uspeshnyy pusk ballisticheskoy rakety s 'Plesetska' podtverdil vysokuyu tekhnicheskuyu gotovnost kompleksa 'Topol', zayavil glavkom RVSN," ITAR-TASS, 11 October 2000; in Integrum Techno, http://www.integrum.ru.
[20] Yuriy Golotyuk, "Vernost traditsiyam," Vremya novostey, 12 October 2000, p. 3; in WPS Oborona i Bezopasnost, 15 October 2000; in Integrum Techno, http://www.integrum.ru/. {Entered 2/7/2001 MJ}

Page last updated 22 August 2001
For major recent developments, see the General Nuclear Weapons Developments file.

Comments or questions? E-mail Nikolai Sokov:  nsokovATmiis.edu.

CNSThis material is produced independently for NTI by the Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies and does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been independently verified by NTI or its directors, officers, employees, agents. Copyright © 2002 by MIIS.

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