Russia: Nuclear Weapons: Tactical: 1997 Stockpile Estimates

Russia: 1997 Substrategic (Tactical) Nuclear Weapon Stockpile

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According to a study issued by the Institute for International Economy and International Relations (IMEMO) in 1997, the Soviet Union had approximately 22,000 tactical nuclear warheads in 1991. By 1996, Russia still retained 3,800 nuclear mines, 600 warheads for air-defense missiles, 1,000 gravity bombs, an unidentified number of short-range air-to-surface missiles, and 2,000 sea-launched anti-ship, anti-submarine, and sea-launched surface-to-surface missiles. All of these weapons are stored in Air Force, Navy, and Air Defense Forces storage facilities or at central storage facilities operated by the Twelfth Main Directorate of the Ministry of Defense. The study states that all tactical nuclear weapons currently in Russia’s arsenal must be eliminated by 2003 (see table below) due to the expiration of their service life.

TABLE 1:  IMEMO Study Estimate

Total in 1991  Warheads subject to elimination  
under  1991 unilateral initiatives 
Total number of warheads  
to be eliminated by 1997 
Total number of warheads  
to be eliminated by 2003 
Ground Forces  4,000  4,000  4,000  4,000 
Artillery  2,000  2,000  2,000  2,000 
Engineering Forces  700  700  500  700 
Air Defense  3,000  1,500  2,400  3,000 
Air Force front avaition  7,000  3,500  6,000  7,000 
Navy general purpose (surface ships, submarines)  3,000  1,000  1,000  3,000 
Naval aviation  2,000  1,000  2,000  2,000 
TOTAL  21,700  13,700  17,900  21,700 
Yadernye vooruzheniya i bezopasnost Rossii, ed. by Alexei Arbatov, (Moscow: IMEMO, 1997).

A 1996 estimate by Robert Norris and William Arkin of the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) puts the number of nonstrategic nuclear warheads deployed by Russia at 4,300 and the number of launchers (missiles and bombers) at 1766, with the number of antisubmarine weapons unknown.

TABLE 2: 1996 NRDC Estimate

Category/Type
Weapon System 
Launchers 
Warheads
Air Defense 

Subtotal 

SAMs: SA-5B Gammon, SA-10 Grumble 
1,100 
1,100 

1,100 

Land-based nonstrategic Bombers and Fighters 
Land-based Subtotal 
Backfire (80), Blinder (42), Badger (24), Fencer (280) (AS-4 ASM, AS-16 SRAM, bombs) 
426 
  

1,600 
 

1,600 

Naval nonstrategic 
Attack aircraft 
 

SLCMs 

ASW 

Naval Subtotal 

Backfire (135), Blinder (30), Badger (50), Bear G (25), (AS-4 ASM, bomb) 

SS-N-9, SS-N-12, SS-N-19, SS-N-21, SS-N-22 

SS-N-15, SS-N-16, torpedoes, depth bombs 

 
240 
-- 
 
 
n/a 
600 

500 
 

500 

~ 1,600 

Total Nonstrategic 
1766 
4,300 
(Robert S. Norris and William Arkin, "Estimated Russian Stockpile, September 1996," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, September/October 1996, pp. 62-63).

The estimate appears to contradict the unilateral obligations undertaken by Mikhail Gorbachev in October 1991 and confirmed by President Boris Yeltsin in January 1992. According to these initiatives all nuclear warheads should have been removed from sea- and land-based systems, as well as from air-defense systems. Some delivery systems, such as the Bear G, are included in the nonstrategic count, even though they are classed as strategic under the terms of the START treaties. This may tend to increase the estimated stockpile. Recent Russian estimates place the total number of deployed tactical nuclear weapons at approximately 3,000, although the total stockpile may be significantly larger.[1} The estimate for land-based air-deliverable systems is consistent with an estimate published in a study of arms control conducted by the Institute for International Economics and International Relations (IMEMO) which suggests that the Russian Air Force (VVS) deploys 1,750-2,000 tactical nuclear weapons.[2]
Sources:
[1] NIS Nuclear Profiles discussions with Russian officials. April 1997.
[2] V. Dvorkin, G. Tsetkov, "Vozmozhnoye dal'neysheye sokrashcheniye arsenalov SNV: usloviya i printsipy," in Aleksey Arbatov, ed., Rossiya: v poiskakh strategii bezopasnosti, (Moscow: Nauka, 1996), p. 42.

Page last updated 1 March 1999
For major recent developments, see the General Nuclear Weapons Developments file.

Comments or questions? E-mail Nikolai Sokov:  nsokovATmiis.edu.

CNSThis material is produced independently for NTI by the Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies and does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been independently verified by NTI or its directors, officers, employees, agents. Copyright © 2003 by MIIS.

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