This file is no longer being updated.  For major recent developments, see the General Nuclear Weapons Developments file.

To return to the main Nuclear Weapons Security entry, see the Nuclear Weapons Security Overview file.
For information on "suitcase-size nuclear weapons" please see the overview, Are Suitcase Nukes on the Loose? The Story Behind the Controversy.
 
7/2/2003: TRAINING EXERCISE AT SRF DIVISION
Moskovskiy komsomolets v Mariy El reported on 2 July 2003 that an anti-terrorist exercise took place in the Mari El Kray. Participants in the exercise included the Yoshkar-Ola Strategic Rocket Forces division [equipped with road-mobile SS-25 ICBMs], and local Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) and Federal Security Service (FSB) officials. According to the exercise script, two groups of terrorists attacked the Yoshkar-Ola division. Although one of them was neutralized, the other apparently managed to seize control of nuclear munitions. The second group was eventually neutralized by an FSB anti-terrorist group. In the final phase of the exercise, SRF specialists performed decontamination of the launch vehicle, which had suffered simulated damage during the exercise.
[Alena Svetlova, "Nechego, yadrena mat, ustanovki vorovat," Moskovskiy komsomolets v Mariy El, 2 July 2003; in Integrum Techno, http://www.integrum.com/.] {Entered 8/8/2003 MJ}

11/19/2002: RUSSIAN TV FEATURES NUCLEAR FACILITY SECURITY TRAINING CENTER
On 19 November 2002, Russian television showed a training facility in Sharapovo, Moscow Oblast, used to train security personnel for nuclear weapon storage facilities. The Sharapovo facility uses US-provided simulators, security, and control systems worth $30 million, provided under the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program. Security personnel must complete a six month training course at the facility before being assigned to a guard detail. Their training includes operating security systems installed at nuclear storage training facilities and reacting to attempts to penetrate storage site security.
[TVS broadcast, 19 November 2002; in "Russian TV shows nuclear facility guards training center," FBIS Document CEP20021119000418.] {Entered 1/10/2003 MJ}

9/4/2002: MINISTRY OF DEFENSE CONFIDENT NUCLEAR WARHEADS SAFE
On 4 September 2002 Colonel General Igor Valynkin, chief of the 12th Main Directorate of the Ministry of Defense, ruled out the possibility of a nuclear warhead theft. According to Valynkin, security measures at warhead storage facilities were tripled in the last two years, and access procedures preclude unsanctioned access to the storage facilities. Valynkin also stated that no attempts to penetrate or reconnoiter storage facilities were recorded in 2002.[1] Colonel General Yuriy Baluyevskiy, deputy chief of the General Staff, issued a similar statement asserting the impossibility of terrorist acts at warhead storage facilities.
Sources:
[1] "Minoborony Rossii ne dopuskayet veroyatnosti khishcheniya yadernykh boyepripasov," Interfax, 4 September 2002.
[2] "Rossiyskiy voyennyy isklyuchayet vozmozhnost teraktov na yadernykh obektakh," Interfax, 4 September 2002. {Entered 10/2/2002 MJ}

2/23/2002: SECURITY PROBLEMS REPORTED AT NUCLEAR WEAPONS FACILITIES
A CIA report released on 22 February 2002 described incidents of security lapses at Russian nuclear weapons facilities and measures being taken to counter them.  In May 2000 the Ministry of Defense began using only officers for warhead transportation operations instead of enlisted men.  The change was made after seven reported incidents in that month of enlisted guards leaving their posts.  The report also cited the expulsion of two guards undergoing training at the 12th Main Directorate's Security Assessment Training Center after they failed drug tests. The chief of the 12th Main Directorate, Colonel General Igor Valynkin, emphasized that nuclear warhead personnel undergo psychological, polygraph, drug, and alcohol testing.  He also said that security had been stepped up at nuclear weapons storage sites after the terrorist attacks on the United States.
["CIA Report on Russian Nuclear Weapons Security, February 22," The Acronym Institute for Disarmament Diplomacy Web Site,  http://www.acronym.org.uk, February 2002.] {Entered 3/1/2002 RG}

2/4/2002: ALLEGED CHECHEN PLAN TO STEAL NUCLEAR SUBMARINE DISCOVERED
For detailed information on the discovery of documents which allegedly detail Chechen plans to steal a nuclear submarine in 1995-96, please see the 2/4/2002 entry in the Pacific Fleet General Developments file. {Entered 10/4/2002 EMC}
 
10/25/2001: TWO TERRORIST GROUPS SUSPECTED OF ATTEMPTS TO RECONNOITER NUCLEAR STORAGE FACILITIES
On 25 October 2001, the head of the General Staff's 12th Main Directorate, Colonel General Igor Valynkin, reported that there were two attempts in 2001 by unidentified terrorist groups to reconnoiter nuclear storage facilities.[1]  On both occasions the suspects were detained and turned over to Federal Security Service (FSB) authorities for questioning.[2]  The first attempt took place some eight months ago and the second attempt was recorded two months after the first.[1,2]  After these incidents, the 12th Main Directorate in cooperation with the FSB took measures to strengthen the security at its nuclear munitions sites.[2]  In the interview with Gazeta.ru, Igor Valynkin reported that the12th Main Directorate had already assigned a special mobile response team to each facility.  These teams are to cooperate with the FSB and the MVD.  He added that the 12th Main Directorate will take over the facilities belonging to the 6th Directorates of the individual branches of service.  Their facilities are expected to be transferred to the centralized control of the12th Main Directorate by 2003.[3] 
Sources:
[1] "Russia: Terror Groups Scoped Nuke Site," Associated Press, 25 October 2001; in Salon.com Web Site, http://www.salon.com/news/wire/2001/10/25/nuke/index.html.
[2] "Yaderno-tekhnicheskiye obyekty Rossii nakhodyatsya pod nadezhnoy okhranoy," 25 October 2001, in Strana.Ru Web Site, http://www.strana.ru/text/stories/01/10/08/1714/new.html.
[3] "Rossiya i antiterroristicheskaya aktsiya SShA," 25 October 2001; in Strana.Ru Web Site, http://www.strana.ru/text/stories/01/10/08/1714/new.html.  {Entered 11/15/2001 IA}
 
9/28/2001: EXPERTS SAY NUCLEAR TERRORISM IN RUSSIA IS IMPOSSIBLE
Vladimir Bentsyanov, a member of the Coordinating Council of the Russian Armed Forces, and Sergey Alekseyenko, a former worker at the Semipalatinsk Test Site, stated at a news conference on 28 September 2001 that nuclear terrorism in Russia is impossible.  Alekseyenko claimed that nuclear weapons storage facilities built by the USSR from 1955 to 1975 are so robust and well protected that they simply could not be compromised by terrorists. Alekseyenko noted that the facilities were designed to withstand a 40 kiloton nuclear warhead impact, and were built to last for 500 years.
["Nuclear terrorism 'impossible' in Russia - army expert," RIA Novosti, 28 September 2001; in Johnson's Russia List, No. 5467, 29 September 2001.] {Entered 10/2/01 RG}
 
9/20/2001: FORMER LIEUTENANT COLONEL DETAINED IN STAVROPOL FOR STEALING TOP SECRET ENCRYPTION SYSTEM
According to Interfax, the Federal Security Service (FSB) in Stavropol completed an investigation of the theft of missile launch coding equipment that was part of the ballistic missile command and control system and detained a former SRF lieutenant colonel.  The lieutenant colonel, who was in charge of destroying top secret data and systems in the Stavropol region in the early 1990s, did not allow the top secret encryption system and data to be destroyed, and kept in his house, apparently as a souvenir.  The FSB claims that the lieutenant colonel had no intent of selling this equipment.
["Ob ukraydenykh shifrakh systemy upravleniya ballisticheskimi raketami," Interfax-Agentstvo Voyennykh Novostey, http://www.militarynews.ru/, 20 September 2001.] {Entered 9/21/2001 IA}   
 
8/14/2001: NTV CRITICIZES SECURITY AT NUCLEAR WEAPONS STORAGE FACILITIES
NTV's "Top Secret" television program reported that Russian nuclear weapons storage facilities are poorly guarded and are in danger of being compromised by terrorist groups.  According to unidentified Russian officers interviewed by NTV, security systems protecting nuclear weapons have operated at an ever decreasing capacity due to funding shortages.  Officer salaries are very low and units are only partially staffed.  The unidentified officers said that 12th Main Directorate security systems could easily be breached by a small group of people.  In the report, NTV additionally stated that US funding for increased security was diverted to other purposes, and facilities inspected by US officials were pre-arranged "Potemkin villages" that did not reflect the real situation of nuclear weapons storage facilities.
["Top Secret" NTV program, 14 August 2001; in "Russia:  NTV's 'Top Secret' criticizes lax security at nuclear arsenals," FBIS Document CEP20010815000049.] {Entered 9/21/01 RG}
 
12/20/2000: VALYNKIN ASSERTS THAT NUCLEAR WEAPONS STORAGE FACILITIES ARE RELIABLY PROTECTED
In an interview with Vremya novostey, 12th Main Directorate Chief Colonel General Igor Valynkin gave a "100 percent guarantee" that nuclear weapons storage facilities are reliably protected. This announcement came after reports of weapons and ammunition thefts from Russian military facilities. Valynkin stated that there has never been a documented penetration of nuclear weapons storage facilities, and that the 12th Main Directorate has received US assistance to improve security arrangements. However, Valynkin has expressed concern that only a third of US-provided equipment has been put into service due to financial shortages. For more information about US security equipment assistance see the 3/25/99, 2/7/99, and 2/4/99 entries below.
[Aleksandr Shaburkin, "Only the Nuclear Weapons Are Reliably Protected," Vremya novostey, 11 August 2000; in "Funds Found for Security Equipment at Nuclear Storage Sites," Johnson's Russia List, No. 9, 20 December 2000.] {Entered 12/21/2000 RG}
 
11/1/99: US-RUSSIAN NUCLEAR SECURITY TRAINING CENTER OPENS
The Head of the Russian Ministry of Defense's 12th Main Directorate, Colonel General Igor Valynkin, and the Director of the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program, Brigadier General (retired) Thomas Kuenning Jr., participated in an opening ceremony on 1 November 1999 of the joint US-Russian Security Assessment and Training Center located in Sergiyev Posad, some 30 miles northeast of Moscow. The center will serve as the central site in Russia for testing security equipment and procedures used at nuclear weapons storage facilities managed by the 12th Main Directorate. The center will train guard forces for nuclear weapons storage sites (the center includes a small arms range) and will also provide support for the personnel reliability program of the 12th Main Directorate. The equipment provided for this purpose includes polygraph systems and drug and alcohol testing kits. The new center will also assist the 12th Main Directorate in conducting vulnerability analyses of its nuclear weapons storage sites.
["Text: Joint U.S.-Russia Nuclear Security Training Center Opens," Washington File Web Site, http://usinfo.state.gov/products/washfile.htm, 1 November 1999.] {Entered 11/2/99 SDP}
 
6/3/99: GOVERNMENT OF RUSSIA APPROVES STATUTE ON SPECIAL STATUS OF ZATOs
The government of Russia has approved a statute on the special status of "ZATOs", or closed cities that have Ministry of Defense facilities. The new statute regulates operations of all organizations, military and civilian, located within territorial limits of closed cities. The announced purpose of the statute is to enhance Russia's national security, improve implementation of Russia's international obligations with respect to the nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction, protect classified information relating to weapons of mass destruction, and prevent terrorist acts.  Responsibility for implementing provisions of the statute will rest with individual facility directors.
["Pravitelstvo RF utverdilo polozheniye ob obespechenii osobogo rezhima na zakrytykh obektakh minoborny," Interfax, 3 June 1999.] {Entered 11/5/99 CEM}
 
3/25/99:  12TH MAIN DIRECTORATE CHIEF SATISFIED WITH US ASSISTANCE
In a 25 March 1999 Krasnaya zvezda article, 12th Main Directorate Chief Colonel General Igor Valynkin expressed satisfaction with the implementation of the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program.  Assistance rendered so far for ensuring the security of nuclear warheads while in transit includes supplying over 2,500 protective armored blankets and 250 nuclear weapon containers and adapting 100 railcars for transporting nuclear warheads. In order to help ensure the safety of nuclear munitions in storage, the United States has sent over 50 sets of technical protection systems and over 500km of power and communications cable. To improve the monitoring and accounting of nuclear weapons, money has been allocated for 100 computer systems, and an automated information-analysis system should be in place by the end of the year. United States-provided emergency response equipment includes accident clean-up and radiation monitoring systems. In accordance with the agreements, US inspectors periodically carry out inspections to verify that the equipment and funds are used as intended.
[Aleksandr Dolinin. "Komfort dlya megatonn, ili O tom, kak nam udayetsya obespechivat bezopasnost yadernogo oruzhiya," Krasnaya zvezda online edition, http://www.redstar.ru/, 25 March 1999.] {Entered 10/29/99 CEM}
 
2/7/99: NEW AUTOMATED COMPUTER SYSTEM TO BE INTRODUCED
In an article published in its 1-7 February 1999 issue, UNIAN-VPK reported that the Russian General Staff will introduce a new automated computer system for tracking Russia's nuclear munitions. Chief of the Ministry of Defense's 12th Main Directorate Colonel General Igor Valynkin announced that the system will be established with Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program assistance. Equipment worth about $80 million, half of what the system will cost, has already been delivered to Russia.
[UNIAN-VPK, No. 005, February 1-7, 1999, p. 16.] {Entered10/28/99 CEM}
 
2/5/99: VEK REPORTS STRONG SECURITY AT TOPOL-M BASE
Vek reported on 5 February 1999 that the Topol-M [NATO designation SS-27] missile base in Tatishchevo is well protected by effective security measures. Reporters described a well-guarded perimeter that included electrical fencing and mine fields. No deliberate attempts to breach security have been reported, but the article described incidents in which drunken individuals throwing bottles into the mine field were fired upon and mushroom pickets were caught trying to cross fence lines. Security measures at the base also included mock terrorist attacks staged by Saratov OMON special police units that were reportedly unsuccessful.
[Aleksandr Annin, "Finger on the Button of Topol: Vek Correspondent First To Visit Secret Military Test Site," Vek, 5-11 February 1999, p. 3; in "Correspondent Visits Topol-M Missile Site," FBIS Document FTS19990222001260.] {Entered 9/26/01 RG}

2/4/99: 12TH MAIN DIRECTORATE USES US EQUIPMENT IN ITS PERSONNEL RELIABILITY PROGRAM 
At a press conference on 4 February 1999, 12th Main Directorate Chief General Igor Valynkin told a group of journalists that the directorate is using US-supplied equipment in its personnel reliability system. Valynkin also noted that Russia is grateful for the continued economic assistance from the US for improvements in nuclear security, and that cooperation in this area was "growing as each day passes." A training school north of Moscow has received special containers for transporting nuclear warheads, computers for tracking the status of nuclear weapons, emergency kits, and screening equipment such as lie detectors. According to Valynkin, "in addition to the polygraph, equipment to detect the presence of alcohol or drugs has been supplied and we have used it to test the graduates of the school. We hand-pick graduates and this equipment enables us to tighten control of the people who come to us to work with nuclear warheads." The Soviet and Russian military had not previously used lie detectors to screen personnel--this is happening thanks to donations by the United States. Five percent of those tested failed. Among other things, officers being screened for assignments related to nuclear weapons are questioned about possible criminal links. Valynkin noted that the human factor remains one of the biggest worries for both the United States and Russia. "The person who works with nuclear warheads knows the secrets. He has the access, he knows the security system," he said. "That's why we screen personnel who work with nuclear warheads so thoroughly." According to Valynkin, military personnel under his command had been paid in full in December 1998, and had received two-thirds of their wages in January 1999. Due to enormous arrears, they still have not been paid for August or September 1998. Responding to criticism about possible misappropriation of US funds and equipment, Valynkin noted that there is no possibility of this happening as "everything provided by the Americans is under their control."
[Martin Nesirky, "Russia Uses U.S. Devices to Reduce Nuke Risks," Reuters News Agency, 4 February 1999.] {Entered 10/20/99 CEM}
 
6/16/98: GENERAL HABIGER EVALUATES RUSSIAN C3, WPCA
At a press conference on 16 June 1998, General Eugene Habiger, commander of the US Strategic Command, briefed reporters on a trip to Russia the previous week in which he visited five nuclear weapons storage sites. Habiger told journalists that he did not have any “serious concerns” with security at the five facilities, and lauded the Russian military for the degree of openness shown during his visit. Habiger visited the SS-19 base at Kozelsk (Kaluga Oblast); a national nuclear weapons storage depot in Saratov oblast, the strategic bomber base at Engels (Saratov Oblast); the SS-25 base in Irkutsk (Irkutsk Oblast); and a naval nuclear weapons storage site near Severomorsk (Murmansk oblast). At each of the five sites, General Habiger was shown the safety and security measures used by the Russian military at facilities with nuclear weapons. At Kozelsk, he was shown an operational SS-19 missile in its silo with its six nuclear warheads. Habiger said that unlike US ICBMs, which are guarded largely by technological measures, the Russian military has two armed security guards assigned to each operational ICBM silo, in addition to the launch-control crew.  General Habiger described the security at Kozelsk as “impressive,” and “excellent.” General Habiger termed his visit to the national nuclear weapons storage facility near Saratov “revolutionary,” as no US official had ever visited such a site previously, and stated that “we had never had access to anybody that had ever worked at one of those facilities that I’m aware of.” At the Saratov storage facility, Habiger said that security had been upgraded by US assistance through the Nunn-Lugar program, including fencing and perimeter sensors. Habiger was taken into a mountain-side storage bunker, protected by blast doors weighing “several thousands of tons,” which contained five nuclear weapons storage bays. The Saratov base, which is commanded by a colonel, is a “closed cantonment” with about 1,200 military personnel and 2,300 civilian dependents. Habiger said all work involving nuclear weapons in Russian facilities is conducted exclusively by officers, adding that at most times, procedures require the cooperation of three officers, but at the national storage facility, four officers must be present for any operations with the weapons. Habiger also said he was impressed with the security measures taken against terrorist attack at the Saratov facility. At the strategic bomber base at Engels, Habiger toured a nuclear weapons storage facility, where he said closed-circuit television was widely used, and access procedures “were very, very tight.” Habiger was also shown nuclear weapons storage facilities at the SS-25 base in Irkutsk, where he described security measures as being “much like the way we operate here in the United States.”  At the end of his visit, Habiger visited the naval base at Severomorsk, touring a naval nuclear weapons storage facility and a Delta class nuclear missile submarine. Habiger’s visit was part of a program of confidence-building visits between the strategic forces of Russia and the United States. Habiger had visited the SS-25 base at Teykovo (Ivanovo oblast) and the SS-24 base at Kostroma (Kostroma oblast) in October 1997, and a group of senior Russian officers, including Lieutenant General Igor Valynkin, the head of the 12th Main Directorate of the Russian Defense Ministry, which is responsible for the storage of nuclear weapons removed from active service, had toured several US strategic nuclear weapons facilities in March 1998. Evaluating what he had seen during his June 1998 tour of the five facilities, Habiger told reporters that “I don’t have any serious concerns” about the security of Russian nuclear weapons in military custody. He did admit that he saw “some things they can improve upon.” In response to questions, Habiger said he felt that the personnel at Russian nuclear weapons facilities were “content.” He reported that President Yeltsin had recently authorized a pay increase for all military personnel working with nuclear weapons, so they will receive base pay plus a 50 percent bonus. He admitted that housing was a major problem for the Russian strategic forces, however. Asked if he was “completely and personally convinced of the integrity” of the Russian officers charged with oversight of nuclear weapons, Habiger answered, “As much as I am content with the integrity of the officers that we have.” He also said that he was told by his Russian military colleagues that the five bases he toured were representative of the rest of the Russian strategic forces, and did not represent merely the “best” of their facilities.  (See also the full text of a 4 November 1997 briefing by General Habiger concerning a previous visit to Russian weapons facilities, available at http://www.defenselink.mil/.../t11071997_thabiger.html.)
[DoD News Briefing, General Eugene Habiger, Commander of U.S. Strategic Command, Tuesday, 16 June 1998, http://www.defenselink.mil/.../t06231998_t616hab2.html.]
 
11/4/97: US STRATCOM COMMANDER COMMENTS ON RUSSIAN C3
According to US Air Force General Eugene Habiger, chief of U.S. Strategic Command, Russia's nuclear arsenal is safe from theft or unauthorized nuclear launch. Habiger's assessment of Russian nuclear security, given at a Pentagon news conference on 4 November 1997, followed a 22 - 28 October visit, at the behest of US Secretary of Defense William Cohen, to both the Russian military base at Kostroma and the main nuclear command and control center in Moscow. The Kostroma base is home to rail-mobile SS-24 nuclear missiles.  Based on his impressions of the Russian nuclear arsenal at Kostroma, General Habiger stated that Russian nuclear security appears to be as good as that in the United States. Habiger said that he was particularly impressed with the Kostroma security force's preparedness for emergency situations. The Russian military's elite "10-Alpha" force, responsible for guarding thousands of nuclear weapons, staged a demonstration for Habiger. Habiger said that the "10-Alpha" force is routinely tested by an anti-terrorist group that attempts to break into nuclear facilities. He also noted that Russian controls to prevent accidental nuclear launch were as strict as those in the United States. According to Habiger, moreover, Russian nuclear facilities compensate for the fact that they do not have enough money to install high technology equipment for safeguarding weapons such as low light television cameras. Whereas in the United States cooperation between two qualified troops is necessary for entrance into a nuclear weapons storage area, Russian facilities require the collaboration of three troops. Habiger also said that he and General Vladimir Yakovlev, commander of the Russian Strategic Rocket Forces, have a agreed to work more closely together in sharing information on securing and safeguarding nuclear weapons.
[DoD News Briefing, Commander-in-Chief, Strategic Command, 4 November 1997,  http://www.defenselink.mil/.../t11071997_thabiger.html.]

12/18/96: US PROCURING RELIABILITY TESTING EQUIPMENT FOR RUSSIAN NUCLEAR WORKERS
The Pentagon's Defense Special Weapons Agency (DSWA), is looking to US contractors to provide testing equipment for the Russian Ministry of Defense 'Personnel Reliability Program.' The equipment sought includes 60 alcohol breathalyzers, enough portable drug test indicators to handle 10,000 samples annually and five polygraph computer systems. It is to be used for Russian civilian and military workers who come into contact with nuclear weapons.  The purchase of such equipment is funded by monies from the CTR program and  is aimed at assessing the dependability of Russian nuclear workers.
["USA to help Russia step up nuclear security," Jane's Defence Weekly, 18 December 1996, p.10.]{Entered 10/6/97 PBI}
 

Page last updated 9 December 2003

This file is no longer being updated.  For major recent developments, see the General Nuclear Weapons Developments file.

Comments or questions? E-mail Nikolai Sokov:  nsokovATmiis.edu.

This material is produced independently for NTI by the Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies and does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been independently verified by NTI or its directors, officers, employees, agents. Copyright © 2002 by MIIS.

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