To return to the main
SSBN entry, see the Strategic Naval Deterrent Overview
file.
For information on SLBM test launches please see the SLBM Test Launch
section.
For information on the Northern and Pacific fleets and their facilities
(including SSBN support facilities), see the Nuclear
Fleets subsection of the Naval Nuclear Reactors section.
3/19/2004: SECOND BOREY-CLASS SUBMARINE BEGUN The keel for a new Project 955 Borey-class
ballistic missile nuclear submarine (SSBN) was laid during a ceremony held at
the Sevmash
shipyard in Severodvinsk
on 19 March 2004. The new SSBN, dubbed the Aleksandr Nevskiy, will be the
second Borey-class submarine constructed in accordance with plans
developed by the Rubin
Central Design Bureau for Marine Engineering
in Saint Petersburg. The Aleksandr Nevskiy follows in
the footsteps of another Borey-class submarine, the Yuriy Dolgorukiy,
which has been under construction at Sevmash
since 1996.[1] The Yuriy Dolgorukiy is scheduled to be launched in 2005
and there are conflicting accounts as to whether it will be able to join the Russian Navy in 2006.
It is anticipated that the Borey-class SSBNs will
be equipped with new Bulava
sea-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), a naval version of
the Topol-M [NATO designation SS-27 'Sickle'] missile.
The Bulava remains under development
at the Moscow Institute of
Thermal Technology.[1,2] [1] Ivan Safronov, "'Aleksandr Nevskiy' strategicheskogo
naznacheniya," Kommersant, No. 049, 19 March 2004; in Integrum
Techno, http://www.integrum.com.
[2] Aleksandr Emelyanenkov, "Yadernuyu bulavu - 'Aleksandru Nevskomu',"
Rossiyskaya gazeta, No. 56 (3433), 19 March 2004; in Integrum
Techno, http://www.integrum.com.
{Entered 4/5/2004 EMC} 8/5/2003: PLANS CALL FOR NAVY TO
RECEIVE FOUR MORE SSBNs BY 2010 According to a RIA Novosti report carried by Lenta.Ru on 5 August 2003, plans currently
under consideration by the
Ministry of Defense call for the Navy to receive four
additional strategic nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) armed
with new missile systems by 2010.
Deputy Defense
Minister and Armed Forces Chief of Armaments Aleksey Moskovskiy indicated
that three of these submarines would be new Project 955 Borey-class SSBNs similar to the Yuriy Dolgorukiy, while the fourth would
be a Project 941 Akula-class [NATO name 'Typhoon'] submarine that returned to service in
2002. (CNS believes that this probably refers to the Dmitriy
Donskoy SSBN returned to service in June 2002 after 12 years of awaiting
and undergoing repairs at the
Sevmash shipyard.) Colonel General Moskovskiy
stressed, however, that these plans would require approximately 10% of state
military procurement spending and therefore remain predicated upon availability of the
necessary funding. As a result, there is a possibility that delays might
postpone entry of the submarines into active service until mid-2011 or 2012.[1]
It is anticipated that all four SSBNs will be equipped with new
Bulava
sea-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). The Borey-class submarines, for
example, will carry 12 Bulava SLBMs.[1,2] The Bulava, which is a naval version of
the Topol-M [NATO designation SS-27 'Sickle'] missile, remains under development
at the Moscow Institute of
Thermal Technology. It will have a range of more than 8,300km (5,150 miles)
and will be armed with a multiple independently targeted re-entry vehicle (MIRV)
that will be able to carry 10 warheads.[2,3] In light of the comments offered by
Colonel General Moskovskiy, it is interesting to note statements made by
Commander-in-Chief
of the Navy Admiral Vladimir Kuroyedov that Russia does not intend to
build any expensive "giant submarines" (velikiye podvodniye korabli)
in the future. Kuroyedov stated the displacement of submarines that will
form the backbone of the fleet in the future will not exceed 12,000 metric tons.
(As a result, CNS believes that he
likely is ruling out the construction of additional Typhoon, Project 949 Granit-class [NATO name 'Oscar I'], and Project 949A Antey-class
[NATO name 'Oscar II'] submarines.) Kuroyedov furthermore postulated that the submarines inherited from the
days of the Soviet Union will be able to serve Russia for another 15-20 years.
The Navy Commander-in-Chief foresees that the future of the Navy lies in
mobility and its ability to defend Russia's national interests throughout the
world.[4] Sources:
[1] RIA Novosti; in "K 2010 godu Minoborony postroit chetyre novykh atomnykh podlodki," Lenta.Ru,
5 August 2003; in Integrum
Techno, http://www.integrum.com.
[2] Nikolai Novichkov, "Russian Navy set to revive submarines project,"
Jane's Defence Weekly online edition,
http://www.jdw.janes.com, 13 August 2003.
[3] Nikita Petrov, "Flot vooruzhat 'Bulavami'," Strana.Ru Web Site,
http://www.strana.ru/print/188492.html, 28 July 2003.
[4] Ekho Moskvy; in "Budushchiy rossiyskiy flot oboydetsya bez velikikh podvodnykh korabley," Lenta.Ru, 25 August 2003;
in Integrum
Techno, http://www.integrum.com.
{Entered 10/30/2003 EMC}
7/8/2003: NORTHERN AND PACIFIC FLEET
SUBMARINES TO HAVE PROFESSIONAL CREWS
Vice
Admiral Viktor Fedorov,
commander of Russia's Pacific Fleet, told Interfax on 8 July 2003 that
fleet submarines would have all-volunteer crews by 2004. However, the vice admiral
also stated that
problems with salaries and
affordable housing for the military in the Russian Far East would make it
difficult to achieve
this goal in 2004. While multipurpose nuclear submarines have been most
successful in transitioning to all-volunteer crews, ballistic missile and diesel
submarines have had less success in attracting professional sailors due to
harder work conditions. The vice admiral said that the future of the transfer to
volunteer crews will depend on a governmental decision. Fedorov also
stressed that it would be more effective to offer contracts to conscripts in
their last year of service rather than hiring civilians for the job.[1]
According to Northern Fleet Commander Vice Admiral Gennadiy Suchkov,
submarines crews will become the first professional units in the
Northern Fleet,
followed by crews of surface ships. The whole Northern Fleet
submarine force is scheduled to become professional by 2005.[2]
Sources: [1] Interfax - Agentstvo
voyennykh novostey, 8 July 2003; in "Pacific Fleet Submarines to Become
All-Volunteer in 2003-2004," FBIS Document CEP20030708000151.
[2] Interfax - Agentstvo voyennykh novostey, 7 July 2003; in "Northern Fleet
Submarines to Have Professional Crews by 2005," FBIS Document CEP20030707000091. {Entered
11/19/2003 TS}
3/1/2003: NAVY FACES FURTHER CUTS AS TULA IS MOTHBALLED Jane's Navy International reported on 1 March 2003 that Russia
intends to reduce its fleet of surface ships and submarines by an additional 20%. According to the
Commander-in-Chief
of the Navy, Admiral Vladimir Kuroyedov,the Navy plans to focus its limited resources upon preserving a core
operational force in a higher state of readiness. This will require
decommissioning a number of ships and submarines currently in reserve as
maintenance of these vessels is extremely costly. The severe shortage in
funding for the upkeep of the fleet -- less than 10% of the amount
required -- faced by the Navy since 1996 means that a significant portion of the ships and submarines placed
in reserve are in poor condition, are maintained by skeleton crews, and could
not feasibly be put to sea without extensive repairs or refits. Admiral Kuroyedov,
having concluded that funds for maintenance and construction of new ships are
"not simply insufficient, but few and far between," has begun considering on a
case-by-case basis the status of existing vessels in reserve.[1] His assessment
to date has resulted in a decision to mothball the Delfin-class [NATO name
'Delta-IV'] ballistic missile nuclear submarine
(SSBN) Tula, which currently rests in a slip at the
Zvezdochka Shipyard in Severodvinsk as it undergoes repairs and modernization.
Work on the Tula will continue until the funds foreseen for its
modernization in the 2002 budget -- 120 million rubles ($3.8 million as of 17
February 2003) -- are exhausted. At that
point the Tula will be mothballed at Zvezdochka for at least the next
five years. Kuroyedov linked the decision to suspend work on the Tula
with efforts to complete repairs on the Delfin-class SSBN Yekaterinburg,
which began overhauls in 1996.[2] The Yekaterinburg underwent post-refit sea trials in the White Sea after it was relaunched in
April
2002, and is scheduled to rejoin the Northern Fleet by the summer of 2003.[3]
Another two Delta-IV SSBNs, Bryansk and Novomoskovsk, currently
are docked at Zvezdochka, and are scheduled to undergo repairs that will allow
these ships to serve the Navy until 2010-2015.[4,5] The importance of the modernization
of the Delta IV fleet, which forms the mainstay of Russia's
strategic submarine deterrent force, is magnified further by delays in
introducing the fourth-generation Borey-class SSBNs.[3] A
failure of these efforts significantly would impair plans within the Russian
military to strengthen the emphasis placed on the naval leg of the nuclear
triad.[6] Sources:
[1] Richard Scott, "Russia to make more Navy cuts," Jane's Navy International
online edition, http://jni.janes.com, 1 March 2003.
[2] "Arkhangelskaya oblast. Na 'Zvezdochke' zakonservirovan remont raketnogo
podvodnogo kreysera 'Tula'," Regions.Ru, 17 February 2003;
in
Integrum
Techno, http://www.integrum.com. [3] Richard Scott, "Russian 'Delta IV' submarine back at sea
after refit," Jane's Navy International online edition,
http://jni.janes.com, 1 March
2003. [4] David C Isby, "Russia- Northern Fleet submarines overhauled," Jane's
Defence Upgrades,
http://jdu.janes.com, 16 February 2003.
[5] "Remontnyy konveyyer," Nezavisimoye voyennoye obozreniye, No. 2
(317), 24 January 2003;
in
Integrum
Techno, http://www.integrum.com.
[6] "Genshtab: prioritetom Rossii stanet razvitiye atomnogo flota," Gazeta.Ru,
http://www.gazeta.ru, 14
January 2003. {Entered 4/16/2003 EMC}
1/16/2003: YEKATERINBURG
NEARS RETURN TO SERVICE Interfax reported on 16 January
2003 that repairs to the ballistic missile nuclear submarine (SSBN)
Yekaterinburg have been completed.[1] Work on the Delfin-class
[NATO name 'Delta-IV'] SSBN, undertaken at the
Zvezdochka
shipyard in Severodvinsk over the past four years, also included efforts to
modernize the submarine through the installation of new chemical instrumentation
and improvements to its radio-electronic and weapons systems.[1,2] The
Yekaterinburg
successfully undertook the second stage
of sea trials in the White Sea in December 2002, despite several delays caused
by insufficient funding.[2,3,4,5] During a ceremony marking the end of the
repair work, the Commander of the
Yekaterinburg, Captain First Class Andrey
Pavlovskiy, who leads a crew whose average age is 25 years old, pronounced the
ship completely prepared to return to operational status.[1,2] Due to adverse
weather conditions, however, it is anticipated that the
Yekaterinburg will remain in Severodvinsk until at least June 2003 at which
point it will return to the Northern Fleet base at
Gadzhiyevo
(Murmansk
Oblast) for re-entry into service.[1] In the interim, the
Yekaterinburg
will undertake additional ice-breaking, diving, and firing
exercises.[4,6] Pavlovskiy also praised the
efforts of the personnel at Zvezdochka, who employed "creative" solutions--such as
repairing a number of items slated for replacement--to overcame shortages in
funding and complete the repairs according to schedule and below cost.[1,2,7] In
turn, Vladimir Pospelov, General Director of the
Russian Shipbuilding
Agency, indicated that the Yekaterinburg and its fellow Delfin-class
SSBNs will form the core of the Russian fleet for the next 20-30 years.[7] Sources:
[1] "V Severodvinske posle remonta podpisan akt priyema-sdachi APL
'Yekaterinburg'," Interfax, 16 January 2003.
[2] Yu. Onuchina and V. Frolov, Vesti Pomorya, 15 January 2003; in Informatsionnoye agentstvo Nord Media
Kompani, 17 January 2003; in
Integrum
Techno, http://www.integrum.com.
[3] Vladimir Anufriyev, "Atomnaya podvodnaya lodka 'Yekaterinburg' zavershila
vtoroy etap khodovykh ispytaniy v Belom more posle remonta v Severodvinske,"
ITAR-TASS, 30 December 2002; in
Integrum
Techno, http://www.integrum.com.
[4] "Arkhangelskaya oblast. Zavershilis ispytaniya atomokhoda Severnogo flota
'Yekaterinburg'," VolgaInform, 23 December 2002; in "Omytyy studenoy
volnoy," Informatsionnoye agentstvo Nord Media Kompani, 27 December 2002.
[5] "'Yekaterinburg' pod schastlivoy 'Zvezdochkoy'," Pravda.Ru, 11 December
2002; in "V Severodvinske pristupili k utilizatsii strategicheskoy atomnoy
podlodki K-385," Informatsionnoye agentstvo Nord Media Kompani, 27 December
2002.
[6] "APL 'Yekaterinburg' gotovitsya k vozvrashcheniyu v boevoy sostav Severnogo
flota," Interfax, 3 January 2003.
[7] "'Yekaterinburg' blagopoluchno otremontirovali," Pravda.Ru, 15
January 2003; in Informatsionnoye agentstvo Nord Media
Kompani, 17 January 2003; in
Integrum
Techno, http://www.integrum.com. {Entered
5/20/2003 EMC}
11/2/2002: NAVAL CONSTRUCTION PLAN
DISCUSSED On 2 November 2002,
Vremya MN reported that, according to Russian Navy Chief of Armaments Rear Admiral Gennadiy Perminov,
the Russian military plans to place greater emphasis on maintaining and
modernizing the SSBN force. This is to be accomplished in two phases. The first
phase, which will last through 2005, will concentrate on maintaining the
existing submarine force and the construction of the prototype
Yuriy Dolgorukiy SSBN, armed with
Bulava-30 SLBMs. During the second phase, which will last through 2010, the
Yuriy Dolgorukiy-class SSBNs are to enter series production and eventually
replace SSBN classes currently in service. However, these ambitious plans may
fail due to insufficient funding. The share of the Navy's financing in the
Russian defense budget has decreased to only 11-12%. As a result, the
construction of the Yuriy Dolgorukiy SSBN, which began in 1996 and was
supposed to be completed by 2002, will instead continue until at least 2007
unless the rate of funding is increased. Moreover, the Bulava-30, which is still
in the design phase, may not enter service before the end of the decade.[1]
Yuriy Dolgorukiy-class SSBNs will carry 20 solid-fueled Bulava-30 SLBMs each.[2] Sources:
[1] Sergey Putilov, "'Dolgorukomu' ne khvatayet na 'Bulavu'," Vremya MN,
2 November 2002, p. 4; in Integrum-Techno,
http://www.integrum.ru/.
[2] David C. Isby, "Russia to build more SSBNs," Jane's Missiles and Rockets
online edition,
http://jmr.janes.com/, 1 December 2002. {Entered 11/27/2002 MJ}
9/13/2002: NORTHERN FLEET
STRATEGIC SUBMARINE FLOTILLA DISBANDED On 13 September 2002, Agentstvo voyennykh novostey reported that the 3rd
Strategic Submarine Flotilla based in
Gadzhiyevo
(Murmansk Oblast) has been disbanded and transformed into the 12th Submarine
Squadron in accordance with a directive of the Naval Main Staff.[1] The new
squadron will retain the Project 667 Akula-class [NATO name 'Typhoon'] nuclear
submarines moored to the piers at the
Yagelnaya Naval Base
and the Project 667 BDRM Delfin-class [NATO name 'Delta-4'] ballistic missile
nuclear submarines (SSBNs) attached to the neighboring
Olenya Bay Naval Base.[1,2]
In addition to these military assets, the new 12th Submarine Squadron will
oversee approximately 20 reactor compartments from dismantled nuclear
submarines. These reactor compartments are currently afloat and are tied to
piers in
Sayda Bay.[2] This is the third reduction of combat formations in the
Northern Fleet since December 2001, and completes the Russian Navy reform plan
for the Northern Fleet. In August 2002, the 1st Multipurpose Nuclear Submarine Flotilla in
Zapadnaya Litsa was transformed into the 11th Submarine Squadron, while in
December 2001 the
40th Diesel Submarine Division in Yekaterininskaya Bay, Polyarnyy, was disbanded.[1,3]
Sources:
[1] Agentstvo voyennykh novostey, 13 September 2002; in
"Russia: Strategic submarine flotilla reduced in Northern Fleet," FBIS Document
CEP20020913000065.
[2] Vitaliy Bratkov, "Glavnaya yaderno-strategicheskaya flotiliya Rossii
'usokhla' do eskadry," Pravda.ru online edition,
http://www.pravda.ru; in Integrum
Techno,
http://www.integrum.com.
[3] Interfax; in Moryak severa, 29 October 2002; in Integrum
Techno,
http://www.integrum.com. {Entered 10/9/2002 EMC}
8/26/2002: NEED FOR NAVAL REFORM
DRAWS INCREASED ATTENTION During a visit
to the Pacific Fleet at the end of August 2002, President Putin reinforced the importance the government attaches
to reforming the Navy by proclaiming that "it is time to recognize the role of
the Navy in defending the country and cease treating it as a stepchild (pasynok)."[1,2]
He identified inadequate allocations from the military budget as
contributing to the serious problems faced by the Navy and
characterized the failure to build new ships as a result of government neglect.[2]
Minister of Industry, Science, and Technology Ilya Klebanov furthermore stated that "the problems of the
Navy [now] are the problems of the government and not only the Ministry of
Defense." This new approach represents a significant change from past military
reform programs, which in one case proposed limiting the role of the Navy to
guarding maritime borders. In contrast, the current reform plans call for the Navy to resurrect its status as an oceanic power, assume a
predominant role in nuclear deterrence in place of the
Strategic Rocket Forces,
and receive at least 20% of the overall military budget.[1] An increase in the current
11-12% of the military budget allocated to the Navy (compared to 23% in 1993
and 9.2% in 1998) would enable the Navy to devote more resources to the
completion, repair, and modernization of existing assets as well as begin to build new ships and
submarines. Admiral Kuroyedov estimates that continuation of the current level
of funding would result in a naval fleet of no more than 60 ships by 2015,
whereas reform plans envision a fleet of 12-15 strategic submarines, 50
multipurpose nuclear submarines, 35 diesel submarines, and approximately 70
surface ships. A fleet of this size is unlikely, however,
given that allocations for shipbuilding in 1999-2001 covered only 3-5% of
required yearly costs, in contrast to the allocation of 25% of costs per year sought by Admiral Kuroyedov.[2] Although renewed interest in naval reform produced an 80% increase in state defense orders for the Navy in 2002,
helped to revitalize dormant projects such as the
Severodvinsk nuclear
submarine and the fifth-generation nuclear-powered submarine
Yuriy Dolgorukiy, and led to the launch of the Dmitriy Donskoy SSBN after
repairs that stretched over 12 years,
limited funding and competing priorities within the defense establishment
suggest that it may be difficult for the Navy to overcome existing realities
and pursue the new goal of a revived Soviet Navy.[1,2]
Sources:
[1] Oleg Odnokolenko, "Posle 'Kurska': Strategicheskiy itog tragedii v
Barentsevom more: iz 'pasynka gosudarstva' rossiyskiy Voyenno-morskoy flot
prevrashchayetsya v glavnyy vid Vooruzhennykh sil," Itogi, No. 32, 13
August 2002; in Integrum
Techno,
http://www.integrum.com.
(10 October 2002)
[2] Sergey Sokut, "Trudnoye preodoleniye nostalgii,"
Nezavisimoye
voennoye obozreniye online edition, http://nvo.ng.ru/armament/2002-09-06/1_flot.html,
No. 31(301), 6 September 2002.(10 October 2002) {Entered 10/15/2002 EMC}
7/27/2002: BRYANSK DOCKS FOR
REPAIRS IN SEVERODVINSK WHILE LACK OF FUNDS DELAYS MODERNIZATION OF
TULA The Northern Fleet Project 667 Delfin-class [NATO name
'Delta-4'] ballistic missile nuclear submarine
(SSBN)
Bryansk
docked at the
Zvezdochka shipyard
in Severodvinsk on 27 July 2002 in order to undergo extensive repairs and
modernization.[1,2] The repairs will take several years and according to
preliminary estimates cost approximately
two billion rubles ($63.4 million as of 27 July 2002).[1,3] The
Bryansk, in service since August 1988,
is the third Delfin-class SSBN to undergo repairs at the shipyard, which
previously repaired the Verkhoturye and the
Yekaterinburg.[1,2] In
addition to the Bryansk, the
Delfin-class nuclear submarine Tula,
with the Northern Fleet since January 1987, currently rests in a slip at
the shipyard as it undergoes repairs and modernization. The work on the
Tula,
which began two years ago, has been troubled by insufficient financing. According
to Zvezdochka Director Nikolay Kalistratov, the shipyard
received only 120 million rubles ($3.80 million as of 19 August
2002) for the repairs on the
Tula in 2002. At this level of funding, it will take
10 years to modernize and repair the submarine.[4]
Sources:
[1] Vladimir Anufriyev, "Atomnaya podvodnaya lodka 'Bryansk' postavlena na
kapitalnyy remont na verfi 'Zvezdochka' v Severodvinske," ITAR-TASS, 15 August 2002; in Integrum
Techno,
http://www.integrum.com.
[2] Anatoliy Popov, "'Bryansk' oshvartovalsya u prichala
'Zvezdochki'," Pravda severa, No. 144, 3 August 2002; in Integrum
Techno,
http://www.integrum.com.
[3] "Sudoremontniki zhivut nadezhdoy," Interfax-Agentstvo
voennykh novostei; in Krasnaya zvezda, No. 161, 4 September 2002; in Integrum
Techno,
http://www.integrum.com.
[4] "Remont strategicheskoy submariny 'Tula' mozhet zatyanutsya na
desyatiletiye"; in Polit.Ru: Monitor, 19 August 2002; in Integrum
Techno,
http://www.integrum.com.
{Entered 10/17/2002 EMC}
6/26/2002: FUTURE OF AKULA (TYPHOON) SSBNs
DISCUSSED
On 26 June 2002, the
Sevmash shipyard returned the Dmitriy Donskoy,
a Project 941 Akula [NATO name 'Typhoon']
SSBN, which had spent 12 years at the shipyard undergoing repairs, to active
service. Defense Minister Sergey Ivanov, who
participated in the launching ceremony, said that the
Dmitriy Donskoy
will serve as a test-bed for a new SLBM type.[1] However, at the time of
relaunch, the Dmitriy Donskoy had no missile system installed, making
the submarine less than fully operational. The Bark SLBM originally intended for
the submarine was cancelled, and the Bulava SLBM
is not expected to start flight tests before 2005.[2] Admiral Gennadiy Suchkov,
commander of the Northern Fleet, told
reporters that, apart from the
Dmitriy Donskoy, only two other Akula-class
submarines are still operational. One Akula is in the process of
dismantlement, while two others have also been slated for elimination.[3]
Commenting on the Dmitriy Donskoy's relaunch, Ivanov said that no major
changes were in store for the nuclear submarine force. Ivanov noted that the
Ministry of Defense had strict financial limits, but promised that the Russian
government will pay all debts owed to shipbuilding plants by the end of 2002.[4] Sources:
[1] "Russia Nuclear Sub Launched After 12-Year Overhaul," BBC Monitoring, 26
June 2002; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, http://www.lexis-nexis.com/.
[2] Aleksandr Belkin, "Potemkinskiye eskadry," Grani.ru Web Site, http://www.grani.ru/kursk/articles/donskoi/,
24 July 2002.
[3] "Tri iz shesti strategicheskikh 'Akul' budut utilizirovany, zayavlyayet
komanduyushchiy Severnym flotom," Interfax, 4 July 2002.
[4] "Russian Defence Minister Says No Major Changes In Nuclear Submarine Fleet,"
BBC Monitoring, 26 June 2002; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, http://www.lexis-nexis.com.
{Entered 8/26/2002 MJ}
4/21/2002:
REPAIRS ON YEKATERINBURG NEARING COMPLETION
Interfax reported on 21 April 2002 that the Delfin-class [NATO name
'Delta-IV'] SSBN Yekaterinburg exited
the dry dock in preparation for mooring and running trials at the
Zvezdochka shipyards in Severodvinsk. The
Yekaterinburg is
undergoing required modernization and maintenance repairs to ensure its
operational fitness for the next ten to fifteen years.[1] However, the
quality of the refit may have suffered due to inadequate financing. Due to the
shortage of funds the Russian Navy has insisted on an abbreviated, and less
expensive, refit. Rather than replacing some of the ship's subsystems, as is
normally done at this stage of a submarine's lifetime cycle, the shipyard
limited itself to overhauling them. The Russian Navy has also been late
in paying the shipyard for its work.[2]
Sources:
[1] Interfax, 21
April 2002; in "Russia: Missile-carrying submarine put back in water at
Severodvinsk shipyards," FBIS Document CEP20020421000003.
[2] Vladimir
Kalinin, "'Gepard' kotu pod khvost," Grani.Ru Web Site,
www.grani.ru, 23 April 2002. {Entered 4/30/02 RG}
3/15/2002:
YURIY DOLGORUKIY NEARS COMPLETION
On 15 March 2002, Northern Fleet
Commander Gennadiy Suchkov said that the strategic nuclear-powered ballistic
missile submarine Yuriy Dolgorukiy will join the Northern Fleet
upon its completion at Severodvinsk, scheduled for 2002.[1] The submarine is nearing completion with
the aid of the city of Moscow, which has extended credit to assist in the
final construction.[2] The Yuriy Dolgorukiy is the first
of the Borey series, Russia's fifth generation of nuclear-powered submarines.
This class will be slower than the Typhoon
class, but the power of its missile armaments will be considerably greater.
The Borey series is also favored because of its low noise output, and it is
intended to be the mainstay of the Russian Navy in the 21st century. Naval
Commander-in-Chief Vladimir Kuroyedov claims that the Russian Navy requires
12-15 strategic nuclear submarines and 50 general purpose nuclear submarines.
There are currently four nuclear-powered submarines under
construction at Severodvinsk.[1,3]
[1]"Russian
Fifth-Generation Nuclear Submarine Nearing Completion," ITAR-TASS, 15 March
2002. [2]Mikhail Zubov, "Moskva
i Moskvichi. U khoroshego khozyaina i steni zarabativaut, uveren perviy
zamestitel mera v pravitelstve Moskvi Oleg Tolkachev," Trud, 27
February 2002; in "Universal Database of Central Newspapers,"
www.eastview.com. [3]"Severnoye
Mashinostroitelnoye Predpriyatiye," Regions.ru, 2 February 2002. {Entered on
6/18/2002 TM}
2/4/2002: ALLEGED CHECHEN PLAN TO STEAL NUCLEAR SUBMARINE DISCOVERED For detailed information on the discovery of documents which allegedly
detail Chechen plans to steal a nuclear
submarine in 1995-96, please see the
2/4/2002 entry in the
Pacific Fleet General
Developments file.
{Entered 10/4/2002 EMC}
1/30/2002: MOSCOW CITY GOVERNMENT ALLOCATES FUNDS
FOR COMPLETION OF YURIY DOLGORUKIY According to Trud, Sevmash Plant in Severdovinsk, which has been struggling since 1996 to complete the construction
of the first Borey-class Yuriy Dolgorukiy SSBN, will receive additional
funding from the Moscow city government, which assumed sponsorship over the
project. The exact amount of assistance was not specified. Furthermore, after
President Putin signed a decree that transfering
modernization priority from the SRF to the Navy, the plant expects even more resources to be allocated
by the government for the completion of the submarine.
[Sergey Turchenko, "Yuriy Dolgorukiy High
and Dry. Will We Get 'Our' Ballistic Missile Nuclear Submarine on the Belokamennaya?" Trud, 30 January 2002; in "Construction Update
on Nuclear Submarine Dolgorukiy in Dry Dock at Sevmash," FBIS Document
CEP20020130000306.] {Entered 2/27/02 IA}
6/19/2001: SINEVA TO ARM DELTA IV-CLASS According to a 28 June 2001 Izvestiya
article, in addition to pursuing the development of the Bulava SLBM, which
is to arm the new Borey-class [NATO name 'Delta IV'] SSBNs and replace R-39 [NATO designation
SS-N-20 'Sturgeon'] SLBMs on the
remaining Akula ['Typhoon']-class SSBNs, Russia also plans to deploy a new
variant of the R-29RM [NATO designation SS-N-23 'Skiff'], called the Sineva. The new variant carries
10 warheads and is being developed at the
Makeyev State Missile Center in Miass, which proposed this missile as an alternative to the Bulava and the
failed Bark. The Izvestiya article also stated that while the Bulava's
characteristics are still unknown, it is to be a single-warhead missile,
despite the fact that MIRVed SLBMs are not prohibited by any existing arms
control treaty. [Yevgeniy Krutikov, "Provodit li Rossiya taynyye
ispytaniya yadernogo oruzhiya," Izvestiya, 19 June 2001, p. 1;
in WPS Oborona i Bezopasnost, 20 June 2001; in Integrum Techno,
http://www.integrum.ru.]
{Entered 8/28/2001 MJ}
3/16/2001: GOVERNMENT ORDER FOR 40 SLBMS
EXPECTED, TYPHOONS TO REMAIN IN SERVICE Describing Deputy Prime Minister Ilya Klebanov's visit
on 16 March 2001 to Chelyabinsk Oblast and the Makeyev
Design Bureau in Miass, Kommersant reported that a government
order for 40 SLBMs was imminent, with a
contract value of more than $50 million.[1] The SLBMs to be produced
are probably R-29RM [NATO
designation SS-N-23 'Skiff'] missiles, which are used on Project 667 BDRM
Delfin class [NATO name 'Delta-IV'] SSBNs, although one report suggests they might
be the improved Sineva variant, with 10 warheads and modernized
navigational systems and computers.[2] The
Makeyev Design Bureau's reported production capacity would allow completion of
the order within a year.[1] The missile orders coincided with a
Russian Navy announcement on 23 March 2001 of its intention to overhaul and
retain in service three Project 941 Akula-class SSBNs [NATO name 'Typhoon'], and
modernize
Delfins. One Akula was reportedly undergoing repairs and
another one was being modified to carry the Bulava SLBM.[3]
Sources: [1] German Galkin & Dmitriy Zobkov,
"Vice Premier Klebanov Saving Missile Makers. Minister Adamov
Escaping From 'Greens'," Kommersant, 17 March 2001; in "Kommersant
Views Klebanov Chelyabinsk Tour, Order for 40 ICBM's Likely 'Soon',"
FBIS document CEP20010319000186. [2] Yuriy Golotyuk, "Tri 'golovy'
khorosho, a desyat - luchshe," Vremya novostey, 16 March 2001, p.
3; in Oborona i bezopasnost, 19 March 2001; in Integrum Techno, http://www.integrum.ru.
[3] "Raketnyy flot," Nezavisimoye
voyennoye obozreniye, No. 10, 23 March 2001, p. 6. {Entered 4/30/01 RG}
3/2-15/2001: RUSSIAN NAVY EXPECTS TO RECEIVE YURIY DOLGORUKIY
BY 2005 Admiral Viktor Kravchenko, Chief of the Russian Navy
General Staff, announced in March 2001 that the navy expects to receive
the first Borey-class Yuriy Dolgorukiy SSBNin 2005,
and that its construction is on
schedule. Development of the new Bulava
SLBM, which is to arm the new SSBN, was also reported on schedule. For more information on the Yuriy
Dolgorukiy, see the 10/25/97, 11/2/96,
and 10/17/96 entries in this section.
["Pyatoye pokoleniye," Nezavisimoye
voyennoye obozreniye, No. 8, 2-15 March 2001, p. 6.] {Entered 6/6/2001 RG}
2/11/2001: RUSSIA AND UKRAINE SIGN MEMORANDUM
OF COOPERATION TO ELIMINATE RUSSIAN SS-24 and SS-N-20 BALLISTIC MISSILES On 11 February 2001, Ukrainian
and Russian officials signed a Memorandum of Cooperation at a
Russian-Ukrainian summit meeting in Dnipropetrovsk addressing the dismantlement of solid-propellant RS-22 [NATO designation SS-24
'Scalpel'] and RSM-52 [NATO designation SS-N-20 'Sturgeon'] missiles.
For more information, see the 2/11/2001
entry in the Ukraine:
Missile/Silo Dismantlement file. {Entered 3/27/2001 RG}
6/16/2000: 21 INJURED IN SLBM OXIDIZER LEAK Twenty-one military and civilian personnel suffered
injuries as a result of an oxidizer leak from an RSM-50 "Volna" [NATO designation
SS-N-18 "Stingray"] SLBM being offloaded from a transport vessel.
For additional information see the 6/16/2000
entry in the Shkotovo
peninsula section of the database.
{Entered 6/21/00 MJ}
4/19/2000: BULAVA
SLBM TO ARM RUSSIAN SSBNS Speaking to journalists following the State Duma's
ratification of the START II treaty, Russian Defense Minister Marshal Igor
Sergeyev stated that the naval leg of the Russian nuclear triad will rely
on the new Bulava SLBM.[1] Chief of the Russian General Staff Army General
Anatoliy Kvashnin confirmed the selection of the Bulava while speaking to journalists
shortly after the Federation Council's ratification of the START II treaty.[2]
The Bulava, often referred to as Bulava-30, is to be a "compact-sized" solid-fuelled
ballistic missile.[3] It is being developed by the Moscow
Institute of Thermal Technology (MITT) which is also responsible for
the Topol-M ICBM [NATO designation SS-27], in cooperation with Makeyev
Design Bureau.[4] The Bulava will replace the RSM-52V Variant-3
or Bark [NATO designation SS-NX-28] which was to have been deployed on
the Borey-class SSBN Yuriy Dolgorukiyunder
construction in Severodvinsk since 1996 as well as on Akula-class
[NATO designation 'Typhoon'] SSBNs. The Bark is a thoroughly modified version
of the RSM-52 SLBM [NATO designation SS-N-20 'Sturgeon'] arming the Akulas,
has a range in excess of 10,000km and carries 10 warheads.[5] However,
the
Bark suffered a failure in a November 1997 test launch. The Russian
Security Council, influenced by MITT proposals to design a ballistic missile
capable of land and sea launch, decided in July 1998 to stop the work on
the Bark, to scrap all but one of the Akulas, and to redesign the Yuriy
Dolgorukiy to accept the Bulava.[4,5] The Bulava may also be intended
for retrofitting Delfin-class [NATO designation 'Delta IV'] SSBNs, according
to announcements made by Armed Forces Chief of Armaments Colonel General
Anatoliy Sitnov.[3] However, the Bulava is not expected to become operational
before the end of the decade, which may be the reason for the order issued
in September 1999 by the then-Prime Minister Vladimir Putin to restart
production of the RSM-54 SLBM [NATO designation SS-N-23 'Skiff'] which currently
arms Delfins.[4] The new RSM-54s may be the new Sineva variant with 10
warheads and Bark subcomponents and would ensure that Delfins have an operational
missile after 2007, the date often cited as the expiration date for currently
deployed Russian ICBMs and SLBMs.[3,5] It remains unclear whether
work on the Bark will resume. On 4 January 2000 Chief of the Northern Fleet's
Testing Complex at Nenoksa Rear Admiral Vladimir Makeyev stated that the
Bark will be tested on Akula-class SSBNs and will arm the Yuriy Dolgorukiy
by
2005.[7] However, to date there have been no indications that work on Bark
has resumed. (For more detailed background information see Nikolai Sokov's paper
on Russian Strategic Modernization.)
Sources: [1] Pavel Koryashkin, ITAR-TASS, 14
April 2000; in "START Ratification Said To Meet Russian Security Interests,"
FBIS Document CEP20000414000129. [2] RIA Novosti, 19 April 2000; in
"New Nuclear Missiles To Ensure 'Strategic Parity'," FBIS Document CEP20000419000114. [3] Alexander Konovalov, RIA Novosti,
28 September 1999; in "Russian Official on Life of Strategic Nuclear Forces,"
FBIS Document FTS19990928001137. [4] Dmitriy Litovkin, "'Tayfuny' derzhat
kurs na utilizatsiyu," Yadernaya bezopasnost, No. 31, December 1999,
p.5-6 [5] Dmitriy Litovkin, "'Sineva' podnimetsa
nad morem," Nezavisimoye voyennoye obozreniye, 12-18 May 2000, p.
1, 6; in WPS Voyennaya Ekonomika i Konversiya, No. 56, 17 May 2000. [6] Valeriy Aleksin, "Vozrozhdeniye
morskogo raketostroyeniya," Nezavisimoye voyennoye obozreniye on-line
edition,
http://nvo.ng.ru/forces/1999-12-24/3_renessainse.html,
24 December 2000. [7] Interfax, 4 January 2000; in "Russian
Admiral Vaunts Naval Missile Systems," FBIS Document FTS20000104000595.{Entered
7/14/00 MJ}
10/6/98: MASLYUKOV LINKS STRATEGIC NUCLEAR MODERNIZATION WITH
START II First Deputy Prime Minister Yuriy Maslyukov told a 6 October 1998 press
conference that "the government of Russia and the Federal Assembly should
jointly agree on a program of re-arming the Strategic Nuclear Forces, by
guaranteeing its financing." Maslyukov noted that modernization was
imperative, because the "existing strategic nuclear forces are aging and
suffer physical wear and tear and in seven to eight years time, the country
will have not a single missile, not a single submarine, not a single bomber
left that was built in Soviet times." To compensate for this mass
obsolescence of the existing nuclear forces, Maslyukov said that it is
neccessary to ensure, starting with 2000, the annual commissioning of 35-40
Topol-M missiles and, toward the end of the next decade, to guarantee the
building of at least several Yuriy Dolgorukiy-type [Borey-class]
submarines.[1] Maslyukov said, "along with rearmament of Russia's
strategic nuclear forces, it is necessary to seek in a diplomatic way a
limitation and reduction of the nuclear potential of the United States."
According to him, START II ratification is an important part of such a
diplomatic approach. He added, however, that rapid opening of START
III negotiations and continued US adherence to the 1972 ABM Treaty would
also be necessary to guarantee the preservation of "mutual nuclear
deterrence." Maslyukov warned that "the world will not understand"
if Russia now rejects START II, and said that doing so would hamper efforts
to prevent further nuclear proliferation in the wake of the May 1998 nuclear
tests in India and Pakistan.[2] (For more information please see
the section on START II Ratification
Developments.)
Sources: [1] Dmitriy Znamenskiy, RIA-Novosti, 7 October 1998; in "Russia's
Maslyukov on Financing Nuclear Arms, START II," FBIS-TAC-98-280. [2] Yelena Kornysheva, ITAR-TASS, 6 October 1998; in "Further
on Russia's Nuclear Rearmament," FBIS-SOV-98-279. {entered 11/30/98 SS} 7/7/98: RUSSIAN SSBN LAUNCHES
SATELLITE "Tubsat-N," a ten kilogram satellite designed to
receive and transmit oceanographic and animal migration data, was placed
into orbit on 7 July 1998 by an RSM-54 (NATO name SS-N-23) SLBM launched
from the Novomoskovsk, a Delfin (Delta IV) class SSBN.[1,2] A cooperative
effort of the Northern Fleet and the Makeyev
Design Bureau to demonstrate the commercial potential of space launches
from SSBNs, the launch took place at 0315 GMT in the Barents sea a few
km north of Murmansk and inserted the satellite into an elliptical orbit
400 to 770 km above the earth's surface. Tubsat-N was designed and
built by Berlin Technical University in collaboration with the Makeyev
Bureau, which plans to launch a second "microsputnik" in 1998.[3]
Sources: [1] Pavel Buzayev and Sergey Golotyuk,
"Iz-pod vody--v kosmos," Russkiy Telegraf, 3 July 1998. [2] Robin Lodge, "Russian Submarine
Launches Satellite," The Times (London), 8 July 1998, p. 10. [3] Yevgeniy Tkachenko, ITAR-TASS,
15 December 1997, in "Russian State Missiles Center Celebrates Anniversary,"
FBIS-SOV-97-349.{Entered 7/24/98 FW} 5/5/98: RUSSIA COMPLAINS ABOUT INCIDENT DURING
SLBM DESTRUCTION The Russian Foreign Ministry has filed an official
protest with the US Embassy in Moscow over an incident which ocurred in
the Barents Sea during the December 1997 destruction of 20 RSM-52/R-39
SLBMs (see entry below). The
Russian complaint alleges that a US Los Angeles class attack submarine
closely shadowed the Russian Typhoon class submarine which was launching
the missiles that were to be destroyed, presumably to gather data about
the launch. Seven US observers were already monitoring the launch from
a nearby Russian ship. The protest charges that the US submarine created
a hazardous situation by coming within four miles of the Russian submarine.
Russian naval vessels signaled the US submarine to leave the immediate
area, but they were ignored. A Russian helicopter then dropped and exploded
depth charges in the area around the US submarine, after which it retreated.
The US Navy has refused comment on the incident, but anonymous US officials
have refuted the Russian allegations, telling The Washington Post
that the submarine involved in the incident did not belong to the United
States. Russian officials insist that they are sure the submarine in question
was a US vessel. Russian naval officers had earlier complained about
the actions of US submarines during a similar destruction operation in
March 1997 (see entry below).
["Moscow Files Complaint With U.S.
Over Sub Incident," Washington Post, 5 May 1998, p. A16.]{entered
5/5/98 sdp}
12/18/97: RUSSIAN NAVY SAYS DESTROYED SLBMS NO
THREAT TO ENVIRONMENT The Military Prosecutor's Office of the Northern
Fleet told RIA-Novosti on 18 December 1997 that the destruction earlier
that month of 20 RSM-52/R-39 SLBMs (NATO designation SS-N-20) by launching
did not pose any danger to the environment. In a carefully-worded statement,
the prosecutor's office said that an expert commission had reached the
conclusion that "the elimination of solid-fuel missiles with the expired
lifetime by means of blasting in the air, presents no direct danger to
humans, fauna, and sea." The RIA-Novosti report also refuted claims by
some Russian media (see below), that the missiles that had been destroyed
were liquid-fuelled.
[RIA-Novosti, 18 December 1997; in
"Rusian Fleet Confirms Destroyed Missiles Not Dangerous," FBIS-UMA-97-352.]{entered
2/13/98 sdp}
12/4/97:
ANOTHER 20 SLBMS DESTROYED BY LOW-ALTITUDE EXPLOSION Repeating the operation carried out in March 1997
(see entry below), 20 RSM-52/R-39 solid-fuel
SLBMs (NATO designation SS-N-20) were destroyed over the course of three
days by intentionally exploding them shortly after launch from a Typhoon
class SSBN. The destruction operation, carried out in the Barents
Sea, was monitored by seven US observers who watched from a nearby research
vessel. As a result of this operation and the identical one carried
out earlier, Russia has now destroyed 40 of the 120 SS-N-20 missiles it
had previously deployed on six Typhoon class submarines, leaving
two of those submarines without SLBMs.
[ITAR-TASS, 4 December 1997; in "Russia's
Northern Fleet Destroys Ballistic Missiles," FBIS-UMA-97-338.]{entered
2/13/98 sdp}
12/3/97: ENVIRONMENTAL WORRIES OVER DESTROYING
SLBMS BY LAUNCHING An article in the newspaper Kommersant-daily
on 3 December 1997 questioned the environmental soundness of destroying
SLBMs by launching them over the Barents Sea and exploding them at low
altitude. The article claimed that the Russian navy was planning to destroy
RSM-40/R-29 liquid-fuel SLBMs (NATO designation SS-N-8) deployed on Delta
I and Delta II class submarines by this method, which it said
would result in wide-spread contamination of the surrounding sea with tons
of highly toxic heptyl and nitrogen tetraoxide. The paper said that
the Russian Defense Ministry had decided to destroy the missiles by launching
because other alternatives were too costly. Test-launching the missiles
at targets in Kamchatka, as is usually done in readiness exercises, was
not considered an acceptable alternative, the paper alleged, because Defense
Ministry officials feared the aging missiles would fail to reach their
designated targets, thus vividly demonstrating the decay of the Russian
military. The article failed to mention that the 20 SLBMs destroyed by
this method in March 1997, were solid-fuel
SS-N-20s, not liquid-fuel missiles. However, the Norwegian-based environmental
group Bellona
contends that destroying solid-fuel missiles by this method also releases
large quantities of toxic chemicals which pose an environmental hazard.[2]
Sources: [1]Andrey Bagrov, "It Will Go Off Soon:
North Is in for Ecological Disaster," Kommersant-daily, 3 December
1997; in "Pollution Threat Seen From Barrents Missile Destruction Plan,"
FBIS-TAC-97-339.] [2] Thomas Nilsen and Igor Kudrik,
"20 SS-N-20 Missiles to Be Destroyed in December," 4 December 1997, at
http://www.bellona.no/e/russia/nfl/index.htm.
{entered 2/13/98 sdp}
10/25/97: FINANCIAL
PROBLEMS HAMPER CONSTRUCTION OF YURIY DOLGORUKIY In a 25 October 1997 interview with Komsomolskaya
pravda, Boris Linshits, press spokesman for the Northern Machine Building
Plant in Severodvinsk, complained that the Defense Ministry was not allocating
sufficient funds to the plant for the construction of the new Borey
class SSBN, Yuriy Dolgorukiy, which is under construction there.
The keel for the new submarine was laid amid much pomp nearly a year earlier,
on 2 November 1996. Linshits told the paper that "for us, Yuriy Dolgorukiy
is
the number one order. But its financing, of course, leaves much to
be desired." Linshits said that the exact amount of funding that the yard
had received for work on the new SSBN is classified. However, he admitted
that it "has not received" the 500 billion rubles (about $83 million) which
was estimated as necessary to keep construction on schedule. Linshits
added that the Defense Ministry currently owes the shipyard debts totalling
1.9 trillion rubles (about $317 million).[1] Some Western observers believe
that the Yuriy Dolgorukiy is still only about 1% complete, indicating
that unless much more significant funding is forthcoming, its delivery
to the fleet will be delayed far beyond its officially scheduled commissioning
date of 2001.[2]
Sources: [1] Igor Yelkov, "When Will We Get
the New Submarine? We May Never See the Launch of the Yuriy Dolgorukiy
Promised
by the Two Statesmen," Komsomolskaya pravda, 25 October 1997, p.
2; in "Linshits on Delays in Yuriy Dolgorukiy Construction," FBIS-SOV-97-309. [2] Igor Kudrik, "No Progress on the
Uriy
Dokogruky," 31 October 1997, Bellona web site, http://www.bellona.no/e/russia/nfl/index.htm.
{entered 2/13/98 sdp}
6/25/97: RUSSIAN SSBN FORCE WILL PROBABLY FALL
WELL BELOW START II LIMITS Owing to insufficient financing, the Russian Navy
will almost certainly be unable to deploy sufficient SSSBNs to reach the
1750-warhead ceiling on deployed SLBMs allowed under the terms of
the still-unratified START II arms control agreement. Financial problems
are preventing the navy from carrying out necessary maintenance and repairs
on existing submarines, reducing their useful service lives, while the
same problems are preventing constuction of new submarines from moving
forward. Already Russia is removing some of its newer submarines,
the Typhoons, (commissioned from 1981-1989) from service due to
maintenance problems, and its other modern submarines, the Delta IV
and Delta III classes, are of similar or older vintage. Western
observers believe all these SSBNs are unlikely to remain servicable much
beyond 2000, especially at current maintenance levels. If the present
level of financing for the SSBN fleet is not upgraded, it is possible that
the sea-borne leg of the Russian strategic triad will all but disappear
in the first years of the 21st century.
[Igor Kudrik, "Pointless Hampering
of START II Agreement," 25 June 1997, at
http://www.bellona.no/e/russia/nfl/index.htm] {entered
2/13/98 sdp}
3/28/97: 20 SLBMS
DESTROYED AFTER LAUNCHING BY MEANS OF LOW-ALTITUDE EXPLOSION Over the course of two days, 20 RSM-52/R-39 solid-fuel
SLBMs (NATO designation SS-N-20) were destroyed by intentionally exploding
them shortly after launch from a Typhoon class SSBN in the Barents
Sea. The missiles were exploded at an altitude of 3,000 meters, after which
the burning pieces fell into the sea. As a Typhoon class SSBN carries
20 RSM-52 missiles, the destruction procedure eliminated the entire complement
of missiles carried by the submarine. Russian scientists on board
the ASW ship Admiral Levchenko, who monitored the air and water
in the area, told ITAR-TASS that this method of destroying SLBMs had been
under development for several years, and said it was the most effective,
economical, and ecologically clean procedure for their elimination. Russian
Vice-Admiral Mikhail Motsak, who was in command of the operation, summarized
its results as "more than good," arguing that destroying the SLBMs by exploding
them after launch was "10 times cheaper than the creation of a special
facility and the delivery of the missiles to their place of elimination."
He added that it provided realistic training for the submarine crew as
well.[1] Russian TV reported that a Norwegian "spy" ship and three US Navy
submarines shadowed the operation, adding that their presence near the
restricted operational area annoyed the Russian Navy.[2] A report on the
operation in the official Defense Ministry newspaper Krasnaya zvezda
said the operation was carried out "within the framework of the START I
treaty," but noted that destruction by launching "is the least expensive
way of liquidating strategic weapons which have exceeded their service
lives." US observers also were invited to monitor the destruction procedure
from a nearby hospital ship, although this is not required under START
I.[3] Since Russia can choose which SLBMs to scrap under the terms
of START I, the phrasing used by Krasnaya zvezda suggests that the
RSM-52/R-39 missiles are being destroyed because of their age. Although
the RSM-52/R-39 missiles and the Typhoon class SSBNs on which they
are deployed are among the newer systems in the Russian navy's strategic
arsenal, the first of the Typhoon class was commissioned in 1981,
and it may be that the solid-fuel in the RSM-52/R-39 missiles is considered
reliable for only about 15 years. If this inference is correct, it
suggests that Russia may be planning to dismantle some or all of the six
Typhoon
class
SSBNs in its arsenal, since even after the RSM-52/R-39 missiles aboard
a Typhoon class submarine are destroyed, the SSBN launchers still
count against START I and START II ceilings until the submarine itself
is dismantled. Recent reports that two Typhoon class SSBNs
have been removed from service also support this interpretation. On the
other hand, the Russian Navy might be planning to retrofit the Typhoon
class
submarines with the new RSM-52V SLBM, which is currently under development.
(See the entry in the SLBM Test Launches
and SSBN Exercises file.)
Sources: [1] ITAR-TASS, 29 March 1997; in
"20 Ballistic Missiles Destroyed in Barrents Sea," FBIS-UMA-97-088. [2] Russian TV, 13 April
1997; in "Fleet Brushes with U.S. Subs During ICBM Launches," FBIS-UMA-97-114. [3] Dmitriy Litovkin, "Raketnyye
puski v...util," Krasnaya zvezda, 1 April 1997, p. 1.{entered 2/12/98
sdp}
2/19/97: TWO TYPHOON SSBNS REPORTEDLY REMOVED
FROM SERVICE According to a 19 February 1997 report by the Norwegian
environmental group Bellona, which closely monitors the activity of the
Russian Northern Fleet, the two oldest of the six Typhoon class
SSBNs have been removed from service because insufficient funds have made
proper maintenance and upgrades impossible. The report said that the Typhoon
design
has always been subject to a large number of technical problems, because
the class was rushed into service during the 1980s without adequate testing,
so that the Soviet leadership could demonstrate that it had new SSBNs that
were equivalent to the then-new US Trident-class SSBNs. According to the
report, which cited an article in the November 1996 issue of Morskoy
sbornik, the journal of the Russian Navy, only two of the six Typhoons
in the Russian fleet, all of which are based at Zapadnaya Litsa (Murmansk
Oblast), are currently operational. The others are either undergoing
repair, being modernized, or just moored in port. It is believed by many
Western analysts that the Russian Navy planned to keep the Typhoons
in service until early in the next century, when the new Borey class
SSBNs would begin entering the fleet. The premature withdrawal from
service of some (or perhaps eventually all) of the six Typhoons
may significantly reduce the sea-borne leg of the Russian strategic nuclear
forces, at a time when the terms of the START II treaty will also constrain
the land-based leg as well.
[Igor Kudrik, "Two Typhoon Subs Taken
Out of Service," 19 February 1997, at http://www.bellona.no/e/russia/nfl/index.htm]{entered
2/13/98 sdp}
11/2/96: VIPS ATTEND
YURIY
DOLGORUKIY KEEL-LAYING Chief of Staff of the Yeltsin Administration Anatoliy
Chubays, along with Mayor of Moscow Yuriy Luzhkov and First Deputy Defense
Minister Andrey Kokoshin, participated in the ceremonial keel-laying of
the new nuclear-powered submarine named for the founder of Moscow, Yuriy
Dolgorukiy, in Severodvinsk, on 2 November 1996.[1] Workers at
the Sevmash facility have not received wages for four months,[2] but the
Russian Government has allocated funding to the Ministry of Defense for
the construction of the Yuriy Dolgorukiy.[1] In addition,
Mayor Luzhkov pledged support to the defense activities in Severodvinsk.[2]
According to a telegram from Russian President Boris Yeltsin to the shipbuilders
at Sevmash, Russia has not built a strategic nuclear missile submarine
in approximately ten years.[3] Chubays noted that the Yuriy Dolgorukiy
is only the first in a new series of submarines and represents not only
the future of Russia's nuclear fleet, but also Russia's nuclear deterrent
for the next century.[1]
Sources: [1] L. Varebrus, "Luzhkov, Chubays
Presence at Nuclear Submarine Ceremony Noted," Russian Television Network,
2 November 1996; in FBIS-SOV-96-217. [2] "Chubays, Luzhkov Attend Keel-Laying
of Nuclear Submarine," Russian Public Television Network, 2 November 1996;
in FBIS-SOV-96-214. [3] "Building of New Strategic Nuclear
Submarine Class Begins," Interfax, 3 November 1996; in FBIS-SOV-96-214.
{Entered JET 5/19/98} 10/17/96: GROMOV ANNOUNCES NEW SSBN, YURIY
DOLGORUKIY Commander in Chief of the Russian Navy Admiral Feliks
Gromov noted plans to begin construction of the new SSBN Yuriy Dolgorukiy
at the Sevmash
shipbuilding facility in Severodvinsk in mid-October 1996.[1] The new vessel
is the first Borey-class SSBN. Construction is expected to be complete
by 2002 or 2003, after which date Sevmash expects the production rate to
be one per year. The Borey class is reportedly larger than the Delta
class
but smaller than the Typhoon class.[2] A new SLBM is being developed
for the boat. Sergey Kovalev of the Rubin
Central Design Bureau for Marine Engineering in Saint Petersburg led
the development of the vessel's design. Chief Designer of the vessel
is Vladimir Zdornov. Approximately 500 billion rubles has been budgeted
in 1997 for construction of the Yuriy Dolgorukiy, with the project
reportedly receiving top funding priority. The total cost of the submarine
is estimated at several trillion rubles.[2]
Sources: [1]"Russian Navy to Get New Strategic
Submarine," Jamestown Foundation Monitor, 18 October 1996. [2] Viktor Litovkin, "Atomnaya podvodnaya
lodka, na kotoruyu stupyat Luzhkov i Chubays, vsplyvet v XXI veke," Izvestiya,
25 October 1996, pp. 1-2.{Entered JL 11/15/96; revised 1/9/97} {Updated
JET 5/19/98} 10/23/96: SLBM DESTRUCTION BY LAUNCHING TESTED As part of a program to test techniques for destroying SLBMs to be reduced
under the START I treaty, a Typhoon SSBN launched an SLBM which was then
blown up after reaching an altitude of approximately 3,500 meters. The
launch was intended to test the feasibility of disposing of excess SLBMs
by destroying them after launch. ITAR-TASS reported that preliminary reports
indicated the process was as "ecologically clean as had been expected."
[Vladimir Gundarov, "Flot umenshilya na odnu raketu,"
KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 10/14/96, p. 1; ITAR-TASS, 10/24/96, in "Foreign Ministry:
Military Observing Deadlines in START-I," FBIS-SOV-96-208.] {Entered 1/17/97}
6/1/96:NORTHERN FLEET "PRIMARY" MEANS OF DETERRENCE Northern Fleet Commander Admiral Oleg Yerofeyev stated that Russia's primary
means of deterrence is its SSBN force. In an interview with a correspondent
for the Northern Fleet's newspaper, Na strazhe zapolyarya, Yerofeyev
said that although the numbers of submarines had decreased, the existing
weapons in service enabled the fleet to efficiently carry out its tasks.
Consequently, permanent SSBN combat patrols near the shores of other countries
had become unnecessary. First Deputy Commander in Chief of the Russian
Navy, Admiral Igor Kasatonov, agreed that the Northern Fleet continued
to remain "the pride and reliable shield" of Russian naval power. However,
Kasatonov regretted the overall reduction in Russian navy's forces and
assets, claiming that it undermined the combat potential of operational
groupings of strategic, ASW, and strike forces, reported Nezavisimoye
voyennoye obozreniye. According to Kasatonov, the six years of "perestroyka"
(1986-1991) and the following five years of "radical reforms" (1992-1996)
together resulted in nearly 50 percent reduction of the fleet in active
service and more than a 60 percent reduction in naval aviation forces.
The manning level of ship crews dropped to 65-70 percent, and from 22 to
75 percent of the flotillas, squadrons, naval bases, divisions and brigades
were disbanded.
Sources: [1] V. Gundarov, "The Navy as a Sign of Russia's Prestige,"
NA STRAZHE ZAPOLYARYA, 06/01/96, pp.1-2; in FORMER SOVIET UNION FIFTEEN
NATIONS: POLICY & SECURITY, 06/96, p. 30 [2] "Admiral Igor Kasatonov, "Taking an Ax to the Navy: The
Many Years of Efforts for the Builders of the Country's Fighting Fleet
May Go Down the Drain," NEZAVISIMOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE, Supplement to
NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA, No. 10, 05/30/96, p. 5. [3] "Kasatonov on Past Capabilities, Current Plight of Russian
Navy," FBIS-UMA-96-138-S, 05/30/96. {Entered 8/14/96 KD}
6/1/96:NORTHERN FLEET CAN MAINTAIN ONLY TWO SUBS ON ACTIVE DUTY According to an article in the Northern Fleet's newspaper, the fleet can
only afford to keep one or two nuclear submarines on combat duty. The repair
services at the fleet's disposal amount to only 6 percent of its needs.
Out of 240 ships that need repairs, only 16-17 can be serviced, and repairs
take up to 12 months .
[V. Gundarov, "The Navy as a Sign of Russia's Prestige,"
NA STRAZHE ZAPOLYARYA (newspaper of the Northern Fleet), 6/01/96, pp.1-2;
in FORMER SOVIET UNION FIFTEEN NATIONS: POLICY & SECURITY, 06/96, p.
30.]{Entered 8/13/96 KD}
2/17/96: NORTHERN FLEET FUNDING TO DROP FURTHER According to Nikolai Kalistratov, director of the Zvezdochka shipyard,
government financing of the nuclear fleet has been reduced by a factor
of six since 1990. In 1996, it is expected to decrease by nine times and
will constitute 10 percent of the required budget. Such drastic cuts will
inevitably lead to maintenance problems with strategic nuclear submarines
whose average age will be 17 years in the year 2000. The Typhoon system
will suffer the most as it carries 1,200 warheads out of the total 2,500
deployed on SSBNs.
["Restoration Of Ships Is Becoming Increasingly Difficult,"
KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 2/17/96, p. 5.]
2/1/96:FUTURE EFFECTS OF PRESENT FUNDING TRENDS FOR NAVY Given the current level of government financing for the Russian Navy, by
the year 2000 Russia will have between seven and ten ballistic missile
submarines (each of which can carry approximately 16 ballistic missiles),
between 15 and 20 nuclear attack submarines, between ten and twelve diesel-powered
submarines, between 112 and 160 ballistic missile launchers, one aircraft
carrier, two or three missile cruisers, seven to ten torpedo-boat destroyers
and the same number of frigates, and 30 to 40 missile boats.
["Russia On Land," KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA, 2/1/96, p. 2.]
6/6/95: YELTSIN EDICT PROVIDES FOR REPAIRS ON
SSBNS President Yeltsin signed an edict "On Immediate Measures
to Maintain Strategic Readiness of Naval Strategic Forces." Among the measures
is a provision for repair work on the Delta-4 and Typhoon SSBNs.
["Clinching Teeth And Cursing The Authority,"
Pravda,
27 December 1995, p. 1.]
4/25/95:RUSSIA STOPS MANUFACTURE OF SLBMS It was reported that Russia has stopped manufacturing long-range, nuclear-tipped
SLBMs and removed all tactical nuclear weapons from aircraft, navy ships,
and "multi-purpose" submarines. A Russian official stated that Russia no
longer produces nuclear-armed artillery shells, mines, and tactical missiles.
["National Report On The Implementation By The Russian
Federation Of The Treaty On The Non-Proliferation Of Nuclear Weapons,"
1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties on the Non-Proliferation
of Nuclear Weapons, New York, New York, 4/25/95, NPT/CONF.1995/25, pp.
3-4.]
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